Autumn 1979
Volume 24 no 4 (109)
£3.75 7.25$

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

79-21380

POLAND FROM INSIDE

Part I

Emergence of the Opposition

Currents and Activities of the Opposition

Official Reactions and Repressions

Censorship

Church and State

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London NW10 0DD (Tel. 01-450 8080)

Subscription Rates

UK £12 or US $27. Elsewhere £15. Single issues £3.75 or US $7.25.
Special arrangements for airmail.

Manuscripts

Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should
typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house style of *Survey*.

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ISSN 0039–619

Survey is published under the auspices of the London School of Economics
Political Science by

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Produced in cooperation with Freedom House (New York)

Autumn 1979
Volume 24
no 4 (109)

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Poland from Inside: Part I

Preface 1

Emergence of the Opposition

Introduction ... ... *Leszek Kolakowski* 3
The Polish Opposition ... ... *Joseph Kay* 7
The Limits of Political Realism ... ... *Andrzej Szczypiorski* 21
Experience of Democratic Opposition ... *Andrzej Drawicz* 33
Contemporary Political Opposition in Poland *Tadeusz Szafar* 40

Currents and Activities of the Opposition

The Uncensored Press ... ... *Lidia Ciolkosz* 56
The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" 68
Polish League for Independence (PPN) 80
Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) 84
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 87
Students' Defence Committees (SKS) 90
Workers' Actions 93
Farmers' and Peasants' Groups 103
Society for Academic Courses (The Flying University) 114

Official Reactions and Repressions

The Security Police and the Opposition 127
Chronicle of Reprisals 141
The Trial of Kazimierz Switon ... *Anka Kowalska* 154
The Case of Chojecki and Grzesiak 162

Censorship

The Language of Propaganda 166
Polish Censorship Exposed 173
The Katyn Affair ... ... *Stanislaw Swianiewicz* 188
Guidelines for Censors and Propagandists 199

Church and State

The Polish Pope and the Polish Catholic Church *Anna Kaminska* 204
Believers' Complaints 223
Pope John Paul II in Poland 230
Lay Catholic Organizations in Poland ... *Antoni Pospieszalski* 237

Notes on Contributors and Authors 246

Index 249

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Preface

THE 60th anniversary of the creation of the Republic of Poland came in 1978. The state formed in the aftermath of the First World War marked restored sovereignty for a nation which had lost its independence at the end of the eighteenth century and which for more than a hundred years had been partitioned between Austria, Prussia and Russia.

In 1939 the sovereignty of the nation was again lost when Germany (and soon after the Soviet Union) invaded Poland, thereby provoking the Second World War. A Polish government in exile was rapidly formed, initially based in Paris, then after the fall of France in London. Under General Sikorski, Polish troops fought alongside the French and the British. Within Nazi-occupied Poland, a formidable resistance movement developed, organized in the so-called "Home Army," which took its orders from the government in exile.

In 1943 Stalin severed diplomatic relations with the London-based Sikorski government over its insistence that an investigation be made into the Katyn graves. As the Soviet army pushed the German troops back through eastern Poland, Stalin was able to promote the pro-communist Polish Workers' Party, formed in 1942, Wladyslaw Gomulka being one of its leaders. In 1944 the "Lublin Government" was recognized by the USSR as the official Polish government. The failure of the Soviet army to advance to the assistance of the Home Army during the Warsaw uprising in August 1944 marked the defeat of anti-communist forces within Poland. At the Teheran (December 1943) and Yalta (February 1945) conferences, Churchill and Roosevelt accepted that Poland should become part of the Soviet sphere of influence and later on agreed that post-war arrangements should be based on the Lublin government. But they still insisted that members of the government in exile should be represented. Sikorski's successor, Mikolajczyk, was allowed to return to Poland, but after the elections of 1947 he was obliged to flee the country.

In 1948 a forced merger of the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Workers' Party resulted in the formation of the Polish United Workers' Party and it is this party which still holds power in the Polish People's Republic. Today, however, the scene in Poland is very different from what the PUWP believed the outcome of its policies would be.

The successive communist administrations of Bierut, Gomulka and Gierek have proved unable to make themselves acceptable to the people, as the workers' riots and the general unrest in Poznan and Warsaw in 1956, in Gdynia and Gdansk in 1970, in Radom in 1976, and in Lublin in 1980 have clearly indicated.

In many respects Poland is a unique case among communist countries. It has been fairly accessible to foreign journalists and its internal

developments have often been reported in the Western press. If we have decided to devote two special issues of Survey (*Nos. 109 and 110*) *to Poland it is for three reasons:*

1. In the recent period it has not received a comprehensive in-depth analysis in the West.

2. The unofficial writings of the opposition are practically unknown in the West although they are more extensive and sophisticated than other samizdat *publications. They certainly contain material for a better understanding of the nature of relations between the totalitarian state and society. They convey a wealth of analytical detail based on an experience of totalitarianism at first hand which is lacking in even the most well-informed Western commentaries.*

3. The activities of the Polish opposition may have universal significance in providing a new lesson in the struggle against totalitarianism.

These struggles have of course their ups and downs. Recently, particularly since the Eighth Party Congress (February 1980), repressions against the democratic movement have increased. Yet they are still limited and the opposition remains unbowed.

All documentary material and most of the individual contributions to these two special issues of Survey *come from Poland. Some of them have appeared in* samizdat *publications, others were specially written for* Survey, *some have the name of the author, others only his pen-name.*

L. L.

Introduction

Leszek Kolakowski

NOBODY can predict what might be happening in Poland by the time this issue of *Survey* is printed. Many of the people (by no means all) involved in the democratic opposition movement fear that, given the accumulation of social tensions of various kinds, the never-ending and apparently deepening economic difficulties and the utter loss of the government's credibility, an accident, a trifle in itself, could easily trigger off an uncontrollable surge of strikes and popular riots similar to, yet on a larger scale than, those of 1970 and 1976. In such a case, if the local forces of repression prove inadequate, Soviet invasion is the likely disastrous outcome. Other observers fear, on the other hand, that the rulers of the Soviet bloc, having reached the conclusion that they have nothing to lose in terms of their reputation in the West and nothing to gain from attempts to improve it, will order a thorough purge and as a result the Polish party and police will try to destroy the democratic movement by hard repressive measures. To be effective, such repressions could not now be limited to gaoling a dozen or so activists; they would have to be carried out on a relatively massive scale considering the actual size of the movement. This is technically possible, no doubt, probably even easy, for the enormously inflated police apparatus; yet again the political effect of such a move is difficult to predict. And international developments could encourage one or another course of events.

It is quite possible, though, that neither of these two gloomy scenarios will materialize after all. Leaving aside the unpredictable impact of world events, some internal aspects of the Polish situation allow for a less pessimistic assessment. Since the end of the war and the *de facto* loss of Poland's sovereignty the entire population has been well trained in the constant and acute awareness of Soviet imperialism; fraternal tanks were very close to Warsaw when they occupied Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; and Poland is the only country with these tokens of proletarian internationalism on all sides of her frontiers. Needless to say, the direct Soviet occupation of Poland, inevitably involving cruel massacres, is a thing nobody wants and on this point the rulers, the Church and the opposition are in agreement. In fact party leaders repeatedly make exaggerated hints of such a threat in order to terrify people and to convince them that any disobedience and any protest will immediately bring Soviet troops on to the streets of Polish cities (so far, they are confined to barracks and cut off from all contact with the Polish population).

On the other hand the physical destruction of the organized bodies of opposition would not only not solve the country's predicament in any way but would add much to its trouble. And if it is feasible to smash

30 or so uncensored (and thus "illegal") journals and to gaol a few thousand active people, it is not possible with internal repressive instruments to destroy the most powerful crystallizing force of social consciousness to resist the Sovietization process and the most powerful source of moral authority, *viz.* the Catholic Church.

The democratic movement of which the last phase dates from the end of 1975 is perfectly aware of the danger. They argue that the actual menace of Soviet invasion lies in the rulers' total inability to gain any sort of credibility or even to listen to the real grievances and desires of society. There are no established channels or institutional means whereby people could express, let alone satisfy, their claims. This is, of course, the normal pattern of communist despotism. Yet this is why attempts to rebuild, against the formidable machinery of oppression, autonomous forms of organization independent of (the intentionally, though inefficiently, totalitarian) power, far from favouring uncontrollable outbursts of popular anger, provide people with both more effective and less dangerous instruments of social pressure.

IT was natural that while it was widening, the opposition movement should be divided and differentiated. On the one hand some specific groups with specific grievances formed separate bodies: peasants protesting against fiscal burdens imposed on them; workers trying to organize non-state-owned unions (a particularly difficult task, as on this point the authorities, not surprisingly, are exceptionally sensitive and the repressions are perhaps more ruthless than in other cases); writers and intellectuals mimeographing their uncensored journals; scholars setting up the "Flying University"; laymen of the Church organizing defence committees to resist police and administrative chicaneries. On the other hand, some political dividing lines have reappeared in altered forms; one might venture the suggestion that among political groups (they are not parties, though) some are closer to the social democratic, others to the nationalist, traditions; however, communist dissenting groups, such as Trotskyites, Maoists or leftists, are conspicuously absent, and for good reason. The dividing lines are less obvious in the content of ideological statements—after all, basic values concerning Poland's independence and the restoration of representative institutions are shared by all of them—but can be seen to a certain extent in the vocabulary of political documents, in the distribution of emphasis, in the stress laid upon various historical traditions and, last but not least, in the tactics employed. And it is clear that, whatever the differentiating political criteria may be, there is no recognizable sense in which they could be defined by "left-right" labels. If to loathe Soviet imperialism and to dream of Poland's national self-determination is to be "rightist," then almost all Poles are rightists; if to want independent workers' unions is to be "leftist," then the overwhelming majority is "left." So be it.

Independence and democracy being both fundamental and remote

goals, beyond the reach of direct tactical means, the anti-totalitarian opposition movement is trying to operate within the existing political framework; few people would deny, after all, that the communist system, oppressive though it necessarily is, can be, depending on various circumstances, somewhat more or somewhat less oppressive and the unbearable pressure of Sovietization somewhat more or somewhat less heavy and that these variations, familiar after 35 years of experience, are not a matter of indifference. Whatever can be done within this framework to enhance the hope for a sovereign democratic Poland, to combat communist mendacity, to resist and to denounce aloud the repressions and the lawlessness, is not lost in terms of the fight for fundamental goals. In Poland and in all countries forcibly driven into the cage of the New World, the Sovietization process does not mean that people actually start believing in the absurdities of the state doctrine (this hopeless task has largely been given up); it means that people accept the oppressive *status quo* as an inescapable reality and resign themselves to their fate of being helpless and passive subjects of the police regime. The mental enslavement of the population is achieved not when people, or a substantial part of them, give credence to official ideology, but when they are plunged into hopelessness. To oppose this process is one of the crucial functions of the opposition.

The word " opposition " is admittedly awkward, as it might suggest what the movement is not: organized bodies trying to take political power. Yet the word " dissidents " frequently used in the Western press is even more misleading: it suggests that the distinctive mark of those people is that they dissent from the officially binding ideological beliefs; but in this sense there are hardly any non-dissidents in Poland, considering the total collapse of those beliefs both in the society as a whole and in the party.

THE ideological collapse of communism in Poland and all over the Soviet-dominated parts of Europe inevitably changed patterns of resistance. Marxist revisionism has virtually disappeared as a viable alternative (although its fading remnants can still be found in East Germany, Hungary or Czechoslovakia) and nobody any longer expects that new ideologically motivated forces might emerge within the party apparatus. To be sure, whenever serious social and economic tensions arise—and they are almost uninterruptedly with us—various cliques vying for power spring up among party functionaries; in recent years, however, they have hardly ever tried to produce anything remotely resembling an alternative political programme. It is not totally impossible that some party groups, faced with the appalling economic situation, will make attempts to come out with reform proposals. Yet it is universally admitted, even among the moderate critics, that no serious economic improvement is likely without political changes granting society at least a substantial number of genuine self-governing rights and thus going far beyond what has ever been conceivable in the

communist world; no saviour from within the party can be expected to appear and delude society with vague promises of justice and order and be given credence. On the other hand radical political changes are unlikely within the post-Yalta international agreements which are still valid and give the Soviets practically unrestricted freedom of action within their empire. Naturally enough, the feeling of having been sold out by the West breeds in Eastern Europe widespread frustration and hopelessness—the most reliable allies of Soviet expansionism.

The situation is perhaps less bleak, though, than such a one-sided description suggests. There are signs announcing serious cracks in the Holy Alliance of 1945. The standard way in which Western politicians used to explain away their appeasement policy—" nothing can change in the Soviet bloc unless it starts from Moscow "—becomes less, and not more, credible. In fact there is nothing in the history of empires to prove that their disintegration process cannot be given impulses from peripheries—and this is what is happening right now. It is in the interests both of the West and of East European nations to speed up this process by peaceful means: peaceful, yet strategically clear. This implies encouraging the diversity and variety, both economic and political, within the Soviet area of domination and contributing in any way possible to the struggle against communist mendacity, the most powerful weapon of Sovietism.

The Polish Opposition

Joseph Kay

IF by "the Polish opposition" we meant simply opposition to state authority, then it could safely be said that all Poles are in opposition and have been for two hundred years. A more narrow definition, however, the organized attempt to change political leadership and policies, discloses three major forms of opposition since the war. First, obviously, is the struggle for power, the competition for office and influence at the top, which performs the task of opposition in a liberal democracy in replacing one administration by another. However undemocratic in actual conduct, this is the usual means by which political succession takes place in communist countries.[1] A second form, revisionism, was the effort, made after Stalin died, to revive the party, the economy and Marxism from within. Its supposition was that no irreconcilable division existed between society and the party apparatus, which was expected, under pressure of the arguments from reformers, to hand down concessions of substance as an act of magnanimity or self-criticism "from above."[2] The events of 1968—a Polish pogrom and the invasion of Czechoslovakia—put paid to this expectation. Short of outright revolution or some external collapse as imagined in Amalrik's 1984, this would leave one channel only for political pressure: non-party opposition. This novel feature of Polish politics in the 1970s rests on the assumption that only by society's own efforts can reforms be wrested from the authorities. In place of revolution, it promises evolution,[3] whose maximum objective would be the attainment of "socialism with a human face."[4]

The origins of this opposition lie in the complex economic crisis of the mid-1970s which removed the main source of Gierek's popular legitimacy, the achievement and sustaining of high economic growth. In contrast to the stagnant 1960s, when real incomes rose annually by 1 or 2 per cent, the early 1970s were a period of unprecedented advancement in which pay rises of 10 per cent per annum were enjoyed by ordinary people and the best-placed groups (miners, shipbuilders, functionaries, police and military) did even better. For the first time, the general population began to believe in profiting from the communist system. By 1975, however, strains had started to appear. A meat crisis in March, with strikes in Lodz and Radom, and protests at the proposed constitutional changes in December, were ominous

[1] Leonard Schapiro (ed.) *Political Opposition in One-Party States* (London, 1972), p. 5.

[2] Marc Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism* (London, 1978), pp. 130—34.

[3] Adam Michnik, "The New Evolutionism," *Survey* No. 100–101, Summer/Autumn 1976.

[4] Marek Turbacz, "Opportunities for Oppositional Activity in Poland," *Aneks* 16/17, 1977.

signals for the Gierek leadership. By June 1976 the government was greatly in foreign debt, at the end of an import-led investment boom with little in the way of consumer output to show for it, and no longer able to afford the staggering 12 per cent of GDP being spent on food subsidies, a legacy of the previous political crisis in 1970–71. As one critic commented, Gierek had been pursuing "simultaneous and increasingly hectic love affairs with the Polish housewives, and Western bankers." [5] He would have to drop one partner and it was unlikely to be the bankers. The party put basic prices up by 40 per cent and, following mass protests, down again the next day.

The events of June 1976 revealed the lack of trust between the Polish United Workers' Party and the social stratum that it claimed to represent. When demonstrations got under way, the workers knew where to protest. In Radom they took over the party headquarters, running down the red flag. At the Ursus tractor factory they blocked the international railway track, imprisoning the express from Paris for several hours. In Plock the army was incited to defect. At these places, and many others, there were massive subsequent repressions. Yet crucial differences marked off the government's handling of the crisis from that of 1970. The use of force was limited: mass arrests and torture took the place of massacre. These measures led not to the acquiescence of society but to new forms of resistance and to further repression.

A GROUP of intellectuals who had previously protested against changes in the Constitution denounced the treatment of workers and proposed the reform of workers' representation in a letter to the Seym. A further 14, in September, formed a Committee to Defend Workers' Rights (KOR) which pressed for an independent inquiry into the aftermath of the June events and offered medical, financial and legal help to persecuted workers.[6] The latter was extraordinarily effective. All workers sentenced for their part in the events—some for up to 10 years in prison—had been released by the end of July 1977, and reinstated, though often to inferior positions and work. The Committee, despite the temporary arrest of 10 members, thus succeeded in its initial objective. Yet rather than falling redundant, as the authorities had perhaps hoped, it changed its function to the defence of all society (KSS), with the label "KOR" retained for nostalgic reasons.

Now 34 strong, it ranges in age from students of the recent period, brought into politics in 1966–68, to Edward Lipinski, a professor of economics (emeritus) and socialist since 1906. The great majority have outstanding records of resistance to one or other forms of authoritarian repression. Five are veterans of the Russian war of 1920; 13

[5] Peter Green, "Third Round in Poland," *New Left Review* Feb./Apr. 1977, p. 98.
[6] Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954–1977* (London, 1978), pp. 246–7, 252–5, ff.

took part in underground resistance to Nazi occupation; many others were victims of the show trials in the Stalin and post-Stalin eras.[7] Despite the efforts of official sources to present KOR as an isolated band of renegades and traitors, these people have set new standards of public behaviour. Consistently they have tried to break down the barriers between social classes.

Perhaps surprisingly to Western critics who dub the Polish opposition "Marxist," KOR subscribes to no all-embracing ideology. On the one hand, this means rejection of Marxism as propounded by the political authorities as an ineffectual catechism unrelated to socialist reality. On the other, it involves rejection of Western theories as having little relevance to the new societies of Eastern Europe. No recent texts have circulated on this topic since Leszek Kolakowski's widely known three-volume work *Main Currents of Marxism*, but interesting collaboration occurred between Hungarian writers (notably the two who call themselves Rakovski) and members of the KOR journal *Krytyka*. In their mutual critiques of state socialism, in its Polish and "Kadarist" variants, there is the shared assumption that social pressure, not socio-philosophical cogitation, is more likely to influence the authorities.[8]

Determined to break through the division between workers and intellectuals, the latter engaged, initially, in a fact-finding exercise. Since 1976, the opposition has published a thick factual bi-monthly *Biuletyn Informacyjny* modelled on the Russian *Chronicle of Current Events*. Assembled by four Warsaw intellectuals, whose names and addresses appear on it, this collates material about police searches, confiscations, charges, sentences and brutalities from all over the country. Thus, issue No. 5 (December 1976) covered the autumn trials that followed the June events at Ursus, in Plock, Poznan, Lodz and Radom, describing the harsh sentences handed down, the flimsy evidence, judicial irregularities and the harassment of correspondents. They then sought more permanent means of mutual cooperation. At first, the signs were not good. Workers looked askance at the project of "free trade unions," pointing out that they had unions already, and that there seemed little purpose in supplementing one set of dummies with another.[9] Social links between workers outside the factory proved tenuous, making solidarity with the repressed difficult, and external organization almost impossible. It looked as though the existing pattern, workers' acquiescence punctuated by sudden outbursts of suppressed fury, would repeat itself. This, indeed, may happen. But one channel of continuing communication with workers, and between them, has been established. A newspaper, *Robotnik* (Worker), edited by KOR members from materials sent in by worker-correspondents,

[7] Jacek Kuron, "An Open Letter," *Bratniak* (Gdansk) No. 16, Spring 1979.
[8] "From Marxism to Opposition," *Krytyka* (Warsaw) No. 5, Winter 1980.
[9] Interview with J. Litynski, *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, Jan. 1980, p. 12.

has appeared with one break since September 1977. From modest, semi-legible beginnings, the paper has risen to an issue, in off-set, of 40,000. It reaches workers in all major industries: Silesian miners, Cracow steel-makers, shipbuilders on the Baltic coast, textile and light-industrial employees in Central Poland. At one stage distribution was done openly at the gates of factories and shipyards; normally news sheets are carried into work places for covert distribution. The existence of such a publication, which reaches 100,000–200,000 workers, has no precedent in communist Eastern Europe.

The first articles dealt with basic issues: "Why is there no meat?" (Nos. 2–3); prices and inflation; infringements of the labour code. These were followed by broader topics, such as discussion of equality (12), relations with the Soviet Union (13), and free trade unions (15). A series on anniversaries culminated with an issue on Czechoslovakia: 1968–78 (No. 20).[10] Polish workers' struggles were reported alongside those of miners in Rumania and the unemployed in the Soviet Union. They were put in the broader context of the open political struggle in Poland. At the same time, a pattern of local politics appeared, with *Robotnik* correspondents—B. Borusewicz in Gdansk, M. Sulecki in Silesia and E. Zadrozynski in Grudziadz (near Torun)—emerging as spokesmen for local issues.

Thus, *Robotnik* printed a strong protest from citizens of Grudziadz, who listed the consumer shortages in their town. They enumerated absence of children's clothing, domestic utensils and asked why so many goods "are available only in foreign currency shops." They pointed out "we receive our wages and pensions in zlotys and demand all goods be available in our currency." Turning to social policies, they added that the promised school and sports stadium for the town (which has 50,000 inhabitants) lay abandoned. Transport and housing were inadequate.[11] The petition had almost 1,000 signatures, collected by Zadrozynski. There was no direct reply to this appeal from the Polish Seym though Zadrozynski was sent to Torun gaol.

While persecution of *Robotnik*'s correspondents has been considerable, there has also been an observable process of workers learning how to avoid repression. Strikes gain mass support only when they show every sign of being successful. The word strike is often avoided: workers prefer to call their actions *awarie* (breakdowns), *przestoje* (bottle-necks), *przerwy w pracy* (breaks in work) or simply *zebrania* (meetings). Employees are aware that strike action will bring down on them the full force of factory managers, state administrators, party and trade union officials, and possibly judges and militiamen.[12] Yet it occurs regularly.

A common pattern is the occupation of a plant or factory until

[10] A commemorative poster was distributed in 1,000 copies.
[11] *Robotnik* (Warsaw) No. 32, 30 Apr. 1979.
[12] Jozef Sreniowski, "In Praise of Strikes," *Glos* (Warsaw) Jan./Feb. 1979.

certain requirements—meat in town, restoration of old norms—are met. These actions are often successful. Yet such protests are almost invariably defensive responses to measures that the authorities have already taken. Much less frequent is the canvassing of new demands. Workers are not necessarily less interested in political freedoms than, say, scientific researchers, but are simply more pragmatic than intellectuals in assessing present possibilities. Such freedoms do not head a manual workers' agenda, but, once the authorities are on the run, "economistic" demands from workers quickly escalate into the political domain.

To this end *Robotnik* has published an action programme. This specifies immediate demands: wages should be inflation-linked and raised above an independently-assessed social minimum; a 40-hour week, with an end to week-end working for miners; job safety, in which inspectors have real powers and factory medical facilities are independent of management; open and equal sharing of material privileges "to liquidate privileged groups, e.g. the militia and party apparatus"; and guaranteeing of the right to strike.[13] The editors did not imagine that printing this would at once improve the situation. Rather they hoped that formulating a more general programme would lead to gradual betterment of conditions, focus the latent working-class discontent and so ward off the next working-class explosion. The demands take the form of a Charter of Workers' Rights [see Part I, p. 94] with signatures from 22 cities. The Charter tries to convince workers that it is possible to influence the authorities by other means than periodic uprisings. Yet such means of constant pressure remain embryonic.

ALTHOUGH contact between intellectuals and peasants is a Polish tradition, any effort to give such contacts political expression must overcome the basic attitude of peasant individualism. Polish peasants have their own political traditions. A smallholder, Witos, was Prime Minister in the 1920s. There were peasant political parties, federated in 1931, and a surge of political involvement thereafter, culminating in the peasants' strike of 1937. During the war, peasants had their own battalions. Peasant cultural activities also included a youth organization (*Wici*), publishing enterprises, a press, and people's universities. All this occurred in opposition to the state. Indeed the latter was regarded—long before the post-war authorities closed all independent peasant organs down—as a repressive and alien institution.

During the post-war period contacts with the state swung from the pole of bitter hostility during the period of partial collectivization (1948–55) back towards the pole of regulated, if unfavourable, market relations. Both sets of policies, corresponding in Russian terms roughly to the Stalinist and Bukharinite (NEP) solutions, were based through-

[13] *Robotnik* (Warsaw) No. 35, Special Number, 18 July 1979.

out on mutual misgivings. To the state authorities, the peasantry were the most backward element in their ideological and industrial programmes. To the peasant, the authorities were a perpetual source of intervention, both actual and potential. This led to peasant attitudes of recalcitrance, expressed through civil disobedience, rather than to peasant challenges to the state in alliance with some other classes.

Hence, in the summer of 1978, when a new pension scheme was introduced for peasants, which required premiums to be paid at once for benefits to be received in 1980, some 400,000 peasants withheld contributions. They organized token strikes against the policy, withholding milk deliveries to the state, and promised more action if the authorities persisted in forcible attempts to collect the premiums. Simultaneously, other issues began to be raised concerning social facilities offered by the state. Inadequacies of infrastructure were criticized, especially of roads, schools and public transport. Peasants criticized the wastage of fallow land that had been, nominally, taken over by the state. As usual they reported chronic shortages of supply. At the heart of these grievances lay an awareness of inequalities between town and countryside. Peasants noted that, unlike urban dwellers, they have to build their own communal facilities, at their own expense. This reminded them less of "social action," as it is called, than of *szarwarki*, unpaid service to the landlord in the old days.

To give these issues public expression, peasants started to form self-defence committees on KOR lines. Begun in the poorer, central and eastern voivodships, Lublin and Rzeszow, this spread to the semi-urban, Grojec region. Resolutions were passed at open meetings, with peasants' names and districts appended to them, and sharp statements issued against the inevitable harassment of their spokesmen, who are commonly held in preventive detention for the duration of meetings.

Peasant protests are a severe problem for the authorities. Outright repression, which would only cause counter-violence, was wisely excluded: there has been no return to Stalinist methods. On the other hand, market relations continue to be in peasants' disfavour. Compulsory quotas on the delivery of slaughtered animals, cereals and potatoes had been lifted (in 1972), without sufficient monetary incentives to the peasant to increase production. If we take only one index, meat production—a key issue in Polish politics—then output rose by only 34 per cent in the period 1970–77, while nominal wages rose by 120 per cent, four times as quickly. Moreover, the required shift away from meat consumption, as incomes rose, did not occur, leaving only the possibilities of change in meat prices, or (as in 1977, following the crisis) massive imports.[14]

Nor, necessarily, does the opposition have an answer to this explosive problem, being generally rather weak on economic theory. They do, however, realize that the peasantry needs a series of confidence-

[14] Waldemar Kuczynski, *Po wielkim skoku* (Warsaw, 1979).

building measures, to reassure them of the good intentions of their major buyer, the state. This amounts, on the one hand, to restoring at least some of the previously abolished independent peasant institutions, and, on the other, to the careful fostering of their relations with other classes. The opposition clearly sees the solution as institutional, not fiscal.

Any effort at organizing the peasants, whether from outside or amongst peasants themselves, must challenge cultural traditions in addition to that of antagonism to the state. Here education is essential, as peasants themselves recognized when they reopened the Peasant Universities in February 1979. The first lectures considered: peasant culture and national culture; peasant history including the activities of the Polish Peasants' Party; questions of human rights and the experience of KOR. An amalgamation of peasant self-defence committees, a provisional committee of a farmers' trade union and an association of believers contributed to this revival and promised further lectures on the wartime battalions, on administrative law, economics and ethnography. In June 1979, a peasants' " centre for knowledge " was established to work for peasant self-government which, they noted, cannot be organized from outside, " For all organizations must grow organically in particular villages." [15]

The problem of pluralism is that it enrages the authorities, who are simply unused, after 30 years of monopoly, to dealing with independent institutions. The response to meetings of the Peasant University was sharp indeed. Localities are regularly patrolled beforehand. Private cars are stopped and searched. People on the way to visit families are turned back. Above all, the authorities try to prevent intellectuals from attending meetings. Experts, authors, oppositionists and members of the Academy have all been prevented from delivering lectures. Peasants drew their own conclusions:

> The example of this small and embryonic social institution discloses the real intentions of the authorities. For them, the peasant should be ignorant, for only then will he be a willing slave. He must not think about democracy, self-management or social history. He must labour, plough and raise pigs, but cannot even listen to an expert lecture on pig-rearing.[16]

Despite their own ignorance, they said, the peasants would not abandon the search for free thought: " Only he who wants to be a slave will become one."

Without doubt, in the struggle for peasant education, it is the opposition and peasants themselves who have the wiser view. Self-awareness and self-organization are the only long-term solutions to the peasant's traditional antagonism to the state, which the disruption of independent peasant activities only confirms. In present circumstances,

[15] Peasants' Self-Defence Committee, Grojec region, *Appeal*, 7 Nov., 12 Nov. 1978.
[16] Peasants' University, Grojec region, *Communiqué*.

any action by the authorities, however well-motivated, tends to be rejected, and the pattern of rejectionism is reflected in the rest of the population. Much worker discontent stems from the peasant pattern of long periods of apparent acceptance, punctuated by sudden outbursts of blind fury.

The outcome is a peculiar blend of social authoritarianism, enhanced by dogmas of both Church and state, with a form of Polish Messianism: the belief in some millenial solution. On authority, while all agree that parish priests play a major role in the preservation of local values and education, which furnishes a primary source of non-official thought and action in the state, it is also arguable that the system of higher values to which they subscribe are hardened and regressive ones.[17] The Polish Church has not made compromises with modern society as other Catholic bodies have done: which is both its great strength and its contribution to social brittleness. On messianism, there is an evangelical spirit, as the Pope's visit showed, which indicates a deeply committed nation, steeped in its own history, of which the post-war period seems but a fleeting phase. These are potentially much more powerful ingredients in the Polish character than a commitment to the socialist industrial state.

A third attitude confronts the socialist opposition: the explosive mixture of "right-wing" tendencies from before the war. Whether in memories of its National Democrats or open anti-semites from those times, or the touching-off of social forces by recent politicians—ranging from Moczar to Moczulski—one can see that the opposition, just as much as the authorities, face a volatile society, conscious and proud of its own past, nationhood and self-righteousness, which may easily be pulled in non-socialist directions.

THERE is no doubt that it is the intelligentsia which is the key to any future socialism. One part of this is drawn into the ruling apparatus and provides loyal functionaries from whom no new social initiatives can be expected. A smaller part retains its traditional posture as an independent critic of the state. This element becomes politically effective when it finds ways to express the grievances of the whole population. The third section, professionals, will be considered later.

Critical intellectuals have used various means of putting pressure on the authorities:

1. Mobilizing International Opinion

As the release of workers and intellectuals in July 1977 showed, public opinion can be extraordinarily effective. Its mobilization requires a

[17] Some counter-arguments are proposed in: Adam Michnik, *Kosciol, Lewica, Dialog* (Paris, 1977); Andrzej Micewski, *Wspolrzadzic czy nie klamac?: Pax i Znak w Polsce, 1945–1976* (Paris, 1978).

specific target, if possible supported from abroad. Thus after the June events Kuron addressed an open letter on repression to Berlinguer [18] trying to use one communist party to influence another. Similarly, a human rights group ROPCiO, founded in June 1977, engaged in various public activites at the time of President Carter's visit later that year, and having failed to attend his press conference submitted a questionnaire to which they received a prompt, if cautious reply.[19] Both ROPCiO and KOR used the Helsinki agreement and Belgrade "monitoring" of it to gain Western publicity, and found that the government became marginally more sensitive to its international image, though the need for further credits was no doubt decisive here.

2. Pressure-Group Activity

Preconditions of pressure-group activity, often seen as a liberal-democratic preserve, may also prevail in Poland. Despite repression, there now exist organized groups, such as KOR and ROPCiO, which seek to influence public opinion. KOR informs the public of unused opportunities within present institutions. Secret elections to cultural unions, or votes for the Seym could be used to promote more acceptable candidates. Both groups display group loyalty, solidarity and high standards of a kind that is so impressive precisely because, as the founder of Charter 77 remarked, "it is in such contrast to the way the authorities carry on." [20]

3. Breaking Information Monopolies

All governments use their executive powers to conceal information, and this has been very much the case under communism. A key aim of opposition is to eat into this monopoly by independent research into problems of society and the economy. Here leakage from official bodies can be expected; welfare statistics filter out of the Central Statistical Offices, economic prognoses from the Planning Commission, and opinion surveys from the Higher School of Social Sciences. A major example is the receipt of censorship material from a young functionary who defected to Sweden. Widely circulated in the country, and published in full abroad,[21] these documents provide depressing testimony to the readiness of the authorities to censor vital information (such as the discharge of poisonous effluent into the Vistula) rather than acknowledge errors and inform the public. [See Part I, p. 173].

4. Creation of a Counter-Culture

It is an old truth that high culture, like religion, thrives on persecution, and plenty of evidence from post-war Poland confirms that a

[18] *L'Unitá*, 20 July 1976.
[19] Raina, pp. 542–4.
[20] Patocka, quoted by Raina (Dedication).
[21] *Czarna ksiega cenzury PRL* Vol. 1 (248 pp.), Vol. 11 (470 pp.) (London, 1977–78).

regime's repressive policies can drive writers and artists into opposition. Thus the tightening of censorship and other controls in the mid-1970s pushed many cultural figures out of public life, confronting them with the choice of silence or of opposition. The outcome has been a plethora of *samizdat*, originally belleletristic, now covering social problems, and its dissemination through an independent publishing house, NOWA. Some 50 titles have now been published: some simply banned authors (Tyrmand or Konwicki), others in translation (Orwell and Günter Grass). The poetry of Mandelstam and Brodsky has appeared, with that of Baranczak and (under the imprint of the Dzerzhinsky Institute of Satire) Szpotanski. Feuilletons, literary criticism and reviews come out in the journal *Zapis*, edited in Poland, and re-published in London.

5. Reopening the "Flying University"

A second source of counter-culture are academics, some 16 of whom had been dismissed from Warsaw University, including Andrzej Celinski, whose initiative it was to revive an older institution, the "Flying University." The idea is to offer an alternative source of higher education, to raise subjects which the latter holds taboo (such as the history and culture of neighbouring national minorities) and to keep contacts alive between students and dismissed lecturers. Seven courses were offered in the first session: on post-war politics, economic thought, sociology, contemporary political ideologies, social psychology, literature and culture.[22] After serious physical assaults, the system of open lectures was curtailed, and the pattern changed to that of seminars with invited scientific speakers. The first of these, "The Language of Propaganda" [see Part I, p. 166], has now been published.

6. Revival of Professional Associations

Intellectuals in the "grey area" of the professions—such as law and medicine—may, according to circumstances, be drawn towards opposition. This briefly happened in the aftermath of June 1976, when doctors protested to the Ministry of Justice at the state of workers delivered to them from the militia, and as members of the legal profession sought to represent workers at their trials and, later, to assist society at large through KOR's legal Intervention Bureau. There were also moves amongst social scientists, with critical sessions, on poverty, of the Sociological Association, and, on planning, at the Economics Association. The censorship disclosures drew protests from the Writers' Union and the directors Wajda and Zanussi were elected to positions in the Film Union. But none of these occurrences marked a general threat to the authorities, for there has been no overall revival of professional associations, as there was in 1956.

[22] More information is found in *Index on Censorship*, Nov.–Dec. 1979.

7. Fostering of Independent Institutions

This ambitious goal, of which KOR itself is evidence, may be illustrated by the case of students. Following the suspicious death of Stanislaw Pyjas, a Cracow student who supported KOR, and who had previously received anonymous death threats, a Students' Solidarity Committee (SKS) was formed in May 1977 "to operate outside the officially sanctioned forms of socio-political activity, which are dependent on the communist party." It sought further to encourage "independent self-organization of Polish students outside officially recognized institutions." [23] This referred to the formation of a socialist students' union SZSP, in place of four disparate unions in 1973, which was thereafter treated as the exclusive representation of Polish students. The title itself was an affront to Catholic students, as was its political exclusiveness. Indeed, an early action of the Cracow SKS was to challenge the requirement that passport applicants received from SZSP a statement of their "proper moral and political position." The pattern was repeated in many university cities. Kuron summed up this aspect of KOR's activity as "the struggle for pluralism in every area of social life, in schools, scientific institutes, in film and in literature, in the Church, in peasant households and amongst friends." [24]

UNDERLYING this activity is a cultural challenge to the social bases of totalitarianism. The assumption is that while the crisis of 1976 was economic, and then political, its roots lay deeper in society. A social crisis calls for social remedies. Here, however, established attitudes in the party run against deeper ones in society. After 1976 it was clear that top officials were going to take no cut in their own privileges. As KOR pointed out in autumn 1978 a new party hospital was going ahead, despite the chronic overcrowding elsewhere and universal shortage of pharmaceuticals.[25] Not only did this increase the anger of a population which many surveys find to favour egalitarianism, but it removed what capital could be made by government officials from calls for general austerity.

More recent measures have been sharply divisive: distribution of meat through a two- (later three-) tier system; extension of dollar shops for "internal export"; legalization of foreign currency accounts; encouragement of parallel markets, of which the book bazaar in Warsaw is one recent example. Omnipresent is the growth of bribery and corruption. Five thousand citizens asked to rank main problems found in daily life and work put "arrogant and rude treatment in offices," nepotism, cliques and bribery above criminal offences such as theft, and second only to alcoholism as a social evil.[26] Research by

[23] Students' Solidarity Committee, *Statement*, June 1979.
[24] *Bratniak* (Gdansk) No. 16, Spring 1979.
[25] KSS "KOR," *Appeal to Society*, Warsaw, 10 Oct. 1978.
[26] *Differences in Living Conditions and Needs of Polish Society: Selected materials* (Warsaw, Nov. 1976.)

Andrzej Tymowski on corruption—of the withholding by an administrator of his signature, by a doctor of hospital admission, by a professor of university admission, pending a consideration—revealed a picture much closer to the Hobbesian war of "all against all" than the rosy scene of consensus painted by party sociology.[27]

POLITICALLY, the problem is that Gierek's team has little room for manoeuvre. People remember only too well Gierek's offers made in 1971 of a new economic deal, greater cultural freedoms, more expert government and reopening of some channels of communication between rulers and the ruled. More seriously, successive administrations have knocked out the institutions which formed social bonds. Class and party have been optimistically redefined: no longer instruments of conflict, they are now instruments of consensus. In consequence, the citizen confronts the state without mediating institutions: factory workers are without genuine trade unions, students are without real unions, consumers are unprotected. On the one hand, this leaves the state in the quandary of knowing too little about the popular moods and feelings which its policies are trying to reach. On the other hand, the citizen may feel that, in his turn, anything goes: that he must defend himself by every means, legal or illegal, fair or foul. This is a recipe for further explosions. Given that alarming prospect, there has recently been discussion of reform proposals by party and non-party members, behind the scenes. Whereas the early promise of Gierek's government to involve experts in policy-making was not fulfilled, and when consultations did occur, as in educational reform, their advice tended to be ignored, the latest crisis seems to have obliged the authorities once more to broaden the range of opinions it considers, even to the extent of allowing rather critical documents to circulate in *samizdat*.

Outstanding amongst these is the extensive survey "Experience and the Future: a report on the state of the Republic and on ways to improve it" [see Part II, p. 3], whose first version of 200 pages appeared in May 1979. Its preface explains how it was written. A questionnaire on major problems of Polish life was sent to 50 figures in public and academic life, "party and non-party, atheists and believers," and their responses were collated by a small editorial board. The report discloses a general view that radical changes in the Polish socio-political "model" are absolutely inevitable, while simultaneously impossible, and tries to show that this need not be so.

Post-war history is analysed as a "vicious circle": popular uprisings, followed by reform, withdrawal of reform and further popular explosions. It adds that the effect of every crisis was "to limit and withdraw self-regulation, to blot out spontaneous initiative and hence

[27] *Experience and the Future: A report on the state of the Republic and on ways to correct it* (first version, Warsaw, May 1979), p. 26.

to imprint ever more firmly the division between rulers and the ruled." In consequence, the ordinary citizen was steadily more distanced from the authorities and came to treat all institutions—the state, trade unions and local government—as " for ' them ' and not for us." On law, for instance, one respondent commented:

> It is hard to avoid the impression that law, in a great many cases performs a quasi-class role. It serves to defend privilege and inequality, it is an instrument for the dictatorship of groups and individuals whose purpose is unfettered legal authority for the sake of egotistical self-advantage, even though the essence of a legal order is to limit arbitrariness.[28]

The editors found that the basic problem was that post-war institutions lacked legitimacy: " Over this whole period the regulations and norms of social life were not accepted." As KOR had done, they saw the basic need to build institutions that would genuinely mediate between the citizens and the state authorities. In contrast, one reply stated, Poland suffers from: " pseudo-planning, pseudo-science, culture and education; pseudo-legislation and consultation; elections that are not elections; the pompous opening of half completed factories; a pseudo-struggle with apparent difficulties; pseudo-legality—so that no one believes what actually is the case, of which empirical investigation is anyway disallowed." [29] The criticism continues through agriculture, wages and investments, local government and many other areas of public life.

The diagnosis is institutional: that nothing mediates between the closest circle of family and friends and the state, with disastrous social consequences: " People drink and steal. They take and offer bribes. They make deals. They sneer at everything. Everything is ' terrible ' and ' depressing ' . . .". But the remedy proposed is weaker. A minimum programme is put forward: to separate the party from the legal and economic apparatuses and from the state; to extend powers of representative organs such as the Control Commission (NIK) and the Seym; to restrict censorship and to build up legal guarantees against abuses by legislative and administrative reform. But, unlike the KOR programme, this first draft at least does not show through what social or other pressures this reform could be achieved.

BASIC reform, as all agree, has to be preceded by a change of heart, if not of system, in the Soviet Union. Experience shows the limits within which Russian leaders expect their East European counterparts to remain. Fundamental changes of foreign policy (such as leaving the Warsaw Pact) are inadmissible, as are such domestic reforms as the establishment of rival parties under sanction from the

[28] Ibid. pp. 22–3.
[29] Ibid. p. 37.

authorities, the dismantling of the "socialist system" (planning, censorship and "Marxism-Leninism"), or the countenancing of openly anti-Russian demonstrations by society. Within these boundaries, however, it is reasonable to expect a further Russian interest to operate: the wish for social peace within its largest satellite. The Kremlin might well be willing to pay quite a price in piecemeal Polish reform if the outcome was a stabilization of society and hence the preservation of its major interests. This is an important option for the Polish leadership. For while the Polish party continues to contain many fervent advocates of the Soviet model, who would protest to Moscow should there be too much tampering, there are two other currents, each interested in change. One, a conservative tendency, would prefer to run the Soviet model with less interference from Moscow and greater concern for their definition of Polish traditions and the national interest. A second, much smaller, is a social-democratic tendency, who live closer to and care more for society. It is not impossible that they could join the bridge—now manned only by the opposition—between the rulers and the ruled.

The Limits of Political Realism

Andrzej Szczypiorski

CONTRARY to appearances, the political and moral position of the Poles is fairly simple. It is even more straightforward today than it was in the nineteenth century, during the period of partition which lasted several generations. What I intend to discuss is an understanding of the situation rather than some programme of action which would require great wisdom and political experience, an analysis of the conditions and limitations in which Poles live rather than of the much more complicated problem of objectives which, in any case, might not bring the results the Poles want.

Awareness that choice is limited and room to manoeuvre restricted affects people's thinking and obliges them to face the future realistically. Thus those who admonish the Poles to be realistic and denounce their idealistic dreams are kicking an open door. Yet, stemming undoubtedly from traditional views of history, and of the nineteenth century in particular, the popular belief persists that the Poles harbour romantic ideas and idealistic day-dreams, and that they prefer moral postures to political realism. Those who advise them to cool their political ambitions seem to forget that every nation with an intellectual elite develops its political ideas and attitudes on the basis of historical experience and the logic of events. The Poles are no exception. The history of the last 30 years has clearly shown that their political wisdom not only deserves some respect but could also be emulated by others.

Let us first examine the question of historical analogy. Although it is true that due to their peculiar experiences the Poles have an acute sense of history this does not mean that patterns of behaviour and political concepts in today's Poland recall the past. Historical experience, precious as it is, is not necessarily to be taken as a guideline for the final quarter of the twentieth century. Whoever seeks too many historical analogies will come to false conclusions. If one wishes to consider the significance and limits of the political realism of the Poles seriously, certain elementary truths should be borne in mind. Firstly, in the nineteenth century the Poles had no state of their own, whereas today they suffer from an excess of state power. Secondly, during the nineteenth century the Poles were constantly trying to manoeuvre between Russia and Germany in their efforts to find support for the continuation and development of their national consciousness, whereas today this problem no longer exists and is unlikely to arise during the next few generations. Thirdly, the cultural context and social composition of Poland have changed completely since the nineteenth century. Were we to take these three elements of the Polish situation

it would indeed be difficult to formulate any sensible historical analogies. All nineteenth century experiences are anachronistic, while references to the national character of the Poles derived from the distant past are unconvincing.

The Poles are a small European nation and are deeply conscious of this fact today. They live within the enormous Russian sphere of influence and know that within the foreseeable future this cannot be significantly altered. They are conscious that in a communist country power is exercised in an unambiguously totalitarian way, and that therefore its influence is immeasurably greater and more pervasive than state power could have been in the nineteenth century, even the absolute power of the Tsars. Modern technology has extended the reach of today's totalitarian state incomparably further than that of the most despotic governments of the past. All these are obvious truisms which, however, do need to be constantly repeated in any discussion of present Polish attitudes towards the European and world political situation.

SOME Western "well-wishers," apprehensive of the supposed Polish romanticism and idealism, urge the Poles towards the greatest possible restraint and tranquillity and to an acceptance of the *status quo*. This sounds like a sensible idea. However, one must have a clear understanding of what this restraint is to be about, what social tranquillity is to be like, and what the *status quo* actually means in the practical realities of public life. Otherwise it is not apparent that people using the same words may have different blueprints in mind.

My own impression is that present-day Poles are quite restrained in applying their ideas on national development within existing structures. I believe that the Poles themselves want peace in Poland more than anyone. The question, however, is one of interpretation.

If moderation is the name for apathy, if social tranquillity is the name for the death of all forms of authentic public life, this is hardly political realism but a recipe for national suicide. One can hardly expect 35 million people to welcome this. If peace and moderation simply mean allowing the state with its totalitarian bureaucracy to strengthen its all-pervading presence in every aspect of public and private life, it would be unreasonable to expect the nation to accept such a *status quo* and to cooperate eagerly in maintaining it.

The interpretation of such questions is not a matter of semantics, but of national survival. People who proffer good advice from a safe distance, although they often act with the best of intentions, simply show a lack of understanding of the basic elements of Polish life. These people fear that irresponsible moves might provoke a catastrophe. Good and noble as this concern might be one should remember that there are two kinds of catastrophes which can beset a nation—those which are bloody and those that are not. The bloody ones are

usually noisy and spectacular and reverberate in world opinion. The bloodless ones occur in apparent peace and tranquillity, in the full view of a world which notices nothing. They are less spectacular, but no less painful. The damage may not be physical, but in a moral and psychological sense they can be even more disastrous. They leave no legend behind them. A bloody catastrophe leaves a residue in the consciousness, a tradition which can be revived in future generations. A bloodless catastrophe is a homely affair and leaves no positive trace, but anaesthetizes and enslaves the mind so that traditional cultural, political and moral motives can no longer operate.

No Pole in his right mind would wish for a bloody catastrophe. Admonitions to moderation are gratuitous and tantamount to mockery. Poles need no reminders of such axioms. But when outside observers, mistakenly assuming that social activity directed against the bloodless type of catastrophe is an expression of dangerous Polish romanticism, call on the Poles to calm down, this is a more serious matter. What kind of calm do they have in mind? The calm of unthinking conformity? The peace of a cemetery where Polish national consciousness and cultural tradition lie buried? What kind of moderation is this? Should the Poles refrain from resisting the encroachment of government into all areas of life? Should they stand by meekly and mindlessly passive while those basic moral values which make human life worthwhile are destroyed?

The democratic opposition in Poland understands full well that Poland is an important element in the global policy of the USSR, that it is part of the Soviet bloc, and that Polish sovereignty will remain drastically curtailed for a long time to come. No sensible person today will support gestures or programmes which disregard the presence of our powerful Russian neighbour, and its virtual domination of events. There do exist, however, considerable opportunities for preserving and strengthening Polish national and cultural identity within the communist bloc, and for encouraging an authentic social life. Although freely functioning democratic institutions may not be possible within the foreseeable future—as the one-party system is a permanent feature of Soviet domination—there are rational and politically realistic grounds for hoping that changes can be made which will preserve the moral fibre, character and consciousness of the nation.

THE one thing the Kremlin leaders and the Polish opposition are agreed upon is the undesirability of Soviet military intervention. For the USSR it would no doubt be a lightning military success but also a colossal political defeat. For the present ruling team in Warsaw it would undoubtedly be the end of the road and political limbo for the one to follow. The fate of the opposition does not bear thinking

about. The situation of the whole country would be exceptionally tragic.

Nobody would be the victor should such a catastrophe occur and as everybody realizes this there are certain possibilities for manoeuvre within the existing set-up. No such action should strive to overturn it, nor to inflict too great a loss on one side or give too many gains to the other. Manoeuvre is, however, possible. What is more—it is essential if the Poles are to survive the present historical period and continue as a nation in the future.

The one-party system is by no means an immutable and solidified model. Its functioning is influenced by many factors, and particularly, though not exclusively, by economic ones. Like everywhere else in the world change can be effected by the intensity of social activities. This activity should be politically realistic and should remain within the confines of the law. This, however, is obviously not easy as much depends on the interpretation of the law. Clearly, every bureaucracy, and the communist one is no exception, tends to interpret statutes in their most restrictive sense. Where there are democratic institutions bureaucracy does not control all areas of life and is therefore contained within certain natural limits. In a totalitarian system its field of operations is enormous and replaces what sociologists call informal social links. Within the existing laws, however, these can be rebuilt without too much difficulty. Because of the very fact that they are informal, they do not infringe the law, and bureaucracy, by applying the law and preserving the legitimacy of government, finds it difficult to prove that regulations have been infringed. The rebuilding of informal social links and the resulting stimulation of public life in Poland provide new political and moral elements. It enables society to recover a certain amount of authenticity and in the nature of things restricts the encroachment of the state in the life of its citizens.

This is patient work which is most unspectacular but quite effective. It is surprising therefore to hear some Western observers express the fear that such a rebirth of public life will result in a catastrophic military intervention, while others argue that a democratic opposition aiming only at the rebuilding of informal social links in fact lacks any political programme and therefore will soon lose popular appeal.

Such views are wrong. There is a vast difference between limiting totalitarian bureaucracy and abolishing the one-party system, and nobody in Moscow is going to take drastic steps because of the greater intensity of social and public life in Poland. On the other hand it would be folly to disregard political realities and call for a far-reaching restructuring of the system of power in Poland when there exist no indications that the international balance of power is likely to change in the 1980s or indeed before the end of the century. Seen from the point of view of our everyday life, the supposed lack of appeal of

the democratic opposition in Poland is a Western misunderstanding. During the last few years Poles have understood perfectly well that the rebuilding of social and public life is slow and painstaking, but fruitful. The wider the influence of the various informal social links the smaller and less painful is the pressure of totalitarian bureaucracy on the daily life of individuals and groups.

In Poland today, and also in all other communist countries, the essential thing is the work within the community itself aimed at preventing the state from devouring society. Through its extensive bureaucracy the state strives to take under its wing all initiatives and assume control of all public life or even to eliminate it altogether, replacing it with state administration. What is more, the state not only acts for the citizen, but thinks and decides for him in matters that affect his most intimate affairs. In consequence, tacit approval of such practices leads to the death of the nation and the complete enslavement of the individual. It is therefore not surprising that a vital and educated society defends itself and reacts with increasing intensity. This reaction is moderate and remains within the confines of communist enacted laws. Today it is the interpretation of these laws that is the field of the battle between the authorities and a great part of the population. This struggle requires tenacity, coherence, and considerable sacrifices from the whole of society, particularly from the intellectual elite. It is impossible to ask a nation which wants to exist, live and develop in these difficult conditions to abandon such a struggle voluntarily, especially if it is aware of the present results and future potential of the struggle.

Herein lies the true realism of present-day Polish political thinking. There is no talk of the abolition of the existing power structure nor of the re-positioning of the country within the world power blocs as they exist today. The programme is modest yet of fundamental importance for the future of the nation. It aims at the rebuilding of social structures which would limit the interference of totalitarian bureaucracy in the lives of individuals and social groups, and which would restore to society its natural rhythm in order to preserve and strengthen social and national awareness which, if nothing were to be done, would first become emaciated and later eliminated and buried forever.

This kind of political realism results from Polish patriotism which in today's European and world conditions is itself profoundly realistic.

It is this ostensibly modest programme which underlies the various initiatives undertaken during the last few years by the more enlightened and courageous groups and individuals. The Committee for Social Self-Defence, KOR, expresses in its very name its moral-ideological stance and its whole platform. Its programme is the defence of society and the individual citizen threatened by the arbitrariness of totalitarian bureaucracy. This initiative, taken by people who, as a result of the effectiveness of their work and their moral authority, later provided a

focal point for many other public-minded activities, has been and will remain modest in terms of international politics, but it is extremely important to Polish life, particularly in the context of the present situation in Poland and the state of mind of the nation during the last decade. KOR takes initiatives to uphold the rule of law in relations between the authorities and citizens or groups of citizens. In the specific Polish situation the very fact of being active in public life, of trying to resist bureaucratic pressures, amounts to an offensive, and indeed silence and passivity are bound to lead to defeat. A bureaucracy which meets with no resistance conquers new ground in its penetration of society and stifles all social initiative in public life.

To people who live under old and proven democratic institutions, which protect them from the arbitrariness of the authorities, these problems would seem somewhat exotic. They could and in fact should ask the question: in what way does the state try to dominate the life of the private citizen and invade all those spheres of activity where informal social links should flourish?

The answer is fairly simple. In essence it is that in Poland today the state authorities either already have or want to have the monopoly of deciding about everything everywhere. This does not only apply to economics, politics, culture and ideology but it also means that the citizen is totally dependent on the state in matters of everyday existence. Everywhere and always his contact with the state is not only burdensome but constant and uninterrupted. For the citizen the state is omnipresent. He has to live in a state apartment, he shops in a state shop where he buys state products, goes to state schools, is employed by the state, takes part in holidays organized by the state in state-owned centres, is kept " informed " by state-run media, receives only state-approved information and, lastly, enjoys state-regulated entertainments organized in conformity with the interests of the ruling bureaucracy.

The reason why state control of the life and thoughts of the Poles has not yet achieved the degree of perfection prevailing elsewhere is due to three factors which distinguish Poland from other members of the Eastern bloc. Firstly, an important slice of agriculture is privately owned. Although this probably has had a bad effect on modernization, it has greatly helped to limit the influence of bureaucracy on the life of the countryside and therefore indirectly on the rest of the country. Secondly, there exists a powerful, thousand-year-old Catholic Church which constantly strives to prevent social disintegration in the interests of religion and for patriotic reasons. Finally, the Poles have inherited from the past a deep respect for Western democratic institutions and have an extremely acute sense of self-preservation combined with a dislike of authoritarian government, a dislike rooted in the nineteenth century when they were subject to the arbitrary government of occupying foreign powers. These three factors enable them to survive.

In one way or another totalitarian bureaucracy destroys social links and leads to tragically disastrous consequences. A lone individual is defenceless *vis-à-vis* the state which is able to exert all kinds of material and psychological pressures. Only the principle of joint action in the common interest gives people the strength to confront the power of totalitarian bureaucracy. The simple rules of solidarity take on new meaning and greater value, while traditional everyday customs become weapons in the fight for personal dignity and integrity. There is even no need to attack: simply by not giving in to pressures a great deal of the substance of public life can be preserved.

TOTALITARIAN bureaucracy has launched the slogan: "Party, State, Nation!" which is supposed to express the unity, or even the identity of these three elements. The party is the state, the state is equivalent to the nation, and therefore not even the slightest chink between the party and the nation should permit any political or ideological manoeuvre. Whoever is not with the party is against the state and the nation, and therefore disloyal to the fatherland. Fortunately this slogan is only a slogan, not part of the law. One can, therefore, while remaining law-abiding, question its correctness and logic. This does not seem to be too difficult for the Poles, for the simple reason that even the rulers admit that the nation has a thousand-year history during which the state has passed through a complicated and often surprising evolution. There was even a period, lasting as long as a century and a half, when there was no state at all, while the nation existed and developed in a way which following generations admired. The party on the other hand is a fairly young political growth. Its ideological roots reach back to the middle of the nineteenth century, its organization is some 60 years old, and its power dates only from the end of the last war. It is therefore difficult in a country with such long and rich political and cultural traditions to campaign with such a slogan without appearing intellectually trite. The purpose is quite simple. It is to show that the party rules the state, which in turn embodies the aspirations, ambitions and hopes of the nation, and that therefore all that is contrary to the interests of the party is against the interests of the state and of the nation.

During these last few years, official propaganda has spent a great deal of time trying to convince the country that politically and morally it is more united than ever before. This line has had little impact even on the least intelligent people because everyday reality contradicts it at every turn. If this unity of the nation under the leadership of the party and of the state bureaucracy is so self-evident, how do we account for the powerful Church, for the millions of Catholics who reject an atheistic view of the world, for the countless numbers of citizens who for one reason or another are in conflict with the bureaucracy, in matters both big and small, particularly in the small ones which after all are the stuff of everyday life.

While this view of total social unity is being propounded, whatever contradicts it (and contradictions occur constantly everywhere in public life) is passed over. And as the existence of these contradictions is being denied, the whole of official policy sounds pitifully false and unconvincing: the bureaucracy makes it impossible for itself to deal with them which, *ipso facto*, makes them worse. It is a paradoxical situation in which the totalitarian bureaucracy limits and weakens itself by using slogans which prevents it from taking any action to eliminate or even smooth over these contradictions. If national unity really existed, as the propaganda says it does, there would be no opposition and no opponents of bureaucracy. But if the latter exist, the vaunted unity is an obvious fiction. This is not just a play on words, but the ever-present reality of Polish life. Indeed, it is the entanglement of the bureaucracy in its imaginary view of the world (which, paradoxically enough, was created for the enslavement of minds), which renders it powerless and enables society to put up an increasingly effective resistance.

The most important tasks in Poland today are to increase the social awareness of the population, the free flow of information, and to improve the quality of political and social life. The activities of the democratic opposition are limited to these aims. This programme is serious, responsible and difficult to implement, but it will bear fruits which will be a blessing to the nation. It has to be carried out in a hard and continuous struggle with the bureaucracy whose aims are diametrically opposed to it and whose power is a hundredfold greater.

At this point Polish political realism becomes enriched with moral values. This is because all the time the opposition has to call on the better side of human nature. It demands truth about the state of the country and of the nation; it demands respect for the individual, freedom of opinion, and also honesty, decency and responsibility in public life. The opposition denounces not only law-breaking by the totalitarian bureaucracy, but also corruption, careerism, self-seeking, immorality, irresponsibility, and falsehood—that is, all the ills which proliferate whenever democratic control is absent. The political realism of the opposition has, therefore, a tremendous importance for the future of the nation. Its long-term aim is not only to modify the structures of the country, in order to contain totalitarian bureaucracy and enable society to play a greater part in the affairs of the state, but also to bring about changes in the functions, the scope and the character of state power itself.

THUS the re-creation of informal ties is the guiding principle of the democratic opposition. It is astonishing what tricks history sometimes likes to play! That which so many people concerned with Polish sovereignty tried to build with such difficulty, sacrifice and expenditure of effort—one man managed to create in the course of a week.

The whole world was dumbfounded during the visit of Pope John

Paul II to his native country. All the strivings, exertions and efforts of 35 years on the part of the communist regime turned out to be not only sterile, but a glaring failure. The myth so painstakingly created and fostered by the party was quickly buried for ever.

The communist authorities have been trying for years to persuade themselves, the Poles and the rest of Europe, that they enjoy the support of the masses in Poland, that they are the authentic representatives of the national interest and that they reflect the views of the overwhelming majority of Polish society. That the Poles are not at all persuaded of this is obvious, the opposite is the case: they have always been perfectly well aware of the fact that these never-ending propaganda incantations are exercises in black magic and witchcraft. As far as the government is concerned, it has been prone in moments of euphoria to yield to the illusion that it really enjoyed the support of the nation. However for all practical purposes, at least the more intelligent members of the establishment were aware of the fiction under which they had to operate and take decisions. The myth of unity between the nation and the party had a far stronger influence abroad. To Poles visiting the West this always seemed half-ghastly, half-comic. Every child brought up in the communist system knows how easy it is to bamboozle democratic opinion in the West. But the illusion that the party constitutes an authentic representative body of the Polish nation was widely entertained not only by public opinion at large, but also by experienced Western politicians who in other areas display a certain amount of common sense, acumen and perspicacity, but who in matters concerning Eastern Europe are either politically illiterate or just mad. The Pope's visit to Poland accomplished an unexpected break. As in Hans Andersen's story, it suddenly became obvious that " the emperor had no clothes." Anyone who had clung on to a modicum of common sense finally had to admit that Polish reality is diametrically opposed to the mythological yarn which communist propaganda has been serving up to the world for years on end.

During the Pope's visit, millions and millions of Poles manifested their true feelings, thoughts and attitudes. The truth spoke loudly, clearly, unambiguously: the Poles, regardless of their beliefs and views, told the whole world in those days in June 1979 what they thought of life, reality and contemporary ideas and outlooks.

Needless to say, this caused some misunderstandings outside Poland. These misunderstandings are the result of an unfamiliarity with Polish history, and also of ignorance on the part of the West about certain aspects of life under communism. The Western press, like a single chorus, pronounced that during John Paul II's stay the large majority of Poles had manifested their attachment to the Roman Church, that with all their hearts they showed themselves to be for Catholicism.

The communists will continue to rule in Poland, at least in the foreseeable future. The Church will not rule even if some miracle were to

create a vacuum of power and the communists were to disappear into the dustbin of history. The Poles certainly do not wish to live under clericalism nor do they wish to abandon the basic structural changes of a socialist nature. Who does not understand this does not understand Polish reality. All those who so ardently and sincerely manifested their attachment, even their love, for the Pope are by no means opponents of basic socialist principles. They are, however, irreconcilable opponents of a system of power based on party monopoly, of totalitarian methods of rule, of all anti-democratic practices which by usurping power, create the all-powerful state, pushing society aside.

IN Poland, as I have tried to indicate, there is no conflict about basic socialist principles. In Poland the battle was and is about imponderables dividing state and society. The state takes over nearly all functions, as a result of which society feels totally deprived of its own will. This omnipotent power of the state destroys not only the living tissue of social life, but also paralyses the economy, creating continuous serious tensions.

That is why without at least the partial restoration of the sovereignty of the social factor there can be no question of overcoming the crisis in Poland.

Every more-or-less reasonable Pole knows all this, whether he is a Catholic or an atheist. Among the millions of people who demonstrated their enthusiasm for the Pope, practising Catholic believers were probably in a minority. In a formal sense almost all Poles, if only because of their attachment to historical tradition, consider themselves to be Catholics. But this does not mean that they are genuinely Catholics, that they belong to the Church for spiritual motives and spend time on religious practices. The great mass of Poles today are indifferent towards religion, whether they are party members or not.

The tremendous demonstrations in support of Pope John Paul II in Poland were not of a religious character, although the Church hierarchy in Poland would have liked it to be so. There is no doubt that very many Poles did demonstrate their attachment to the head of the Roman Church and their purely religious emotions. But the majority manifested feelings, hopes and desires of a different kind. They were concerned with civic rather than with religious matters. They were showing their attachment to the Polish tradition, to Polish history, to the Western world, to Latin civilization, to their thousand-year-old ties with Western culture and to democratic principles. For centuries this Latin world shaped the Polish mentality, and the Pope is its symbol. Westerners today fail to understand how Byzantine, how Russian contemporary communism is. Westerners do not understand that the regime which has ruled in Poland for the last 35 years is not only economically inefficient, but above all is contrary to the thousand-year-old national tradition, to the spiritual roots of Latin Europe, to

the whole intellectual achievement of Western thought which provided a model for Poland for a millennium. And this is not just a question of spiritual links with the Roman Catholic Church, but a wider, multi-faceted problem. It touches upon all instincts, all thoughts, and all patterns of behaviour of individuals in Poland.

When dense crowds sang a traditional Polish song wishing the Pope a "Hundred Years" of life, they were not just demonstrating their loyalty to an extraordinary man and their reverence for the Bishop of Rome, but also their attachment to the authentic traditions of Poland which have been gagged and falsified for 35 years.

There was yet another motive force. This Pope is the first Polish Pope in history. The Poles are convinced, not without reason, that the Roman Catholic cardinals who made him their choice in October 1978, indirectly indicated that Poland belongs to the West, that it is a country faithful to the Latin tradition no less than Italy or France. For the Poles, cut off from their own Western roots for decades, this was not just a triumph, it came as a great moral and psychological compensation. The Poles have felt many times that they were abandoned and betrayed by the West, with which they had many bitter experiences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many generations lived with the conviction, a well-founded conviction, that our common motherland, Europe, had rejected us, cheated us, abandoned us. Thus in 1939 the Western powers abandoned Poland to the tender mercies of Hitler and Stalin. Thus during the grim period of the terrible Nazi occupation, when the smoke was rising over the crematoria in the annihilation camps, when the Nazi execution squads were shooting intellectuals and priests, workers and peasants, when three million Polish Jews were murdered in the gas chambers, the West was not only unable to help, but also unimaginative, small-minded, and short-sighted.

When Stalin reached Berlin, the West tried again to create an illusion of peace and security; without any qualms it sacrificed Poland to the Byzantine despot.

And then in 1978 the Roman Church, which has been a symbol of Western civilization for two thousand years, turned to Poland and expressed its faith in and admiration of a nation which has been for ten centuries the easternmost bastion of this civilization. Is it surprising that when the conclave chose a Polish Pope the Poles felt relieved, and that—party members and non-party people, Catholics and atheists and all—straightened their backs and raised their heads?! Is it surprising that it was for them one of the most significant events in their history? And that it produced a moral and psychological breakthrough for all society? All this is not just evidence of the rising tide of Catholicism in Poland. No sensible person would deny the influence of the Church on Polish life, but one should not exaggerate it by seeing the visit of John Paul II as an indication of clerical ascendancy in

Poland. That would be absurd, particularly as the experience of the Pope himself and his intellectual sophistication and wisdom provide a barrier to any kind of half-baked clericalism. For the Poles, the fact that one of them is Pope is a visible sign that once again they belong to the West, and this is beyond any price. Since the June 1979 visit of the Pope, Poland is a different country. What the democratic opposition tried so hard and for so long to achieve—the re-creation of authentic social ties among the people—suddenly became a possibility during the few days of the Pope's travels in Poland. This is irreversible.

Pope John Paul II laid the groundwork on which the Poles can now build their authentic national identity. This is not easy, because the many tentacled state will do everything in its power to prevent it. The struggle over what is to be the domain of the state and what the domain of society will continue. But the situation has changed. During the 10 days of the Pope's visit all the functions of the state were subordinate to the desires of society. This is a precedent which may be decisive for the nation.

Experience of Democratic Opposition

Andrzej Drawicz

THE summer of 1977 marked a turning point for the opposition movement. The authorities were forced to grant an amnesty for the members of KOR and the workers arrested as a result of the disturbances in June 1976. Thus within 10 months of the formation of KOR, its supporters achieved their objective, thanks to a well organized campaign at home and wide support from abroad. This was not the first instance of successful resistance to governmental measures in Poland. In 1970 and in 1976 the authorities twice abandoned price increases, which in each case would have hit the lower paid, while in 1976 they partially retreated from the anti-democratic amendments to the Constitution. Previous successes had, however, been sporadic, resulting from spontaneous acts, with short-term aims. The campaign which resulted in the amnesty in the summer of 1977 was organized at all levels of society and mobilized a large number of sympathizers as well as a broad mass of people ready to give KOR concealed but nevertheless real support. This was therefore a true national resistance movement, aimed at the long term, to some extent institutionalized, cleverly making use of the substantially new idea of complete openness.

The authorities fought as well as they could: difficulties with employment, administrative repressions, violent incidents, long-term harassment and defamatory press campaigns were all made use of. Gradually these repressive measures grew in intensity and culminated in the killing in May 1977 of Stanislaw Pyjas, a Cracow student and supporter of KOR, followed by the arrest of 11 members and close collaborators of KOR. Two months later the authorities had to concede.

Within the spectrum of East European experience this effective nation-wide opposition covering a span of 10 months deserves careful study. It introduced a chain of events showing that the opposition, far from resting on its laurels, regrouped and undertook new tasks in the following year. While they fitted into the Human Rights campaign, they became less *ad hoc* than in the preceding year, when precedence was given to the defence of the arrested, harassed and repressed (though such actions were not discontinued) and their aims became more long term and extensive, reaching all classes of the population. Taking 5 December 1975 as the starting point of a new phase of opposition, when a group of 59 intellectuals protested to the Seym against an anti-democratic project of constitutional reforms, at the same time briefly outlining their democratic demands, we can now see that over a five-year period the opposition has established itself as a lasting element of social life.

In addition to its *ad hoc* successes the deeper social significance of this fact can hardly be exaggerated. Let me quote here the conclusion of an article by Jan Tomasz Gross, "June 1976–June 1978"

> . . . demonstrating to public opinion in Poland, that the people are not powerless *vis-à-vis* the authorities, and that without breaking the law, one might, by-passing the existing, government controlled institutions, effectively claim one's rights and that initiatives escaping government control can be taken, thus creating *faits accomplis*. The threshold of fear has been lowered, new people and new milieux have been activated, a network of publications informing the public about the state of affairs has been set up.

ONE of the distinctive features of the Polish opposition is that it gathers the representatives of different classes and groups. Long-standing collaboration is a completely new phenomenon. It has occurred only briefly once before, in October 1956, and was quickly paralysed by the authorities conscious of the danger inherent in the situation. In 1968 students and intellectuals stepped forth while workers were neutralized. In 1970 it was the turn of the workers, without the participation of the intelligentsia. In 1975 during the discussions over the Constitution, the intellectuals took the lead. Again in 1976 the workers acted alone.

The setting up of KOR was an act of solidarity between the intelligentsia and the workers. This solidarity grew stronger, initiating a significant process. Gradually workers ceased to be the object of action and themselves became agents. The new periodical *Robotnik* was edited by representatives of KOR and of the workers. In several towns people took the initiative of setting up free trade unions, independent of the corrupt official ones. Several authentic trade unionists appeared on the scene. So far, all this is at an embryonic stage but it opens up possibilities for a significant impact on the future of the democratic movement in Poland and elsewhere.

In addition to KOR a new centre was created on 25 March 1977 called the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) aiming at the implementation of the basic principles underlying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the international agreements on Human Rights. ROPCiO also uses a variety of means, including setting up a network of information centres. Both KOR and ROPCiO include people of different persuasions and differences can be detected in the policy statements of both organizations. They both believe, however, that the time is not right for discussing underlying divergences, but that on the contrary, work must proceed on the basis of mutual understanding and respect.

Independent student organizations, Students' Solidarity Committees (SKS) have been formed in opposition to the official Socialist Association of Polish Students. The first one was created in Cracow after the

killing of Stanislaw Pyjas. There are now six of them in various academic centres.

ANOTHER significant factor is that the democratic opposition finds support in the Catholic Church, a powerful anti-totalitarian force, traditionally connected with aspirations for freedom and democracy. It is therefore not surprising that it provides a focus for the hopes both of unbelievers and of its own members. An atmosphere of solidarity has arisen enabling an open examination of both former and present relationships between the so-called lay left and the Church with an honest admission of past mistakes. The Church cautiously but determinedly provides the democratic opposition with an *ad hoc* organizational support and, more fundamentally, lends its own authority, raising its voice in similar cases and in a similar spirit as the opposition. Of course at the same time it pursues its own aims and has its own tactics and strategy.

It is the patriotism of the Church which makes its aims appear convergent if not identical with those of the democratic opposition. It is therefore not surprising that the Church has been subject to blatant advances from the authorities (*Die Welt* once called it the " offensive of ingratiation "), aimed at drawing it away from the opposition in return for small concessions and vague promises. At some point this even worried members of the democratic opposition. It looked as though the Church authorities were taking such offers seriously. However, the subsequent actions of the Church and its unmistakable attitude in later stages, dispelled these fears. At present the ageing, but still staunch ruler of the Church, Cardinal Wyszynski, together with an important proportion of the hierarchy, some of whose members have assumed a very clear-cut attitude, conscious of their special responsibility for the destiny of the country, are determined to cooperate, within limits, with the democratic movement. Various churches and convents, as well as Catholic institutions and publications have for some time been giving the movement support. Finally, individual Catholic intellectuals and both members of the clergy and the laity have themselves played an active part.

THE Polish opposition has given up all hope of a change from within the system, i.e. that given favourable circumstances its progressive elements could over-rule the conservative ones. Such hopes persisted for a long time, particularly as many former Marxists, who earlier on before disillusionment set in were part of the establishment, were members of the movement. These were the so-called " revisionist hopes." The negative evolution of the system during the reign of Gomulka (1956–70) put a stop to this. Now the only serious hope lies with external pressure from organized social forces, in order to force concessions and to question the monopoly of power—particularly in the field of information, education and culture; with the creation of

independent parallel cultural and information channels; with the injection whenever possible of elements of democratic pluralism, thus in effect undermining the totalitarian model of society.

The emergence of independently conceived alternatives to official policies is one of the most important features of the Polish experience. They do not always coincide with some of the objectives of the Czechoslovak, Soviet or East German opposition, which do not completely exclude " revisionist " possibilities. Such differences are understandable and should neither surprise nor cause regret.

This does not negate the fact that a number of party members more or less discreetly express their support for the objectives of the opposition. This is mainly due to their purely nominal party membership. In the great majority of cases party membership ceases to have any kind of ideological commitment, resulting as it does from practical considerations—material advantages, peace and quiet and inertia. Thus, not the prevailing ideology but rather the lack of it helps the democratic movement. Attempts at formulating an alternative from within, that is of a new " revisionism," could of course occur. An instance of this was the letter from 13 former party workers, published in 1977, calling on the leadership to introduce reforms. It is characteristic that this letter, representative of various tendencies within the party, failed to produce any stir. People had definitively ceased to count on a natural evolution of the system. This does not mean that such tendencies could not become tactical allies of the democratic opposition, which is decidedly anti-sectarian. For these reasons, it sees the advantages of the so-called Eurocommunism in the West. At the same time the opposition has a clear understanding of the limitations of all such tendencies. The pragmatic consensus, which assumes that the de-totalitarization of Polish society is everybody's business, and not only that of a chosen few, coexists within the democratic movement with a complete lack of " neo-revisionist " illusions.

THE Committee for the Defence of the Workers (KOR) having reached the end of the first phase of activity and realizing the necessity of broader long-term action and of continuous presence, transformed itself into the Committee for Social Self Defence, KSS–KOR, and with an increased membership undertook new initiatives.

One of these was the Intervention Bureau, whose task was to register all cases of law-breaking and anti-democratic action by the authorities and help the victims of such actions. KSS–KOR also set up the Board of the Social Self Defence Fund, which distributes money to the victims of oppression and supports democratic initiatives, such as independent publications, studies and cultural events. It is worth recalling that in the first year of its existence the sums originating from donations received in and out of Poland totalled 3,251,000 zlotys. At present financial aid is given also to several workers' families.

The Committee also traditionally issues communiqués and statements concerning illegal acts by the authorities. These are quite numerous. The most important was the "white paper" entitled "Documents of Lawlessness" (see Part I, p. 136] disclosing dozens of documented cases of police terror, some of which resulted in death or permanent injury. (In the first year of its existence KOR lodged over one hundred complaints of police brutality.) The paper also demanded the introduction of clear-cut legal guarantees to ensure proper observance of the law and punishment for law breaking. On 18 April 1978 KSS–KOR issued a statement concerning the unclarified circumstances of the death of Stanislaw Pyjas, demanding the reopening of the case.

The systematic campaign of statements and disclosures, despite attempts by the authorities to completely hush it up, has had a resounding impact within the country. A case in point was the publication of a "black book" of secret documents and instructions of the censorship, passed to KSS-KOR by one of the staff of the censor's office who had left the country. It clearly shows that disregarding its statutes, the censorship dictates in minute detail what can and cannot be disclosed to the people. The drastic character of the material published was so great that it could no longer be hushed up, the Polish Writers' Association discussed the arbitrariness of the censorship at their conference, while the Polish P.E.N. Club wrote a letter to the government.

At least 30 periodicals are now being published under the auspices of KSS–KOR, ROPCiO and others. Their readership and character vary. The *Information Bulletin*, the oldest of them all, published 16 issues from September 1976 till the end of 1977. While the monthly *U Progu* and *Opinia* and the quarterly *Zapis* encompass a sizeable and representative group of writers partially or completely debarred from publication, there is also the literary periodical *Puls, Robotnik* and *Gospodarz*, and those like *Bratniak, Indeks, Spotkania* and *Glos* which are directed mainly at the young. Some of them are printed by the independent publishing office "NOWA." The numbers of copies vary, but it must be remembered that they are often recopied and widely read. Books are also published regularly as are policy studies by an anonymous group calling itself the Polish Independence Alliance (PPN). Some of these publications are later reprinted abroad, such as *Zapis* which is published by *Index on Censorship*.

Within Poland, printing techniques are fairly primitive, relying mainly on stencils. Additional difficulties arise as a result of seizures by the authorities. Nevertheless, this activity of the democratic movement in a short space of time assumed spectacular growth and it looks as though this will continue.

Finally, the leading role assumed by the so called "Flying University" organized under the auspices of KSS–KOR must be mentioned. It is not surprising that the "Flying University" attracted the

attention of the whole opposition and also of the police. Lecturers and participants and those who offer their homes continue to be harassed. Gatherings have been forcibly broken up with the use of tear gas and police batons. The authorities have attacked Adam Michnik in particular, trying at all cost to prevent him from coming into contact with his audiences, which has involved him in frequent arrests. All to little effect, as Michnik's lectures are reproduced from tapes, prepared for just such occasions, and once he was replaced by the doyen of Polish oppositionists, the famous economist, Professor Edward Lipinski.

Despite such difficulties the first term of independent teaching (January–May 1978) could claim in Warsaw and elsewhere 120 lectures, with attendances of between 20 and 30, and in some cases over 100, people. Such *faits accomplis* do much to undermine the long indoctrination, with its distortions and doublethink.

The former chairman of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Professor Janusz Groszkowski, welcoming the launching of the Flying University, wrote:

> There is a great danger, that in this situation society will change into a herd and the country will become a jungle. On the other hand the hiding or falsification of truth, the distortion of events and facts create the urgent necessity, particularly in historical studies, to complete information and correct falsehoods, the more so as witnesses and documents of the past gradually disappear. In these conditions, the new generation, even those with a critical attitude simply lack the physical means of learning the truth. The results of official teaching at various levels and in various domains are well known. Therefore the stimulation of self-education outside the official circuits is particularly valuable.

THE tolerance shown by the authorities to these activities is, of course, highly relative. It is true, however, that in comparison with other countries of the Eastern bloc the Polish opposition has a far greater freedom of manoeuvre. There are no attempts at its wholesale liquidation. The authorities are constantly changing tactics, switching pressure on and off, sometimes relying on slanderous press campaigns, sometimes keeping silent on the issue and trying by means of administrative measures to deter others from joining. However, not everything is done against everybody at the same time. Actions are sporadic and often create the impression of a lack of coordination and of conflicting policies. It is not excluded that some of the highest authorities would favour a more elastic approach; but at the same time it is highly likely that others favour toughness, and it is they who prevail. Territorial variations are apparent. A certain official from Poznan releasing Adam Michnik after one of his arrests, said, not without a touch of local pride: "There are no beatings in Poznan." On the other hand in the Cracow and Katowice districts frequent cases of physical violence occur.

The relative tolerance is no doubt also due to the correct tactics of the opposition and in particular the felicitous principle of complete openness. The inherent risk was well worth taking. The repressive apparatus was in turn precluded from taking concealed actions and using accusations of "counter-revolutionary conspiracies," "clandestine activities" and "diversions." The consistent preserving of the letter of the law, constant references to the Constitution, to international agreements, statutes and regulations paid off handsomely. The authorities who secretly disregard the laws cannot, however, admit it openly. They have thus been forced to play according to rules, which, albeit partially, they must obey. Individual acts of terror are possible but a return to the Stalinist type of terror as a basic policy is not. In comparison, the cost of openness, which facilitates repression, is relatively small.

The situation of the democratic opposition is to some extent determined by specific Polish conditions, but perhaps much more so by the more general fact that it "has got it right." Whatever happens, it would appear that achievements so far constitute a kind of successful political and social experiment, which might be useful to others as well.

Contemporary Political Opposition in Poland

Tadeusz Szafar

FIRST, a brief discussion of the term "opposition." If by opposition we mean a political movement or party which submits to the electorate an alternative programme, opposed to policies carried out by those in power, a party which is ready and willing to assume the responsibility of forming a different government, then there is not, and cannot be, such an opposition in a totalitarian state. Only communists can govern in present-day Poland. To claim the contrary—given existing circumstances and the global balance of power, neither of which show any meaningful signs of change in the forseeable future—would amount to day dreaming which borders on the criminally irresponsible. Most of the leaders of the "opposition" movement, therefore, have been very careful not to leave any room for doubts on this account.

The Western mass media, and even many scholars, call this the "dissident" movement, and its followers "dissidents" or "dissenters." This is most unfortunate, because it tends to obscure the true character of the "opposition," and in particular, the difference between the situation in Poland and in other communist-ruled countries. "Dissident"—the word comes from Latin "to sit apart"—means not agreeing, dissenting, discordant, different, and in the ecclesiastical dimension, "one who separates from the established religion." The term cannot, therefore, be applied to people who never did belong to the "church," do not want to reform it, nor indeed, believe that any such reform is possible within the established church, nor to those who have no "religion" at all. Dissenters and dissidents can exist only within the "church," or at least within the "religion," not outside it and in total opposition to it. Such terms might therefore be legitimately used in relation to a Sakharov or a Medvedev, but not to a Solzhenitsyn or a Bukovsky.

The most adequate description for our subject would probably be "political resistance movement"—were it not for the implications from the Second World War which tend to identify resistance with armed struggle. Thus, until someone provides a better term, we are obliged to use, as a kind of shorthand, the word "opposition," carefully avoiding any analogy with an opposition in a democratic society. The notion of a "human rights movement," preferred by Polish oppositionists themselves, is very imprecise. Nevertheless the spokesman of the movement Jan Jozef Lipski, protested in an interview with *Der Stern* against being counted among an "opposition": "we don't

have any political designs. Instead we are a kind of movement to protect human rights." [1]

EVERY attempt at a periodization of history is to a certain degree arbitrary, but there are good grounds to treat the contemporary opposition in Poland as having emerged in its current form towards the end of 1975, in connexion with the so-called discussion on proposed amendments to the 1952 Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland.

The inter-fractional struggle inside the leadership and the apparatus of the ruling communist party in Poland, which culminated in the March 1968 events—a virtual pogrom of the intelligentsia and the student movement, known in the West mainly because of its rabidly anti-semitic overtones, the witchhunt, and the subsequent exodus of the remains of Polish Jewry, or rather of Polish intellectuals of Jewish origin—had brought temporarily in its wake virtually total paralysis of all political opposition in the country. For this reason the intelligentsia was unable to play a role in the December 1970 workers' revolt in the Baltic port cities which finally managed to put an end to Gomulka's 14 years of disastrous rule, and brought to power the present party leadership under Gierek. For the first few years, the new team enjoyed a certain degree of authentic popularity—partly because of Gierek's undeserved reputation as an allegedly able administrator of Silesia. Besides Gierek's first years coincided with a period of short-term economic prosperity, a marked improvement of social conditions callously neglected under Gomulka and a noticeable, quite significant rise of general standards of living. It was, however, a prosperity based on living above the country's means. What was even worse, the few fat years were not put to good use, reforms of the whole outdated system of prices and wages were not introduced. But these deficiencies became generally obvious only much later, although there were voices unheeded by those in power, which warned against unavoidable, dire consequences.

Thus in the early 1970s the circumstances did not seem propitious for any oppositional activities, but they went on, in an unorganized way, nevertheless. I shall mention only two significant examples: two pieces of legislation introduced by the party were defeated by public opinion and had to be shelved after having been submitted to the puppet parliamentary body, the Seym. I refer here to two bills, closely patterned on Soviet models: one on psychiatric care, and the second against social "parasitism." Both were defeated thanks to a public discussion which engaged a considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia—without even mentioning the real essentially human rights grounds of resistance. Every possible reason—legal, medical, social, etc.—was invoked against them; it was never stated

[1] *Der Stern* (Hamburg), Christmas issue, 1976.

explicitly that in popular opinion these laws had been expressly designed to circumvent the existing bills and to facilitate extra-legal police reprisals against political opponents, by confining them to psychiatric asylums or exiling them as "social parasites."

In 1975 Gierek finally disposed of his Gomulkaite antagonists by introducing a far-reaching administrative reform which permitted him to put his faithful followers in control of the re-organized state and party apparatus. Thus the ground was prepared for amending the constitution which dated from Stalin's times—an operation which in all the other satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe had already been long completed. The whole purpose of the exercise was to consecrate formally the so-called "leading role of the party," and to give legal sanction to the Brezhnev doctrine by constitutionally determining Poland's subordinate place within the "Socialist camp" and her "eternal alliance" with the Soviet Union. Although the proposed amendments were, as a matter of fact, nothing but confirmation of the *status quo,* not intended to change anything in the practice of the governance, they provoked widespread resistance on the part of various strata of the population, including the Church.

On 5 December 1975, the distinguished economist, Professor Edward Lipinski, handed to the Speaker of the Seym a memorandum signed by 59 intellectuals, writers and scholars. The memorandum openly protested against any further restriction of civil and human rights of Polish citizens, against the legalization of the one-party dictatorship, and against setting institutional limits on national sovereignty. The so-called "Manifesto of the 59" [2] also contained a positive programme of demands—freedom of conscience and religion, freedom to work, freedom of expression and information, freedom of knowledge. It was soon followed by similar protests invoking the Helsinki human rights provisions and signed by hundreds of prominent personalities as well as by students who apparently had by then overcome the trauma of March 1968. In a similar vein a pastoral letter of the Episcopate defended the rights of believers, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the Polish population.[3]

In the face of such wide-ranging resistance—all in all, some 40,000 people signed protests of one kind or another—the authorities reluctantly had to give in. The constitutional amendments were passed by the Seym, but they had been modified in a way that clearly reflected official awareness of popular indignation. Not less important was the fact that this time, on a truly mass scale, the barrier of fear was effectively broken: all the protesters signed their names, addresses, and phone numbers. Although the usual slanderous attacks in the press followed, and a certain number of administrative reprisals were taken against the most active organizers of the protest move-

[2] Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland: 1954–1977* (London, 1978), pp. 212–214, 228.
[3] Ibid. pp. 224–228.

ment, its sheer size ruled out any large-scale police operation. An open political opposition movement was thus born, and the authorities had no choice but to tolerate its existence.

THE June 1976 workers' riots were a spontaneous outburst against a belated but exceptionally clumsy attempt to reform the price system, by making most staple foodstuffs, meat in particular, prohibitively expensive, without raising wages.[4] The need for some kind of price and wage reform was generally admitted, but the way in which it had been introduced added insult to injury. Workers were not consulted beforehand, were not given any matter-of-fact explanation, nor offered any kind of meaningful recompense. Everything was done by surprise, although the authorities expected trouble and prepared for it by raising the pay of the police and armed forces, by alerting all the security services, and by calling up for "military exercises" all those registered in police files for their previous participation either in the 1968 students riots or in the 1970 rebellion on the Baltic coast. As usual, isolated cases of violent clashes in Ursus near Warsaw and in Radom received notoriety, especially in the West, but what really defeated the authorities was the almost total general strike in industry all over the country. The workers laid down their tools without leaving the plants, thus avoiding a confrontation with riot police. In less than 24 hours, the authorities were forced to revoke the price increases. It is a real irony of history—the blue collar workers, officially described as the "ruling class" but in fact the worst treated and exploited stratum, demonstrated once again that they were the only effective body capable of resisting the party dictatorship, modifying its policies, and even forcing shifts in the leadership coalition.

Although the spontaneous character of the June 1976 riots excludes them as a part and parcel of the political opposition in the strict meaning of the term, there were some moments which seem worthy of attention. The events have shown not only that attempts at atomizing and isolating the working class had failed, but also that workers were capable of learning from experience: nowhere, for instance, did they agree to elect strike or bargaining committees, because they clearly remembered what had happened to their delegates in 1956 and 1970 after the strikes. They agreed to parley with the authorities only *en masse*. The lack of genuine trade unions or any other kind of authentic representation of the working class proved embarassing to the authorities: even when they wanted to negotiate with the workers, there was no one to speak in their name.

And, finally, the deliberate and exceptional brutality with which police and security forces put down the riots also proved counterproductive. The systematic beating up of detainees, the mass dis-

[4] Ibid. pp. 229 ff.

missals from work, the subsequent blacklisting of strikers, and the widespread arrests and trials of workers—this show of naked force and repression more than anything else moved a group of intellectuals who had signed the "Manifesto of the 59" to set up (on 23 September 1976) a Committee for the Defence of the Workers (KOR).[5] This was the first step toward overcoming the main weakness of all earlier oppositional movements—the disparate nature of the various demands made by different social groups. In 1968 students and intellectuals tried in vain to win workers' solidarity, in 1970 they remained passive in face of workers' protests. Now workers and intellectuals acted in accord, and what is more, for the first time the resistance movement assumed an organized form, asserting its legitimacy by citing various laws and constitutional principles enacted by the rulers themselves.

Throughout the winter 1976/77 the authorities obstinately fed the fires for stepping up KOR activities by persecuting the participants of the June strikes, putting some of them on trial and meting out barbarous long-term sentences, blacklisting and harassing others. They did not, however, dare to proceed actively against the organized opposition, whose numbers swelled from month to month, with every collectively signed protest, petition, and demand for judicial inquiries. For a short time the media conducted slanderous campaigns against KOR. This propaganda assault coincided with the Czechoslovak campaign against the signatories of *Charter 77*, and included all the false accusations borrowed from the March 1968 armoury: the oppositional intellectuals were branded as agents of international Zionism and of West German revanchism, as anti-Polish and anti-socialist cosmopolitans and common criminals, as clericals, social-democrats, and Trotskyites.

In May 1977 a Cracow student, Stanislaw Pyjas, who had co-operated with KOR, was found murdered, presumably by police.[6] Apparently he was a victim not of deliberate assassination, but of an *accident de parcours*, an excess of zeal. This triggered spontaneous mass protests of students not only in Cracow but in other university centres as well. Only then a number of KOR members—particularly the younger and more active ones—were arrested for trying to provide this spontaneous movement with a central leadership, though no charges were brought against them. Repression did not put an end to oppositional activities; on the contrary, they went on under demands for a general amnesty, compensation for victims of police brutality and arbitrary dismissals, and punishment of those guilty of torturing strikers. The campaign, which by then was becoming more and more widespread and culminated in a mass hunger strike in a Warsaw church, was crowned by a partial but substantial success.

[5] Ibid. pp. 246 ff., 286–290.
[6] Ibid. pp. 273 ff.

In July 1977, an amnesty was proclaimed; the remaining participants of the June riots still in jail and all the KOR militants were released.[7]

ALTHOUGH other demands were not met, or met only in part, a new stage began of uneasy, and not quite peaceful, co-existence between a totalitarian state and an opposition which in the meantime had acquired a fixed organizational structure, a wide circle of sympathizers all over the country and abroad, as well as its most important and effective weapon—*samizdat*. Starting with a crudely mimeographed and sometimes barely legible KOR *Information Bulletin*, which printed mainly KOR communiqués and protests against police outrages, a number of periodicals and books appeared, published outside the official censorship.

Since the amnesty to a large degree removed KOR's ostensible *raison d'être*—the "defence of workers," victimized for their participation in the June 1976 strikes and riots—the opposition, after some soul-searching, re-emerged in October 1977, under a new name, the Committee for Social Self-Defence, retaining for tradition's sake its original initials KOR.[8]

Even earlier, in March 1977, a new opposition group—the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO)—was launched. The Students' Solidarity Committees, spontaneously established immediately after Pyjas's assassination, also assumed a permanent form and gradually spread to several university cities. They were shortly joined by a number of other organizations, composed as a rule of people of common professional background or common interests, usually having some kind of *samizdat* publication as their focus and rallying point. Thus at present we have a wide spectrum of oppositional committees, organizations and groupings, some of them political, others of a more social character.

Starting on one extreme, we find a tiny group of former communist party leaders, most of them still nominally members of the Polish United Workers' Party, the PUWP. In October 1977, 14 of them headed by the party's former First Secretary, Edward Ochab, addressed an open letter to the Central Committee.[9] This happened on the eve of the Seventh Party Congress, and they made use of the statutory right of each party member to take part in the so-called all-party pre-congress discussion on the programme. The 14 criticized the current party line and called for political and economic reforms, naturally within the existing framework of the one-party state. Their letter was never published, nor even mentioned by the mass media. After its contents had become known thanks to a *samizdat* publication and quoted by foreign Polish-language radio broadcasts, it was dismissed by an official spokesman who invoked an argument as

[7] Ibid. pp. 284–286.
[8] Ibid. pp. 452–458.
[9] Ibid. pp. 444–451.

cynical as it was effective: "Why didn't Ochab carry out his nice programme when he was in power?"

The impact of this group on the party, in particular on its apparatus, and on the population at large, is negligible. They alone resemble, however, at least to a certain degree, some kind of Polish "Eurocommunism," and they are the only ones who legitimately deserve the label of "dissenters" or "dissidents"—since they still consider themselves to be of the established "church," even though they disagree on some of its tenets, rites, services or worship. As far as I know, they have no *samizdat* press organ of their own, do not form a cohesive group with even rudimentary organizational structure, and because of their insignificance, they are not, for the time being at least, harassed by the authorities—not even to the extent of being expelled from the party. This says a lot, not about the party's alleged "liberalism," but about its cavalier attitude to ideological issues in general. Party membership in contemporary Poland is a pure formality, in more senses than one.

Somewhere halfway between those "party dissidents" of vaguely "Eurocommunist" persuasion, and the opposition proper, looms the lonely figure of Wladyslaw Bienkowski, co-founder of the Polish Workers' Party (the PPR) under the Nazi occupation, one-time intimate and political mentor of Wladyslaw Gomulka (and the only intellectual in his entourage), ex-Politburo member and ex-Minister of Education. Bienkowski is an extremely interesting personality not only in Poland but on an international scale. I have no hesitation in calling him the spiritual father of the genuine Polish brand of "national communism," and at the same time the best possible proof that such a combination is utterly impossible, that it constitutes a *contradictio in adjecto,* and is totally distinct from communist nationalism which at present is the ruling ideology in Poland and in other communist-ruled countries. Bienkowski became completely disillusioned with Gomulka's restoration of totalitarianism and with the mounting nationalistic, chauvinistic, and anti-semitic trend of the party as a whole. He joined the protest movement in defence of workers and of human and civil rights, yet, because of his past, and perhaps present, allegiance to Marxism, he has chosen to do so as an outsider, a political figure in, but not of, the opposition. Indeed he publishes his sociological essays abroad, through the Paris-based *Institut Littéraire.*[10]

Another borderline case was the *"Experience and the Future"* discussion club set up in Warsaw in 1979 by a small group of journalists

[10] The following books by Wladyslaw Bienkowski have been published in Paris: *Motory i hamulce socjalizmu* (The Driving Forces and Brakes of Socialism), 1969; *Drogi wyjscia* (Ways Out), 1971; *Socjologia kleski* (Sociology of Defeat), 1972. English translation of Bienkowski's March 1976 "Open Letter" to the authorities on normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, originally published in *Kultura,* is in Raina, op. cit. pp. 366–371; fragments of his first book published abroad in: *La Pologne: une societé en dissidence* (Paris, 1978), pp. 151–166.

and scholars, some of them active party members. The inaugural meeting was attended by some 100 prominent personalities, including some members of the Central Committee. Others were non-party intellectuals and Catholic activists, although people actively involved in the opposition movement were not represented. Despite initial tolerance, or even encouragement, the party leadership quickly moved to suppress the club. Answers received from a questionnaire sent to some 200 prominent intellectuals, however, provided the *ad hoc* editorial board with material for a study entitled "Report on the State of the Republic and Methods of its Reform" [see Part II, p. 3]. This was later published by the underground press. The report's main importance consists in providing irrefutable proof that all attempts to isolate the opposition had failed: despite reprisals it is still capable of influencing the mainstream of political life in Poland, including the party and at least part of its leadership.

ON the opposite extreme of the political spectrum there is an underground group which calls itself the Polish League for Independence. In Poland it is known under the initials PPN, and its name is variously translated also as the Polish Independence Compact/Accord/Coalition. Unlike other oppositional groups, the PPN has chosen to retain its anonymity because its programme goes far beyond the immediate or intermediate demands which—given a modicum of goodwill—can somehow be squared with the continued existence of the present regime, its constitution and penal code. Since its members call for the unconditional restoration of Poland's sovereignty, the authors of its programme would be liable to prosecution for anti-state propaganda. They prefer therefore to publish their controversial and thought-provoking analyses of current political, economic, and social issues, as well as their alternative long-term political programmes, in a *samizdat* form—but without revealing the identity of the authors. To avoid abuse of this self-imposed anonymity by police provocation, they have empowered three prominent individuals in the West to vouch for the authenticity of their texts: Professor Leszek Kolakowski in Oxford, England, Professor Jerzy Lerski in California, and the writer Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski in Western Europe.[11] But even this kind of assurance is by no means foolproof. One of their declarations, touching on a subject most sensitive to Polish public opinion, that of Polish-German relations and the need for reconciliation as a condition for liberating Poland from the Soviet "protectorate," has been denounced as an émigré concoction, or even as a product of an anonymous security official

[11] For their initial proclamation, see Raina, op. cit. pp. 468–484. A very stimulating collection of essays dealing with various subjects has been published by the *Institut Littéraire: Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe* (Paris, 1978). Texts dealing with the 60th anniversary of Poland's independence were published in *Zeszyty Historyczne* no. 47, Paris 1978 ("Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe 1918–1978" and Poradnik Spoleczny PPN—Odzyskanie niepodlegloscіw 1918 r.")

in the West German ministry of *Gesamtdeutsche* affairs. The absurd charge was raised not only by Polish communist official sources—that would be in no way surprising!—but also by a considerable section of the Polish émigré community; namely those who trace their ideological origins to the pre-war *Endecja*—a reactionary, nationalistic, and anti-semitic party, which traditionally advocated some kind of accommodation with Russia, since they consider Germany—any Germany—as the Public Enemy Number One of the Polish nation.[12]

I have devoted so much attention to the PPN group not because of their intrinsic weight—which is very difficult to evaluate without knowing exactly who they are and whom they represent—but to illustrate the fundamental difference of approach between them and the bulk of the political opposition. The PPN people fully realize that their "maximal programme" cannot be achieved without radical changes in the international balance of power, or at least until Poland regains full freedom of action *vis-à-vis* Russia. Nonetheless, they maintain that even problems which now seem remote, or even quite utopian, should be publicly discussed if Poles are to preserve their national identity and consciousness. Their ideological intransigence renders the PPN especially vulnerable to slanderous insinuations. Generally speaking, a conspiracy of any kind in a totalitarian state with such an elaborate security service may not only be inefficient but vulnerable to police provocation with possibly disastrous results.

THE bulk of the contemporary opposition in Poland has therefore decided to give up all attempts at underground activity—except for the unavoidable minimum, required to operate the *samizdat* presses and to offer financial assistance to victims of police reprisals. They prefer to rely on the so-called "socialist legality" on the one hand, and on the other hand on mass support which would render any large-scale repression, short of the sudden re-introduction of indiscriminate Stalinist terror, most difficult, and politically counter-productive. They are aware that the present state of relative tolerance, enforced on the authorities by the strength of the opposition and by the economic and political weakness of the communist regime, might well prove to be of short duration. This is one of the risks which the opposition accepts.

The political opposition, in the narrow sense, is divided in two parts. Probably the most popular, and certainly the most articulate, is the so-called Democratic Movement, at first the sole, and at present the dominant element in the reconstructed KOR.[13] Its political *credo*

[12] Cf. Andrzej J. Chilecki "Orientacja europejska a nie niemiecka" (European, Not German Orientation), *Tydzien Polski*, London, no. 2–11 13 Jan. 1979.
[13] For its October 1977 Declaration, see Raina, op. cit. pp. 452–458.

has been deliberately left rather vague, but its manifesto stresses freedom of convictions, freedom of speech and information, freedom of union, association and assembly, freedom to work. It is in itself divided into three main "generational groups." The eldest one traces its origin to the pre-war left-wing but non-communist parties, including the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and various intelligentsia groups; its best known representative is Professor Lipinski. Most of them have a glorious record of anti-Nazi resistance within the Home Army. The middle group, now in their 40s and early 50s, in part went through a short period of infatuation with Stalinism in their early youth, typical of post-war intellectuals all over Europe, and then, via "revisionism" and "dissent," passed to intransigent anti-totalitarianism; a typical representative here would be Jacek Kuron. Another part of this generation, Jan Jozef Lipski for instance, stems from the anti-Nazi resistance groups among Polish youth. Most of them went through several decades of political passivity, but without seeking accommodation with the post-war regime. The current activization of this circle, which also includes a considerable number of Catholic intellectuals, is undoubtedly one of the most significant political developments in Poland. Finally, there is a group of those in their early 30s, who like Adam Michnik or Adam Maciere-wicz, are mostly survivors of the student movement of 1968. Their age alone precludes the charges that they are "responsible" for Poland's Stalinist experience—unless, in some cases, ill-will leads to blaming the sons for the sins of their fathers.

Generally speaking, the Democratic Movement can best be described as social-democratic, in the West European meaning of the term, even though some of the 110 original signatories of its Declaration might possibly object to this label, if only because of their religious *Weltanschauung*. The political spectrum, even inside this movement, is very wide. Kuron, for instance, proclaims his ultimate faith in what he calls "direct democracy," or "self-management"—a system which seems to be vaguely patterned on the Yugoslav model, supplemented by a kind of "Finlandization" of Poland—voluntary renunciation of some attributes of full sovereignty to the benefit of the powerful neighbour to the East, in exchange for greater freedom to shape internal policies according to Polish traditions and interests. Kuron, however, is most careful to point out that in his opinion the only road to this ultimate goal leads through parliamentary democracy, a system in which political pluralism is a *sine qua non* condition.[14]

[14] Jacek Kuron, *Zasady ideowe* (Ideological Principles), Paris, 1978. It is a collection of essays published in the *samizdat* press in Poland, some of them as polemics with the ROPCiO literature. The main essay "Mysli o programie dzialania" (Thoughts about a Programme of Action), written in October 1976, appeared in English translation in *The Polish Review* (New York), vol. XXII, no. 3, 1977, pp. 51–70.

Adam Michnik defines his own political attitudes as "secular left." In a major work, published in Paris,[15] which deals with the possibilities of dialogue between the Church and the left, he has provided a penetrating analysis of past relations between the "secular left" and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The book breaks with the traditional anti-clericalism of the left and has provoked a lively debate that continues in clandestine periodicals inside Poland—a discussion that focuses on the Church as the most effective organization of resistance to totalitarianism in the country, as well as on relations between believers and non-believers.[16]

THE Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) emerged in March 1977. Some of its founding members had earlier belonged to KOR, but the split was less of a spin-off than a conscious attempt to enlarge the base of the political opposition by appealing to the more traditionally minded, that is to the right of the democratic movement. Its monthly journal *Opinia* has appeared with a regularity quite astonishing for a clandestine publication. It has also managed to set up a network of Intervention Bureaux which try to provide legal, financial and other assistance to victims of the arbitrary lawlessness of the authorities. It has been quite successful in reaching various strata and circles which formerly remained passive because either they did not believe in effective resistance to the authorities, or considered KOR as too "leftist."

ROPCiO is, in fact, also a coalition. The elder generation comprises the survivors of Poland's traditional political parties—Christian Democrats, agrarians from the Peasant Party, faithful Pilsudskiites, even National-Democrats or *Endeks*. Among the signatories of its documents are high-ranking general officers of the pre-war regular armed forces, and heroes of anti-Nazi resistance, as well as once well-known though today largely forgotten political party leaders. The driving force, however, is a younger generation, previously known only from the notorious Ruch trial in 1971.[17] From the ideological point of view they represent various shades of the more traditionally orientated centre-right, mostly of nationalist and Christian-democratic persuasion. From the beginning, there were some objections concerning the democratic credentials of some extremist leaders of this movement. The doubts concentrated mainly on a journalist and historian, Leszek Moczulski, who was even suspected of being "a plant" of the Moczarite "police faction," which in the 1960s had used nationalistic and anti-semitic demagoguery in its bid for power

[15] Adam Michnik, *Kosciol, lewica, dialog* (The Chuch, the Left, and a Dialogue), Paris, 1977.

[16] A very interesting contribution to this dialogue, by Fr. Jacek Salij, OP, published in *Zapis* no. 4, 1977, is available in English translation in: *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston, Kent), vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1979, pp. 42–46.

[17] The trial is covered by Raina, op. cit. pp. 205–206.

inside the party leadership. It was in this connexion that Kuron back in 1976 defined the limits of *democratic* opposition: "I consider all those people who consciously and actively oppose totalitarianism while fighting for the sovereignty of the Polish nation and state, as political oppositionists. On the other hand I do not consider as oppositionists those people who aim at state sovereignty without actively opposing totalitarianism." [18] The political discussion aimed at eradicating all traces of Moczarite influence in the opposition is still going on in the *samizdat* press. It has lost some of its ferocity since Moczulski, although absolved of suspicion of collaboration with the Moczarites and of concealed anti-semitism, ceased to be the editor of *Opinia* and the official spokesman of ROPCiO. He now publishes his own samizdat monthly *Droga* under the aegis of ROPCiO but not as its official organ.[19]

Recently, Moczulski and his followers have jumped the gun, proclaiming themselves a clandestine political party with a programme which openly demands immediate restoration of Poland's independence and national sovereignty [see Part I, p. 87]. This move has been condemned by other opposition groups, not because they disagree with the ultimate goals but because they consider the move premature and potentially dangerous. The attempt to organize a boycott of the March 1980 elections to the Seym and provincial councils proved ineffective. There remains, however, a danger to the opposition as a whole, inherent in any tendency of different groups to make extreme, irresponsible and unrealistic demands.

DESPITE serious differences between political currents of the opposition—differences concerning the ultimate goals, the means used to achieve them, and the limits beyond which the opposition cannot push without risking the disaster of a Soviet armed intervention—there is a great deal of solidarity between them. While engaging in political and ideological discussion in their respective press organs, as a rule they support each other's political and organizational activities. I would not want to present the situation in the camp of Polish opposition as an unmarred idyll—far from it! As anywhere, there is not only matter-of-fact discussion on important political issues, but also a lot of pettiness, bickering, jockeying for position and influence, and even unsubstantiated accusations and slander. More important, however, is the fact that for all their political divergences, people of very different political and ideological opinion usually manage to cooperate within a growing number of oppositional organizations which represent the interests of specific professional groups or set themselves more restricted aims.

It would take me too long to list all such organizations and their

[18] Jacek Kuron, op. cit. p. 15.

[19] For a ROPCiO communiqué on Moczulski *et. al.*, see *Kultura* (Paris), no. 1 (376–2), 377, Jan.-Feb. 1979, p. 229.

specific achievements, as for instance, the Students' Solidarity Committees, the Free Trade Unions, the Peasant Self-Defence Committees, the Polish branch of Amnesty International, and others. By now, all of them have their own *samizdat* organs, and a circle of followers whose strength and influence are very difficult to gauge from afar. But there is one field of activity that until very recently was extremely important—the so-called "Society for Academic Courses," with its "Flying University." In Poland, both names have traditional connotations dating back to the tsarist period, when no Polish higher education was allowed. Many prominent Polish scholars joined the Society, including people who up till then had kept aloof from any kind of oppositional activity.

The stated goal of the Society is to undermine the party's monopoly on education, especially in the social sciences and humanities, fields that have been particularly vulnerable to falsification and propaganda double-talk. Special attention has been paid to the modern history of Poland, Polish literature, Poland's international relations during and after the last war, the political development of post-war Polish society, as well as to some selected problems in economics, sociology, and political science. Some of the lectures on these subjects, which are either taboo at state universities or are treated in a heavily biased, mendacious way, have been held by eminent professors and younger scholars, as a rule in private apartments. They were announced beforehand, and attracted dozens, and in some cases hundreds, of students, who also had access to *samizdat* publications and books smuggled from abroad, circulating through a network of clandestine lending libraries.

Naturally enough, it is against the Flying University, now in the third year of its precarious existence, that most of the police harassment and reprisals have been directed. To prevent lecturers from appearing on the announced dates, they are often detained for up to 48 hours—the maximum time a person can be held by police without specific charges being made. To avoid the necessity of cancelling lectures, they are therefore taped, and if need be replayed from recorders. Because the owners of apartments put at the Flying University's disposal have been harassed, some of the lectures were held in churches, monasteries and other religions institutions, where the police are wary of intervening in force, mindful of the need to maintain outwardly correct relations with the Church, especially since the election of the Polish Pope.

In recent months the Flying University has been forced to restrict its activity because of increased police harassment and physical terror applied by strong-arm squads recruited by security officials among certain students. The initiative remains a brave, if not entirely successful, attempt to break the party monopoly in higher education and scholarship, to provide a focus for independent research and thought

in the areas of the humanities which are worst hit by indoctrination and restrained by censorship.

THE Polish Church has been one of the most traditionally minded churches, not very adaptable to the spirit of the changing times. But paradoxically, its rigidity and dogmatism provided the Church with a dynamic role in society. After the communist takeover, the church reasserted itself as the traditional bulwark of Polish national tradition, culture, and pride. It was forced, of course, to accommodate to the new regime in a variety of practical matters, but unlike the churches in other communist-ruled countries, it has never abandoned its fundamental moral, spiritual, and religious mission. Since no totalitarian regime can tolerate an independent source of authority not subject to its control, the very existence of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, and its enormous prestige as the only authentic authority not imposed by the new rulers and their Soviet taskmasters, largely contributed to the fact that even Stalinism in Poland was to a certain degree emasculated, and never succeeded in breaking the backbone of internal opposition.

The Church is not a political party: it cannot and should not be described in terms of, and even less judged by, political standards. At one time it preferred to consider all oppositional activities and the suppression of dissidents as family quarrels among communists and therefore of no concern to the Church. It is, however, to the great credit of the Primate of Poland, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, that he was one of the first to realize that such an attitude was short-sighted, harmful to the Church itself, and to its religous mission. It is not widely known that in the early 1960s Wyszynski agreed to meet Leszek Kolakowski, then already a scholar of world renown, but still a Marxist philosopher and militant atheist. From that point on, the Catholic hierarchy, always conscious of its religious role as the protector of Church, country, and people, moved imperceptibly towards its present-day stance of defiance. A particularly important role in this evolution was played by the Archbishop of Cracow, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, now Pope John Paul II. While Wyszynski represents the traditional, national Catholicism, Wojtyla was the reformer, open to modern developments. Despite these differences, the authorities' attempts to play one prelate against the other failed dismally.

The Church carefully avoids identifying itself with any particular oppositional current. More than that, it categorically rejects all attempts to make political capital out of some of the groups' genuine or assumed affinity with religion. This does not mean, however, that Church activists and institutions are not involved with the opposition. Some priests are members of KOR and of ROPCiO. Academic chaplains, Catholic students, and Catholic intellectuals publish one

of the most interesting *samizdat* papers, *Spotkania* (Encounters).[20] There are supporters and members of the opposition in the Episcopate-supported Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia, legal newspapers, and publishing houses. Students and faculty members of the Catholic University in Lublin play an active part in the opposition but like other Catholic activists, they always participate in a strictly individual capacity, not as representatives of the Church.

The Church, by defending its own religious and moral values, indirectly strengthens the hand of the opposition. In demanding full human and civil rights for believers, the Church provides powerful support for the opposition. Fundamental differences between the Church and the "secular left" apparently do not, and need not, erect an obstacle to cooperation and support.

WE come now to perhaps the most important question: how do the leaders of the opposition see their future activity, what do they hope to achieve and how, where do they see its limitations? The Democratic Movement rejects any kind of adventurism, that is to say, any attempt to bring about a radical change of the regime. Hence their unqualified rejection of conspiratorial activities and their observance of existing laws, demanding at the same time that the authorities observe their own laws. Hence, also, the stress laid on human and civil rights, theoretically safeguarded by the Constitution, the penal code, the Helsinki Agreement and the United Nations' Convention on Human Rights. The opposition is convinced that even without changing the basic premises of the regime, important gains can be made towards its relative liberalization by challenging the party and state monopoly, by introducing as many elements as possible of political and cultural pluralism, and by exerting incessant pressure from below. There are few illusions that this can be achieved by appealing to the good will of the rulers, or by playing off one party faction against another. The times when such illusions were fairly widespread are long over. Today no one assumes that the party leadership can be convinced to act in the interests of the country and the nation, unless those interests happen to coincide with their own, or that a so-called "liberal" faction can gain the upper hand in the leadership. As Kuron put it in a recent article, "I don't believe in a liberal wing in the party, I believe in the pragmatism of the people in power."[21]

The introduction of reform and of elements of pluralism seems, at first glance, incompatible with the very nature of totalitarianism,

[20] *Spotkania* is reprinted in London (15 Broxholm Road, London S.E.27); cf. Piotr Jeglinski and Alexander Tomsky, "*Spotkania*—Journal of the Catholic Opposition in Poland," *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston, Kent), vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 1979, pp. 23–28.

[21] Jacek Kuron, "Drogi i podzialy" (Ways and Divisions), *Kultura*, (Paris), no. 1/376–2/377, Jan.-Feb. 1979, pp. 168–182.

and certainly cannot provide a long-term solution. But for the time being, there is apparently room for manoeuvre by creating *faits accomplis* through the organization of various forces in society as *sui generis* pressure groups. These groups are tolerated by the authorities because they remain within the confines of the system itself, and chiefly because the party leadership is too weak and therefore unwilling to face direct confrontation.

One aim has been largely achieved thanks to the breaking of the state and party monopoly in information, education and culture. As far as I know, there are at present between 20 and 40 *samizdat* publications, ranging from small broadsheets addressed to a limited audience to voluminous books and literary almanacs, published in a large number of copies, sometimes using the most modern polygraphic techniques, in some cases in luxurious bibliophile editions, with woodcut illustrations. All of them, of course, bypass the official censorship. At first they published mainly texts previously rejected by censors—and therefore written with the intention of submitting them to censorship. By now, most of the literary output is being written directly for *samizdat*, that is to say, without self-censorship.[22]

Some books and periodicals are being reprinted abroad and smuggled back to Poland, together with books written and signed by writers and essayists living in Poland but openly publishing in émigré presses. Even more important is the fact that most of these publications are excerpted or quoted at length by Polish-language foreign radio broadcasts, in particular by Radio Free Europe, and thus reach a very large audience—considerably larger than would have been possible for *samizdat* publications alone. It is therefore no exaggeration to say the party and state monopoly in mass media, literature, and higher education has been to a large extent already undermined, despite recent attempts to put an end to independent publishing. Since such a monopoly is one of the essential preconditions for totalitarian rule, we are witnessing here a most interesting and important experiment, one whose far-reaching consequences are impossible to foresee.

[22] The leading underground literary almanac, *Zapis* (Record), is reprinted in London by *Index on Censorship*. Single issues of other journals, such as *Res Publica*, *Krytyka*, *Puls*, *Spotkania*, *Opinia* and *Glos*, have also been reprinted in the West.

The Uncensored Press*

Lidia Ciolkosz

Of all the tyrannies
Of human kind
The worst is that
Which persecutes the mind.
JOHN DRYDEN

WHEN the subject of Human Rights became an international issue at Helsinki, the Polish democratic opposition made it their own main concern. The Polish opposition groups insist that their activities are within the law as it stands. Among the groups who choose to remain underground, one, PPN (The Polish League for Independence), is more of a think tank than an active organization. As for the rest, they prefer openness to safety and anonymity.

The pattern of the opposition movement is that of pluralism: it embraces a very wide range of attitudes and ideologies. It does not set itself organizational objectives and it intends to achieve its aims by exerting pressure, through the community, on the government and by encouraging free discussion within the movement itself. The exchange of views is conducted, at present, through the medium of 30 or more periodicals published "outside censorship" i.e. not submitted to the censor before publication. Besides supplying reliable information on current events, the free press publishes literary work and political comment.

The publications and the publishers are, naturally, subject to constant police harassment, arrests, beatings, raids, searches and seizures of their work. The technical conditions are difficult in the extreme. Despite all this, no other country in the Eastern bloc has produced a free press of comparable size.

The movement publishes books as well as periodicals and papers. Among the book publishers the most notable are "NOWA," with about 50 titles to its credit, "Wydawnictwo Polskie" (Polish Publishing Company) and "Wydawnictwo Konstytucji 3go Maja" (May Constitution Publishers). The free press represents various groupings within the opposition movement. Thus *Glos, Krytyka, Biuletyn Informacyjny KSS, Komunikat KOR* and *Robotnik* are linked with groups centred round KSS-KOR (Social Self-Defence Committee—KOR). *Opinia, Gospodarz, Ruch Zwiazkowy, Droga, Gazeta Polska, Bratniak* all emanate from the two factions of ROPCiO (Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights),

* This article is based on papers prepared for the conference on the Polish democratic opposition held in London in September 1979.

Spotkania published in Lublin is an independent paper for young Catholics, *Placowka* represents the peasant movement. *Zapis* in Warsaw and *Puls* in Lodz are literary magazines and *Res Publica* stands for and by itself.

THE debate within the opposition movement centres round the ways and means by which the country can recover political independence. The free press expresses the movement's overriding unanimity on the ultimate goal; the ways and means are subject to discussion and the views vary widely even within a particular group.

Let us examine some of the free press statements on the definition of and the prognosis for political independence. Thus, PPN opts for the concept of national sovereignty as an inalienable right of the nation to decide its own fate. PPN concedes that this is not attainable at present. In the PPN publication *1918–1979* we find the following:

> Political independence was thought of in terms of a miracle for more than a century of subjugation. At present, if the 35 million Poles patiently wait for the miracle to happen, it may or may not come about. But if the 35 million work for it—they are bound to succeed. The Polish People's Republic and Poland are not the same thing; the common past, the present and the future, the shared fate and heritage are the essentials of national identity: Poland means Independence.

Marek Turbacz in *Glos,* No. 6, discusses the same problem in greater depth:

> I do not approve of groundless expectations and I do not believe in an early or easy victory. Only a fundamental change in the USSR will make freedom and democracy attainable for us. However, the Soviet political system appears stable at the moment and we cannot expect a reversal in the near future. The stability extends to the whole Soviet empire of which we are a part. I share the view that political independence is not possible in the immediate future. Nonetheless, full independence is one of our goals to be reached as early as conditions permit. I think it important to declare this ultimate objective now as a natural national right which we wish to realize. Even if it is beyond our reach at present, it remains a cornerstone of our political thinking.

Turbacz rejects the concept of "Finlandization" as a possible step towards full independence. In his opinion, the Brezhnev doctrine would never allow this to come about. He continues:

> During the nineteenth century the Poles had to build their hopes on a potential military conflict between European powers. Now, we have to await a radical change in the USSR. In the circumstances, some Western politicians advise us to drop plans for an independent democracy and some of our own country-

> men advise us to keep such plans to ourselves: but we should do neither. Even if our objectives are not attainable in the immediate future our activity exerts a genuine influence in the dissident movement in the USSR and in the satellite countries.

In "What is it about?," *Spotkania* No. 1, Janusz Topacz goes further into the problem:

> We shall not gain allies if we conduct our quest for independence in a spirit of national egoism, without regard for the aspirations of others. We can recover independence and democracy only within a framework of international cooperation: a free Poland in a free world. We shall not gain nor be able to keep our freedom unless the peoples of the USSR become free also.

The importance of solidarity with the dissident movement in the USSR and in other countries of the Soviet bloc is a frequently discussed and much stressed theme in the Polish free press.

Opinia presents the ROPCiO programme. This takes as its point of departure the final statement of the underground Council of National Unity of 1945. This, in keeping with tradition, declared that the struggle for independence should continue, whatever the circumstances. *Opinia* would support, therefore, any moves aimed at recapturing for the nation its own rights, above all the right to freedom.

An article in No. 7 of *Droga* states:

> The campaign for independence and the imponderable moral values should be conducted openly and its ultimate aims should be made clear to the whole nation.

Osrodek Mysli Ludowej, a group which links several generations of peasant politicians, issued in June 1979 a detailed statement of policy, centred on problems of the rural community. Its final paragraphs, however, are of more general import:

> As long as we live, we have the responsibility for the past, the present and the future of our country. No one can make us relinquish it and no one can discharge it in our stead . . . the peasant movement and the country expect us to carry out the trust. The past achievements of the peasant movement, its patriotic stand, are an essential part of the national political heritage: we have to preserve them, against lies and oblivion.

The Gdansk student paper *Bratniak,* No. 2, affirms:

> A proper regard for personal dignity and the unconstrained development of every individual are possible only in a free country, within a framework of national independence.

I think it worthwhile to quote further two statements: they come from very different milieux and are written in very different styles. Both are concerned with the celebrations organized by the autho-

rities on the 60th anniversary of Poland's independence. Both deny to the party and the government the moral right to commemorate the occasion. The eminent writer Jerzy Andrzejewski writes in *Zapis*, No. 8:

> When on the subject of the anniversary, I thought of dividing the period into three: I would call the 20 years between the wars *freedom despite all*, the second war was, oddly, the time of *interior freedom*, what we have now is *a pretence of freedom*.

"Polish People's Republic Celebrates the Anniversary" in No. 25 of *Robotnik* contains the following:

> It has to be said, and said quite bluntly, that to celebrate in good faith, we have to draw a clear line between full and partial independence. We in *Robotnik* put our faith in the ideal of full and not partial freedom. While it can be said with truth that the governing class of pre-war Poland was selfish, reactionary and sometimes downright stupid, it must also be said that the road from our present condition to real independence is bound to be long and the going hard, through mud and mire. But neither criticism of the past, nor sensible patience with the present can obscure the truth: the celebrations of the 60th anniversary are valid only as a reminder of the meaning of genuine independence, confirmation of belief and strengthening of determination. They should not be celebrated by those who have surrendered hope.

POLICY towards neighbouring countries is a much discussed subject in the free press. The manifesto of PPN includes this:

> We are not neighbours of Russia. Our Eastern neighbours are Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. We fully support the desire of those nations to free themselves from Russian domination. Within our means we must aid and assist them.
>
> We make no territorial claims on our Eastern neighbours, although the loss of Vilno and Lvov, cities which for so long formed part of our cultural heritage, is and must remain a deep sorrow.

PPN would ask our neighbours to guarantee to Poles living there equality within the law and opportunities to preserve their language and culture. The KOR publications take a similar view. The Catholic *Spotkania*, in an article by Janusz Topacz states plainly that the Lithuanians cannot be expected to give up Vilno, nor the Ukrainians to abandon Lvov. *Bratniak* makes a different point in an article "Lvov—Thoughts on a city":

> The Ukrainians are fully entitled to call Lvov theirs. It does not follow that the Poles have to forget it and to forgo memories of the city so closely linked with our past. The Ukrainians are one of the inheritors of our own tradition and it is high time for our two nations to join hands and to build lasting solidarity on the foundation of common ideals and aspirations.

Similar views are expressed in *Opinia*.

The relations between Poles and Jews were yet another of the pre-war national minority problems. *Spotkania,* No. 1, published "The Jewish Problem or Anti-semitism?" by Jacek Zaborowski. Zaborowski examines the problem in the light of religious belief and the position of the Church: "A clear distinction between the Jewish problem and anti-semitic attitudes is a goal for the coming generation."

PPN in "Poles and Jews" points out that, for the first time in history, Poland now pursues an official anti-Jewish policy known euphemistically as anti-Zionism, backed by Moscow. The Russians play a double game, feeding world opinion with stories of Polish anti-semitism, while encouraging it to the hilt inside Poland. PPN comes to the conclusion that anti-semitism and its psychological motivations ceased to be a real problem long ago and are now a dead issue.

In future Polish-Russian relations a genuine friendship could be achieved only if they are based on frankness and an open acknowledgment by the Russians of past wrong inflicted on Poland. The relations between the two countries would have to be placed on a footing of equality between sovereign states before old wounds can be healed.

As far as Germany is concerned, PPN considers unification desirable with two provisos: 1. that the present western frontier of Poland be recognized unconditionally; 2. that the whole of Germany be integrated into the EEC.

AS seen by the uncensored press, the role of the Church, whatever the political framework, is to preach the Gospel which proclaims the privileges, rights and duties of individuals. The Church needs to establish for itself conditions of normality in which to carry out its mission. While campaigning for its own rights, the Church battles, indirectly, for the personal rights and freedom of all, whatever their religious or political convictions. When freedom is under brutal attack, the Church has the right and duty to condemn publicly cases of abuse. During the period 1949–55 the Church had to defend its identity and its own existence. Since then, it has fought to enlarge its freedom of action in the field of education and other religious activities. In the dramatic encounters between the people and the party, the Church sided firmly with the people and demanded that human and civil rights be observed. Indeed, the Church made this a prerequisite of the potential normalization of its relations with the state.

The fundamental disparity between the Christian and the Marxist doctrine is obvious. The equally fundamental disparity between the Christian doctrine and any totalitarian ideology has not been always acknowledged. In *Spotkania,* No. 3, Father Stanislaw Malkowski states the case:

> The totalitarian government regards itself as owner of the official ideology and interpreter of history, it sees itself as its own *raison d'être,* it uses people for its own purposes, it recognizes only those social ties, institutions and organizations which it can control and

> manipulate. The Church rejects totalitarianism as a form of organized idolatry . . . the Church is a fundamental obstacle to the development of totalitarian systems, inhuman as they are in their essence.

The anti-totalitarian attitude brought the Church and the opposition movement together. Father Malkowski comments:

> The definition of the opposition's aims and methods makes it clear that the present system should be replaced by polycentric pluralism and not by another type of totalitarianism nor by the chaos of anarchy. The opposition which stands for human rights and life is, *eo ipso*, anti-totalitarian and positive in its approach.

On the side of the free press there is an unequivocal support for the Church. This comes not only from committed Catholic papers such as *Spotkania*, which declared: "The position of our paper arises from our acceptance of Catholic principles . . ." or *Samoobrona Polska* which stands for specifically Polish, traditionally expressed virtues, such as "the faith of our fathers. . . ."

In *Droga*, No. 7, Leszek Moczulski introduces, in the article "Revolution without Revolution," the concept of moral priorities which include patriotism and Christianity as principal motivations. Moczulski considers the Church an intrinsic part of the national heritage. The position of *Spotkania* is further defined by Father Ludwik Wisniewski O.P. in "The Christians and the Struggle for Justice.":

> What are the social consequences of our belief in the Gospel? Is it our duty as Christians to take an active part in temporal affairs? Are we responsible for the eradication of evil and injustice? Should Christians enter actively into the struggle for human values and rights? In short, are we under an obligation to campaign for justice in this world? Among Polish Catholics, there certainly exists a consensus that they must not stand by in the face of injustice.

The peasant free press also accepts Christian ethics. In *Gospodarz*, No. 8, Andrzej Stanislawski states:

> The times when the views of the presbytery and those of the peasants could, on occasion, conflict, belong to the past. We have common political, economic and moral aspirations. We have to act in concert and support each other to realize them.

The memorable statement of the Bishops' Conference of March 1978 found the full support of *Gospodarz*, No. 4: "Once again we find the Church placing its spiritual authority in support of the peasants and the real interests of the nation."

The traditional peasant forms of Catholicism are defended in *Bratniak*, No. 4/5, by Aleksander Hall against an attack by J. T. Lipski and W. Ostrowski. Hall maintains that the popular forms of religious

observance contributed greatly to the survival of the nation against historical odds.

The PPN manifesto examines the obstacles created by the government to prevent the Church discharging its religious, social and educational functions:

> The authority of the Church increased further as a result of its resistance under the German occupation and communist oppression. It is time for the Church to be given freedom of action and be provided with conditions essential to fulfil its role. The importance of this great institution should be recognized in law and all other denominations should be granted the necessary legal safeguards.

The KOR press recognizes the role played by the Church in the campaign for freedom of conscience. As Jacek Kuron puts it in his "Ideological Principles":

> I place among the supreme values the common good, the sanctity of the individual and human creativity. During the past decade, I and many of my friends who took part in the October 1956 and the March 1968 movements, discovered for ourselves the Gospel as a code of ethics of universal significance. I believe that the Gospel should be read anew by each generation and I am convinced that the Left played a considerable part in creating the contemporary readership.

Adam Michnik's frank and controversial book "The Church, the Left and a Dialogue" escaped censorship as it was published in Paris by *Instytut Literacki.*[1] The book set off the process of redefinition by former communists and other members of the agnostic left of their attitude towards religion and the Church. It has been widely discussed by the free press in Poland. Conclusions varied from acceptance of the author's argument to its rejection. There were in addition some personal attacks on the author.

The Pope's visit to Poland was greeted with universal enthusiasm. KOR said in a statement:

> The millions of Poles, whatever their religious views, listened to his words with understanding, enthusiasm and emotion. The unending applause has shown how much his words were heeded, how exactly his message about the supreme importance of the individual fitted the deep spiritual need of the people who reject the denial of human and national rights. The Pope's message created for many of us, in Poland and abroad, an obligation to undertake or else to intensify the campaign in defence of freedom. We in KOR accept this obligation.

ROPCiO said this:

> We feel we must express a sense of joy, gratitude and reverence towards God and towards the successor of St. Peter, 'our own flesh

[1] The French translation was published by "Editions du Seuil" as *L'Eglise et la Gauche—Le Dialogue Polonais*, 1979.

> and blood.' We are grateful to the Holy Father for speaking 'the language of faith and tradition,' for reminding us of the profound truth that to survive, a nation has to go back often to its roots. We are grateful, above all, for demonstrating the spiritual ties common to all humanity and in particular to those nations who shared our history. We are grateful for the words about the respect due to every individual and nation, our own included, who has earned its right to freedom and independence by hard endeavour.

Biuletyn Informacyjny, No. 4/30, includes Adam Michnik's article "A Lesson in Dignity": "... in Cracow, listening to the sermon by John Paul II, I felt that when the Pope asked professing Catholics never to deny Jesus he was also addressing me, a pagan."

THE whole Polish opposition movement agrees on the kind of political system it wants: their experience of two dictatorships, German and Russian, convinced them that a parliamentary democracy is the only acceptable solution. The PPN manifesto puts it as follows: "Power is to be exercised by the people through their representatives elected by a free, secret, direct, equal and proportional vote."

Jacek Kuron in his "Reflections on a Programme of Action" said:

> Without doubt, parliamentary democracy as a system still leaves much to be desired. Nonetheless, as it provides conditions for common aspirations to be realized and a practical platform for voluntary cooperation, it is certainly the best of all political systems tried as yet.

Kuron adds, however, that under a parliamentary system he himself would join a movement for direct democracy, which, he admits, can be introduced only under the aegis of parliament. Under any other system any attempt in this direction would be at the mercy of the state.

Marek Tarniewski examines problems of parliamentary systems and the possible pitfalls from a different angle in "Democracy, Initiative, Social Control" published in *Glos*, No. 6:

> Obviously, democracy has its own problems. In many cases, power tends to pass into the hands of experts ... Can then democracy be combined with an effective system of delegation? The answer is yes, but only if there exists a system of control by agencies independent of the government and representing directly the interest of the people. ...

As examples of such agencies Tarniewski quotes the ombudsmen and the constitutional and administrative tribunals of democratic countries.

Democracy should be strengthened, in the view of the opposition, by a wide measure of local self government in political, administrative and economic life. It is felt that this would be particularly appropriate in the rural areas.

In issue No. 5, *Opinia* published an abbreviated version of a statement by a well known peasant leader Michal Jagla, in which he discusses the inequalities suffered by peasants under the present system. On the same subject, *Placowka*, No. 1/5, has this to say:

> The present government's wish is to destroy the peasants' self respect. And this despite the fact that the history of the peasant movement amply demonstrates its ability to organize successfully advanced self governing institutions.

The freedom of work is another frequently discussed problem: this, it is agreed, cannot be realized without independent trade unions, representative workers' councils, the right to strike and freedom of assembly and association. Parliamentary democracy rests on free speech and a free press. That a number of Polish writers publish openly abroad and that many write in unofficial papers under their own names, is another step towards defeating the system. An editorial in *Spotkania* points out:

> The fast growing size of independent publishing proves that despite 30 years of the monstrously large policing system, independent thought has not been destroyed. Its existence is crucial for the survival of the nation.

Andrzej Braun, speaking courageously at the Writers' Congress in Katowice in April 1978, criticized the condition of Polish cultural life which suffers from censorship, coercion and regimentation. In his speech, published in *Zapis*, No. 7, Braun said:

> A writer, if he is to be more than a cultural bureaucrat, must be allowed to exercise his conscience in judging the public life of the country. This is the essence of his vocation, his social function and the meaning of his profession. He must also be able to comment on the literary work of others on moral and social grounds as his conscience dictates.

The late Professor Stanislaw Ossowski in his article "Problems of Freedom of Speech" reprinted in *Puls*, No. 7, defined the role of the academic community thus: "Campaigning for freedom of speech, for truth as they see it, is one of the principal components of their role in society, it is quintessential."

Freedom of research is closely linked with freedom of speech. This does not exist—in the words of the "Manifesto of the 59"—since the selection of research personnel and the choice of subjects for research are in the hands of officials and subject to political judgment. The institutions of higher education should have their autonomy restored and the academic community should be allowed to govern itself. This problem is much discussed in the independent student press, based on the Students' Solidarity Committees. A. Hall in *Bratniak*, No. 1, says that as the student body is ideologically and politically pluralist, it should not be represented by one sole organization, as at present. Jan Ajzner reminds readers of *Indeks*, No. 1, that, under the new university

regulations only those who are members of the government sponsored organization are eligible for grants. The independent student press reports cases of harassment by the police and the university administration, also cases of expulsion on political grounds. It discloses the well founded concern among the young for the future of the whole fabric of cultural life when the educational reforms now introduced are fully implemented.

The Society for Academic Courses or the Flying University demonstrates in practical terms the concern for freedom of thought, as does the Popular (Peasant) University in Zbroza and other independent academic ventures. Despite the police and administrative harassment organized to prevent lectures taking place, instruction nevertheless continues.

WE come to the coverage of the economy in the free press. It is difficult to discern a concerted approach: the opposition has not yet worked out a common framework of economic principles, or a plan of reform, either in the long or short term. We can, however, quote some views of the economy from the PPN manifesto and the Declaration of the Democratic Movement, also some personal comments in various independent papers.

The principles of social welfare underline the opposition views on economic policy. PPN presented the group's economic thinking in its Manifesto:

> The economic and the political power should be separated. The state should retain control of key industries, such as energy but . . . to achieve the necessary growth it will be essential to remove brakes placed on private initiative by our dogmatic doctrinaires: this would apply not only to large scale cooperatives but also to commercial companies.

The state monopoly is particularly absurd in service industries:

> State ownership in service industries should be restricted to large enterprises . . . for the rest, it would be more efficient and profitable to have private shops and small partnerships. . . . Agriculture needs radical reform. Firstly, the peasants should be assured of the ownership of their land and the nightmare of collectivization removed. Secondly, they should be allowed and encouraged to buy more land and all the machinery they need. There should be no upper limit on the area owned by an individual and all cooperative arrangements should be voluntary and autonomous. Credit should be available for modernization.

PPN makes this point about workers' participation: "Workers in industries owned by the state should be allowed to participate in all decision making processes including investment, production planning and organization."

The 1977 Declaration of the Democratic Movement stresses the importance of freedom of work: "At present there is no freedom of

work since the government usurped the position of the sole employer and the trade unions are under party control." The Democratic Movement demands for the workers the right to strike and to form their own representative bodies independent of the government and the party apparat. Further, the Declaration demands legal safeguards for an independent and autonomous consumer movement.

The Declaration bears the signatures of 110 leaders of the opposition movement, among them Professor E. Lipinski, the grand old man of Polish economics. Professor Lipinski discussed in more detail some of the problems set out in the Declaration in "Fiction and Reality" published in *Glos*, No. 2, 1978: ". . . welfare economy is only possible in a pluralistic society . . ." Professor Lipinski examines the centralized planning system now in operation and dismisses it as fiction: it is not planning that is centralized but the management, a bureaucratic machine which runs the economy on dictatorial lines relying heavily on police support. There is serious lack of reliable economic information, selection methods of the top management need a complete overhaul, works councils and consumer organizations should be introduced, competition encouraged.

In March 1978 "NOWA" published "Reflections on the Polish Economic Situation." The work, prepared by an anonymous team of economists, was introduced by Professor Lipinski, who emphasized the minimalist approach of the authors. The team tried to fit their ideas into the existing political framework and assumed in their considerations the continuing "directing role" of the party. They hoped that this might influence the reaction of the authorities and assure some measure of official attention for the reforms they sought. The present situation, the origins of the crisis and possible solutions are examined. There is some emphasis on the need to inform the country that earnings and consumption cannot at present be allowed to grow rapidly because of heavy borrowing over the past few years, the decrease in the growth of the population affecting the productive age group, deterioration in the supply of raw materials for energy production and the need to increase investment in agriculture in order to further mechanization. The short-term economies should include cuts in the privileges and disproportionately high earnings of some groups and a reduction in the size of the unduly elaborate central bureaucracy. In the long run, planning should be designed to create a welfare economy, incomes should be equalized, autonomous workers and consumer organizations encouraged. The suggestions do not go beyond those of the Democratic Movement and, because they are addressed to government and the party, they have to be less radical.

One of the more interesting reactions to "Reflections" was "The Diagnosis and the Cure," a recorded conversation between economists W. Niedbala, K. Ostaniec, and A. Skrzetny (presumably pseudonyms) and the editorial team of *Droga*, summer 1978. Niedbala, Ostaniec and Skrzetny (N. O. S. for short) criticize the minimalism of "Reflections"

as a tactical and psychological mistake; the party is bound to interpret it as a proof of weakness. Only under the kind of pressure which brings its own continuing position into question will the party agree to concessions. N. O. S. are against slowing down demands for higher pay and reject the argument of national responsibility for foreign borrowing. In their view the debt should be repaid by the industry in which it was invested and pay demands should be maintained at high levels, as the living standard of Polish workers is at present a great deal lower than in Western Europe. It is lower also than that in most of the countries of the Soviet bloc. N. O. S. point out that even the current " economic manoeuvre " which meant partial structural and administrative changes and " opening " of the plan, came about only under the pressure of the June 1976 strikes. In this context, N. O. S. consider that " . . . for the opposition to appeal for a stop to higher pay claims would amount to relinquishing the only argument capable of pressurizing the party into acquiescing to a measure of change." N. O. S. are in agreement with some suggestions in " Reflections " but they feel that the force of the argument was vitiated by being addressed to the government and not to the people.

The discussion continued. Professor K. S. in *Glos*, No. 7, May 1978, disputed the views of N. O. S. and gave priority to a radical price reform which would be possible if free market conditions were re-introduced. Production growth should be shifted from heavy industry to consumer goods and light industry, foreign trade should be redirected so as to make Poland independent of the USSR and a new agricultural policy established which would encourage the development of the private sector, as suggested in statements by the PPN and Independent Peasant Movement. Professor K. S. addresses his remarks to the nation as a whole and argues against the belief in the unlimited power of the USSR which has acquired a quasi-hypnotic quality. The USSR is the guarantor of the present political system and the party has succeeded in convincing the people that the Russian form of socialism is as inevitable as death itself. In fact, the present system, built by one group of people, could well be overturned by another.

FROM statements in the uncensored press there emerges the goal of an independent, democratic, libertarian, tolerant and socially just Poland, searching for a place in the free world. The democratic opposition is carrying out the difficult process of self definition while campaigning against the oppressive system forced upon the country.

Declarations of Opposition Groups

The documents published below illustrate the multiplicity of activities and attitudes displayed by the opposition since it emerged as a significant factor on the Polish scene. They have also been selected to demonstrate the different stages of development of these various currents.

Kor

The Workers' Defence Committee

Warsaw, 10 May 1977

. . . These are only a few examples of the authorities' criminal behaviour and of their violent disregard for and violation of human rights. It is an extremely grave and serious situation, one that we must not underestimate. We must not overlook its incalculable consequences. We have to oppose it with all our might and as actively as possible. We appeal to every single individual to act at all times to oppose any act of terror and persecution, whether it is directed against his fellow citizens, his colleagues or against himself, and whether it takes place at work, in his professional or social environment, or in his union. Solidarity is now an absolute necessity and self-defence by the community as a whole is indispensable. Every violation of human rights and of our rights as citizens which goes uncensored, which passes without opposition and without being brought before the public eye will eventually severely injure every one of us, though it may not, at that moment, be aimed directly at us. Every infringement that passes without comment becomes an antecedent to another transgression. We become accomplices to every violation that we let pass in silence. As acts of lawlessness are growing in number, the Workers' Defence Committee acknowledges the necessity for appointing an Intervention Bureau. It function will be to collect evidence of any violation of human and civil rights and then to inform the public. Whenever it lies within its power to do so it will try to give legal aid where possible, medical aid where needed and financial aid where absolutely necessary to the victims of unjust treatment by establishments of work, by trade unions, by the administrative organs of the state, by the security service or by the judiciary. It also becomes necessary to form a Social Self-Defence Fund in order to establish continuing aid for victims of reprisals and of criminal behaviour by the authorities. This Fund will be instituted directly after the accounts of the Workers' Defence Committee have been cleared. We call on the following people to help set out the principles of administering the Fund: Professor Jan Kielanowski, Professor Edward Lipinski, Dr Jan Jozef Lipski, Dr Jozef Rybicki, Halina Mikolajska, Waclaw Zawadzki, Father Jan Zieja.

The Workers' Defence Committee appeals to all citizens to oppose any manifest act of criminal behaviour. We call on individuals to relay every reliable piece of information concerning known cases of violation of the law by the authorities. The Workers' Defence Committee wishes to stress its conviction that widespread and purposeful action by a united community is the only way to counteract acts of violence, and to check the recurring violations of human and civil rights which are being committed with such impunity in our country. We alone, with justice to support us, can fight against injustice.

The Workers' Defence Committee

29 September 1977

. . . All the participants in the events of 25 June 1976 who were arrested have now been released. The majority of those who had been sacked have been reappointed but, with only a few exceptions, the conditions of their appointment are considerably worse and continuity of employment has not been maintained. The demand for an official disclosure of the extent to which repressions were imposed has not been met and the Polish Government has turned a deaf ear to public opinion which demands that a Special Parliamentary Committee be called to make an unbiased investigation into the circumstances surrounding the June events. The main aim of the Workers' Defence Committee was to provide legal, financial and medical aid for the victims of the post-June repression. This campaign has, for the most part, been completed, although there are a certain number of cases where help is still necessary. At the same time, in the course of its activities, the Workers' Defence Committee has received appeals from many people who, for political reasons unconnected with the June events, have also been suffering repressions and who are seeking aid in the fight for their rights. All sorts of problems have arisen connected with the unlawful activities of the security service and the police, with the way in which justice is dispensed, with the way prisons are managed and so on. KOR could not refuse to ally itself with such important social problems; it found various ways of doing so, amongst others was the forming of the Intervention Bureau and the announcement of the intention to create the Social Self-Defence Fund.

In this situation we consider it necessary to expand the tasks and the field of activities of the Committee. We have decided to reshape KOR into the Social Self-Defence Committee. The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" will insist on the realization of the Workers' Defence Committee's hitherto unrealized demands, it will give aid to those victims of the post-June repressions who are still in need of such aid.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" has the following aims:

1. To fight against repressions imposed for political, philosophical,

religious or racial reasons and to give aid to those who are being victimized for such reasons.
2. To fight against lawlessness and to help those who have been wronged.
3. To fight for an official guarantee that the rights and freedoms of the citizen will not be violated.
4. To support and protect all public initiatives which aim at the realization of human and civil rights.

The year's activities have documented the tragic state of law and order in Poland. This relates above all to the abuse of power by the organs of prosecution, by the prison authorities as well as by the courts of law and the administrative authorities. We will continue our activities as we are sure that the most effective weapon against the constraints enforced by the authorities is the active solidarity of all citizens. The main source of lawlessness as practised by the authorities is the defencelessness of a society deprived of institutions which are independent of the government and which protect individuals and groups in accordance with their best interests.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 10 October 1978

An Appeal to the Nation

The workers' protest in June 1976 revealed the deep crisis in the economic and social life of the country. The period of two years which has since elapsed should have been enough to allow one to expect that the authorities would at least have provided outline plans for solving the crisis. Unfortunately the causes of the outbreak have not been removed in those two years, new sources of tension have arisen instead. Growing disorganization and torpor ravage the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. In this serious situation we consider it our duty to turn to the Polish people with an assessment of the situation and an attempt to indicate remedial measures within their reach. We would also wish our statement to be a warning to the authorities against continuing the policy of consciously ignoring genuine social problems and shirking solutions. The results of such a policy have many times proved fatal to the people and all responsibility for them must rest on the authorities.

1. The increase in food prices rejected by the people in 1976 was replaced by a covert increase. The method of putting onto the market more expensive articles under new names and withdrawing cheaper articles is practised on a wide scale. This tactic is used in the case of many industrial articles and most foodstuffs, not excluding bread and pastry. The rise in prices in the nationalized trade is reflected in the private sector causing a considerable increase in the price of vegetables

and fruit. It is difficult to estimate the scale of this type of price increase but there is no doubt that if official changes are included, inflation is much higher than would appear from official data.

The supply difficulties are growing steadily both in the case of industrial articles and foodstuffs. It is impossible to buy many articles in the shops without queuing up, without an enormous waste of time, without connexions or bribery.

The problem of meat supplies has not been solved. It is difficult to accept the development of the commercial shop network, in which a kilo of sausage costs roughly the daily wage of an average worker (150–200 zlotys) as a solution. Lately meat rationing has been introduced in some industrial plants (for example: Nowa Huta, Roza Luxemburg factory). We do not know whether rationing of meat products is necessary at present. It is impossible to form an opinion until the authorities publish a full balance sheet (production, export and consumption of meat). It is certain, however, that if rationing is introduced it should apply to the whole country and the decision should be approved by the people. The covert increase in prices and the supply difficulties result in a drastic increase in the cost of living which severely hits the poorest classes.

2. The Health Service is in a desperate state. For long years not enough has been invested in it and as a result the number of hospital beds, insufficient to start with, has decreased. Owing to the lack of space and to the poor facilities of the great majority of hospitals which have not been renovated since before the war, the sanitary conditions in many hospitals are a threat to the patients.

Poor diet and shortage of medicines both in hospitals and on the market are an additional obstacle to treatment.

Against this background, the fact that a special, modern hospital for dignitaries is under construction in Miedzylesie and medicines are specially imported for it can only mean that the authorities are fully aware of the state of the health service and collecting premiums for the Social Health Fund is a cynical abuse.

3. There has been no improvement in these last years in the dramatic housing situation. The waiting lists grow longer from year to year as does the waiting period. At the same time the cost of housing steadily adds to the burden of the family budget (the rent plus the repayment of loans from the housing cooperative amount to 3,000 zlotys per month).

4. The authorities try to make up for the economic disorganization by increased exploitation of the workers. The working day for many groups often grows longer. Drivers, miners, workers in the building industry and in other professions work 10–12 hours a day.

Depriving the miners of compensatory days for working on Saturdays, compulsory work on Sundays and a wage system in which one day's absence even if more than justified (illness, death in the family) results in a 20 per cent reduction in the monthly wage such condi-

tions may be compared only to the exploitation of the workers in the early days of capitalism.

5. An examination of the daily wages of the workers and the prices in commercial shops reveals another disturbing fact: an increase in the stratification of society. Wage and retirement pension differentials are too great. We have in Poland families living under extremely difficult conditions and a few families with no material worries. An additional factor which increases social inequalities is the existence of privileges for groups connected with those in power: extra supplies, special health service, housing allocation, building sites allotment, foreign currency allocation, special rest centres—these are but a few of the facilities enjoyed by the ruling group. As a result they become alienated from the community and fail to see the real problems facing it.

More and more often we find that children inherit the privileges of their parents. The principle of an equal start for the young is an illusion.

In a situation where the whole society is going through an economic crisis and the poor suffer the most, special privileges for the ruling group provoke moral indignation and anger.

6. The basic element of the economic, social and political situation in the country in recent years is the deepening crisis in agriculture. The results of a policy of discrimination and of destroying family farming conducted in the last 30 years have now become evident. Despite this, more is produced on one hectare of land in family farming than on one hectare of land in socialized farming. But huge investment sums continue to be directed by the state farms and production cooperatives despite the fact that the cost of running the state farms exceeds the value of their products.

In the last few years the difficulties connected with the general economic crisis, such as the shortage of coal, fertilizers, fodder, agricultural machines and building materials have been particularly severe. This radically restricts the investments of individual farmers and is the reason for the young people leaving the farms.

Bad organization and corruption in the state procurement centres result in the waste of agricultural products ready for the market. With the recent introduction of the pension scheme individual farmers' payments to the state often exceed half of their incomes. The refusal to pay premiums, by more than 250,000 farmers in the country, is the best indication of their attitude to the state agricultural policy.

7. The violation of the principles of the rule of law, which became apparent during the June developments appears to be common practice. The beatings of arrested people by the militia are not just isolated cases but a form of militia law sanctioned by the authorities.

The material collected by the KOR Intervention Bureau and published in the Documents of Lawlessness are proof of the immunity of the militia and security service. Functionaries guilty of the murder of arrested people do not bear any consequences for their action. The

Prosecutor's Office, contrary to legislation, does not react to complaints it receives while the Council of State, the Seym and the Ministry of Justice remain blind to all signs of the growing degeneration and anarchy in the police force and administration of justice.

8. The usurpation by the party of the exclusive right to lead the nation, to impose judgments and decisions in all spheres of life without having to render account is particularly dangerous to Polish learning and culture.

The drastic restrictions on the scope and freedom of academic research and the publication of its results especially in the humanities, in philosophy, economy, sociology, history, the rigid demands of an imposed doctrine which has long lost its ideology and consists of a collection of dogmas and arbitrary regulations dictated by the authorities, the appointment to academic posts of incompetent but docile performers of the instructions of the political apparatus—all this has done irreparable harm to Polish culture; not only does it check its development, it makes the preservation and cultivation of its past achievements impossible. Literature, theatre, films—the branches of culture where the word dominates—are particularly vulnerable when freedom of thought is arbitrarily stifled and all creative activity frustrated. Culture withers away in such conditions. Literature, a vital factor in the spiritual life of a nation is either reduced to the role of the performer of instructions from the authorities and forced to break with the truth about the reality we live in or it is tolerated as harmless and absurd. Culture can only defend itself by the public initiative started a couple of years ago of publishing works outside state control and of engaging in studies free from deforming mendacity.

The system of preventive censorship does not strike only at culture and learning but at the social and economic life as a whole. Censorship stifles not only all criticism but all authentic information which, against the wishes of the party, might allow the people to judge the situation for themselves. The Book of Directives and Recommendations (GUKPPiW) published by KOR reveals the extent of the censorship's interference in all spheres of life. The ever widening area of silence produced by discrimination against living contemporary culture is taken over by a substitute product—blown up to monstrous proportions and omnipresent—entertainment in all its forms, numerous pop festivals, a poor second rate culture which is popularized and which stifles the deeper cultural aspirations of the nation and systematically lowers the level of its spiritual needs.

The works of the most outstanding representatives of science and culture are banned. The more ambitious films are not allowed on the screen, whole periods of earlier history are omitted or falsified. The Polish Primate, the highest moral authority in the country, has warned against this phenomenon, considering it a threat to our national and cultural identity.

The system of disinformation is a vicious circle which also involves the authorities who created it. According to *Zycie Warszawy* 65 per

cent of statistical entries received by the Main Statistical Office are false and even this assessment should be taken as optimistic. It is not possible to make correct decisions on the basis of false information. Paralysis will spread across the country.

The authorities afraid of their own people cannot tell them the truth about the situation. The so-called " economic manoeuvre " propagated as a way out of the crisis turned out to be a collection of temporary, arbitrary and uncoordinated interferences in the economic life of the country. Progressive economic disorganization ensued.

The system of arbitrary and irrevocable decisions made by the authorities who claim infallibility has wrought havoc in the social consciousness of the nation. Opposition to all independent views and insistence on unreserved obedience to all directives form a hypocritical attitude devoid of ideals and promote conformism, servility and careerism. These traits are a recommendation when it comes to filling executive posts. People who are competent, enlightened and capable of independent thought are barred from promotion and often from obtaining a job. The spreading nihilism within society has yielded heavy drinking, cunning, corruption and contempt for honest work.

Basic economic reforms are essential. However, even the best thought out, the most consistent reforms will not bring any improvement if they come up against a barrier of social indifference and discouragement.

THERE are enormous reserves of initiative, action and energy which can bring the country out of its crisis. They will be released only under the condition that all social spheres are truly represented. Publication of true and full information concerning the economic and social situation is also an essential condition. Only when these conditions are fulfilled (cooperation between the rulers and the ruled) will it be possible to work out a detailed programme to improve the economic system and the social situation. The programme should be drawn up on the basis of wide discussions, with the participation of independent experts. If these conditions are disregarded all attempts at establishing contact with the people will only result in a dialogue of the rulers with the rulers.

The experiences of December 1970 and June 1976 have shown that concessions can be obtained from the authorities by means of social pressure. However, the results proved to be short-lived. In no time the authorities took back from the disintegrated society what it had obtained. Only a steady, wide and organized pressure can bring positive results.

Towards the end of 1975 the project to amend the Polish Constitution advanced by the authorities was under discussion. The proposals put forward by the citizens in letters and petitions may be considered a new approach in obtaining the objective of independent social action. The objective is to secure the freedom of conviction, freedom of

speech and information, the freedom of assembly and meeting, the freedom of the press, the responsibility of the state authorities towards society. Action aimed at attaining this objective should create social links, consistently destroyed in a system of a monopolistic, centralized rule. It should be taken up independently of the official organizational structures. It is not by helpless despair that society can regain its rights and set the way to improve the situation—it can achieve this only through a consistent, determined and dignified insistence on its rights. This conviction found its expression in the Declaration of the Democratic Movement, published in October 1977, worked out in association with KOR and signed by more than a hundred people (*Glos* No. 1). The programme for self-organized groups drawn up in the Declaration is an alternative to the growing danger of a spontaneous social revolt which would result in a national catastrophe.

The many independent social initiatives which have arisen recently have proved the programme right:

—the defence of the workers' interests was taken up by the fortnightly *Robotnik*.

—the official trade unions being discredited, founding groups for Free Trade Unions have emerged in Silesia and Gdansk.

—towards the end of July 1978 the Provisional Committee for Farmers' Self-Defence was set up in the Lublin Region and at the beginning of September in the Grojec region. These committees represent 16 villages in the Lublin voivodship and 20 villages in the Radom voivodship. The fortnightly *Gospodarz* deals with the problems of the farmers.

—the reason for the emergence of the KOR Intervention Bureau was to reveal the violations of the law and help those who were wronged.

—the student committees set up at colleges throughout the country aim at breaking the monopoly of the official Socialist Student Union and at reviving an independent movement to protect the interests of the students and higher education.

—the emergence of the Society for Academic Courses was a reply to the subjugation and mendacity of scholarship. A group of outstanding scholars organized last year a series of lectures for the whole semester at which several hundred students were able to take up studies in an atmosphere of gravity and truth unchecked by censorship and not tortured with political phraseology.

—the state monopoly on publishing has been broken by the ever developing independent press. The socio-political papers and the Independent Publishing House publish authors condemned to silence by the authorities.

— all this indicates the revival of cultural life.

It is not much but sufficient to show that independent, organized, effective social action is possible. The larger the independent organiza-

tions, the less the danger of its members being exposed to reprisals and the more effective their activity.

Independent social action in recent years consists of organizing genuine public opinion, defence against reprisals, formulating realistic demands and breaking the state's monopoly on information. Everyone can join in this action.

IT is imperative that there should be the widest possible discussion on the social and economic situation in the country. It will not be started by the authorities, but:

(a) every citizen can and should voice his opinions at public meetings, present facts known to him and insist on receiving information from the authorities, put forward his suggestions and get them passed by the meeting.

(b) every citizen can and should inspire among the people he works with discussions on the living and working conditions and the economic and political situation in the country. These discussions should lead to the formulation of demands for changes in the place of work and initiate work on the programme of improving the general situation. They should also be the beginning of action within the official structures and beyond them.

(c) every citizen can and should take part in breaking the state monopoly on information. He can do so by, for example, distributing independent papers and informing independent institutions of the problems facing his colleagues, of their needs and demands.

It is imperative to be organized in order to defend one's rights. Only people who are organized can choose their real representatives. All citizens who are members of trade unions and official farmers' organizations have the opportunity of choosing their real representatives at all union levels and of drawing up a programme in defence of the workers' interests. For example, the miners, waiting in vain for compulsory work on Sundays or a 12-hour working day to be abolished, could make this into an issue at the union elections, voting only for those candidates who will pledge themselves to fight for the realization of this demand. Citizens who cannot work through official organizations, ineffective as a rule, can call to life new ones, as did the farmers from the Lublin and Grojec regions. Such action is possible in all social spheres.

It is always easier to fight in an organized way. Every strike, every group petition by factory workers or farmers will be effective if we act in solidarity and in a disciplined way. This is particularly important at a time when the use of force by the authorities provokes indignation, anger and despair.

The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares: (Article 10) Every citizen has the right to hold his own views without impediments; every citizen has the right to express freely his opinions, this right includes the freedom to seek, obtain and impart all informa-

tion and opinions orally or in print, in the form of a work of art or any other way he chooses. (Article 22) Every citizen has the right to freely unite in public organization including the right to set up and join trade unions to defend his interests.

The Covenant was ratified by the Council of State in March 1977 and is legally binding on all. When Polish society is able to organize itself in defence of its rights the process of overcoming the social, economic and political crisis will have started. The deepest cause underlying the crisis in our country is that the citizens are deprived of their rights and the state of its sovereignty.

Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 17 September 1979

The 40th anniversary of the Nazi German attack on Poland fell on 1 September. On 17 September came the 40th anniversary of the attack on our country by the USSR. With these invasions the Second World War began. The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" feels an obligation to remind public opinion at home and abroad, and the nations and governments of the whole world of the crimes of genocide committeed against the population of Poland by the occupying powers. Crimes of genocide have been prosecuted by the forces of international law only in so far as regards Nazi crimes. The crimes of genocide of which the Stalinist government of the USSR was guilty have not, to the present day, been prosecuted, although their victims number some 40–60 million people (a figure given, *inter alia*, by the former labour-camp prisoner, the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn). We wish to state that the Soviet authorities are fully responsible for the crimes of genocide committed by the Stalinist regime in their own country and abroad being hushed up and not prosecuted. As regards Poland and the population of our country, the Soviet authorities are guilty of the following crimes:

(1) The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (concluded 23 August 1939 and augmented by the agreement of 22 September 1939) made possible the outbreak of the Second World War and served as a premise for the partition of Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

(2) On 17 September 1939 the Soviet armies broke the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact and attacked the Polish Commonwealth. After heavy fighting, they began the occupation of more than half the area of the country. The Soviet government treated Polish statehood as non-existent. During the fighting, the Soviet high command, in leaflets signed by Marshal Timoshenko, called upon the soldiers of the Polish army to liquidate their officers. Out of the 230,000 prisoners-of-war taken by the Soviets, only 82,000 survived.

(3) During their occupation of the territory of the Polish Common-

wealth in 1939–41, the Soviet authorities undertook a systematic campaign of extermination of the population of the occupied region, which was particularly aimed at those of Polish nationality. Between 1·6 and 1·8 million citizens of the Polish Commonwealth were transported to prisons, labour camps and regions of forced settlement in the Arctic. Out of this number, close on 600,000 prisoners perished from hunger, want and exhaustion as a result of conditions prevailing in the camps. The Soviet authorities continued the extermination of the Polish population after the region was reoccupied by the Soviet armies in 1944. For example: from the Vilna area and the Lvov district more than 30,000 soldiers of the Home Army were deported, and even today, the fate of most of them remains unknown. Within the territory of the Polish state, after 1944, the Soviet authorities imprisoned and detained soldiers of the Home Army and representatives of the government of the Polish Commonwealth. Only a negligible fraction of the several tens of thousands of victims of these repressions survived. The majority perished, deported to the Soviet Union or shot on the spot. The Soviet authorities then brought a case against the Polish State. 16 members of the highest authorities of the Polish Commonwealth were kidnapped from Polish territory and convicted in a fake trial in Moscow.

(4) In spring 1940, the organs of the NKVD murdered 4,500 officers of the Polish army in Katyn wood in the vicinity of Gniazdovo village near Smolensk. These were prisoners-of-war captured in 1939. These prisoners had previously been in a camp for officers at Kozielsk. The fate of the Polish officers who were prisoners-of-war in the camps at Starobielsk (numbering 3,910) and Ostashkow (about 6,500) has still not been investigated fully. The Katyn graves were uncovered in 1943. The Soviet government denied responsibility for the crime and when the Polish authorities approached the International Red Cross with a request that the Katyn graves should be investigated, the Soviets took this as collaboration with the Nazis and severed diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile. In a note sent to the Polish government on 25 April 1943 the Soviet government stated that "The Polish government and the Nazi government forced the International Red Cross to carry out the 'investigation' . . . The fact that a hostile campaign against the Soviet Union was begun simultaneously in the German and the Polish press within the framework of the same plan leaves no doubt that between the enemies of the allies, Hitler, and the Polish government there exists a contact and collusion in waging this hostile campaign." The same formulation was used in a letter from Stalin to Churchill on 21 April 1943. In 1946, the Soviet government charged the Nazi war criminals, before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, with having committed the murders in Katyn wood. The Nuremberg tribunal did not find the leaders of the Third Reich guilty. But they did not consider the guilt of the USSR either. Only in 1952 did the Katyn commission of the USA state that "the Polish officers at Katyn were shot in spring 1940 by the Soviet NKVD."

THE Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" wishes to state that the Soviet government has never, up to the present time, considered the Stalinist regime in the USSR guilty of the crimes of genocide described here and has not tried to trace the perpetrators. Likewise, the government of the Polish People's Republic did not want and still does not want to bring to light the matter of Katyn and the other Soviet crimes; on the contrary it tries in every way to make it impossible to reach the truth. Evidence of this, *inter alia,* is given by the instructions of the Principal Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances forbidding mention of the Katyn murders in the press and other publications. Hence, in accordance with the criminal law of the Polish People's Republic, the Polish government is an accessory to hushing up the crime and making it impossible to reach the material truth and to trace the perpetrators of genocide. The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" considers that the crimes of genocide committed by the Soviet authorities must be brought to light and made public. This obligation falls also on the authorities of the Polish People's Republic. The criminals, like the Nazi criminals, must be put in the dock. We are not driven by a desire for revenge or punishment; our aim is judgment. We are convinced that the whole truth must be revealed. All people must be fully aware that instructions from the ruling authorities do not exempt from responsibility those who committed the deeds.

PPN

The Opponents of the System

September 1977

The political system governing Poland today must be defined as totalitarian. Totalitarian systems, although alike in practice, differ considerably. Our own variety rests on three principles:

1. The Party, or, to be more precise, the strongest group within the Party leadership, has the monopoly of political and economic power.

2. The country is subordinated to the USSR politically, economically and militarily.

3. The Party controls the administration of justice: the courts are not independent.

The three principles are intrinsically linked. All three are essential for the system to survive. Even if one of them were to be removed, the whole system would change. It would change to such an extent that it would cease to be totalitarian.

The first principle means that we do not choose our leaders and that we are not consulted in matters which concern us. The ruling Party forbids the expression of any but communist ideology. It is forced to tolerate the Catholic Church, and religion in general, owing to the pressure brought to bear by believers. The Party apparatus, the administration and the economy are not under public control. The government as a whole and its members are not responsible to the country for its own aberrations, not even for shooting at striking workers. The economy of the country is subordinate to ideological dogma, to political decisions and to the whims of Party despots. The deployment of resources needed to maintain the enormous apparatus of the Party, the administration and the police leads to the exploitation of the working masses.

The second principle leads to the subordination of our national interests to those of the USSR and to continued Sovietization of Polish culture. Stifling of the Polish tradition of independence, distortion of our history and weakening of our links with the Western countries, our traditional partners, are among the ideological consequences of our subjection to the USSR.

Politically, the decisions of the Kremlin dictate our international strategy, our pacts and alliances; they impede our relations with the European Community and with international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Militarily, we are forced to arm well beyond our needs, all under the control of Soviet officers. Instead of negotiating our own treaties and non-aggression pacts we have to follow Soviet adventurism in Asia and Africa. In the economic field, the USSR made it impossible for us to put into practice the so-called great reform after 1970. It forces us to support its own outdated economy by making us invest in projects which are not in our interest. Trade with the USSR is based on an artificial rate of exchange between the ruble and the zloty and we are unable to use our surplus to acquire hard currencies.

The principle of subordination ties Poland to a country theoretically

rich but badly administered and economically out of date. The dangers of the situation have been amply demonstrated in the oil industry, where the USSR has not been able to supply the contracted quantities.

The third principle is manifest in the appointment and dismissal of judges, always dependent on the whim of the authorities, and in the subjection of the courts to political pressures. The verdicts are dictated, false indictments are made, and the law is interpreted according to political requirements. The authorities interfere with the administration of justice to the point of making it into an instrument of intimidation. One cannot hope for an impartial judgment and this is particularly glaring in political cases, partly because the legal provisions are often in contradiction to fundamental principles laid down by the Constitution. The Constitution contains safeguards for the freedom of speech and worship, but the law prescribes long terms of imprisonment for disseminating information the authorities consider harmful. Despite the constitutional safeguards people have been tried and sentenced for expressing criticism of authority in private letters, for satirical ditties about Gomulka, for writing open letters to the Party and for lending books, the contents of which were awkward for the government. All these are means by which the authorities hope to prevent the development of any independent political activity.

THE majority of Poles are profoundly opposed to all three ruling principles. The majority want this country to be democratic, independent and just. There are, however, many people, either members of the Party or holding administrative posts, who are opposed to only one or two of the three principles.

There are those who consider that the consolidation of political and economic control in the same hands is a mistake. The separation of powers in these fields, perhaps on the model of Yugoslavia, and the freeing of the economy from the dogmatic control and political pressures exerted by the Party apparatus would bring speedy economic improvement, as demonstrated by even the partial and timid reforms which were allowed to take place after the crises of 1956 and 1970. There are undoubtedly many members of the Party leadership, particularly those concerned with the economy as a whole, who would welcome fundamental economic reforms. They would not, at least not at the start, regard them as a curtailment of their own power. They would, on the contrary, see such reforms as the way to freedom from the constant threats to supplies of food and other everyday necessities.

It is also likely that the majority within the Party are against the subservience to the USSR which is the official line. Nobody can be very fond of the role of servant to a foreign power: particularly so, as the internecine struggle in the Kremlin is so often liable to reflect on those in power in Warsaw. Having tasted power, the quasi-colonial governors would much prefer to hold it in their own right rather than strain at the leash. The conflict tends to accelerate when the USSR dictates decisions directly opposed to Polish national interests, as was the case when further development of the steel industry was ordained instead of the much more needed chemical industry, utilizing coal derivatives. Even if the dependence on the Kremlin does not jar on the sense of national dignity, it must be irritating and humiliating

personally. Even those within the leadership who have no other objections to the totalitarian system, would surely prefer it to be at least a sovereign one, on the lines of Rumania.

The third principle, depriving the courts of their independence, is bound to be opposed even by some committed supporters of the system. At present, as the administration of justice depends on the current whim of the leadership, those who happen to fall out of favour may find themselves in peril : guilty or not, they may, if the moment is propitious, become scapegoats in a purge. To them, the independence of the courts would mean that the sentence would be related to the offence instead of representing an outcome of the intra-Party struggle. We think, therefore, that it is reasonable to assume that a considerable number of people now near the centre of power are opposed to the third principle.

But, as we have said before, the three principles are welded into one. Without the monopoly of power the Party enjoys, it would be impossible to maintain the existing servile dependence on the USSR. A democratically elected government might agree to an alliance, but not to servitude or to falsifying national history just to please our powerful neighbour. A separation of the economic from the political authority would bring in independent experts to run the economy. They would have more freedom of action and the resulting prosperity would lead to democratization of the system.

Once the country were freed from its dependence on the USSR, it would be found impossible to maintain the monopoly of power. The communist system was forced on us in 1944–45 and has survived since owing to the Soviet military presence in the immediate postwar period and to continuing military blackmail. The moment the USSR ceases to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland, the system is bound to evolve in the direction more acceptable to the majority. Totalitarianism is completely at odds with the importance we have always attached to the existence and the implementation of human rights.

The USSR cannot afford an open intervention in Poland, or at least not a repeated one, nor one too brutal. The threat of military intervention, slyly bandied about by the permanently intimidated Party leaders, has succeeded in keeping Poland in unwilling subjection for so long only because the third principle of the system has been in operation. If the administration of justice were not so much in the control of the authorities, if the public were not intimidated by the daily repression and economic threats, the totalitarian system could not survive the strong and unyielding public pressure against it.

Even without realizing it, everyone who is opposed to at least one of the three principles, is in fact opposing the whole system. And there are very few, even among the *apparatchiki*, who approve of all three. Only very few are so attached to their own privileged position that they are prepared to defend the monopoly of power, remain in political servitude to the USSR and break the law. Such people are not our opponents but our enemies: they are prepared to betray, to shoot and to torture. Let them remember, though, how very thin on the ground they are.

If there are so few of them, however, how is it that they can continue to keep the country in slavery? Although the main reason

for the survival of the system is that the USSR is its guarantor, the totalitarian state also survives because so many of those who are against it in spirit, are passively supporting it in deed. Those in power have at their disposal a large range of punishments and rewards and many citizens are tempted to come to quasi-contractual arrangements with the authorities. There are rewards to be had for silence, for joining the Party, for obeying directives, for repeating lies, for keenness and for over-keenness, for protecting some and upsetting others, or perhaps for doing both but at different times. The public, stupefied and corrupted, is apt to forget that the ultimate purpose of favours from the authorities is the utter subjection of the country to the crushing power of the totalitarian system.

PEOPLE who maintain that the USSR will not allow any political change in Poland are right only in part. The Soviet pressure is very great but not immutable and not necessarily eternal. We managed to get rid of the Soviet "advisers," including the then Minister of Defence, in 1956: there is no reason why we should remain in this condition of servitude in the present, much improved, international situation.

All of us who oppose the system, those outside the Party and those within it, should understand better the nature of our strength. We should remember that we represent the great majority of our people. We should remember that even among the leadership and the Party apparatus there are very few people totally dedicated to the system. Many would prefer to live and to work under a different regime and many could play a positive part in a democratic Poland.

We must also remember that we will succeed only if we oppose actively: in our work and in our thinking, always aware of our ultimate aims of liberty and justice. An opponent of the system who does not make his position clear, becomes its unwitting adherent.

ROPCiO

Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights

To the People of Poland

25 March 1977

On 10 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document codified the key provisions with regard to the defence, freedom and dignity of the individual. As a result, respect for the fundamental human liberties became an intrinsic part of contemporary and future order in the world. Consolidation of this principle in the world community was given expression on 16 December 1966, when the UN General Assembly passed the international Covenants on Human Rights, which have the status of international law, binding those states which have ratified the Covenants. They came into effect at the beginning of 1976, after ratification by the required number of 35 countries; in the Polish People's Republic they became binding on 3 March 1977, i.e. from the moment of their ratification.

We accept with satisfaction the ratification of the Covenants by the Council of State in Poland and believe it to be in agreement with the fundamental desires of the people of Poland. It is one of the most valuable and still thriving traditions of the Polish nation that great weight is attached to the rights of man and citizen, to the dignity of the individual, to freedom and mutual tolerance. Over the centuries these fundamental principles have found expression in such documents as *Neminem Captivabimus, Nihil Novi,* the Warsaw Confederacy, the Constitution of 3 May, and in the motto "For Your Freedom and Ours"; having for many generations been a quintessential part of our national consciousness, they are generally accepted to be indispensable to our life as a society.

For this reason we attest, together with the peoples of the world: that human and civil rights are inviolable and inalienable; they can not be relinquished. No nation can be truly free if its members renounce the use and defence of their rights, as historical experience, including that of the Poles, has shown. Therefore we, the undersigned, taking into account: —that respect, and demand for respect, for human rights and dignity, belongs to the most valuable traditions and achievements of Polish culture—that the fundamental guarantees of the freedom and dignity of the individual, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international Covenants on Human Rights, are generally accepted today to be one of the key achievements of our civilization—that the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on 31 July 1975 in Helsinki, binds all the signatory states to act in accordance with the aims and principles of the Charter of the UN and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, raising respect for the rights and liberties of the individual as there defined to the status of a factor controlling international relations on our continent—that the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic also affirms the implementation of the civil liberties contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as: freedom of conscience, the spoken and written word, of demonstration, meeting and association, and that the practical realization of these provisions has become indispensable not only for the spiritual welfare of our country, but also because it is a *sine qua non* for the expansion of our economy and culture—have decided to take up joint action in order to:

1. Adhere to, and monitor adherence to, all human and civil rights, and human dignity;
2. Make known to public opinion and to the appropriate authorities infringements of human rights and liberties, and to provide victims with such aid and protection as lies within our scope;
3. Propagate among the public and propose to the state authorities changes in the law and regulations which would lead to a genuine and continuous assurance of the implementation of the rights and liberties defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international Covenants on Human Rights;
4. Propagate the need for all European countries to join the international Covenants on Human Rights, in order to create a common legal and political base for the development of genuine détente and understanding in Europe.
5. Cooperate with all international organizations which defend human rights, and with the UN Human Rights Commission in particular, so that the principle of freedom may triumph in the world.

We are not forming an organization or association. Our initiative is the result of urgent public need.

A strong social current has already arisen in Poland—the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights. We appeal to everyone in Poland for moral support, for cooperation and help, particularly in obtaining essential information concerning the infringement of human and civil rights; we appeal to everyone to take up and expand similar initiatives in all social, professional and regional milieux. Human and civil rights and the dignity of the individual can be preserved only when they are respected by all, and all actively demand that they be respected.

Text of speech by Wojciech Ziembinski, delivered on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, on 31 July 1979 in Warsaw, in front of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (*transcript of a tape*).

Soldiers of the Polish Underground! Soldiers, who from September 1939 onwards, faced the Germans and the Russians. We fought against

both occupying powers. The Polish people pay dearly for their freedom. The war claimed six million victims, Polish citizens. Well over ten thousand soldiers and almost two hundred thousand civilian inhabitants perished in the ruins of Warsaw—a city never enslaved and never conquered. We are standing in front of a Pantheon to the glory of the Polish Nation, in front of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—before a Tomb which the occupiers damaged but will never be able to destroy. The German enemy tanks came through here. Other unworthy hands removed the tablets bearing the names of battlefields of the Great War and the Russo-Polish war of 1919–20. We demand the return of those tablets, commemorating the glory of Polish arms (*applause from the crowd*).

Fellow Poles! We stand here and place our modest offering, bouquets of wild flowers, wreaths. On their ribbons are written the words " To the Soldiers of the Polish Underground from the Upholders of the Ideals of Independence," " To the Insurgents of Warsaw from the Youth of Poland." We lay those wreaths, conscious of the importance of this moment and remembering that the last will and testament of the soldiers of Fighting Poland has not been carried out (*applause*). The last Commander of the Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki, who laid down his life on foreign soil, murdered in Moscow in 1946, on 19 January 1945 issued his final order which I will now read out to you: " Soldiers, I give you my final command. Carry on with your work and activity aimed at regaining full independence of the Polish State and at safeguarding the Polish population from the holocaust. Try to be the leaders of the people and to restore the independence for the Polish State. In this task, every one of you must be his own commander-in-chief (*applause*)."

Poles! I am speaking to you in the name of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights in Poland—a movement which for some years has striven openly in the cause of the full restitution of the rights of our most Illustrious Commonweath (*applause*). Freedom is the most precious objective. We pledge to you, soldiers of the Polish Underground, to safeguard the independence and the freedom of the whole Republic and to continue your work as long as we live. (*Crowd sings the Polish National Anthem.*)

KPN

Declaration of Principle of the Confederation of Independent Poland

September 1979

We are yet another generation in the long march of history. For over 200 years, since the time of the partitions, the people of the millennial Republic have been fighting for independent statehood. Forty years ago the Polish state fell under the blows of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. It will soon be 35 years since the infamous Yalta agreements, when the Western powers—despite their professed ideals of international justice and democracy—sanctioned the latest partition of the Republic as well as Soviet domination over Poland. The Polish People's Republic, governed in a totalitarian way by the Polish United Workers' Party, is a modern form of institutionalized Russian rule over Poland.

Today the Polish nation, bent in the yoke of slavery for so long, is awakening and standing up for its rights. We are now entering a new chapter in our history. It is to a large extent up to us when Poland will regain its independence and the Polish people will be able to decide their own fate. It has been a historical tradition in the life of the Republic that in moments of national need citizens formed confederations in order to defend their rights and their motherland. The formation of the Confederation of Independent Poland is a Polish response to the challenge of the changing times. We must not waste the emerging opportunity to create an independent and democratic Third Republic. The only way to achieve this is to remove Soviet domination by eliminating the power of the Polish United Workers' Party.

The Confederation of Independent Poland unites actions and efforts of various groups which differ on matters of ideology and in their social and political convictions but all are faithful to the overriding cause of independence. The Confederation is a focal point for the present efforts towards independence and intends to unite all those who are convinced that:

1. An independent Polish Republic is the only form capable in the modern world of giving the Poles an opportunity to develop and fulfil national and individual aspirations.
2. The creation of the Republic is possible only if the principle of national self-determination is realized and it depends first and foremost on the will and action of the Poles themselves.

both occasional self-determination consists in free expression of the will of the people on:
—international sovereignty of the state,
—social system and type of state,
—state authorities.

4. Any democratic system is based on inalienable human and civic rights, mutual tolerance and respect for the rights of others. The democratic system finds expression in the formation of state authorities solely based on the social mandate of confidence. Such authorities act strictly within that mandate and only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the people.
5. In order to ensure social justice and real equality for all citizens, the cooperation of all working people in the administration of the national economy is necessary, as well as co-supervision of common property, acknowledging the functions of intervention and coordination of the state.
6. The condition of the proper functioning of the Republic, the welfare of her nation and of all individuals, in the fulfilment of duties—equal for all—towards oneself and other people, towards society and the nation, towards the neighbouring peoples with whom we share our history and our life on this planet, towards the Republic and humanity at large. A sense of duty is expressed in devotion to our high ideals and our motherland, and devoted service leads to generosity and readiness to make sacrifices.
7. Social strength is multiplied by the historical national community which contains all the past, present and future Polish generations. Within this community the individual aspiration of the people are realized. Polish national consciousness has been moulded by a process of over 1,000 years of social and national development, a process accompanied by the presence of the Catholic Church, both in good and in bad times. The irremovable values inherent in the Polish national consciousness are:
—the awareness that the Republic belongs to all its citizens
—an understanding of the need for national sacrifices in the name of higher aims common to all Poles
—attachment to the world of values formed by Catholicism and to the principles of Christian ethics.
8. Our history and our national tradition gives us a sense of joint responsibility for the freedom and welfare of our brotherly peoples whose history is linked with ours and who have the right to determine their own fate.
9. The honour of the Nation and of the Republic is a common good and a common duty of all citizens.
10. The Republic—which is a common good and common need of all citizens—can belong to them only; serving the Republic we are serving mankind.

The activities of the Confederation of Independent Poland, of its confederated groups and of all its members, are based on the above principles. Each of the confederated groups has its own programme regarding particular questions.

In forming the Confederation of Independent Poland we appeal to all Poles here and abroad to unite in actions for freedom and independence.

The Council of State of the
Polish People's Republic

In accordance with Article 83 of the Polish Constitution and Article 19 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, we demand that equipment necessary for press and book publication (printing presses, offset, xerox, book-binding and distribution facilities among others) be made available to independent groups and movements.

Publications independent of the ruling party, which monopolizes all mass media, are necessary for the proper functioning and development of society.

The monthly journal of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, *Opinia*, has been published since April 1977. Other periodicals which have appeared regularly for a long time are: *Biuletyn Informacyjny, Bratniak, Glos, Zapis, Gospodarz, Robotnik, Ruch Zwiazkowy, Spotkania, Droga, Krytyka, Puls.* These periodicals are being published in particularly difficult conditions and with a great social effort.

Access to publication is an inalienable right of the whole of society and not just of one privileged group. This is guaranteed by the legal documents mentioned above. The deepening economic and social crisis in our country is a glaring proof of the lack of independent public opinion and social autonomy. One of the fundamental conditions of realizing genuine autonomy is to give access to publication to independent social groups and movements.

Having the good of Poland in mind we demand the immediate implementation of our request. In case publishing facilities are not made available to us, we shall have to turn to the nation. Moreover, we will appeal to the UN Human Rights Committee which monitors the implementation of human and civil rights. Being aware of our inalienable rights to use publishing facilities, we shall be forced to ask international institutions for help in obtaining them.

On behalf of the Movement for the
Defence of Human and Civil Rights
Marian Golebiowski
(Press bureau of the Movement)
Warsaw, 2 April 1979.

SKS

Cracow Students' Solidarity Committee
Aims and Principles of the Student Movement

Cracow, 25 May 1977

The SKS is not an organization but a widely based movement within the student community. Our aim is to monitor the way in which the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution and other legal provisions are being observed. Our special concern, and a moral obligation, is to watch the way in which student rights are considered.

The SKS does not offer formal membership to those wishing to support it. The movement started as the result of a spontaneous student initiative.

The spokesmen for the Committee have no formal or legally binding control over the movement and they do not constitute in any sense its governing body. It was found necessary to nominate them in order that the proposals and initiatives of the movement as a whole could be coordinated.

The activities of the SKS in no way infringe the law relating to the right of individuals to associate. The SKS acts in accordance with the letter and the spirit of article 84 of the Constitution and article 22 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the Polish government on 3 March 1977.

. . . The SKS considers it right and proper to examine critically the status and activity of the Socialist Association of Polish Students (SZSP) . . . [the statement goes on to analyse the statute of SZSP and concludes that it is a political organization, dependent on the party, and therefore not independent].

. . . There is a need for an independent student movement open to all without regard for political adherence and ideology. Such a movement would provide a platform for discussion in which everyone could take part as well as genuinely representing student interests.

The SKS is determined to press for the creation of a truly independent organization capable of achieving constructive change within the universities and other institutions of higher education.

There is a need for far reaching changes leading to a more democratic structure of the universities and to the genuine participation of students in the planning of the curriculum as suggested by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 2), which states that the purpose of education is the full development of the personality and the enhancement of respect for human rights and fundamental liberties.

Student autonomy is a necessary prerequisite for the autonomy of academic institutions as organizations and as places of research. Aca-

demic institutions cannot function satisfactorily without such autonomy.

The student movement must not, however, restrict its concern to the problems of its own environment. Our situation is determined by the conditions prevailing in the community at large: we can exercise influence over the latter only if we are free from organizational and institutional dependence which binds us at present. It is for this reason that we must pay close attention to the question of human rights, guaranteed by the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Students' Solidarity Committee in Warsaw

Warsaw, 15 May 1979

THE Students' Solidarity Committee in Warsaw thinks it is its duty to inform the students and teachers of Warsaw University about the suggested changes and amendments to the statute of their University. Although the authorities of the University published the text of the intended alterations, the number of copies—400—makes it practically inaccessible not only to all the students but even to many teachers and researchers who are most affected by the regulations of the statute. Below we quote some of the formulations of this text:

> Following §2, §2a is added: 2a—The Polish United Workers Party plays a leading political role in the University through its inspirational, mobilizing and controlling activity. The Party is particularly concerned about the conformability of the University activities with the socialist programme of the country's development. §4: The Polish Students Socialist Union represents the students. The Union is an exponent of the aims and aspirations of the students and junior University teachers and it takes part in the formation and realization of all the objectives of the University. §17;5—The Rector is responsible for law and order within the University. Therefore he can order a reconsideration, repeal or change of decisions taken by all the organs of the University, if such decisions are incompatible with the law or principles of social coexistence, or are not in accordance with the basic aims of the University. §33;1—It lies within the Dean's capacity in particular to: 1, Lead within his department the process of education and teaching in a way that would take into account the latest scientific achievements and in a way permeated by the socialist, patriotic and international spirit . . .

In our view the inclusion of these clauses within the Warsaw University statute would be equivalent to abolishing the last vestiges of University autonomy and a violation of the principle of freedom of research. Research can develop freely and be creative only when it is not subjected to ideological pressures and when its sole objective is the search for truth. The authorities of the Polish People's Republic

want to hide the real state of the country from the people. Social sciences and the humanities are the main targets of political restrictions. If this state of affairs is legalized in the statute of the University, it might mean the end of all free inquiry. Since the draft mentions also " the controlling role of the Party," one can fear that the authorities want to legalize a situation in which the University is to serve as an exponent of Party doctrine.

Workers' Actions

Declaration of the Founding Committee of the Free Trade Unions of the Baltic Seaboard

29 April 1978

The Polish Trade Union Movement ceased to exist over 30 years ago.

Forced dissolution of political parties, such as the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) and other independent organizations representing various social groups in the country, preceded by the imposed merger of individual Labour Unions into a single body, resulted in the Trade Unions becoming yet another institution representing the interests of one monopolistic state employer, rather than that of the employees. The Unions became an extension of the Polish United Workers' Party and an obedient tool to operate a system of organized exploitation of all social strata in Poland.

A population deprived of its natural and necessary forms of self-defence could only react impulsively: violent eruptions of social discontent—such as in Poznan in 1956, during the "March Events" of 1968, the Baltic Coast workers' revolt of 1970 and later of June 1976—were always accompanied by the danger of revolution, whose course and consequences could not be predicted.

The authorities, though occasionally forced to retreat (June 1976) or to offer a tactical appeasement (1956, December 1970) proved to be incapable of carrying out the democratization of public life. Such ineptitude resulted in the constant aggravation of the social and economic crisis, leading to a crisis of state authority.

What is necessary today is a process of widespread democratization. The population must continue to struggle for democratic control over its state. All social strata must regain their right to self-determination and be allowed to recreate social institutions which could truly realize society's rights. Only free unions and associations can save the state, since only democratization can lead to the integration of the interests and the will of the citizen with the interests and the power of the state. These tasks are being carried out at present by existing social institutions, such as the "Social Self-Defence Committee—KOR," the "Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights," the "Society for Academic Courses," or the "Students' Solidarity Committees."

While remembering the tragic events of December 1970 and acting in compliance with the expectations of numerous groups and milieux of the Baltic Seaboard, we wish to follow the lead of our Silesian colleagues by organizing independent trade unions. Today, on the eve of May Day, which for over 80 years symbolized the struggle for

workers' rights, we hereby call into being the Founding Committee of the Free Trade Unions of the Baltic Seaboard.

The aim of the Free Trade Unions is to organize the defence of the economic, legal and humanitarian interests of the working population. The Free Trade Unions declare their willingness to assist and to protect all employees, irrespective of their political views or their qualifications.

The Founding Committee will operate openly through its representative, leaving our collaborators and supporters the right of decision and of expressing their own opinions.

We wish to identify ourselves with the guiding principles of the journal *Robotnik;* we shall give information about our work through its columns and in our own publications.

We appeal to all working people—workers, technical, managerial and administrative staff: form your own independent representations. Alternatively you may reach the same goal by introducing independent-minded activists into your Works Councils—people who would honestly represent the electorate's interests.

We would like our initiative to become a stimulus for a number of varied and independent social actions.

We appeal to independent social institutions for support and the widest publicity for our initiative.

We appeal to all for solidarity in the struggle for a brighter future.

Charter of Workers' Rights

Whereas:

—citizens are being deprived of the right to take part in decision-making on matters that concern them;
—restrictions are being imposed on the fundamental rights of the employee such as the right to secure and rational work, to a just wage, and to reasonable rest;
—social inequalities and injustices are becoming more profound;
—there exist no institutions to protect the employee—the official Polish Trade Unions are not institutions of this kind;
—workers are denied their fundamental right of defence, which is the right to strike;
—society has to shoulder the cost of every mistake of the authorities, including the cost of the current crisis;

we have entered upon a course of action whose long term aim is the creation of a self-defence system for employees, first and foremost, independent Trade Unions.

We wish to begin with the problems which seem to us to be capable of solution, at least in part, at the present time.

Unofficial publications: information and criticism.



Official headlines: exhortation and triumphalism.

June 1976, Radom: the Party Headquarters on fire.



June 1976, Radom: Workers build barricades around the Party HQ.

1. *Wages*

—pay should rise at least in step with the cost of living; a cost of living supplement is essential;
—everyone should be ensured a minimum living wage; teams of specialists should work out this minimum and amend it in proportion to rising prices; families living below this line should be paid appropriate supplements;
—efforts must be made to eliminate glaring and unfounded differences in pay;
—stoppages, changes of quota, etc. must not be allowed to entail a drop in wages;
—workers doing the same job under the same conditions should receive remuneration in accordance with standardized scales of rates which are independent of the industry in which the said workers are employed.

2. *Working Hours*

—it is inadmissible that overtime, additional and community work should be compulsory; miners must have Sundays and holidays free;
—the free Saturdays of the current system must be legally guaranteed to everyone;
—efforts must be made to implement a 40-hour working week without reduction of wages.

3. *Occupational Safety*

—safety standards and regulations must be observed without exception: there should be special commissions to monitor this, having wide powers including the right to shut down a plant; commissions monitoring occupational health and safety, accident commissions and also factory doctors must be institutionally independent of the factory management;
—no one who suffers loss of health due to harmful working conditions can be left without the pay supplements or disability pensions to which they are entitled;
—it is essential to update the current list of industrial diseases;
—night work for women must be eliminated; it should not be permitted that women do heavy physical work.

4. *Granting of Privileges*

—the remuneration of an employee and his promotion should not depend on his party allegiance, political opinions nor outlook;
—benefits such as premium payments, housing or vacations must be allotted in an open manner; the means of allotting these privileges and the names of the beneficiaries must be openly announced;
—there must be an end to the granting of privileges to groups connected with the government (police, party functionaries): special

allowances of goods greatly in demand, such as housing, plots of land, building materials, cars, special medical care, luxury holiday homes, special pension rights, etc.

5. *Compulsion to Act Against One's Conscience*

—no one should be forced to immoral acts, to inform for superiors, the party or the security service, to take part in attacks on undesirable persons;

—people should not be compelled to produce shoddy goods, to carry out work which threatens their safety and that of others, to hush up accidents, make false reports, etc.

6. *Labour Code*

The Labour Code in force since 1975 must be radically changed. It established regulations which are disadvantageous to the workers. Its articles are equivocal, and hence in any given situation can be and frequently are interpreted to the benefit of the management. In particular:

—Article 52 must be changed. It is used as an anti-strike law (the numerous sackings after June 1976 were based on it); the right to strike must be guaranteed by law;

—if someone is dismissed, the management must explain in writing the reason for the dismissal; the worker should continue in his job so long as his case is going through the successive legal instances; throughout the whole process he should have the right to the assistance of a lawyer;

—union officials elected by the work force must be legally protected against dismissed for a certain time after laying down office also.

We consider that the realization of these demands depends on our own stance. Evidence that workers can force the authorities and management to make concessions is provided by the great showdowns of 1956, 1970 and 1976, and by numerous strikes.

For several months now, we have felt the effects of the crisis on our own skin. Deliveries and transport get worse and worse, wages are going down, prices are going up, in many plants the working hours are getting longer and are taking up the "free Saturdays," there are more and more stoppages. If we ourselves do not now make a start on defending our own interests, our situation will go from bad to worse.

However, in order to win, we must rid ourselves of any feeling of impotence, stop passively putting up with restrictions on our rights and the deterioration of the conditions of life, and must look for the most effective form of action. There exist a great number of possibilities:

1. Undoubtedly the most effective form of action is to strike, even if the strikes are not on a large scale. Generally however, it is only effective in the short run. In order not to waste the achievements of

a strike, the participants must elect representatives to monitor the realization of their demands. If the workers know how to act in solidarity and are not afraid, they can force management to concessions by the very threat of a strike, by presenting petitions, or sending delegations.

2. A very great deal can be achieved simply by the dissemination of information. It is necessary to speak up loudly and to protest when someone is wronged, when we see injustice; it is necessary to publicize the actions of cliques and the granting of privileges, shortcomings, and wastage, breaches of the regulations on occupational health and safety and the hushing-up of accidents. It is necessary to speak about this to colleagues and at meetings. To demand that the authorities take a stand on this. To tell the independent social institutions and the independent press.
3. There are many problems in labour relations which can be solved by using the official trade unions. It would certainly be better for us if these were not so dead as in fact they are at present. We must demand that the factory councils defend the interests of the workers, we must use union meetings for discussions and put forward demands to them, and must elect to factory councils people who will realize the demands.
4. A condition for our actions to be something more than *ad hoc* and haphazard is the existence of a group of workers in a state of constant alertness. This group, even if implicitly at first, can draw up a programme of activity, organize a series of actions, form public opinion, and, in time, come out into the open as independent workers' committees.
5. Wherever there are strong, organized communities of workers who are able to defend their representatives against dismissal from work and imprisonment, free trade union committees should be set up. The experience of employees in the Western democracies shows that this is the most effective way of defending the workers' interests.

Only independent trade unions, having support among the workers whom they represent, have any chance of opposing the authorities. Only they will represent a force with which the authorities must reckon and with which they can deal on equal terms.

We, the undersigned, pledge ourselves to work towards the demands contained in the Charter of Workers' Rights.

We are also setting up an Aid Fund and pledge constant contributions to it. The resources collected in the Fund will be used to assist persons dismissed from work for taking part in independent union activity.

Appendix

Our activities are in accordance with the law. In ratifying the International Labour Pacts and the Conventions of the International Labour

Organization, the government of the Polish People's Republic acknowledged:

I. The right of workers to form associations.

Article 2 from Convention 87 of the International Labour Organization:

Workers and employers, without any discrimination, have the right, without seeking prior permission, to form organizations at their own discretion, and also to join such organizations, subject only to adhering to their statutes.

Article 8 point 1a of the International Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

The states party to the present pact pledge themselves to ensure the right of everyone to form and join trade unions at their own choice, in order to support and defend their own economic and social interests, subject only to the condition of observing the statutory regulations of the said organization. Availing oneself of this right must not be subject to any restrictions other than those provided for in the laws and ordinances of a democratic society in the interests of state security or public order or to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

II. The right to strike

Article 8 point 1d of the International Pact of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

The states party to the present pact pledge themselves to ensure the right to strike provided that the strike be carried out in accordance with the constitution of the said country.

The Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR "

Warsaw, September 1978

Towards the end of July 1978 KOR was approached by a group of miners from Silesia, who wanted the Committee to take a stand on the matter of the drastic extending of working hours in the mining industry. The inhuman exploitation of miners—which has been brought to wider attention already by miners from the Walbrzych Basin, the Rybnicki mining region and other areas, is now the basic problem of this community and a source of ever greater discontent and opposition. Attempts are made to compensate for the increasing disorganization and economic stagnation by a ruthless increase in the rate of coal extraction. Since there is no concomitant development of technology the main burden is transferred onto the shoulders of the workforce. This takes the form, primarily, of an extension of working hours. The system of so-called " planned Sundays " which was still in existence in 1977 (that is to say working Sundays: in some mines as many as 3 in a month) was replaced by the so-called " recruitment Sundays,"

when work is in theory voluntary. The change is purely one of name, since the recruitment of miners by the technical staff is accompanied by compulsion and intimidation of those who have the courage to refuse. We have yet to hear of a mine where the workforce is able to benefit from the 12 statutory work-free Saturdays *per annum*.

The wages system in force in the mining industry, based on a host of supplements (1st Miners' Charter, 2nd Miners' Charter, 13th and 14th wage reviews, etc.) envisages the payment of a considerable part of a miner's wage (in many cases as much as 50 per cent) only on completion of all additionally imposed work-days. A particularly inhuman practice is the so-called 2nd Miners' Charter, according to which about 20 per cent of the wage depends solely on a person's being at the place of work. No excuses are accepted: not even the illness or death of a member of one's family. The Miners' Health Service is under pressure to limit the number of doctors' certificates. This underhand practice needs no comment and reminds one inescapably of a camp regime.

Demanding work from sick people, forcing them to work beyond their powers while depriving them of their free days, leaving aside temporary advantages, can lead to one thing only: the already noticeable increase in accidents and the ruin of the physical health of the miners. Work without free days and rest deprives the miners of a normal family life and has a deleterious effect on the bringing up of children which in turn leads to a rupturing of all social ties. This prevents the miners from participating in cultural and social life and turns them, as in the period of early capitalism, into a dehumanized work-force.

The exploitation of miners in the Polish Peoples' Republic is nothing new. The Polish bishops have issued statements on the matter. The return of human rights to miners was the purpose of this year's mass pilgrimage to Piekary Slaskie, the cause of strikes in many mines. Unless this problem is to become the source of a new social conflict, it must be resolved fairly and honestly.

KOR supports the miners' demands for a return to a statutory working week without a lowering of real wages.

We recall that the working class movement managed more than 50 years ago to achieve the right to an 8-hour working day.

We recall that one of the first acts of the reborn Polish state was the directive of the Head of State of 23 November 1920, establishing an 8-hour working day without a reduction in wages.

Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"
and Editors of *Robotnik*

Warsaw, 2 January 1979

Reports have reached *Robotnik* of workers' strikes in many factories. Here are some data covering the last quarter of 1978.

From 9 to 11 October workers of the Pabianice Dressing Materials Factory "PASO" went on strike. They were losing several hundred zlotys a month because a change of package sizes was introduced, without any corresponding change in the scale of payments.

On 10–14 October workers of the Pabianice Pharmaceutical factory "Polfa" went on strike because their bonus was withdrawn. The reason for this was that their factory's delivery plan was not fulfilled, although the production plans were met, and it was the management, not the workers, who were responsible for deliveries.

At the end of November workers of the Pabianice Electric Bulb factory "Polam" went on strike, in protest against being deprived of a work-free Saturday. On 1 December the spinning room workers in the Technical Textiles Plant in Pabianice went on strike. The reason was that inferior quality yarn was classified as top quality, and workers were deprived of a special bonus for working with inferior quality yarn.

On 26 October 1978 workers of the Confectionery Plant "Optima" in Lodz went on strike, demanding a wages settlement. Their wages were reduced due to lack of raw materials.

On 18 November 1978 workers of the concrete-mixing factory in Myszkow went on strike because their wages had not been paid on the appointed date.

On 22 December 1978 a violent protest broke out among the miners of the fifth division of the "Gliwice" mine against the 12-hour working day and enforced work over Christmas holidays. Earlier (in the summer) miners of the Rybnice and Upper Silesia coal-fields protested against prolongation of working time.

Reports of strikes reach us by chance. We can assume that they illustrate only a fragment of a wider workers' movement in the whole country, for conditions in other factories are similar to those that caused workers' protests known to us.

The immediate cause of strikes is most often a wages reduction, increase of production norms not previously accepted by the workers themselves, cancelling of work-free Saturdays, or enforcing additional working hours (work on Sundays or 12-hour day on Saturdays). Managements try to save their threatened production plans by economizing on the workers' wages or looking for "reserves" in an extension of working hours or productivity increases. Many plants have not fulfilled their plans as a result of numerous standstills in the second and third quarters of 1978, or not working at full capacity, due to lack of raw materials and energy, irregular supplies, bad organization and mismanagement throughout the whole of the economy.

Economic and political management on different levels is trying to lay the blame for the economic crisis on workers who are not responsible for it. This takes place at a time of a general fall in living standards (rising prices, "commercial" shops) and deterioration in the supplies of foodstuffs, in a situation which offers no prospects of

a change for the better in the living conditions of workers and their families.

All attempts to further reduce the living standards of workers must be met with firm protest. All cases of workers' protest known to us have the same character: workers have been defending themselves against unjust wages reductions or exploitation. In addition they demanded that the supplies of goods to shops be improved. They have not put forward new demands but merely defended what is theirs by right.

In the disputes between management and workers, the party-controlled trade unions defend the vested interests of the party-economic apparatus. And thus workers cannot count on the unions' support. A strike, or the threat of a strike, has become the only method available to defend workers' rights. On the whole strikes last for a short time and end with a short-term success. The management refund lost wages, restore former productivity norms, or reintroduce a work-free Saturday. For the most part, however, these concessions apply to individual cases only and take a form that does not satisfy the workers: for example, they are given a bonus instead of due wages and thus have no guarantee for the future. Food supplies that usually improve after a workers' protest also have a temporary character. Often, some time after the tense atmosphere is relieved, reprisals come for the active participants of the strikes—they are dismissed from work or transferred to worse jobs.

A significant weakness of workers' protest actions has been so far the lack of solidarity with the persecuted colleagues as well as the temporary character of the achievements won by the strikes. Therefore it is necessary that workers organize themselves in more permanent forms, such as Strike Committees or Free Trade Unions. These in turn would represent workers in disputes with management, would see to it that the rights won by workers are respected, and would organize defence for the victims of repressions.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" and *Robotnik* announce that they give and will continue to give help to the persecuted worker activists. Our help involves: legal aid in case of deterioration in working conditions or dismissal; financial help in the form of unemployment benefit in case of dismissal and inability to find work elsewhere. This help is distributed by the Workers' Fund created from the contributions of workers and members of the intelligentsia and supported by the Fund of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR."

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" and the editors of *Robotnik* declare their intention to inform the public—since the official media keep silent about the strikes in our country—about all workers' protests confirmed by us. Please send in all confirmed information about strikes to members of "KOR" and the editors of *Robotnik*. Information sent in should include: name of town and factory; if possible the division and shift; the date of beginning and

end of the strike; its causes; demands put forward, the course of the strike; the number of strikers. Please supply detailed information about persons who held talks with the strikers, if and how their demands are to be met, who suffered reprisals and how after the strike was over.

All information received about strikes will be verified. It will be of great help if we receive addresses where details can be obtained. Unconfirmed reports cannot be published.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" and the editors of *Robotnik* will support peaceful forms of workers' self-defence. The policy of lowering the living standards of the population and increasing exploitation does not help to overcome the economic and social crisis but, on the contrary, aggravates it.

Farmers' and Peasants' Groups

Undated Leaflet

Brother Farmers,

For 30 years the government imposed on us has been oppressing the farmers. The communists started by smashing the Polish Peasant Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—PSL*), the true representation of farmers. Subsequently, the communists forcibly introduced the kolkhozes. They were later forced to give this idea up—but even today they have not abandoned their goal of taking farmers' land away from them and of collectivizing the villages. The pension system, being introduced at present, serves the same goal. Pensions are not yet available, it is not even known when they will be—but pension contributions, very sizeable ones, are to be paid as of now!

But payments are not necessary! We, the farmers from the Milejow district in Lublin Voivodship, held a council and decided not to pay. We are not paying. At the beginning this caused a bit of an uproar, we were threatened by the police and the bailiffs—but threats are all we've had.

Many farmers throughout the country decided to do what we did. According to press reports—250,000 people refused to pay pension contributions. In Lisia Gora district, Tarnow Voivodship, payment orders were handed out to 2,675 people, and only 42 paid up. There are dozens of similar examples.

It is high time for farmers to start fighting for their rights. We have decided to do so. We appeal to you: fight for your rights, do not allow new taxes to be imposed on you. Organize yourselves, as today it is easier to defend our rights and interests by acting together.

Provisional Farmers' Self-Defence Committee
Lublin Region

Ostrowek, 30 July 1978

We, the farmers of the Lublin region, inhabitants of Zalesie, Kajetanowka, Kolonia Gorne, Wolka Lancuchowska, Lancuchow, Ciechanki Lancuchowskie, Antoniow, Trzeciakow, Kolonia Ostrowek, Jaszczow, Ostrowek, Maryniow, Szpica, Poplawy, Wola Korybutowa, Zawadow, Sufczyn, Klucz and other villages, assembled on 20 July 1978 at an open meeting in Ostrowek, at which some 200 people were present, demand the withdrawal of secret policemen from our villages. We also demand the revocation of payment orders and the recall of bailiffs.

Last year the Parliament of the Polish People's Republic passed a Bill on Old Age Pensions for farmers and their families. This Bill

requires farmers to pay pension contributions. In our villages these contributions have, on the whole, remained unpaid. The authorities responded by sending in the bailiffs, who, against our will, began to seize our property. At the same time the security service interrogated many of us, demanding to know why pension contributions were not being paid. Faced with this situation we began a farming strike. Between 28 and 30 July 1978 we refused to deliver milk.

We hereby give notice that, should the action directed against our villages continue, longer and more widespread strikes may follow. At the same time we are demanding that the Bill on pensions be suspended until a proper discussion on pensions for farmers can take place, as previous consultations were fictitious. We did not then know the full text of the draft and this is why we could not take a stand on it. Ever since we first refused to pay contributions we have been expecting the arrival of the authorities' representatives for a discussion on the draft and on the situation in agriculture. Bailiffs and security policemen were sent instead.

The purpose of our strike is to bring a number of problems to the attention of the authorities.

Firstly—a Bill envisaging changes in the structure of agriculture may not be passed without prior authorization from farmer electors.

Secondly—the contents of the Bill in its entirety, together with enabling legislation, should have been revealed in full and the wishes of the electorate taken into account.

Thirdly—given the present situation in agriculture, farmers should be able to speak out on the subject of government policy in this field and the catastrophic consequences of that policy.

Fourthly—the authorities should put an end to the practice of using police methods to intimidate society.

At today's meeting we have elected the representatives of farmers from our region to form a Provisional Farmers' Self-Defence Committee. The Committee is empowered to talk to the authorities on the subject of the present strike, its consequences and the situation of farmers in our region.

We enjoin the Committee to organize self-defence against any reprisals which may follow.

We have decided that no village will negotiate separately with the authorities.

We appeal to farmers throughout Poland to establish contact with us.

This unjust Bill, harmful to the farmers, will be changed if all farmers will demand it. In order to achieve anything we should act together, communicate between ourselves and elect Committees, which will present our demands to the authorities.

This resolution has been accepted unanimously.

Resolution

Adopted 9 September 1978

There is nothing more harmful in any kingdom than bad and unjust laws; both for the vengeance of God who will not allow them and for damage to the peope who follow such laws.

Keeping in mind these words of Piotr Skarga, the son of Grojec soil, we, the peasants of the Grojec district, assembled here in Zbroza Duza on 9 September 1978, at an open meeting, in order to protest against and counteract such bad laws.

The following subjects were discussed: (1) the pension scheme for farmers; (2) the supply of provisions and means of production for villages; (3) self-government; (4) the social position of farmers, etc.

The meeting stated the following:

1. Our district was greatly wronged and persecuted during the struggle over the building of the church in Zbroza. These wrongs have not been put right yet. We do not want to suffer even more injustices now.
2. The pension scheme is unjust and has to be changed.
3. The decisions concerning the village are made without the peasants' participation (nothing can be decided about us without us).
4. The village supply of provisions and means of production is critical and there has never been such a hungry harvest time as now.
5. The social position of the peasant deteriorates every year. If this continues, it will lead to social catastrophe.

The meeting decided that for the near future:

1. We shall not pay any pension premiums in their present form and we shall oppose any administrative attempts to enforce them.
2. We shall claim better provisions for the villages.

Independent representatives of our villages were elected at the meeting. This representation adopts the name of the Grojec Farmers' Defence Committee.

The Farmers' Self-Defence Committee,
Grojec Region

Zbroza Duza, 17 September 1978

In the resolution of 9 September we demanded a better provision of food and means of production for the villages. Within a week of the formation of the Committee the supplies in our areas have improved: there are enough fertilizers, fodder, wire, etc. In the village of Kozie Glowy a shop was opened whose construction had dragged on for years. In order to make up for meat shortages, we are sent ox hooves in quantities far beyond our needs.

However, the commune council officials from Prosno and Jasieniec molest the peasants in our area. They try to persuade the Committee

members to leave the Committee in exchange for various reliefs, provisions, permissions and building materials. And thus, for example, Mr. Jerzy Skrzeczynski from Daltrozow, a father of seven, was promised, for leaving the Committee, the tax relief that he had been refused before.

Our district is watched day and night by the police and security forces. On the nights of 11 and 16 September light rockets were fired. Helicopters are flying over the villages. Members of the Committee are under surveillance. The police check identity papers of travellers and passers-by. On 11 September the police tried to take away Jerzy Gorski, the Zbroza village administrator, who is a member of the Farmers' Defence Committee. But the church bells rang, the fire siren sounded, people flocked together and Jerzy Gorski was released. He was detained, however, on 15 September in Jasieniec, where he had gone to pay his taxes. Attempts were made to interrogate him informally. On the same day another member of the Farmers' Defence Committee, Miroslaw Macierzynski, was forcibly detained during work. He was taken to Grojec, where the police tried to examine him informally. But the wives and children of both men went to Jasieniec, to the police headquarters, and demanded immediate release of their husbands. Both men were released shortly afterwards.

The policemen try to persuade the peasants to give up meeting in the parish hall, under the pretext that it is a desecration of a holy place. They seem to have forgotten how a few years back they themselves had taken away the Holy Eucharist from the chapel in Zbroza Duza and abandoned it among dustbins near the church in Jasieniec. Members of the Committee have suggested meetings with the local authorities in order to discuss various village problems. Nobody, however, has accepted such an invitation.

We demand that police and security forces be withdrawn from our district. The fact that peasants organize themselves for discussion with authorities cannot justify a state of emergency. We expect that dialogue will be undertaken with the Committee. We believe that there are no problems that Poles with Poles cannot solve by means of peaceful dialogue.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 20 September 1978

It is evident from the recent announcements published by the Provisional Farmers' Defence Committee of the Lublin Region and the Farmers' Self-Defence Committee of the Grojec Region that in the areas where farmers organize themselves the situation is anomalous and can be described as a state of emergency. In these regions the police and the security forces behave in a provocative manner: cease-

less patrols, obstruction of the roads and telephone lines, flares, patrolling helicopters, arrests. On 17 September, a member of the Provisional Farmers' Self-Defence Committee of the Lublin Region Janusz Rozek was brutally kicked and beaten up during an interrogation at police headquarters in Milejow. On 20 September Janusz Rozek lodged a complaint against this treatment. He was accompanied by 100 farmers from nearby villages. The local administration joined in the action against the farmers. Together with the police, administration officials molest the farmers, blackmail them, try to bribe them and press them in other ways. In this action employees of the commune councils and lower party officials take part.

The Polish village is going through an economic and social crisis which is caused by a faulty and irresponsible farming policy. Farmers are generally embittered, and recently even more so, because of the introduction of the pension scheme which is unjust and does not take into account the real interests of the farmers. The farmers who organize themselves with a view to putting forward their demands show civic responsibility. No repressions can stop this process. Only a dialogue with farmers, represented by their independent delegates, can create conditions for an improvement of the social and economic situation of the Polish village and for an increase in food production. If authorities continue to show their hostility towards the people, and to resort to police terror instead of political action, the already serious economic and social situation will inevitably deteriorate—it is a sign of thoughtless irresponsibility. The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" supports the emerging farmers movement as an extremely significant step towards social self-organization.

Farmers' Self-Defence Committee
Rzeszow region
Communiqué

Lowiska, 2 September 1979

The Committee would like to describe developments in our village since the time of the last communiqué. From the very start of our activity we have been persecuted by security agents and the local administration, especially by the commune leader Jozef Czubata. They organized meetings to prejudice the villagers against us but fortunately nobody was taken in. They would employ anyone, even criminals and drunkards, to spy on us. There are over one hundred agents in our village.

1. Jozef Czubata has taken over 70 hectares of the land that now lies fallow. Those who believe comrade Gierek about the importance of every ear of corn should take a look at this land. The Cooperative Farmers' Circle received 50 million zlotys (taken away from the peasants) for land cultivation. What could not the village do even with a part of that money? But peasants are an inferior race.

2. In Lowisko Jozef Czubata persecutes everyone whose land could be used by the Cooperative Farmers' Circle. Katarzyna, Zofia and Julia Haber who run their farm themselves have to give their land to the state. They are not receiving tax assessment so that their land could be confiscated in the future on the grounds of tax avoidance. The commune leader told the women: "We don't need you, you're to be finished." We congratulate the authorities on such a disciple.

There are some people in the village who out of fear or for material gain help the commune leader. For example Maciej Gogola, the local councillor, signed expropriation papers—not authorized by the village—and in return received some land and two tractors as well as other privileges. There are others who harm the village by toadying to the authorities. Let God make them see and return to the path of neighbourly love.

3. Workers at the steelworks at Stalowa Wola have been waiting for the coal allocation for six months.

4. Test drillings were carried out without warning on some fields, damaging the nearly ready crops. Despite promises, no compensation has yet been paid.

6. The most urgent problem for the villagers in Lowiska is a new church. The old one is nearly falling down. Many delegations went to Rzeszow and Warsaw to obtain building permission. Comrade Duda at the Ministry of Religious Affairs complained about the behaviour of the villagers, about their organizing a demonstration—he meant a Corpus Christi procession. Security agents are trying to intimidate the priest who was also thrown out of the Ministry. It is our moral duty as Catholics to build a church and no authority reprisals will succeed in frightening us. We shall never give in. The Committee knows and supports the position of other villagers, in particular in Tarnogora, Cisowy Las and Majdan Letowski, on the question of church building.

The Programme of the Peasant Centre for Knowledge, a new platform for a better understanding between the old and the new peasant activists. (*summary*)

Warsaw, 3 June 1979

Peasants have called upon us to come out in public and express our common concern for the country. For years now peasants from various parts of the country have been turning to the activists of the old independent peasant movement for an appraisal of the situation. Recently those peasants who—aware of their civic duty—started to exercise their rights (especially the Farmers' Self-Defence Committees of the Grojec and Lublin regions) have turned to the signatories of documents issued in defence of peasant rights and to other independent peasant activists for help in presenting their ideas and conclusions to public opinion. In answer to their call, in December 1978 we—

peasant activists from the districts of Krakow, Lublin, Lodz, Poznan and Warsaw—decided to attempt a preliminary assessment of the situation and to form a Centre to deal with it. We recognize in theory and in practice the principle of independence and self-government within peasant movements and, aware of our rights guaranteed by the constitution and international pacts of civic and economic rights, state the following:

1. In the years 1947–49 Polish peasants were deprived of their own independent self-governing political organization. The Peasant Youth Union "Wici," after 20 years of educational and civic activity, in 1948 became forcibly incorporated into the Marxist Polish Youth Union. The Peasant Party was well known in the country for its long struggle for an independent and democratic Poland. After persistent mass repressions it was destroyed, and what was left of it incorporated into the United Peasants Party, created by the authorities. Thus hundreds of thousands of members of the independent peasant movement found themselves in a situation of internal emigration.

2. The United Peasants Party acknowledges its dependence on the Communist Party. By the same token it forsakes the traditions of the independent peasant movement. Having renounced any ambition to formulate its own programme, it always joins in with the Communist Party. Moreover, it carefully avoids passing on peasants' observations and suggestions which do not coincide with the Party's programme. The United Peasants Party, following the Communist Party, introduced centralistic principles into the organization, thereby totally eliminating the self-governing and cooperative principles, so highly valued in the peasant movement. Deputies to all conferences and congresses are appointed from above. It is not the members themselves who have control over the Party authorities, but vice versa. The Party's control includes preventive censorship of statements made at the meetings. As a result the peasants have grown completely indifferent to the initiatives of the authorities. Individual farming exists not thanks to, but despite the official policy of the Party. Today, in view of the world food shortages, farming developments become most vital to national interests. But the direction of these developments can only be defined and applied by an independent, self-governing organization which truly represents their wishes. This cannot be said of the United Peasants Party but, given the right attitude of the peasants themselves, it could potentially become such an organization.

3. In the past 30 years the differences between the town and the village have increased. Villages have become our "third world"—in respect of housing, social and communal services, supplies of building materials, fuel, energy, foodstuffs. A similar difference can be observed between the state-run and individual farms. Although individual farming is cheaper and more efficient, state-owned farms are privileged materially and financially. It is incomprehensible why coal allowances for peasants should be so much lower than for other people.

Profits in individual farming are regulated by state prices and have for years now been too low to cover the cost of production, maintenance of farm machinery and the cost of living. The income of one third of peasant families is below the officially recognized minimum. Only 1/10 of farms of relatively larger acreage have managed, with great difficulty, to cross the barrier of insufficiency. There has been a trend away from the hard life of the countryside to the comforts of city living. People have not been deterred by the ghetto-like obligation to register in towns, where registration depends on employment, and employment is the condition of registration.

The numerous restrictions concerning the peasants' control over their land are harmful relics of the past. They include a prohibition on selling farms in the first 5 years of ownership which is detrimental to the interests of the society and creates more and more impoverished and encumbered farms. This in turn was used as a justification for the regulations about compulsory sales of land and land mergers and exchanges, regulations which have been used by the administration to expropriate individual peasants for the benefit of collective farms. The very high costs of redeeming land for cultivation are paid for by the nation and the results are unsatisfactory. Such regulations are a threat to smaller as well as larger farms. Chaos in administration complicates the situation even further. Such a state of affairs, reminiscent of the Stalin era, stands in sharp contrast with constitutional and other declarations concerning individual farming and fans the flame of the peasants' distrust of the real intentions of the agricultural policy in Poland.

At the same time the influence of farmers in local and cooperative management is being constantly curbed by various means. Farmers' circles have been made to join farmers' cooperatives and bring in their funds and equipment. But since again the collective farms are favoured, in fact their joining in means worse services to the individual members of farmers' circles. Only a few farmers' circles have been able to resist the pressure. The farmers' cooperative movement has been centralized and red-taped. Even the lowest rung of the local government—the village administrator—is nominated by the administration and no longer can be said to represent the interests of the villagers. The village, totally dependent and deprived of all self-government mechanisms, is an easy prey to "callousness and theft, clique-rule, favouritism and often plain villainy"—to use the words of the Communist Party First Secretary.

Education and culture in the village have been seriously neglected. An attempt to bring cultural institutions to the peasants is over. Schooling becomes more centralized and even small children are made to walk many kilometres to school every day. Grass root level cultural initiatives disappear and genuine folk art finds refuge in museums. Students from peasant backgrounds constitute today only 1/10 of the total number of students in the country. When social and cultural life

withers away, alcoholism rises and everything has to be done to prevent it from growing to such magnitude as in the days of villein service, Poland's partition and of German occupation.

It is no use to quote the differences between life in the country now and before the war. The only way to change the situation in agriculture is to give equal rights to all social groups and to adopt principles based on experience. All problems in the sphere of agriculture cannot be solved without the agreement of the peasants concerned. The principle of efficiency should dictate organization and supply policies. Agricultural administration should really concern itself only with creating the right conditions for agricultural growth. Peasants should be consulted in pricing their produce so that their profit is assured. Some of the big farms that are not self-sufficient financially should be divided up and leased. Peasant self-government should be independent of state administration.

4. We are no longer alone in our striving for human dignity and civic rights. The Church has come out in defence of the persecuted. By being apolitical and looking at things from the point of view of Christian morality, the Church has gained unrivalled moral authority and trust. The working class rebelled three times and twice achieved short-lived changes, while on the third occasion the rise of food prices was repealed. Students have demonstrated in defence of freedom of speech. There were many protests from all over the country against the proposal of constitutional changes, against centralization of youth associations and of cooperative organizations.

Only a democratic path can lead from a subjected to a participating society, from a formal and imposed unity to a unity in diversity. It is a long and difficult path and it is easier to enter it than to persevere on it. One has to stand by one's independent opinions and be courageous enough to discard them when proved wrong, to be able to give up apparent peace and comfort in order to remain at peace with one's conscience.

5. As long as we live we are responsible towards the past, the present, and the future of our country. Nobody can release us from this duty. Although we may not be responsible for what is going on in our country, yet we should see it in the perspective of the post-war period and with a view to the future of the country. In this spirit we wish to save from oblivion and falsification the achievement of the independent peasant movement which is an important part of the Polish political heritage. Let us remember its patriotic attitude thus summarized by Wincenty Witos: "When there is no independent Poland let us strive for it, when it is here let us work for it, and when Poland is in need let us defend it." We also wish to present to public opinion the peasants' observations, ideas and conclusions; to share our experience of self-government with all those who come with similar initiatives; to help in the revival of country life in the form of People's University

courses; to cooperate with other independent and democratic organizations in defence of human rights.

The Peasant Centre for Knowledge does not attempt to be an organization, for all organizations have to grow organically in particular villages. It is a group of people who are ready to devote their time and energy to work for self-government. Perhaps many people from and in the countryside, as well as other people of good will, would like to join us in fulfilling this civic duty.

Peasant Centre for Knowledge

Communiqué No. 1

July 1979

In July 1979 the signatories of the Centre's statement had their first meeting. After discussion they resolved:

1. In historical research, to concentrate on the various aspects of the people's movement which are either passed over in silence or misrepresented by the official historiography.
2. To strive for the following: a) repeal of those regulations and programmes which violate the constitutional principle of co-existence of private and state-owned farms and allow for peasant expropriation; b) immediate cessation of all discrimination against individual farmers in supplies; c) equal treatment and justice for peasants in the question of old age pensions; d) prohibition of administrative interference into the internal affairs of peasant organizations, restoration of full independence of Farmers' Circles, a change in electoral law so that elections are not restricted to voting for candidates already chosen by higher authorities; e) support all initiatives aiming at cultural renewal, to counteract the spreading indifference, lack of ideals, demoralization and alcoholism among the young; f) to remind the authorities at all levels about their duty to prepare the country for the winter, especially to secure adequate supplies of fuel, wherever human and animal life is involved.
3. To adopt as guidelines for the future the programmes formulated in the declarations of "Wici" and PSL (Polish Peasant Party) which state that individual, group and national sovereignty is indispensable to dignified life. Life with dignity can flourish only when the unchanging moral principles of Christianity are observed, as well as the democratic mechanisms of representation which must not exclude anyone and must depend on honest elections, the independence of courts, open public life and general access to accurate information. In national life all things are inter-connected: production is equally important as services or education and variety enhances development and growth. Natural resources are exhaustible and have to be protected for the good of present and future generations.

4. The activity of the Centre will be based on the cooperation between its signatory members and other followers. Minority views will be respected. Results will be published in the form of communiqués, conclusions and other publications, all financed with voluntary payments for the Farmers' Self-government Funds.

The Flying University

Declaration

Warsaw, 22 January 1978

We, the undersigned, hereby call into being the *Society for Academic Courses,* the purpose of which is to meet the existing demand for wider, richer and more complete knowledge. This demand has become more evident recently among students and the young intelligentsia in Poland, especially in the field of social studies and the humanities. It is born out of the need to understand the era and society in which we live and the desire to enhance our self-knowledge. Both this new intellectual vitality and its motives are, from the social point of view, extremely valuable. Without searching for truth about the world and about oneself, it is impossible for people's creative, independent and civic attitudes to form and develop. The acquisition of specialized qualifications—indispensable in itself—is not enough for this formation and development: there is also the need to understand social life as a whole. We need a deep knowledge of the present day's historical genesis in its every dimension. Today there is no educational system in the world capable of meeting such needs. The educational system is primarily pragmatic and favours an even greater narrowing down of specialized knowledge, both in teaching and in research. This causes a dangerous disintegration of culture into its instrumental and scientific strata, to the detriment of both, and transforms the intelligentsia into an agent for carrying out tasks in the formulation of which it not only does not, but cannot even, participate sensibly. This is precisely because, as a result of narrow professional specialization, the intelligentsia cannot fully realize the consequence of this. This potential danger is enhanced by the power structure in our country. This is detrimental to society, to its science and culture.

This is most acutely felt by young people and that is why they take various initiatives for self-education. The inadequacies of official education as well as the political and ideological restrictions imposed on science, have been known and criticized for ages. In trying to remedy such a state of affairs, societies have been and are creating institutions and forms of teaching and self-education outside the systems of official education. In this respect too, the history of Polish science and education has a magnificent tradition of many educational societies, the Flying University, Teach-Yourself Handbooks and the Free Polish University of the inter-war period.

Mindful of this tradition and of contemporary needs, we advance our initiative with the intention of helping all those who want to enrich their knowledge through self-education. In accordance with our abilities, we want to promote advice and information as well as didactic and scientific assistance to all who wish to approach us. The Council

for the Syllabus which we are establishing will be responsible for the standard and miscellaneous programmes, for the methods and general direction of the syllabus, for the freedom of discussion and research. The initiation of this activity is the work of self-educated groups which in this academic year are or will be studying selected problems from history, sociology, economy, literature, philosophy and pedagogy. The work is generally accessible and free of charge. Those who participate are students and graduates in nearly all fields of study, and lecturers who are providing their services free. Despite the fact that participation in self-education courses gives no rights and does not ensure a diploma, there is considerable interest in them among young people—something which confirms the social need of such action.

We embark on our undertaking in the belief that there is today an urgent need for such action. The development of our initiative will depend on the reception it gets among the students themselves and the support it is given by the nation.

62 signatures as of 12 February 1978

The Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR "

Warsaw, 24 February 1978

Between 10 and 24 February 1978, in the main towns of the country, police operations were carried out in order to frustrate discussion meetings, seminars and lectures organized with a view to self-education.

On five occasions, Adam Michnik, lecturing on behalf of the Society for Academic Courses, was held for many hours in Cracow, Poznan and Warsaw. Twice he was beaten up and abused by police officers.

On 11 February, the writer Wiktor Woroszylski who had arrived from Warsaw for a reading of his works was detained at Cracow railway station.

On 18 February, in Cracow, the following activists of the Warsaw and Gdansk Students' Solidarity Committees were detained: Urszula Doroszewska, Roland Kruk, Stanislaw Smigiel, Cezary Drzymalski.

On the same day, Antoni Macierewicz who had arrived for a discussion meeting was detained at Gdansk airport.

On 22 February, in Sopot, at a history seminar taking place in a private apartment, Bogdan Borusewicz and Stanislaw Smigiel were detained. The Petty Offences Tribunal sentenced Bogdan Borusewicz after an emergency hearing to 14 days' imprisonment for hooliganism.

On 23 February, in Wroclaw, Jolanta Bojwit and Janina Stasiaczek were detained, as were the following members of the Wroclaw Students' Solidarity Committee: Marek Adamkiewicz, Jaroslaw Kminek and Marek Rospond.

On 23 February, Andrzej Klimowicz, Janusz Krupski and Jacek Kuron were detained in Lublin.

On the night of 23/24 February, the writer Andrzej Kijowski, a member of the Society for Academic Courses, the actor Maciej Rajzacher and a graduate of the Cracow Medical Academy, Elzbieta Krawczyk, were detained in Warsaw.

On 24 February, Ewa Sobol and Leopold Gierek from Radom and Ewa Milewicz, Jan Litynski and Janusz Szpotanski from Warsaw were all detained in Radom.

At the time of writing, the following still remain in custody: Marek Adamkiewicz, Bogdan Borusewicz, Jolanta Bojwit, Leopold Gierek, Jaroslaw Klimek, Jacek Kuron, Janusz Krupski, Jan Litynski, Adam Michnik, Ewa Milewicz, Marek Rospond, Ewa Sobol, Janina Stasiaczek, Janusz Szpotanski, Stanislaw Smigiel.

Having entered apartments in which discussion meetings or lectures were taking place, the police made a search on two occasions (Wroclaw and Sopot) and used teargas on two occasions (Cracow, Sopot). During the search in Wroclaw, the police forced Anna Bojwit who was ill to get out of bed. During the search of Borusewicz's flat in Sopot, police officers wrecked the flat. One of the occupants has been given a medical certificate stating that he is unfit for work on account of damage to his eye from teargas.

In Lodz, all members of the Independent Discussion Club were summoned to the city police headquarters. In the Poznan and Wroclaw police headquarters many people are under interrogation. Such an intensification of repressions has not been witnessed since the mass police operations which took place in April/May of last year. These facts are decisive proof of the escalation of police terror directed against self-education which is an expression of young people's wholesome aspiration to broaden their knowledge. This terror leads to confrontation between society and the police; moreover, moral right is indisputably on the side of the society—against the police. In recent years, the Polish people have shown that they want and are able to defend themselves. It is in nobody's interest to violate the peace of society.

Students' Solidarity Committee in Warsaw

To Warsaw University students and teachers

Warsaw, 21 March 1979

On 21 January 1978 a group of intellectuals organized a Society for Academic Courses which aims to give the students of Warsaw opportunities for self-education in the humanities: in history, sociology, philosophy, pedagogy, economics, literature, etc., i.e. those fields of

knowledge where the deficiencies of the official education and the political and ideological limitations are most keenly felt.

The lectures, organized by many people of good will and taking place in private homes, have enjoyed great popularity. From the start the police, security forces and administrative authorities have been trying to disrupt the work of the Society for Academic Courses: the lecturers were detained, identity papers of the students were verified, the owners of the flats where lectures took place were blackmailed and harassed. Despite these obstacles the activity of the Society for Academic Courses continued in the academic year 1978–79. In December 1978 the action against self-education was joined by party organizations, activist groups of the Polish Youth Socialist Union and the Polish Students Socialist Union (SZSP). Organized groups of debaters started to appear at the lectures to attack the lecturers from the "correct" ideological positions. Although these debaters sometimes betrayed a lack of knowledge and good will—and always remained absolutely convinced that they were in the right—their activity did not disrupt the meetings. On the contrary, it seemed to confirm the possibility of a dialogue between people of different convictions. Soon it became clear, however, that this was just a prelude to a quite different type of action. The arguments used by those lively debaters were becoming less and less relevant to the subject matter of the lectures and referred more to the private lives and activities and parentage of the lecturers themselves and their families. The "debaters" resorted to gross invectives, insults and insinuations. When this method also failed and the lectures continued, they lost patience. According to the principle that when other arguments fail physical violence will prevail, "heavy" gangs have been organized, consisting of activists of the Polish Youth Socialist Union, and SZSP, as well as security agents. The squads were gathered and trained in the headquarters of the Federation of the Polish Students Socialist Union and the Centre for the Student Academic Movement. After the training they left to disrupt the lectures.

Towards the end of January 1979 a heavy gang filled the flat of Jacek Kuron where a lecture was to be held, entitled "Social Movement as an Educational Environment." Members of the heavy gang, with no fear of legal responsibility for their actions, insulted the host, tore up the books, damaged the floor. Under the circumstances the lecture was postponed to a later date. On the new day the heavy squad reappeared and tried to storm the flat. During the attempt one of the attackers bit Jacek Kuron's hand.

After the term break the lectures continued. On 7 March during Jacek Kuron's lecture, the squad repeated their action: they surrounded the house and attacked the students as they arrived. Two were beaten up. In the flat Jacek Borucki and Henryk Wujec were several times struck in the face, Jacek Kuron was thrown down the

stairs. The attackers cut off the electricity and for several hours did not allow anyone to leave the flat.

On 14 March the heavy squad appeared at a lecture in the Modern Polish History series. Since the students were not let through, Adam Michnik—one of the lecturers, the other one was to be Professor Adam Szczypiorski—cancelled the lecture and waited outside for the attackers to leave the building in which the lecture was to take place. Then he was dragged inside. At the same time the mathematician Konrad Bielinski who accompanied Michnik was beaten up and Jan Cywinski, a student of Classical Philology of Warsaw University, was hit. Soon after they were both carried away by the squad. They were knocked about, their bags taken away and searched. When they were finally released, Konrad Bielinski found that 4,000 zlotys was missing. On leaving, the attackers threatened to come to the next lecture.

All these actions took place with the tacit consent of the police. When the tenants of the houses concerned phoned the police, they were told that the police were already informed about the disturbances and taking action. Among the members of heavy squads functionaries known from surveillance, detentions and searches were recognized.

The actions described above (beatings, assaults, damage to homes) are criminal and should be judged in court. It is an outrage that this kind of activity is tolerated by the administration and the police, as well as by student authorities—since students have also been members of the squads. Among others, two Warsaw University students and activists of the SZSP were recognized: Pisarkiewicz and Witrowy. At a meeting of the Department Board of SZSP its chairman, Aleksander Swiatopelk Mirski, admitted that he had also participated in this action. By such behaviour they damage the reputation of other members of SZSP to whom such methods are foreign and they give the lie to the idea that this organization represents the interests of all students.

The lectures and seminars of the Society for Academic Courses are carried out in the open and conform to the laws of our country. The brutal attacks which disrupt self-education are a provocation to the academic world. The instigators of the heavy squad's action would like to drive the initiators and participants of the Academic Courses to the level of discussion where physical violence is the main argument and thus to stop the courses altogether. We appeal to the academic world to condemn the criminal activities described above. We count on the good sense of the authorities whose duty it is to bring about the immediate cessation of such actions.

Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR "

Warsaw, 26 March 1979

On 21 March around 7 p.m. a heavy squad of several dozen broke into the flat of Jacek Kuron at 27 Mickiewicz Street, flat no. 64. On the

door of the flat there was a notice cancelling that evening's lecture due to the illness of Jacek Kuron's father. Indeed, three and a half hours previously engineer Henryk Kuron had had a heart attack and an ambulance had been called, but had not arrived. This did not deter the heavy squad. They broke into the flat, despite the entreaties of those present to leave, since a seriously ill man was lying there and any agitation caused by the row put his life in danger. The attackers shouted: "We'll make a massacre here." They beat Grazyna Kuroniowa, Konrad Bielinski, Adam Michnik, Severyn Blumsztajn, Wojciech Malicki, Maciej Kuron and Henryk Wujec. It turned out later that Maciej Kuron and Henryk Wujec suffered brain concussion. Wujec's head was split near the temple and he was dragged, bleeding and unconscious, down the stairs. He was on sick leave from work for 10 days and the doctor told him to stay in bed. Maciej Kuron was exempted from school for 14 days and also ordered to stay in bed. Only around 8 p.m. did a reanimation ambulance arrive and it took Henryk Kuron to hospital. His condition was very serious. Then the squad left the flat.

The Warsaw Council of the Federation of the Polish Youth Socialist Union has acknowledged its participation in organizing attacks on the Society for Academic Courses. The whole action has been organized under the auspices of the police; when Kuron's neighbours telephoned the police about the raid, they were told that the police had already been informed and taken appropriate action.

By means of this letter we inform the state authorities about the crimes committed against health and life, penal threats and violation of home peace. Previous experiences indicate, however, that prosecutors, including the Chief Prosecutor's Office of the Polish People's Republic, ignore the complaints of citizens, or take legal action not against the culprits but against the injured. Police, public prosecutors, and courts act in concert and as a result the wronged parties are sentenced while the guilty go free. The trial of the actors of the 8th Day Theatre and of Kazimierz Switon may be taken as examples here. Under such circumstances it is futile to seek justice by legal channels. Therefore we are investigating the case in order to ascertain the facts and to expose the perpetrators of the criminal actions. The result of our investigation will be published.

On behalf of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR":
Professor Adam Szczypiorski, Aniela Steinsbergowa—lawyer.

Provisional Committee
of Farmers' Independent Trade Union

6 April 1979

In March progressive public opinion in Poland was shocked by the monstrous behaviour of a gang of hooligans under the sponsorship of

the Polish authorities. We refer to the already widely known attack on the home of Jacek Kuron, member of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR," of Mickiewicz street in Warsaw. It was not the first intrusion in the flat. Here are the details of the raid:

In Jacek Kuron's flat there was to be a lecture for students of the "Flying University." The lecture was cancelled, however, due to the serious illness of the 74-year-old Henryk Kuron, father of the host. An ambulance was called. The previously organized strong-arm gang, which was closely watching the flat, decided to take action. They broke into the flat despite the cancellation notice on the door. There were several dozen members of the heavy squad. They forced the door of Jacek Kuron's flat open and found several people there who had arrived earlier to talk over other matters before the lecture. They were for the most part family friends. Here the outrage begins. Strangers invaded a private home and then started to insult and beat those present. And what a beating—Jacek Kuron's son, the 19-year-old Maciej, and Henryk Wujec, a friend of the host, came out of this encounter with brain concussion. Women were not spared either. These individuals made themselves out to be students. And indeed, after a few days they were identified. It so happened that during this attack there was a foreign correspondent among Kuron's guests who could observe this scene. We ask: who benefits by this? No citizen of our country will acknowledge those students as Poles, but the fact remains that they were speaking Polish. Did the organizers want to create an impression that the attack was spontaneous? No one in Poland will believe that. It will be interesting to see what the government press says about the incident, for they have been greatly concerned about the lack of freedom in Spain, China, Chile. When will they at last deal objectively with our freedom? The world is moving forward, there are changes for the better, and here what? Why is it that in Poland, a country of great traditions of freedom, things look so bad? Cannot the Polish People's Republic afford even to guarantee respect for basic civic rights? The action of the strong-arm gang against Kuron's guests is not an exception.

All over Poland similar abuses are taking place. Are the beaten and persecuted people to defend themselves against heavy squads? We demand that the guilty be punished and these matters put before the whole nation.

Society for Academic Courses
Statement at the Conclusion of the First Year of Educational Activities

The first year of educational self-help activity under the auspices of SAC is drawing to an end. During the past year, the Society has supported self-educational groups which were already in existence before

its inception and has undertaken new initiatives. From October 1977 to May 1978 there have been more than 120 self-educational meetings in Warsaw, Cracow, Wroclaw, Lodz and Poznan. Lectures and individual lessons have been given by: Stefan Amsterdamski, Stanislaw Baranczak, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Czeslaw Bobrowski, Tomasz Burek, Bogdan Cywinski, Jerzy Jedlicki, Tadeusz Kowalik, Jacek Kuron, Stefan Kurowski, Edward Lipinski, Edward Lukawer, Jan Walc, Adam Michnik, Irena Nowakowa, Adam Stanowski, Jan Strzelecki, Zdzislaw Szapowski, Andrzej Werner, Wiktor Woroszylski, Karol Zarnowski, and others. The subjects of lectures and seminars were: post-war Polish history, the history of social thought, analysis of contemporary social structures, economic questions, problems of education, sociology of science, philosophy, literature, and the contemporary arts. The historical lectures enjoyed the greatest success; they drew audiences of a hundred or more. The more specialized questions drew groups which were smaller but on that account more constant and consolidated. All the courses started last autumn commanded the interest of students to the end. Coordination was undertaken by the Programme Committee which was set up by the signatories of the Society's declaration in successive meetings. The Programme Committee assumed the responsibility of selecting lectures and undertook to prepare the Society's programme of self-education for the following year.

A remarkable feature of the discussions during the lectures and seminars was the genuine curiosity of the young people and the maturity of their approach to the questions under discussion. It is also important to stress their composure and self-possession when the conditions of self-education were disrupted. The Society wishes to thank in particular those who, disinterestedly, in spite of harassment, reprisals and threats, lent their homes for self-educational activity.

The needs which the Society can, at least to a small extent, meet are known. They are felt first and foremost by the young people who experience for themselves the gaps and distortions in the educational system, starting from the primary school and continuing through secondary school right up to higher educational institutions. The absence of a genuine spirit of education and knowledge, which renders sterile the process of education and gives young people only a shallow, impoverished general culture with which to enter the community and professional life is a heavy burden on the life of the young generation.

Our initiative arose from the fact that such needs exist and remain unsatisfied; needs which are felt by teachers at various levels of the educational system, although for various considerations it is difficult for them to speak about such matters explicitly. They are felt by academic circles, frequently helpless in the face of increasing pressure and working in conditions where higher education institutions have no powers of self-government and are defending their integrity against interference in academic life, in the freedom of discussion and publica-

tion, and in the independence of academic associations, experiments and inquiry.

The existence of these needs and their significance has been spoken of by independent moral authorities in our country, the Polish Episcopate, which in a communiqué of March this year expressed its "disapprobation with all actions which hinder the human spirit from creating free values of culture" and affirmed that "the Church will support those initiatives which aim at presenting culture, the works of the human spirit and the history of the nation in an authentic form, for the nation has the right to the objective truth about itself."

SAC has placed before public opinion the problem of national education in the light of the threat presented to it by excessive formalization of studies and the monopolistic tendencies of the state, expressed, *inter alia,* in the subordination, especially of the social sciences, to the demands of propaganda and the current political circumstances.

It has gathered a group of people ready to work together to improve the educational system, analyse the compulsory syllabuses and textbooks, and to contribute to a change in higher education institutions. The signatories of the declaration at successive meetings concurred in stressing the intellectual and moral damage caused by narrow specialization of studies and theses, political censorship of history and sociology textbooks, and especially the arbitrary employment policies in higher educational and academic institutions. The self-educational movement is filling the gaps in the humanities, by reinforcing the feeling of tradition and historical continuity which has been particularly weakened. The movement is spurring people to discussions of principle and is inducing them to undertake independent, group or individual, studies. The new kind of bond between lecturers and audiences which has been created in the course of the work performed within the framework of the Society's activities is breaking down the official rigidity and hierarchical structure which, despite the efforts of a great number of men and women of learning is becoming widespread in our higher education institutions.

The Society appeals to every tradition of the Polish self-educational movement. It has drawn together people of different outlooks, who agree, however, that to instil in a new generation the love of truth and knowledge, the spirit of social and intellectual action, necessitates going beyond the framework of the official educational system. This initiative does not constitute a challenge to the existing state structures or the laws prevailing in our country. It has as its aims the enrichment of the intellectual life and experience of young people with a spontaneous, disinterested and moral element.

The Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences has been notified of the formation of SAC. The Society's initiatives remain unrecognized, and certain circles described SAC's activities as "socially harmful" or even "politically dangerous." Administrative measures were

taken against the Society's members, and especially against those persons who allowed their homes to be used for self-educational meetings. None of this had any influence on the decisions of the Society regarding its future activity. The hampering and harassment of the Society's work, the campaign undertaken against the social initiative which it had taken, on the pretext that it has no place in the official system of education and its structures, while at the same time silence was preserved as to why this initiative arose, and while not a single step was taken to fulfil these needs felt by the Society—all this activity is as harmful to national culture as it is myopic. The Society is resolute in its intention to continue its self-educational activity in the conviction that the measures taken against it will be discredited, and that in the end good sense and concern for common general human and national values will prevail. Freedom of education and academic discussion and the right to undertake social activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic and the Human Rights Covenants which Poland has ratified do not constitute a threat to the social order but rather a bulwark resting on intelligent and moral foundations.

An Appeal from the Society for Academic Courses

Warsaw, November 1979

The Society for Academic Courses is facing a new wave of repressions which are increasing every day. After the harassment, the fines, the disruption of lectures by security squads, and acts of physical violence, in the past few weeks the activities of the Society have become the target of systematic and harsh repressions, directed against the lecturers, listeners, owners of flats where meetings are held. The educational activity of the Society has been rendered impossible by the police. Long detentions, searches, fines, even acts of violence are hitting the lecturers and members of the Society. Under these circumstances we urge all groups in society to support our efforts to defend the very existence of the Society for Academic Courses. We appeal in particular to Polish academic circles, to teachers, artists and intellectuals, not to accept—through silence—the violence and repressions which reign over the intellectual life and education of the young generation. We appeal to Poles living abroad. So far the activity of the Society for Academic Courses has met with understanding in Polish circles abroad. We count on further support for our endeavours, convinced that they serve the vital interests of the national culture, whose future is dependent on the degree of respect for the freedom of thought and conscience in our country. We also appeal to international public opinion, to those working in the fields of science and culture all over the world. Because of the difficult situation in which the Society finds

itself at the moment we count on moral support and solidarity, on the condemnation of repressions to which we are subjected, on a public defence of the violated freedom of thinking and teaching.

Free Learning in Poland
International Support Committee

November 1979

For many years the struggle has been going on in Poland to keep alive an independent intellectual life, free from censorship and official restrictions. An extremely important aspect of this struggle is the " Society for Academic Courses " (better known under the nickname of the "Flying University "). This Society arranges—in private flats—open lectures, seminars and discussions in fields which, in official academic teaching, are inevitably distorted by all sorts of suppressions, taboos and lies—especially in the social and human sciences.

To sustain and to expand this movement—basic for genuine cultural life—the support and solidarity of scholarly circles all over the world is essential, in particular since persistent and often extremely brutal attempts are made to stifle any efforts in the direction of an independent intellectual life and scholarly freedom. This is why we believe it advisable to set up an International Support Committee for the Freedom of Learning in Poland. It aims at defending the " Flying University," at providing support for various forms of free cultural activity and at stimulating exchange between scholars in Poland and in other countries. This includes meetings, material help for intellectuals who are harassed or discriminated against in Poland, provision of libraries to support free learning and studies, and publication of the results of discussions and research.

We wish to associate ourselves with this cause and ask for the support of all who hold dear the freedom of teaching, of research and of intellectual progress.

Paolo Alatri, historian, Messina
Alfred Ayer, philosopher, Oxford
Bronislaw Baczko, historian, Geneva
Zygmunt Bauman, sociologist, Leeds
Heinrich Böll, author, Nobel Prize, Cologne
Wlodzimierz Brus, economist, Oxford
Claude Bruter, mathematician, Brest
Alexander Cairncross, economist, Oxford
Paolo Casini, historian of philosophy, Rome
Robert Conquest, author, London
Michel de Certeau, historian, San Diego
Jean Delumeau, historian, Paris
Michael Dummett, logician, Oxford

Jean Ehrard, historian of literature, Clermont-Ferrand
Jean-Claude Favez, historian, Geneva
Michel Foucault, philosopher, Paris
Diaz Furio, historian, Pisa
Stanislaw Gomulka, economist, London
Jean-Marie Goulemot, historian, Tours
Arnor Hannibalsson, philosopher, Reykjavik
Agnes Heller, sociologist, Melbourne
Maria Hirszowicz, sociologist, Reading
Richard Kahn, economist, Cambridge
Frank Kermode, historian of literature, Cambridge
Leszek Kolakowski, philosopher, Oxford
Jaroslav Krejci, sociologist, Lancaster
Kazimierz Laski, economist, Vienna
Harvey Leibenstein, economist, Harvard
Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, historian, Paris
Richard Löwenthal, political scientist, Berlin
Cesare Lupporini, philosopher, Florence
André Lvoff, biologist, Nobel Prize, Paris
Mary McCarthy, author, Paris
Czeslaw Milosz, author, Berkeley
Miklos Molnar, historian, Geneva
Georges Mond, political scientist, Paris
Iris Murdoch, author, Oxfordshire
Gunnar Myrdal, economist, Nobel Prize, Stockholm
Robert Nozick, sociologist, Harvard
Henry Phelps-Brown, economist, Oxford
Krzysztof Pomian, historian, Paris
Jacques Prentki, physicist, Geneva
Hilary Putnam, logician, Harvard
Willard Quine, philosopher, Harvard
Joan Robinson, economist, Cambridge
Ruggiero Romano, historian, Paris
Laurent Schwartz, mathematician, Field's Medal, Paris
Dents Sciama, physicist, Oxford
Quentin Skinner, political scientist, Cambridge
Piotr Slonimski, biologist, Paris
Aleksander Smolar, economist, Paris
Jean Starobinski, historian of literature, Geneva
Stefan Strelcyn, orientalist, Manchester
Juliusz Stroynowski, historian, Cologne
Stanislaw Swianiewicz, economic historian, London
Charles Taylor, philosopher, Montreal
Tymon Terlecki, historian of literature, London
René Thom, mathematician, Field's Medal, Paris
Edward Thompson, historian, Worcestershire
Franco Venturi, historian, Turin

Jean-Pierre Vernant, historian, Paris
C. J. T. Wall, mathematician, Liverpool
Peter Wiles, economist, London
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The Security Police and the Opposition

Although the repressions to which Polish dissidents are subjected are far less harsh than in the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, they are marked nevertheless by vicious chicaneries and occasional brutality. The characteristic method of persecution in Poland is the tactic of harassment and petty cajolery adopted by the authorities in the "war of attrition" against the opposition. As the documents reproduced below testify, this is borne with fortitude. For its part, the opposition develops various forms of resistance to such bullying pressures. As long as Poland depends as heavily on Western credits and other economic favours as it does now, the authorities are inhibited in using more drastic methods of totalitarian vindictiveness.

Problems Concerning the Strengthening of Law and Order and Social Discipline

Extract from official text of speech delivered by Teodor Palimaka, Head of the Department of Administration of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party during a meeting with Party lecturers on 20 April 1978.

We note the increase during the last few years of imperialistic incursions directed against Poland and other countries of the socialist block. At its roots lies the negative attitude towards the strengthening of détente in the sphere of international relations, and also the fact of the increase of socialist forces in the world. . . .

Anti-socialist activities are a marginal factor in the political and social life of our country. They are conducted by people and groups known for years to represent revisionist and Zionist, social democratic, right-wing clerical, and bourgeois liberal attitudes. Their social base is limited to narrow, though noisy circles among scientific workers, some students, a limited number of writers and other representatives of the cultural life. . . . These people are trying to gain notoriety by creating the illusion of the existence of a broad mass movement which questions the policy of the Party and negates the whole construction of socialism in Poland. . . . During these last few months the prestige of anti-communist forces in Poland has suffered several defeats. For instance, in spite of their efforts they did not succeed in manifesting their presence during the visit of Carter. The high attendance and the number of votes received by the candidates of the Front of National Unity during the elections to the local national councils was another defeat,

and so was the lack of support from the students for the provocative commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the events of March. . . . Nevertheless, new and significant elements appeared among the anti-socialist forces operating within the Polish People's Republic. They aim primarily at extending and strengthening their illegal organizational structures, having their own publishing capability, their own funds, and varied forms of foreign links, particularly with diversionary centres. These are, among others, KOR, ROPCiO, SKS (in Cracow, Warsaw, Gdansk, Poznan, Wroclaw), TKN and LU which are connected with it, the Polish section of Amnesty International and the Salon of Independent Culture. Noteworthy is the tendency for these hostile activities to adopt drastic forms and methods. Among them are the particularly aggressive and provocative attitudes, towards representatives of the state and the application of active forms of resistance, for instance, when dispersing illegal meetings and the open demonstration of hostile attitudes (abusing the militiamen). The anti-socialistic groups are spreading their action through the ever-developing press. They print some 20,000 copies at a time, shared among 19 publications, of which half is seized by the UB [state security police]. . . . Since the autumn of 1977 one notices the increased activity of enemy forces among university students. It is shown for instance in the wider reach of the SKS, the relatively considerable publishing and educational activity and the organization of *ad hoc* actions of an anti-social character. The so-called " flying universities " are particularly dangerous because of the number of participants and the backing they receive from some of the university staff.

Press Conference in the Ministry of Internal Affairs*

The conference took place on 26 September 1979. It was held for journalists who write about the police, security forces, crime, etc. The conference was chaired by the Director of the Press Bureau of the Party Central Committee, a Central Committee Secretary, Rokoszewski. Minister Kowalczyk delivered the main speech. He spoke about the origins of the security forces 35 years ago and of their fight against the forces of reaction. He said that there had recently been attempts to distort the role of the police and security forces in those days. Minister Kowalczyk talked about their importance in strengthening the " people's power " and of recent attempts to " subvert " Polish organizations and Polish citizens abroad, especially in Sweden and Austria. Experienced foreign agents were said to be active in Poland as well as anti-socialist groups, organized in the country and charac-

* Summary of the notes taken by a participant.

terized by their pathological hatred of socialism. The people who took part in such actions were enticed by good money and were recruited from the fringes of society—said Minister Kowalczyk. By way of example he mentioned Edmund Zadrozynski of Grudziadz, whom he described as a criminal and an associate of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"; Piotr Lukaszewicz, sentenced for rape [he was never associated with KOR, although KOR spoke out in his case because there were grounds for believing that he was murdered by the police during interrogation]. Concerning foreign travel he said that only people who were suspected of discrediting national dignity were not allowed to travel abroad, or those with a criminal record.

General Krzysztoforski of the security forces spoke about ideological sabotage and about 26 different anti-socialist organized groups. Mentioning the recently sentenced Adam Wojciechowski, he cited Amnesty International as one such group. He described the opposition in general terms: its success in the field of publishing and its poor progress among the peasants. According to Krzysztoforski the "groups of ideological saboteurs" were initially financed by foreign sources independent of governments but that this situation had lately changed. He said that the main activists received thousands of dollars and that for every 48-hour detention a special premium was paid. Such 48-hour detentions were used as preventive treatment—maintained Krzysztoforski. This together with "verbal persuasion" were the methods used by the authorities in fighting the opposition. There was no need for legal reprisals.

Another speaker, Rokoszewski, said that press campaigns against the opposition were not effective and would not be mounted in the future. It was not so important to write about the economic crimes in the country but the press should rather concentrate on "making the police and security activities look more human." As far as censorship was concerned he said that soon it would not be needed since there was an increasing number of newly appointed "responsible editors." Those who failed to exercise "self-censorship," would receive two warnings and then be dismissed.

The Citizen and the Security Service

A Practical Guide by the Polish League for Independence

July 1977

This is neither an instruction for conspirators, nor a textbook for revolutionaries. It has been written with all those who live under the totalitarian dictatorship of the Polish People's Republic in mind. The political police (going under the name of security services) are a ubiquitous and controlling presence, ever curious about attitudes and

behaviour. No one is free from the danger of coming into their orbit. They try to infiltrate every institution and every social group: informers are their most important tool. Although modern technology provides the police with other, more exact, methods of extracting information, they still put great store by their net of informers, constantly seeking to maintain and enlarge it. These secret collaborators are important not only because they collect information but also because they help to disintegrate natural social forces, and to spread fear and inertia.

Potential informers are sought particularly among students, school children, young workers and among groups with some foreign connexions, not necessarily Western. The recruiting net is so widely spread that almost everyone is at risk of being approached with proposals of collaboration coupled with promises of various advantages and not infrequently with blackmail.

Techniques are worked out in detail. The potential informer is invited to meet representatives of the security services either while on a business visit to an official institution or, more often, in an unofficial location: a café, restaurant or hotel room. The secret servicemen tend to introduce themselves as members of the counter espionage service to add to their own stature. The conversation is conducted in a friendly and lighthearted tone: the potential informer may be told that among his acquaintances there is someone engaged in work for the enemy and that he himself is or may become involved in it without his knowledge. Allusions to his personal circumstances are made in order to make him feel that the security organs are very well informed about his family, his financial position, his work and his social life. They also seem to know all there is to know about everyone he knows. This effect is achieved relatively easily by having a number of people put under surveillance for a period, using telephone tapping and other means and then producing the information thus acquired at the right moment.

The offer to collaborate is rarely advanced at the first meeting. The potential informer is asked to think over the warning and to look carefully at the people indicated as suspect. He is warned that the conversation is confidential. At later meetings he may be asked his opinion of various acquaintances or of the situation at work. Even if he tries to retreat into generalizations or to give away nothing except details of no consequence, the security men will try to get him to write them down. Once they succeed in this, they are in possession of a pawn, to be used against their victim later on.

In the conversation the candidate's affairs are discussed and offers of possible assistance are made: better pay and conditions or, on the other hand, risks run by those of whom the security service disapproves, for example the risk of having one's passport withdrawn. The police take care to preserve a relaxed and friendly atmosphere. A favourite gimmick of theirs is to confide their own personal troubles to the interviewee. Only after a period of psychological softening is a definite offer made, backed with promises of money and other benefits. A

refusal provokes complete and immediate change: dismissal from work, studies at university or school are threatened, or the interviewee is told of unknown and distressing facts such as adultery on the part of a wife or husband. If a refusal comes after a prolonged series of meetings which the victim had agreed to keep secret and, in particular, if he had made any written statements, he is told that in view of the existing documents his final agreement would do no more than formalize already existing arrangements. He is also threatened with being compromised among his friends by having his written statements shown around. Recruiting techniques vary, of course, but elements of deception, bribery and blackmail are always present.

The best defence line is to refuse to enter into any informal conversations from the beginning, bearing in mind that one cannot be forced to take part in them. In all contacts with the police (of which security is but a branch) it is desirable to keep the following rules in mind:

> Always demand to see the authorizing document, specifying in what capacity one is called to see the police, whether as a witness or as a suspect.
>
> Refuse to take part in any meetings other than in the police station or another official location.
>
> Demand that a record be made of the interrogation and refuse to enter into any conversations off the record.

Anyone so taken by surprise that he agrees to engage in private informal conversations with the police may still save himself by breaking them off immediately and by making it widely known that they have taken place. Neither refusing to respond to police approaches nor publicizing the fact that they have been made is against the law and cannot make one criminally liable in any way. These are the best methods to discourage the police from further attempts to acquire a new recruit.

He must never give way to threats or blackmail. The police will try hard to get a new informer, but they have no authority to employ repressive measures on a massive scale without special permission. Experience shows that a clear refusal to collaborate despite threats and psychological pressure usually ends in the police leaving the intended victim alone.

Formal contacts with the security services are quite another matter. The Code of Criminal Procedure charges the security services with responsibility for criminal inquiries under the supervision of and on instructions from the Offices of Public Prosecutions. The inquiries are mostly concerned with suspected political offences. Very often the alleged offences are in fact attempts by private citizens to exercise legal rights guaranteed by the Constitution and other legal instruments.

A number of articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which people have been charged in recent years are in direct contradiction to the treaties on Human Rights. It is for this reason that the texts of the treaties have not been published and are not generally

available even though they have been ratified by the Council of State and the Seym.

The supervision supposedly exercised by the Offices of Public Prosecutions over police inquiries tends to be illusory. The security services enjoy considerable autonomy in interpreting the law as to the legality of activities under examination. Anyone required by the police to make a statement should bear that in mind, even if only called as a witness. Utmost caution is indicated, as it is never certain in what way one's statement could be interpreted and used.

Article 160 paragraph 1 states that "a person called as a witness is bound to appear and to make a statement." Neglecting to appear or refusing to make a statement renders one liable to be fined or to be imprisoned for up to 30 days. Making a false statement may lead to a prosecution for perjury. The Code does, however, envisage situations in which one is allowed to refuse to make a statement and it is advisable to know how to make the best use of the rules.

When summoned to attend the witness has to be informed of the nature of the case. If this has not been done, he has the right to demand it. A witness has the right to refuse to make a statement if the accused is a person related to him, such as a wife or a husband, a child or a parent, a brother or sister, or a common law spouse (Article 120 paragraph 5). The same applies to a divorced spouse and his or her close relatives.

A witness may also request to be allowed not to make a statement if ties of friendship, guardianship or a similar relationship exist between him and the accused (Article 167). In that case, however, the decision whether or not he need testify rests with the official in charge of the inquiry. A witness may also refuse to make a statement pleading professional discretion. This applies to doctors, journalists and others. In these cases only a court or a public prosecutor can order the witness to make a statement.

The most commonly given reason for a refusal to make a statement is that it might incriminate the witness or his family as defined in Article 120 paragraph 5. This right of refusal is given in Article 166 paragraph 1. When pleading possible incrimination, the witness does not have to specify what he is afraid of or whether he is afraid of incriminating himself or his family. He does not have to declare the connexion between the circumstances being investigated and his own putative responsibility. It is enough that he invoke Article 166 paragraph 1. It is indeed advisable to invoke this privilege whenever applicable as it is only too easy for a witness to be recast as a defendant. It is quite common for the police to call a suspect as a witness at first in order to obtain incriminating material sufficient to bring a charge. It has to be borne in mind at all times that the legal position of a witness is very different from that a defendant:

First, the accused, when charged, has to be presented with details of the alleged offence, and the article under which the charge is brought

has to be named. If the accused so requests, the police have to produce a more extensive statement of the charge within 14 days.

Secondly, once charged, the defendant may refuse to make a statement without any explanation whatsoever (Article 63) and he is not criminally liable for giving false evidence.

It is nonetheless obvious that in the duel between the defendant and the police the latter have inbuilt advantages. The criminal procedure is designed on inquisitorial lines. The accused is in the hands of the police who charge him, examine him, may place him under arrest with the permission of a public prosecutor and thus cut him off from all outside contacts and from the help of a lawyer. The accused does not have to be appraised of the evidence against him until the inquiry is completed: if he is under arrest, he is then allowed to communicate with his lawyer. Throughout the period of the inquiry the accused, especially if under arrest, tends to feel lost and ignorant of his own position and of the intentions of the police. He is not, as a rule, allowed to see his counsel, he is unable to see the documents relating to the case, he does not even know whether he is being charged alone or with others and he is not aware of the nature of the evidence against him. The only thing he knows is the charge, but even that may be altered at any time. In the circumstances, his only effective defence throughout the investigation is silence. Any statement he makes, whether true or false, may be used against him by the police: only silence can keep him safe from further incriminating himself. It is imperative in a political case to refuse absolutely to give information to the police. In any case, it is not possible to set about the preparation of one's defence until the documents of the case are made available and contact with the lawyers established, in other words until the investigatory stage is over and the charge finalized.

Total silence is a very difficult tactic to follow, especially for a person in detention. It is essential to remember to keep silent not only during hours spent under examination but also all the time in the cell, which is perhaps bugged, and perhaps harbours an informer among the inmates. Often, silence has to be kept for long periods, perhaps for many months. It requires severe self-discipline: one must neither talk nor think of the case. For the period of the investigation it is essential to make oneself forget about it altogether. This may be made somewhat easier if certain rules, in fact a complete psychological regime, are followed; a time-table should be devised and followed consistently, allowing for reading and learning, especially of foreign languages.

We now pass on to certain rules which should be followed in order to lessen other dangers arising from the omnipresence of the police and from the technology at their disposal.

A number of activities, legal according to the letter of the law, are, under a variety of pretexts, treated by the authorities as if they were illegal. They include organized discussions, expression of political views, the spreading of information on current events, the dissemination of

political writings, lending foreign publications and assisting victims of repression. It is therefore absolutely necessary to exercise utmost care in order to avoid giving the police grounds for instigating inquiries or reprisals.

The crucial rule to be followed at all times is that of discretion, especially on the subject of other people. As long as we express our own views, distribute our own writings, we expose only ourselves to possible dangers and only we may be called upon to bear the consequences. Talking and gossiping about other people involved in activities frowned upon by the authorities may end in placing them under suspicion.

Now for some other circumstances in which caution is essential. It is necessary to bear in mind that, while officially the secrecy of private correspondence is inviolate, it is a rule notoriously disregarded, even with the permission of a public prosecutor. Private letters, expressing personal views, are known to have been used in evidence in political trials. Telephone tapping presents no problems for the police: panicking is of no use but the fact must not be forgotten. True that recorded conversations cannot be cited in evidence, nonetheless they give the police knowledge of plans and activities of suspects. If one has good reason to believe that a telephone is being tapped (and it is impossible to make sure without specialized instruments), it is just as well to conduct all confidential conversations from a call box or a private telephone known to be safe. The police need several minutes to identify the particular telephone. Bugging devices are notoriously difficult to detect. Technical sophistication has reached such levels that they can be installed in places which are difficult of access and detection. Small battery operated transmitters, no larger than a match box, are often used. Any telephone instrument, unless the wall plug is taken out, may be used for the purpose. It is quite feasible to establish whether a telephone is transmitting at a given moment. A small and easily available instrument is capable of determining whether the contact plates of the microphone are receiving an electric charge. If they are, the receiver registers sounds within the room, when seemingly inoperative. It is possible for the police to listen to conversations virtually anywhere, if enough money and effort have been expended. One may lessen the risk by having a radio or a record player play loudly. This works up to a point, but only if the source of sound and the jamming instrument are at approximately equal distance from the transmitter. But in the end the only safe conversations are those conducted in the open and preferably under trees.

We would like to emphasize that the preceding remarks are not meant to serve as instructions for conspirators, since private conversations and exchange of information are not forms of conspiracy in the eyes of the law. We simply offer some advice to people who might become victims of abuse of the law and of the Constitution by the security services.

Appendix

September 1977

One of the possible results of a person having been brought to the attention of the security services is a search, known to the Code of Criminal Procedure as " an examination." In theory, a search, either of a person or of premises, is not allowed without the authorization of a public prosecutor or a court and it can be authorized only if proceedings are already in progress.

The Code decrees that an authorization must be in writing and it must be shown to the person concerned before the search starts (Article 191 paragraph 1). An exception is made for urgent cases, when authorization issued by the head of the local police unit, or even presentation of an identity card by the policeman in charge of the investigation is sufficient.

Other provisions of the Code, concerned with the principles of search, are equally flexible. E.g. night searches (between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m.) are forbidden but in cases of great urgency the police are allowed to waive this restriction. Also, a search begun in day time may be continued after 9 p.m. (Article 192 paragraph 1 and paragraph 2.)

A personal search should be conducted by a police officer of the same sex as the person being searched but, says the Code of Criminal Procedure, only if this is possible (Article 194).

A person about to be searched has the right to name another person to be present during the search but, says the Code again, only if it does not make the search either impossible or difficult (Article 195 paragraph 2).

All the foregoing provisions for protecting individuals are clearly somewhat insubstantial but there are others from which no exceptions are permitted and which must be observed by any police officer conducting a search. The duty to produce a record of search and to issue on the spot a receipt for objects confiscated is among them.

The record has to be signed by all present, including the person searched, who has the right to read the record and to state any objections he or she may have. The objections have then to be entered in the record (Article 136). As the record is meant to reflect the course of the search, all objections concerning the behaviour of the police, failure to observe the Code etc., should be brought up before the document is signed. If the police refuse to include the objections in the record, the person searched must refuse to sign.

When given the receipt for objects taken away by the police, a careful check must be made to ensure that the list is accurate enough to prevent difficulties in identification. This is particularly important in the case of typewritten material, loose printed pages and the like.

If the objects were confiscated during a search not authorized by the court or a public prosecutor, such authorization must be produced

within seven days, or else the objects taken must be returned to the owner (Article 197 paragraph 3).

Only objects held unlawfully and those necessary to provide evidence may be retained by the police. The owner or the person from whom such objects were taken has the right to appeal to a higher authority against the public prosecutor's authorization (Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).

As a rule, the security services confiscate all Polish books and periodicals published abroad and found during the search. They are particularly keen to discover copies of the Paris *Kultura* and other publications of the Polish Literary Institute. As the legislation stands now, this practice is unlawful. The possession of books, newspapers and periodicals, critical and even hostile to the political system of the Polish People's Republic and the social and political situation in the country is in no way forbidden, unless the owner intends to circulate them. Possession of more than one copy of these publications may be construed as evidence of such intention. Therefore, seizure of single copies of books and periodicals has no legal justification and should be opposed.

As to the technical aspects of searches, it is useful to remember that when they are conducted with sufficient skill and accuracy, they are likely to discover even the most ingenious hide-outs. But this does require a great deal of work, technical resources and time. In most cases, therefore, searches are bound to be somewhat superficial.

We repeat: these are not instructions for conspirators. Exchange of ideas and news is not a conspiracy in the eyes of the law. Ours is advice to all those who come up against infringement of the Constitution and the law by the security services.

Documents of Lawlessness

KOR Statement on the publication of a " White Paper.

Warsaw, 7 April 1978

We consider it our duty to inform the public of facts which point to a general practice of violating the law on the part of institutions set up for its protection —viz. the police, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the courts of law. After the events of June 1976 well over a hundred people made complaints to the relevant authorities, stating that they had been tortured and beaten by officers of the security service (secret police) and the police; many hundreds of others made similar complaints in statements given to the courts and to representatives of the Workers' Defence Committee. The following are extracts from some of these:

Jozef Szczepanik: "I was struck on the temple and lost consciousness. My colleagues told me that after I fainted one of the police officers grabbed me by the throat and dragged me to the cell in this way, while the others walked beside me and beat me on my legs and chest. My legs, chest and back were blue from the beating."

Waldemar Gutowski: "They took me into the magistrate's court building; there I just couldn't take the torture and beating and pain —I admitted to a crime I'd never committed. That way I saved my health."

Ryszard Nowak: "They told me they'd beat me until I admitted I was a thief, even though I didn't steal anything, in fact I've never stolen anything in my life. I was beaten up so hard I thought I couldn't take it any more."

Zbigniew Cibor: "I was beaten and kicked so hard by the policemen and the warders that blood came out of my ears and nose."

Piotr Wojcik: "Five of them set upon me. They pinned me to the radiator and beat me all together so I quickly lost consciousness. They used truncheons, the handle part, which has lead. They kicked me all over my body. Sometimes three or even all five beat me all together. Most of them had been drinking."

Stanislaw Adamski: "I was beaten, kicked and made to run up and down the prison building. After about a two-hour session they threw me into the cell, unconscious."

Zenon Baran: "You had to lie down in the police car, because the policemen beat us and kicked us. They treated us worse than animals. I was beaten during the interrogation: two policemen held me down, the third beat me on the back, head, legs, wherever."

Waldemar Michalski: "My first 'health trot' was from one police car to another—about 50 metres. They told me to walk slowly, so that each of them could hit me in turn. They beat me with their fists, truncheons, boots. At the very end I fell. In that hail of truncheon blows I just couldn't get up again."

Kazimierz Rybski: "When I came to, one of them said, 'Haven't had enough, then?' and said to the other one: 'Give him some more.' They started to beat me with truncheons and kick me. I was lying on the floor."

Stanislaw Wijata: "I was beaten with rubber truncheons, about 75 cm. in length. My whole back was black: we examined each other, my fellow cell-mates and I."

Ferdynand Ufniarz: "At the Central Police Station they took me into a room and proceeded to beat me. I lost consciousness. I came to in another room. My nose was broken. In the general assembly room a police corporal began to beat me and kick me. I fell over and then I lost consciousness again. When I came to, some of my teeth were missing."

Piotr Glowacki: "Two of them took their truncheons, stood behind me and beat me on the back alternately. They told me: 'You're

not doing us any favours. We'll take anyone from the riots, do him over a bit and he'll say he saw you set fire to the Party building. Or we'll get a policeman to say he saw you.' "

Grzegorz Jaroszek: " I lay with my feet bare. They began to beat the soles of my feet with their truncheons. First I felt pain in my feet; then I just felt as if someone was hammering nails into my head."

All these and other complaints, as well as protests from the public, have remained unanswered. Authors of the complaints and signatories of public protests have been harassed, forced to withdraw their charges, interrogated and dismissed from their jobs. Violating Article 259 of the Code of Penal Procedure, the General Prosecutor's Office has made no statement as to whether or not legal action will be taken. The courts have ignored statements made in public by witnesses and defendants that false testimonies had been extracted from them under duress, and passed sentences based solely on the statements of police and security service officers. Official propaganda has portrayed the tortured workers as " dregs of society." But one has to answer before the law even if one has beaten up a gangster. People were tortured in police stations and prisons after June 1976, forced to make false confessions by being beaten to the point of unconsciousness. They were tormented with patent sadism and a sense of boundless impunity. This is an incontrovertible fact which should normally denote a state of emergency for the authorities. Such a sense of impunity can result only from the authorities' indulgence.

In a statement dated 15 November 1976 the Workers' Defence Committee said:

> The brutal conduct of the police officers does not suggest that they have been inculcated with any principles of lawfulness or respect for fellow human beings. The fact that the so-called " health trot " was commonly used both in Radom and in Ursus would indicate that it is a method taught and practised in police training. The facts described above are evidence enough that the training of officers of the law has taken an inadmissible course. Thus, quite apart from bringing to justice those guilty of breaking the law, a parliamentary commission should investigate the training methods of the police and security service as well as the internal regulations and instructions of the police, ZOMO (specially trained mobile police units), and the security service.

Despite a citizens' motion signed by over 3,000 people the special parliamentary commission was never set up. We have therefore taken up, within our limited resources, the task of investigating the problem set out in the citizens' motion. The collation and verification of the material necessary for this research has been carried out by the Interventions Bureau, which was formed in May 1977 under the auspices first of the Workers' Defence Committee and then of the Public Self-Defence Committee " KOR." Today we are in a position to state with full responsibility that the functioning of the law enforcement

organs is based on violation of the law, while the courts conceal these practices by giving unjust convictions, often sentencing innocent people and not taking the trouble to find the real offender. In the documents we submit we do not concern ourselves with proving the commonplace practice of beating up suspects at police stations, since the public is well aware that this takes place. What we shall submit for the public's consideration, however, are documents revealing the tragic consequences of this practice. Of the seven deaths described in them, five came as a result of severe beating either at the police station or in the course of taking the suspect to the police station. In a number of other cases the result of police brutality was permanent disability.

Our limited scope and resources have enabled us to research only a tiny fraction of such incidents. We did not manage to investigate many cases about which we had received information, while several which we did investigate have not been made public on the request of the victims' frightened families. The information we are making available thus reveals merely the tip of the iceberg. In the prevailing conditions we may safely assume that the 25 crimes perpetrated by police officers and described here are representative of a large-scale phenomenon. It is a characteristic of all of them that the prosecution ignores the most clear-cut evidence of the crime and, in choosing to discontinue the criminal proceedings, accepts even the most improbable statements of the police.

We are in possession of a document which reveals the mechanism of concealing police brutality. We quote it in full in our paper: it is a letter from the Regional Deputy Prosecutor in Kalisz to the State Council. It is not just the county police HQ that takes part in covering up police brutality; the offices of the Regional Prosecutor, the County Prosecutor and finally the General Prosecutor of the People's Republic of Poland are also involved.

The second document which proves beyond doubt that the police have been placed above the law is a booklet issued for internal use by the Department of Professional Training within the Ministry of the Interior (F. Armatys, Z. Sokolowski, " The Improper Conduct of Police Officers in the Course of Duty "). We reproduce this document in parts. Of the numerous police offences resulting in loss of health or life listed there, only one (the beating up of a Captain of the Polish Army) reached the courts and resulted in a conviction.

A fact which rouses particular indignation is that there are doctors and experts who cooperate in covering up the crimes of the police. There are cases of medical reports which blatantly contradict evident signs of brutal treatment. In Radom on the night of 30 June 1976 two police officers brought in a heavily beaten-up Jan Brozyna, who died two hours later as a result of his injuries. The doctor who signed him in at the " sobering-up station " noted merely a state of alcoholic

intoxication and a bruise below the eye. That is one of numerous examples.

The most tragic phenomenon, however, is the conduct of the courts of law which take part in protecting criminals in police uniforms, accepting police accounts in preference to those of citizens, and ignoring evidence of the policemen's guilt.

Complaints about police conduct, addressed to the higher authorities, are usually sent on to the department against which the complaint had been made. Thus the procedure comes full circle and the Polish citizen remains defenceless against police victimization and abuse of power, concealed by the prosecutors' offices and the courts.

A terrifying reality emerges from these facts. Such conduct on the part of the law enforcement organs should provide yet another alarm signal which would demonstrate the necessity of changes in the legislative and political system. These changes have long been demanded by the public, and are guaranteed in the Covenants on Human and Civil Rights. In the area under discussion in this Statement such changes would involve a basic transformation of the functioning of the departments of criminal investigation and justice. One *sine qua non* condition is the guaranteed independence of the courts, to be achieved by introducing the principle of the irremovability of judges. The prosecution must be separate from the investigation; the investigation should be led by an independent investigative judge; in the preparatory phase of the investigation, the suspect must invariably have the right to legal aid.

The present state of affairs has created a rift and incited hatred between the public and the departments called on to maintain public order. The tensions resulting from such a rift have more than once in the history of the People's Republic of Poland led to violent clashes with tragic consequences. Submitting our collection of documents, we state that the responsibility for the unpredictable consequences of the continued toleration of lawlessness in our country lies fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland.

Chronicle of Reprisals

Letter from Roman Wojciechowski to the Chief Prosecutor of the Polish People's Republic, 29 December 1978

On 28 December 1978 I was called to the Police Headquarters in Warsaw as a witness in case No. DS 96/78. I was questioned by Inspector Kabala from 10 a.m. to 12.15 p.m., in a manner conforming to the law. After the evidence was given and the record signed, Inspector Kabala wanted to see me off. In the hall we were approached by a security officer who said that I was to give explanations on a different matter. He did not reveal his name. I remembered him from a search in my home, in which he participated together with Inspector Andrzej Zakrzewski. He led me to a room and addressed me as "Mr Grochowski." I explained that my name was not Grochowski but Wojciechowski. The security officer smiled and said that it was not very nice for a police collaborator to refuse to acknowledge his pseudonym. He then asked whether I denied collaboration with the police. I said that such indeed was the case. In reply he put on the desk photocopies of several texts which ran as follows (I quote from memory):

"Warsaw, 9.1.69. I acknowledge receipt of 1,500 zlotys for information given to the police. The money was handed over to me personally by Inspector Stefan Zbiciak." Another photocopy carried an almost identical text, but mentioned 500 zlotys instead of 1,500. The handwriting was exactly like my own, although I never signed such receipts. After this introduction a five-hour long session of blackmail followed which I will try to relate here as faithfully as possible. The security officer informed me that in writing (together with Miroslaw Chojecki) the text entitled "The Citizen and the Security Service," I had challenged them and must suffer the consequences. The only hope for me was to undertake collaboration with the security services. I refused and thus, in his opinion, condemned myself to death. He mentioned a dozen names out of which I remember a few: Golaszewski, Wnuk, Korzen. These people, according to the security officer, were perverted hooligans. They would be informed by the security people that I helped the police to reveal their crimes. They would do me in. He described to me in vivid detail how they would cut my throat, how the blood would gush forth while I was twitching and struggling. In answer to my question if he was aware of the fact that planning a murder was a crime, he said that it was all my own fault because I refused to cooperate and besides, a wise commander would always sacrifice an individual to save his unit. He assured me that no legal action would be taken against him for organizing my murder because the whole thing would be staged in such a way that it would seem to be a settling of accounts

between criminals themselves. The end would be preceded by a nation-wide propaganda campaign against the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR." The materials in the possession of the security service would be published in the mass media. On the one hand, members of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" would be defamed as agents paid by the CIA, on the other, my death would be presented in such a way as to lead people to believe that the murderers, my own colleagues, cut my throat because I was an informer paid by the police. All these facts put together must give an impression to the public at large that the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" consisted partly of degenerate criminals and partly of agents manipulated by foreign intelligence services (I am still quoting the words of the security officer from memory). After this propaganda prelude, reprisals on a massive scale would take place: 200 people, for whom arrest warrants were prepared a few months ago, would be imprisoned within two hours. He told me to get acquainted with articles 122–26 of the Penal Code since my friends and colleagues would be tried on the basis of these articles only. All the time I was being insulted with terms such as: paid traitor of the country, foreign agent, collaborator of thieves, instigators and agents, imperialist lackey etc. My friends and acquaintances were insulted and accused of seizing over 10 million zlotys and informing on people for money. At one stage the security officer asked whether I loved my seven-year-old daughter. I did not answer. He started then to talk in detail about the Golaszewski brothers who would very likely want, after having murdered me, to "have fun" with my daughter. He asked whether the awareness of the fact that my little daughter would fall into the hands of perverts did not induce me to cooperate with the security service, and thus ensure safety for myself and my family. I demanded to be taken immediately to his superior, to whom I wanted to complain about the lawless behaviour of my tormentor. He told me that the boss was very busy now, just as the police would be busy when the criminals were "finishing me off" and torturing my child. I was not even allowed to go to the toilet despite the fact that I was sitting in the interrogation room between 10 a.m. and 5.40 p.m. I was only allowed to use the toilet by one of his colleagues around 5 p.m. At the end (for the last three hours I did not say a word) the security officer said that in the following days searches would take place in the homes of my acquaintances and friends, where security men would drop some copies of the texts I have quoted above. This would compromise me in the eyes of the members of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" to such an extent that I would have to confront the criminals condemned and completely alone.

He warned me not to attempt any legal defence because if I did I would be accused by the security service of insult, slander, and

attack on state organs, and put in prison, where criminals, already briefed about me in a special way, would find me. At an earlier stage of the interrogation he mentioned that I was lucky last spring, when unidentified men had beaten me up in a café, breaking four ribs and a hip, that I did not publish the fact in the underground press. Had I done so, I would be sitting in prison now with a five-year sentence for slander. " The security service knows who did it but as a harmful individual I was outside police protection."

The security officer gave me the date of 3 January 1979 to report to the Permit Section of the Police Headquarters in Warsaw, where he would leave my name and telephone number. If I were to accept collaboration with the security service and supply the required information—he did not specify what information—he would in return give me the compromising papers and would not organize the murder I had already described, as well as refrain from a slandering campaign against me in the mass media. If I were to refuse, however, I would put myself at the mercy of criminals and bring defamation upon my head.

I humbly request that an investigation be launched in this matter and the guilty punished. To identify the security officer concerned should not prove difficult since he was seen by Inspector Kabala and also was present in the team who searched my home together with Inspector Andrzej Zakrzewski.

Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights in Poland

Warsaw, 19 April 1979

We demand that enterprises, plants, institutions and offices stop the lawless practice of dismissing people for their convictions and public activity.

The party is virtually the only employer and if it causes someone's dismissal he cannot obtain another job. We have quite a long list of people dismissed on a discreet party or security recommendation. It is no secret that all economic and other managers in Poland are appointed by the party only and their dependence on it is total. Managers are often forced to dismiss good workers for being " disloyal " which means that they are not afraid to speak the truth.

This is going on in a country whose Minister of Employment, Wages and Social Services, at the 64th session of the International Labour Organization in Geneva in 1978, said that full employment and the right to work is an essential element in satisfying the fundamental needs of society. He even offered to help other countries in solving their unemployment problem.

At the same time we want to point out that Poland has no un-

employment benefits, despite the fact that hidden unemployment exists in some regions of the country, not to mention those who have been sacked for their political convictions.

Work in Poland is made into a privilege which can be taken away from the " disloyal." The fundamental right to work is going to be a weapon in the fight against people of other than Marxist convictions who do not want to become tools of the party.

Thus a new element of economic coercion is being introduced. In view of the exceptional violation of natural rights we demand: (a) that these practices be stopped, (b) that those dismissed be reinstated in accordance with their qualifications, (c) that an institutional safeguard against such abuses be created.

To the Polish Seym and
the Ministry of Employment, Wages and Social Services
Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR "

Warsaw, 13 August 1979

The Intervention Bureau of the Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR " has been receiving more and more information about drastic law abuses, beatings and sudden deaths for which—indirectly or directly —police functionaries are responsible. Usually they act under the protection of the Prosecutor's Office and very often of the courts. In autumn 1978 we published the Documents of Lawlessness, which described a dozen or so cases of this kind. We shall publish more such documents shortly. We are convinced that sooner or later functionaries who break the law will have to be publicly brought to justice. Of one such case we wish to inform public opinion today, since the personal safety of a family member of one such police victim is threatened.

Mrs Zenobia Lukasiewicz of Lodz has turned to us for help and protection. On 25 October 1978 at 11 p.m. two police inspectors, Zdzislaw Pajak and Jacek Prusak, from the District Police Lodz-Baluty, entered her flat, without a prosecutor's order. They forced Mrs Lukasiewicz's sick son out of bed and dragged him downstairs and along the street in such a way that his head was hitting the stairs and the pavement (the neighbours witnessed this). Without shoes or shirt they shoved him into a police car. A few days later Mrs Zenobia Lukasiewicz received a notice about her son's death. The autopsy stated death " through haemorrhage in the brain." In February 1979 the Voivodship Prosecutor's Office in Lodz informed the mother of the deceased that action against the two functionaries Pajak and Prusak had been dropped, since " they had been found innocent of the crime." The decision, dated 6 December 1978, was signed by the Voivodship Prosecutor Krzysztof Nawrocki. It does not explain how Piotr Lukasiewicz died and why action was dropped against the functionaries who at night, using brutal force, took a seriously ill man to their headquarters

where, as they later explained, they had intended to question him, because they suspected he was accessory or witness to a crime. It is worth noting that nobody was ever charged with that crime. The Prosecutor's statement does not mention at all the obvious possibility that it was the brutality of the functionaries that caused the sudden death of Piotr Lukasiewicz. His mother appealed against the refusal to prosecute the policemen to the Chief Prosecutor. She has still not received any reply.

On 24 July 1979 the undertakers Kombud placed a commemorative tombstone, ordered by Mrs Zenobia Lukasiewicz, which read: "In memory of my beloved son Piotr Lukasiewicz whose life was cut short at the age of 22. On 26.X.1978 official murderers entered into his sleep. Mother." The following day around 11 p.m. Mrs Zenobia Lukasiewicz was attacked in front of her home by an unidentified man. This fact was confirmed by the neighbours. On 27 July the Kombud workers hurriedly dismantled the tombstone and the firm informed Mrs Lukasiewicz that they were ready to change the inscription for her. Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" points out that the name of Zdzislaw Pajak of the District Police Lodz-Baluty has appeared in several known cases that ended in the death of the person questioned or detained (for example, Jan Kowalczyk and Zbigniew Gidelski). In all these cases the Prosecutor's Offices discontinued investigation. It is not the first time that we have to state that by such action Prosecutor's Offices become accomplices in the crimes of police functionaries.

The Case of Tomasz Koscielik

Tomasz Koscielik, a worker from Slupsk, electrician, reported to the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" and described what had happened to him:

On 13 July 1979 I was in a shop around 4 p.m., buying a bottle of vodka. I paid and turned to the door to leave, when I was stopped and informed that there had been an attempt to steal coffee from the shop and that I had to wait till the police arrived. I said I wanted to go since I knew nothing about the coffee. When the police arrived they checked my papers and under the pretext that I was a witness to theft they took me to the local police headquarters. Around 10 p.m. I was taken to the investigating officer who was not interested at all in why I was detained but wanted to know what I knew about some serious crimes. I told him I knew nothing about such matters: I go to work and do not go out at night. Then I was taken back to the cell to be released immediately. On the way in a policeman maliciously tore my shirt and after a few minutes he returned saying that we would go to collect my deposit on the way out. But instead he took me to the toilets. He poured water into a metal bucket and told me to

clean the toilets. I said that this was not my job and that I was unjustly detained. He again ordered me to do it and when I refused he poured the water over me and started to bash my head with the bucket. When I finally fell unconscious, he went to the guardroom to tell his colleagues that I attacked him. Five of them, together with the investigating officer, came up to me, placed me next to a bath tub and beat me with fists in the stomach and in the face. When I fell into the tub they revived me by pouring water over me and the beating started again. This was repeated several times, and to the accompaniment of vulgar and abusive language. Finally they told me to wash away my blood from the walls and the floor and I was locked in, in torn and wet clothes, in a cold cell on the floor. I used the remnants of my torn shirt to wipe blood from my nose and temples. Around midnight the same functionary who beat me with the bucket came in and when I asked him for a blanket he hit me hard in the stomach and quickly locked the door. On the following day I was released. I went home, changed and went to see a doctor. He told me to have my head X-rayed. Next day my family had to take me in an ambulance to a neurosurgical ward where I spent three weeks. I am still on leave from work after 67 days. [Here comes a detailed list—based on the medical report—of the injuries inflicted on Tomasz Koscielik.] In the first week in hospital I could not eat or see.

I know from experience that it is useless to complain to the authorities about such incidents, on the contrary, the guilty are left alone and the victims are punished with fines. That is why I am now forced to turn to the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" with a request to give publicity to my case here and abroad—for I know that what happened to me today will happen to many others tomorrow.

Tomasz Koscielik
25 August 1979

Dr Tadeusz Zalinski at the plant where Tomasz Koscielik had worked before the incident, had to declare him an invalid unfit to work as an electrician. He can work as a door-keeper or caretaker. Tomasz Koscielik is 24 years old.

To the Minister of National Defence
General Wojciech Jaruzelski

Lodz, 25 September 1979

For many years now, at least since 1968, the army has been used as a tool of repression against activists of the democratic opposition in Poland. After the student revolt of 1968 many of my friends, dismissed from the University, were called up: some for a few months, some for a longer time, while others found themselves in penal companies. For

the latter " the honour of military service " was equal to a strict regime prison.

Before the price rises of June 1976 tens of thousands of " inconvenient " citizens were isolated in the army for 38 days. Among them were people unfit for military service, men in their fifties, handicapped, dockworkers from Szczecin and Gdansk, my writer friends, lawyers and common criminals. But the whole operation failed and in many towns workers protested against the price rise. The inefficient and corrupt authorities imposed on the people have the vast majority against them. In their attempt to convince themselves and the people that it is only a small group of trouble-makers who are against them the authorities have taken revenge in a most brutal way. As a result the Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR " was formed of which I have the honour to be a close associate.

Before the June 1976 price rises I was also called to a military examination board—although I had been previously declared unfit for military service (category D). In April 1976, however, contrary to the medical certificate, my category was changed from D to C. In my case it was a waste of time since I was still a student and as such could not be called up.

At the beginning of this month, however, I was informed that I would be called for two to three months' training in the near future. Does it spell new price rises or is it a personal distinction awarded me by the security services?

Of course I will survive those two to three months, as well as the possible persecutions I may suffer when I refuse to take the oath. This I consider my moral duty since the present text of the oath is unacceptable to anyone with a basic knowledge of history and elementary honesty, for whom patriotism still means something. No Pole can seriously swear allegiance to a foreign army with bases in Poland, an army which 40 years ago—17 days after the Nazi attack—entered Poland. I am aware that for such a refusal I will be arrested and probably placed in a military psychiatric hospital. All this could be most useful to me, a writer, as a source of material. So far I know only that the Polish army has become a place of deportation and a source of cheap alobur. You, Mr Minister, are also personally responsible for this state of affairs.

Jacek Bierezin

Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR "

Warsaw, 24 September 1979

The Social Self-Defence Committee " KOR " appeals to the Polish nation and to world public opinion for help and solidarity in connexion with yet another attempt on the part of the authorities of the Polish

People's Republic to persecute lawlessly activists of the democratic opposition.

Since 1 July Edmund Zadrozynski—member of KOR, editor of *Robotnik*, worker activist in Grudziadz—has been detained for investigation in Torun. He was arrested under an absurd charge—participation in burglary. A letter of protest against this violation of the law has been signed by approximately 900 people of Grudziadz.

On 14 September the security authorities took Andrzej Czuma, activist of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, from his home. He was detained in the Warsaw police headquarters for 48 hours, released on 16 September and a few minutes later again detained for a further 40 hours.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that the common practice of harassing citizens in the Polish People's Republic by 48-hour long detentions is contrary to the law. An extension of the 48-hour detention is an offence (article 165 of the Penal Code), regardless of the fact that the authorities try to disguise them by sham releases after 48 hours. A few months ago the same procedure was applied against Antoni Macierewicz, member of KOR, in order to prevent him from meeting students in Wroclaw. In the case of Andrzej Czuma the authorities evidently intended to stop him from taking part in the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the Soviet army's attack on Poland on 17 September 1939.

An activist of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights, Adam Wojciechowski, was arrested for the same reason on 15 September 1979. On 17 September the Tribunal for Petty Offences of the Warsaw Central District Council sentenced him to two months' unconditional imprisonment under the pretext of disturbing the public peace. As we have already stated, the same method was used last July against Jerzy Geresz, worker of KOR, who was arrested under a fictitious charge and afterwards savagely beaten in the police headquarters and in prison.

It is our common duty to defend lawlessly persecuted people, irrespective of their political convictions. We demand the immediate release of Adam Wojciechowski and Edmund Zadrozynski. It is our common duty to protest against violation of the law by the authorities.

The Cooperation Committee for National Self-Determination

Warsaw, 19 November 1979

This year's spontaneous celebrations to mark the Independence Day on 11 November all over the country have shown yet again that the rulers of Poland are not able to stop the will of the Polish nation to strive for independence.

In the period preceding 11 November and on that day the security forces managed to detain about 150 activists of the anti-communist

opposition. Despite that, demonstration marches took place in Warsaw, Gdansk, Lublin and Cracow. Flowers were laid at the sites of national remembrance. In their speeches independence activists expressed with determination the will to regain full national rights and civic freedoms. They demanded free elections and expressed solidarity with the enslaved brotherly nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

Security squads tried to disrupt patriotic manifestations by various means: beating, stupefying gases, profanation of wreaths and of the national flag. Their brutal and anti-Polish action deserves scorn and condemnation. We appreciate the restrained and dignified behaviour of the Polish nation. We are also grateful to the British Conservative MPs at the European Parliament for their immediate reaction to the lawless detentions.

Confirmed by Wojciech Ziembinski

Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 18 December 1979

On 17 and 18 December 1979, nine years after the massacre of the coastal workers, the Polish nation commemorated the dead. In an attempt to hinder these celebrations the security services carried out throughout the country searches and detentions. About 200 people were detained for 48 hours, many of them two or three times. As far as we know, 15 people were arrested on the grounds of "participation in an association with a criminal aim" (article 276 of the Penal Code). They are faced with long terms of imprisonment. The detained are members and associates of the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" and participants of the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights.

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" gratefully supports the Polish Episcopate whose communiqué from the latest conference states: "Our country must also secure full safety and legal protection for all those who—whatever their views—express their concern for the common good. Everyone undertaking action must proceed with prudence and responsibility for the nation, with regard to the conditions of time and place."

In full solidarity with the detained, we demand their release. We demand freedom for civic initiatives.

Extract from a speech by Dariusz Kobzdej—representative of the Young Poland Movement—at the celebration of the ninth anniversary of December 1970 in Gdansk

Gdansk, 17 December 1979

Once again we are meeting here to commemorate the tragedy of the Polish December. We are not doing this in the name of hate. Our aim

is to honour peacefully the memory of those who died in defence of their rights and their dignity. By the same token they defended the rights and dignity of us all, of the whole Polish people. That is why it is our right and our duty to honour them and keep their memory alive, although the authorities are doing everything to make the people forget it.

December 1970 revealed the truth about the communist authorities of Poland and their ruthlessness in shedding the blood of the Polish workers. At the same time it made people aware of their strength. In order to prevent another such December, with people killed in the streets, we must now consider the course of action open to us. The best method is social self-organization. All of us have to struggle in a responsible way for our rights and our human and national dignity. A lot depends on our own attitude.

Last year I read to you a letter written by a founder of the Movement of Free Trade Unions, Kazimierz Switon. He called upon you to organize yourselves and to remember that the aims of the Free Trade Union Movement are your aims. Lack of organization weakens the effectiveness of your demands and leads to defeats that could have been avoided. The time is coming when we shall win our goal: a free fatherland in which the nation will govern itself without external interference. But this takes time and responsible, well-organized actions. Time is working for us and against the totalitarian authorities. They humiliate us by making us queue for hours not only for meat but even for onions. They deceive the nation and drivel about progress and tolerance. Every day we experience this communist "tolerance": threats of dismissal from work and detentions. A few days ago you could read in the official press about the sentences of imprisonment for Andrzej Czuma, Wojciech Ziembinski, Jozef Janowski and Bronislaw Komorowski. But you were not informed about the main reasons for this revenge—for there is no other name for it. It was their participation in the celebrations of the 61st anniversary of Poland's independence. The authorities objected to yet another sign that the Polish nation has not given up its freedom and Poland's independence. Let us here—at the gate where martyrs for Polish dignity lost their lives—demand freedom for Andrzej Czuma, Wojciech Ziembinski, Jozef Janowski and Bronislaw Komorowski. Defending individuals we are defending our fatherland. We shall overcome!

Committee for Social Self-Defence "KOR" (KSS–KOR)

Warsaw, 8 February 1980. A regular bi-weekly meeting of the Committee for Social Self-Defence "KOR" was to take place in the flat of Professor Edward Lipinski (Nestor of Polish economists). In Poznan Stanislaw Baranczak was detained while trying to board a train to Warsaw. After the departure of the train he was released with the

warning that should he try again he would again be detained. (He seems to have reached Warsaw eventually). In Gdansk Bogdan Borusewicz was detained. In Warsaw about 4 p.m. the flats of Adam Michnik, Jan Litynski, Andrzej Celinski and Wieslaw Piotr Kecik were searched. At 4.30 p.m. the writer Anka Kowalska was detained in Mokotowska Street, taken to her home which was searched until 10 p.m. The police took some notes and a typewriter. Zbigniew Romaszewski was detained in his home which was also searched. Two persons were arrested in Kecik's flat: Stanislaw Kusinski from Przemysl and Miroslaw Rybicki from Gdansk. Jacek Kuron and Jerzy Nowacki were detained when they left Kuron's home. Professor Jan Kielanowski who was with them was allowed to proceed. Aniela Stajnsberg, Jan Jozef Lipski and Jerzy Ficowski were prevented from entering Edward Lipinski's flat. They proceeded to Aniela Stajnsberg's flat. In Professor Lipinski's flat the following were arrested: Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Jerzy Nowacki, Piotr Naimski, Antoni Macierewicz. It appears that Antoni Pajdak and Jozef Rybicki were also in the flat.

9 February. An attempt was made to hold the meeting in Aniela Stajnsberg's flat. Only a few members managed to reach it. Anka Kowalska was again stopped in the street and warned to return home. She was in the company of Edward Lipinski and Jan Kielanowski who actually took her home under the supervision of a police van. Henryk Wujec who had managed to reach the flat was forcibly removed by two militiamen who had followed him inside. Present in the flat were, apart from the hostess, Antoni Pajdak, Jozef Rybicki, a correspondent of UPI and an American woman journalist. Jan Jozef Lipski who had left from home at 4 p.m. failed to arrive. Also Ludwik Cohn was prevented from entering the flat. Those present issued the following statement:

Committee for Social Self-Defence "KOR"

On 8 February 1980 at 6 p.m. a regular meeting of KSS–KOR was to take place in the flat of Prof. E. Lipinski. From 3 p.m. onwards a big police van was stationed outside the house. Members of KSS–KOR were stopped in the street, some were forced to return home. At the same time searches were conducted in the flats of the following members: Seweryn Blumsztajn, Andrzej Celinski, Wieslaw Piotr Kecik, Anka Kowalska, Jan Litynski, Adam Michnik, Zbigniew Romaszewski. The writer Anka Kowalska and Zbigniew Romaszewski who is a scientist had their typewriters, indispensable in their work, confiscated. The final result at the moment (9.2.80) is that the following members of KSS–KOR have been arrested: Stanislaw Baranczak, Seweryn Blumsztajn, Wieslaw Piotr Kecik, Jacek Kuron, Jan Jozef Lipski, Jan Litynski, Antoni Macierewicz, Adam Michnik, Piotr Naimski, Jerzy

Nowacki, Wojciech Onyszkiewicz, Zbigniew Romaszewski and Henryk Wujec.

It is difficult to see in this massive police action the beginning of the democratic reforms promised in the guidelines to the Eighth Congress of the PUWP which is to begin in two days time.

10 February, late evening. All the arrested KSS–KOR members have been released, with the exception of Henryk Wujec. Bogdan Borusewicz, also member of KSS–KOR, originally arrested on 6 February in Gdansk, released on 8 February, was re-arrested on 9 February. While in prison from 6–8 February he underwent treatment with antibiotics. Members from outside Warsaw were either escorted to the station (Jerzy Nowacki) or ordered to leave Warsaw without meeting other KSS–KOR members (Baranczak). Note: Stanislaw Baranczak, poet and literary critic, who more than a year ago lost his job as lecturer at the University of Poznan, has been selected by Harvard University to fill the vacant post of Professor of Polish literature, but is still waiting for an exit visa.

22 February. The next plenary meeting of KSS–KOR was to take place in Jacek Kuron's flat. On the next day a meeting of KSS–KOR associates from all over Poland was to be held in the same place. Massive arrests throughout Poland made both meetings impossible.

29 February. A number of associates of KSS–KOR and the periodical *Robotnik* (The Worker) distributed successfully over 2,500 sets of documents consisting of the joint KSS–KOR/*Robotnik* statement on the court case of Edmund Zadrozynski in Grudziadz and copies of *Robotnik*, including a special issue containing the Charter of Workers' Rights. Distribution was effected outside 13 large industrial establishments in and around Warsaw. Two distributors, Jacek Czaputowicz and Maciej Stroj, were detained by the police for 48 hours. On 1 March their homes were searched.

Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO)

Four leading members of ROPCiO were convicted of " contempt for the Polish nation " for delivering speeches during the massive demonstration which took place at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw on 11 November 1979, the 61st anniversary of Polish independence. On 10 December Andrzej Czuma and Wojciech Ziembinski were sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and Andrzej Jankowski and Bronislaw Komorowski to one month. They all appealed and subsequently, on 22 January 1980, Ziembinski's sentence was reduced to six weeks for the reason that he had no previous conviction, while sentences on the three others were confirmed. On 21 February Ziembinski actually began to serve his sentence. Komorowski was released from detention and told to report on 5 March. Andrzej

Janowski was to report earlier in Sieradz; so far there is no confirmation whether he has done so. Andrzej Czuma chose to ignore the order to report for serving his sentence. On 27 February, he was arrested in the street and taken to prison. His family was duly informed of what had happened.

Founders' Committee of Free Trade Unions (KZWZZ)

16 January. Piotr Fokscinski detained in Bielsko-Biala. After 24 hours he was taken to his home which was searched, whereupon he was taken back to prison for a further 24 hours. A number of copies of *Robotnik* were confiscated.
22 January. Search in the home of Anna Koczub. Several copies of *Robotnik* confiscated.
23 January. Search in the home of Zdzislaw Mnich. Confiscated: copies of *Robotnik* and *Information Bulletin,* some other unofficial publications, 111 copies of Kazimierz Switon's letter to miners following several safety failures at work, 83 copies of K. Switon's letter to members of PUWP.
29 January. Search in the home of Anna Gorgon in Katowice, carried out by Andrzej Wierzbicki of the Security Police (SB). A. Gorgon detained for 48 hours.
4 February. Richard Switon physically assaulted in Katowice, ul. Golawskiego. The two attackers emerged from a blue Fiat 125, Reg. No. KAA 44 37, and when passers-by began to assemble escaped in the car. R. Switon claims he recognized the two as men who are often patrolling outside his house.
5 February. Another search in the home of Zdzislaw Mnich who was again detained. After 30 hours Mnich complained of heart trouble; a doctor ordered his release.
9 February. Z. Mnich again detained for 43 hours. Andrzej Kecop of Sosnowiec also detained for 27 hours. Both were stopped when leaving the home of Kazimierz Switon in Katowice.
11 February. K. Switon was summoned for an interrogation which lasted two hours. He was told to report again on 14 February. The number of SB watching his home has been increased; the men change every eight hours.
17 February. K. Switon detained while distributing leaflets outside a church. Search in his home. Released after 48 hours.
Katowice, 23 February. Bogdan Gruca and Jerzy Grzebieluk (both workers—Grzebieluk is also a co-editor of *Robotnik*) and Jan Switon were detained for two hours at Zawiercie railway station. Jan Switon's face was burned with a cigarette.

The Switon Trial

Anka Kowalska

THIS morning the city of Katowice is filled with police. We hail a cab. We learn later that two people who set out for the court on foot were arrested in the street. The court building is empty except for one room (possibly the smallest) outside which a crowd has gathered.

At all previous trials in Radom the public has consisted of security personnel and hirelings. They would crowd into the courtrooms, block the entrances, prevent other people from getting inside. But today everyone seems to know everyone else. Greetings and introductions are exchanged. People are here from Wroclaw, Cracow, Warsaw, Gdansk, and from the Katowice area, in spite of the restrictions. The numerous Switon family are here too, all very calm. The American consul from Cracow is here. The state security people must also be here, but we are in the majority.

We sit on the front bench, close to the judge's table. Bohdan Cywinski and Tadeusz Mazowiecki are already sitting there; they arrived during the night. The room is soon filled to capacity. People are standing two deep along the walls.

The judges enter: the presiding judge, who is the judge of the district court, G. Jankowski, the assessors Pawel Lewan and Stanislaw Birecki, and a prosecutor whose name is not mentioned during the trial. Judge Jankowski says he will not conduct the proceedings in such a crowded room. Standing is not permitted, and the room is too small for so many people. People answer that there must be other larger rooms to which the court could move. No, there are no other rooms. After this unofficial argument with the public (the judge has not yet donned his robe) things settle down. People squeeze themselves in on the benches along the walls, but some have to stand in the open door so that both double doors have to be kept open. The witnesses and the policemen escorting the smiling Switon can barely squeeze in.

Before the start of the proceedings, Sila-Nowicki, the lawyer, announces to the court that although dressed in his robe he was stopped in the hall and forced to identify himself.

AS is customary, the witnesses for the prosecution are policemen. Three of them are huge men: Lesniak, Obrok and Grabara. Lieutenant Forma is the odd man out. He has the appearance of a skinny bespectacled intellectual. When Grabara comes to the witness stand after Obrok (or maybe it is Obrok after Lesniak?), Bierezin is surprised. Why is the same man testifying twice? They are interchangeable, almost identical in height and weight, and each is half as big again as Switon.

This is their story. On 14 October a two-man uniformed patrol was proceeding along 77th Street. They were noticed by the accused, who broke into a run. They caught up with him and asked to see his identity papers. The accused clung to a churchyard fence and started to kick them, attacking them and calling them bandits, gestapo men and fascists. Fortunately, two civilian colleagues happened to be passing in a car; they came to the victims' assistance and somehow managed to drag Switon across the pavement to their vehicle, put him inside and drove off, while trying desperately to prevent Switon from demolishing the car. Nevertheless, Switon damaged the door and pushed his legs through it. On the way to the police station they were obliged to stop and shut the door properly.

They were afterwards excused from duty on medical grounds: bruising, sensitivity of the testicles, headaches. Switon must have given them one hell of a thrashing. According to his victims he managed to attack them brutally while clinging on to a fence, and to kick them with his heels dug into the ground. I stare at him in amazement.

INITIALLY, on 16 October, these same policemen accused Switon before a tribunal of illegally drawing a crowd. On the day of the incident they had submitted a report to the duty officer in which violence was not even mentioned. During the hearing which repealed the sentence of the tribunal, on 4 November, Switon still had not so much as touched them. However, when the indictment was filed against him, it turned out that they had been assaulted after all.

When the defence asks why the whole truth has been suppressed for such a long time, the witnesses give similar but vague answers. The judge seems to be giving them fatherly advice. Thus Lieutenant Forma did not write anything about violence in the initial report because such acts of hooliganism occur only far too often. But then why did he fail to write about the most important thing? Well, it was just a note that he wrote. (The judge states for the record: he wrote in the report only what he felt to be pertinent.) The defence asks how often does the witness appear at hearings? The witness asks the court if he must answer this question. The judge says kindly: It is all right for the witness to answer three, maybe four times a year. Three or four times a year. . . .

Sila-Nowicki for the defence: During the tribunal hearing was the witness asked how the incident occurred? Yes, he was. Was it not the witness's duty—as witness and Ministry of Defence officer—to file a true account of the incident? I provided a fragmentary description of the incident and was asked no questions. Did the witness's statement made at the hearing and repeated here correspond to the one he had signed? Yes.

We receive the impression that Switon's defence counsels are harassing the Ministry of Defence witnesses. Difficult questions are also put to the witness Grabara. Did he sign his statement made at the

hearing? Yes, he signed it. Why did he not relate in it all the details of the incident? Because what he had said was already " in excess of the definition of the offence."

Switon's offence at that time was that he drew a crowd illegally, the most common offence committed by persons active in the democratic opposition. If they are detained in the street, they will, for example, ask passers-by to report their arrest by telephoning 39–39–64 and they identify themselves to the witnesses of their arrest as members or co-workers of KSS–KOR. Passers-by often react in a hostile manner towards those who are making arrests, especially if they are being brutal. If the detained person shouts out his name that is enough to provoke the displeasure of the police. He is then brought before a tribunal for breach of the peace, or for illegally drawing a crowd. For this, on 16 October, Switon had been given three month's confinement.

SILA-NOWICKI: Then what you said at the tribunal was what you considered pertinent? The witness is reluctant to answer. The judge, in a fatherly manner: Speak up, speak up, don't be afraid! You won't be giving false evidence. The witness: I said what I considered. . . .

Switon's defence counsels persist in their tactlessness. According to the policemen they did not know that the pugnacious hooligan was Kazimierz Switon until they got to the police station. Olszewski maliciously pretends to believe the defendant's assertion that Lieutenant Forma had conducted a search at Switon's home without a warrant not long before his arrest. Was this so? The possibility cannot be excluded, says the lieutenant. I like this answer very much. It is ambiguous and laconic, not a bad line in a work of fiction.

The lawyers are also clearly siding with the defence witnesses. A list of most of the witnesses, who reported to Mrs Switon immediately after the incident in front of the church, was destroyed during the search conducted before the trial repealing the sentence of the tribunal. Despite this and despite harassment by state security men of the Switons' visitors, at least two stubborn people testify for the defence and stick to their story: Switon was dragged (his arms twisted) by five or six civilians. Grazyna Rajzer, sales lady in a vegetable shop on the corner of Mikolowski and Stelmach Streets, describes it like this. There was a man at the head of the crowd. I saw one policeman in uniform in the crowd. There was another man in uniform walking behind the crowd. A man was being forced to get into a car. He was pushed into it somehow and driven off.

Czeslaw Dobersztajn was passing by and saw everything from beginning to end. He heard and saw Switon who was in the churchyard gateway: he was shouting and was held by two civilians who were twisting his arms. Other civilians were helping them: Dobersztajn estimates that there were four or five of them as well as one police-

man in uniform. The accused was shouting: What do you want from me? Is it forbidden to go to church now? They were all trying to take him to a car parked at the curb. The accused was resisting by digging in his heels. People were watching: finally, the car drove off along Stelmach street. Some men in civilian dress continued to twist the arms of the accused and led him along the street. Again, he was being pushed into the car. Dobersztajn denies that the accused was violent or used insulting language. He may have dug his heels in "but this made no difference as these people were strong." One of the individuals pushed away a woman who managed to pull the accused out of their hands.

Mrs Switon testifies in a similar manner. Her evidence corresponds in detail to the evidence she and her husband gave to the tribunal although she has not seen her husband since he was attacked in front of the church. (Switon's statement at the beginning of today's proceedings was the same except that he did not remember the ending because he was already unconscious.)

They were attacked by four individuals in the church grounds in front of the gate leading on to the pavement. They were separated. Her husband's arms were twisted and he was dragged across the pavement to a Fiat. Her husband was shouting, "I will not go with you"; she was pulling his coat, both were shouting, "what do you want, we have just come out of church." Not one of the assailants said who he was or showed any identification. At first they did not manage to push her husband into the car and the Fiat drove away. They were pushing him forward, twisting his arms and leading him in the direction in which the car had driven off; she was crying; then Lieutenant Forma came up (she knew him from the search he carried out in their home); he grabbed her by the hand and told her to leave immediately. She asked, crying, why they were dragging her husband away, but no one answered her. Then she ran home taking a short cut through some buildings (she lived not far away on Mikolowski street) and called her children for help. When she returned she saw the car on Stelmach street. Her husband was lying in it motionless and unconscious between the front and the back seats. She started crying, "People, come and help me, my husband is dead." They wanted to close the car door but her husband's legs were hanging out of the car; after a while the door was closed and the car drove away.

Later the statement of witnesses who had not been summoned to trial and which had been filed during the investigation are read to the court. A shop assistant had seen a group of people walking in the direction of Stelmach Street, among them a man in a Ministry of Defence uniform. A neighbour of the Switons heard Mrs Switon's cries in the stairwell. They are taking daddy! She ran out into the street and saw the Fiat and Switon lying in the Fiat with his legs sticking out of the vehicle. A news-stand vendor saw a group of civilians with one or two uniformed policemen in their midst and a car with

a leg in dark trousers sticking out. Two or three other statements mentioned a group of civilians, one or two policemen, a car which was driving away from a group of onlookers at a bus-stop, and Switon being dragged behind the vehicle. It appears to me that the show has been staged somewhat carelessly. The props are falling down: a vehicle which just happened to be passing by with assistants who just happened to be in it appears less and less accidental; the uniformed policemen are receding into the background and are taking on the appearance of extras; their number (two) also becomes problematic; and the number of civilians is increasing.

FRIENDS and foes appear to be playing in two different shows. In one, the offender is running away from the keepers of public order; they, almost at the risk of their lives, seize him, fortuitously assisted by two colleagues. In the other, a group of criminals attacks a man and his wife who are leaving a church. A car is waiting nearby, but the man cries out and resists, his wife is crying, the gang is using force, a group of passers-by gathers, the incident is taking place near a bus-stop where a number of people are waiting. As dragging is not enough the gang has to use greater brutality in order to get the man they want into the car, and so the car moves to a place where there are fewer people about. Here they succeed.

A TRAGICOMEDY. The producers are pretending that the action began on the pavement in front of the church, as the policemen insist. But all of us here in the court-room know that the drama actually started two years previously when Switon posted a letter to the authorities defending the workers of Radom and Ursus who had been tortured by the police. When members and supporters of KOR were in prison, Switon learned that several people were protesting by staging a hunger strike in St. Martin's church in Warsaw. Switon knew no one from KOR. He knew no one on the hunger strike. He got on the train and went to Warsaw: he joined the group participating in the hunger strike, and it was then that I heard his name for the first time.

After that his whole world collapsed. The authorities took away his job, his sons were taken to court and tried as criminals, the whole family was placed under surveillance, harmful, slanderous information was spread around in the Katowice community that Kazimierz Switon, who was 13 years old when the occupation ended, was a war criminal. The family had to endure one search after another. Switon went to prison for 47 hours and served two months' confinement as a result of false accusations. After suffering two years of constant revenge a man who dared to feel free is kidnapped in front of a church.

The defence counsels go back to the beginning of those years by asking him questions about his past. Mrs Switon tells about anonymous telephone calls and letters, about persecutions and threats.

The presiding judge is calm. There is no sign of interest in the expressionless eyes of the magistrates. Political trials have ceased to exist in Poland—only criminals are brought to trial. As far as the prosecutor's arguments are concerned there might just as well be no case files, no hearing of the witnesses' statements and indeed no trial. I know this from all the other trials I have attended. I say softly to Bierezin: So we'll be going on hunger strike. Many of us have decided to do this in one of the churches if Switon goes to prison.

THE prosecutor's speech is an expression of decisions clearly made before the trial, and there is no doubt that Switon will be sentenced. I am not in the mood for a hunger strike. First of all I do not have a warm coat, I get cold easily, and we are in the middle of the worst winter of the millenium. I have no strength left for moral indignation after spending seven hours taking notes of those outrageous lies with the truth peeping through occasionally. When everyone has had their say everything is as it always has been.

According to the prosecutor, Switon is guilty on all charges. He has assaulted and lied to the policemen, he has demolished a Ministry of Defence vehicle. One does not assault the representatives of the authorities, or lie to them. Some witnesses have spoken of civilians and of one or two men in uniform, but memories are fallible.

The prosecutor understands the accused's point of view. It is natural enough that he should make the effort to defend himself by presenting the incident in a light favourable to him. His version, like that of the defence, is intended to create certain legends around the accused, myths, an aura. Exactly what aura, what myths, legends, and degree of demagogery are in question has been seen and heard by all present here. " The defence may pursue this line if they so wish, but this has nothing whatever to do with the evidence."

Articles and paragraphs fall from the judge's lips. I hear that the court could reevaluate a certain article and use another in its place, a lighter one, that is if it could be established that while assaulting his opponents Switon did not notice that they were wearing uniforms. . . .

The prosecutor reminds the court who is being tried: a man with a family to support who is not working, an offender who has already been sentenced once before (in fact on a trumped-up charge to do with possessing an air-gun when the licence had expired).

So how many years will the prosecutor ask for? He could get an eight-year sentence. " In spite of the fact that in our country crimes against the authorities are rare, offenders should be dealt with severely. . . ." This contradicts what comes next: the prosecutor demands not eight years but one and a half years and a 15,000 zloty fine, plus damages of 8,000 zlotys. This is almost a favour, not punishment for a criminal. During a short break the court must have

received fresh instructions. Switon is guilty of serious offences but the punishment to be imposed must be a light one.

Sila-Nowicki declares that Kazimierz Switon's defence has been conducted honourably. Today's case should not even be in court. He rejects the imputation of demagoguery: his aim and that of his colleagues is to defend both an individual and public order. If, in the relations between the authorities, the public and the court, irregularities appear, they should not be ignored. In this case, there have been irregularities. . . .

It is true that Switon is engaged in political activities, but he has committed no punishable offence. He was not even found in possession of *samizdat* material. The defence counsel asks for the acquittal of the accused on the grounds that there were contradictions in the evidence, in the statements made by the witnesses. In the circumstances a conviction would be an abuse of the law.

Jan Olszewski draws attention to two facts. First, until June 1977 the accused was an exemplary citizen and worker who had never clashed with the law. After June 1977 there was a sudden transformation, both of the accused and of attitudes towards him. He is plagued by false rumours, anonymous telephone calls and threatening letters. The authorities take no action to detect or punish those who are responsible. It may be, says the defence counsel, that this man is oversensitive if he is making a connexion between the beginning of his harassment and the hunger strike in the Warsaw church. But this same oversensitivity is displayed at the same time by several thousand persons. Thousands have signed a letter in his defence. A former chairman of the Academy of Sciences has written a letter of solidarity to his wife.

Secondly, argues Olszewski, the accused has been tried twice in connexion with the same incident, based on the same evidence. Each time a completely different interpretation has been made. Such a situation is judicially impermissible. Several policemen submitted reports and not one of them, not even Lieutenant Forma, noticed that he had been assaulted and rendered unfit for normal duties for a period of several days. In fact, three days after the incident, two of them were healthy enough to testify before the tribunal without saying a word about being assaulted. And the other two? They did not appear before the tribunal. The duty officer had their reports on the incident. Was he trying to hide them? The two which were submitted do not mention assault because they do not consider it appropriate to testify about a criminal offence, but only about a minor violation. Are these witnesses policemen? What is the validity of such evidence? And yet, says the defence counsel, the entire case for the prosecution was based on such evidence.

A conviction is out of the question, bearing in mind the gaps in the evidence; the clear disproportion of strength between the accused and the efficient policemen; the contradictions in the testimony of the

policemen and that of other witnesses. For example, the question of where the vehicle stopped: the non-police witnesses maintain that the action of putting the accused into the vehicle was accomplished in two stages and in two different locations. The police categorically deny this: if it were so, then at least one of them must have been driving the vehicle and they say there were four of them and only four. Then why all the statements about all the civilians guiding Switon?

As for the motives which prompt the policemen not to tell the court the whole truth—the defence counsel concludes—they make no difference as far as I am concerned. I only know that the testimony is invalid. I demand the acquittal of the accused.

So much for the speeches. Now, we—together with the independent court—are to await outside instructions. And now for the accused's final speech. Why—says Switon—do you torment me and my family so much? This I ask, first of all of the prosecutor. Let us stick to the point—answers the judge. What does the accused have to say?

That which the accused has to say we have already stated hundreds of times in announcements, communiqués and in the independent press. Today he stands before the court like a criminal, but does this upset anyone? He knows this just as I do, as the judge does and the public; and no matter what he will say, the judge will require him to stick to the point. I forgive all my persecutors—says Switon. For one brief moment the world is a better place.

BUT it is not so when we are leaving the court. Sentence has now been passed and the show is over. Switon will return home although the sentence deprives him of liberty for one year and imposes the payment of a stiff fine. Detention cannot be imposed in a law-abiding state after an unenforceable sentence (the defence is to file an appeal). The preliminary detention is waived; I can still see and hear the joy of the public. There will be no hunger strike; the 2,700 signatures for the acquittal of Switon have not been collected in vain. It has once more been shown that every tyranny retreats one step in the face of unanimous courage.

But as we are leaving the courthouse someone comes with the news that all must identify themselves individually outside; tyranny is displaying her face full of fury in the square in front of the building; everywhere one looks in the dusk of a wintry afternoon one sees police officials. Individual uniforms, groups of uniforms. Vehicles with radios are in front of the doors, on the lawn, on the roadway. As we walk past the buildings, numerous men in civilian clothes are looking at us from the doorways in cold silence. The name of this square in Katowice is Liberty Square.

The Case of Chojecki and Grzesiak

The Independent Publishing House " NOWA "
" Our Every-Day Activities "

Acting as the link between the authors and the readers are scores of people—anonymous collaborators of NOWA. Among them are members and sympathizers of KSS-KOR. It is they who manage to obtain the necessary paper and newsprint, duplicating machines and wax stencil plates. They print, set the type, bind and deliver the finished product to distribution points. Our visitors from the West may have often heard that Polish totalitarianism is less totalitarian and the police interference less onerous than in other socialist countries. But even if true, this does not apply to the several score people of NOWA.

It would seem that the very modest output of NOWA could easily be ignored by the authorities which can oppose the independent publishers with a network of highly productive printing shops, an array of obedient writers and journalists, newspapers and periodicals with wide circulation. Yet, from the moment of its establishment to this very day, the activities of NOWA are zealously persecuted by the police. The security organs have confiscated 120 typewriters which were to serve as " evidence of crime." But the investigation in cases in which these typewriters were to be presented as exhibits has either been stopped or has been dragging on for years. Also confiscated was the printing equipment, often received from abroad, not being available in Poland. Collaborators of NOWA are constantly harassed by the police, arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment on the basis of fabricated evidence. Forgery, larceny and anti-Polish activity —such are the charges brought against those who step out against falsifying the country's history and against robbing Polish culture of its most precious values.

Censorship seeks to supress all freedom of speech. He who fights against censorship is persecuted by the police. If you—a guest in this country—are told that police and censorship are indispensable for cultural life in a socialist state, remind them of these words uttered by the spiritual patron of socialism: " Censorship, like slavery, can never be legal, even if it is embodied a thousand times in laws and regulations."

That sentence was written more than a hundred years ago by Karl Marx.

Statement by Miroslav Chojecki

Warsaw, 13 May 1980

On 25 March this year I was arrested on the trumped-up charge of stealing a duplicator. I am one of the co-founders of the independent publishing movement in Poland. Since its foundation in 1977 I have been managing the Independent Publishing Enterprise NOWA, which to date has published nearly 90 titles of the most prominent Polish and foreign writers, historical works, documents, memoirs, books which cannot be published by official presses in the Polish People's Republic. NOWA has published among others the poetry and prose of Jerzy Andrzejewski, Stanislaw Baranczak, Kazimierz Brandys, Jerzy Ficowski, Witold Gombrowicz, Czeslaw Milosz, Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, Tadeusz Konwicki, Witold Wirpsza, Wiktor Woroszylski, Julian Stryjkowski, and the foreign authors Gunther Grass, Josif Brodsky, Bohumil Hrabal, George Orwell, Isaac B. Singer. Our Press also publishes the literary quarterlies *Zapis* and *Puls,* and also the Transactions of the Society for Academic Courses (the "Flying University"). At present our books have a print-run of 2,000–4,000 copies.

In our work we encounter enormous difficulties due not only to police counter-measures, but also to the shortage of paper, the impossibility of buying on the open market ink, stencils, printing euipment, duplicators—any polygraphic materials at all. On all our publications we print an appeal asking for help in organizing polygraphic equipment and materials, which we obtain both from foreign and home sources. After my arrest there was a wave of protests in my defence in Poland, in many countries of Europe and in the USA. Thanks to these protests on 10 May, after a protest hunger strike of 33 days, I was released from prison.

However, there is another NOWA worker still in prison, my friend Bogdan Grzesiak. He was arrested earlier on 6 February, like me on the trumped-up charge of stealing a duplicator. After three weeks on 29 February he was released from prison. When taking this decision the Procurator wrote " the reasons for which the arrest was effected have ceased to exist." On 15 April, Bogdan Grzesiak was arrested again. . . .

Bogdan has not broken down during investigation. All attempts to force him to give false evidence against me have failed. Only someone who knows from his own experience what it is like to be in the hands of Security Service functionaries in a communist prison knows what strength is needed to resist police pressure.

I address my urgent appeal to all those for whom the development of intellectual life, literature and science is close to their hearts, to all those, to whom I owe my freedom, to demand the release of Bogdan Grzesiak.

Resolution passed by the 21st International Publishers Association Congress in Stockholm, Sweden, 22 May 1980:

The First Plenary Session resolved that the International Publishers Association commend for their bravery the Polish Publishing House NOWA and its recently imprisoned Head, Mr Miroslaw Chojecki.

Their courage in publishing important authors and books under difficult conditions is in the finest tradition of independent East European publishing houses and is consistent with the principles of the Helsinki Accords.

The International Publishers Association urges that the Polish authorities follow up their recent release of Mr Chojecki with that of Bogdan Grzesiak, editor-in-chief of NOWA, who remains in gaol.

Excerpts from Miroslaw Chojecki's Speech in Court *

12 June 1980

I am the director of the Independent Publishing Enterprise NOWA. Bogdan Grzesiak is a colleague of mine. The case being heard today is the latest in a series of actions against our press. During the last four years there have been 17 searches in my home. . . .

What is it all about? Why have I, my colleagues and NOWA been subjected to this repression? Why does the government wage war against a publishing house by preferring charges of counterfeiting money, with allegations of breaking and entering, theft, and an attempt to poison the population of Warsaw? Why do they bring such charges against people who take an active stand against the falsification of their history and the pillaging of their culture? . . .

People who are not conscious of their own history are in no position to define their identity. They are condemned to extinction. In Polish society the state of historical knowledge is disastrous. . . . The dates of the turning points in our contemporary history are carefully blotted out: 17 September 1939, April 1940, Katyn, June 1945, the Moscow trial of the 16 leaders of the Polish underground, etc. Yet it was our fathers who took part in these events. I was a child and a young man in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976. It is not possible to forget the events of these years, but officially they do not exist.

As I grew up I came to understand that there is a conscious policy of dispossessing us of our own history. In 1976 I became involved in helping the workers who were victims of repression. I joined the Workers' Defence Committee which later became the Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR." Then in 1977 some of my friends and I realized that this state of falsification and silence could continue

* Chojecki and Grzesiak were given relatively mild sentences of 18 months' imprisonment suspended for three years.

no longer. So we founded the Independent Publishing Enterprise NOWA. In its three years of activity NOWA has published close on 90 titles, including works of history, memoirs and documents. . . .

Next to a country's history, the most important component of culture is its literature. But what is the state of Polish literature today? In the highly rigid framework of the state monopoly of thought and word, there is no room for a wide range of creativity. But the most alarming thing is that there are forbidden authors. Their works cannot appear officially even if they are socially and politically neutral. Literature containing information and facts inconvenient to the authorities or designated as non-existent is forbidden even though the works relate to matters fundamental to the existence of the nation. The titles published by NOWA could not appear officially. . . .

On every occasion our press, radio and television stress our links with European culture. Why is it then that the *Tin Drum* by Günther Grass was delayed by 10 years, mutilated by the censor's scissors, until it was finally published by NOWA? Why cannot George Orwell's classics be published in Poland? Why do the works of the Nobel Laureates, Bertrand Russell, Isaac Bashevis Singer and Jacques Monod have to be published in the unofficial press? Why is the publication of speeches by John Paul II censored and impeded?

Article 83 of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic states: "Point 1: The Polish People's Republic guarantees citizens freedom of speech, of the printed word, of assembly, processions and demonstrations. Point 2: In order to realize this freedom, the following are placed at the disposal of the working people and their organizations: printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, means of communication, radio and other necessary material means." But will someone please show me a shop where a representative of the working people could buy even the most primitive duplicator, printing ink, stencils or any polygraphic material? . . . We receive the various things we need for our printing work from people at home and abroad. Only thanks to their help is our work possible.

The indictment is not aimed at us as individuals but at NOWA, an institution set up in order to defend readers against the arbitrary and wilful behaviour of the censorship. Our work is appreciated by society as an act of self-defence of our culture; it fills a gap and heals the wounds inflicted on our culture. . . .

It is not we who are on trial in this courtroom: it is freedom of speech and thought, Polish culture and the honour of our society which are on trial.

In a totalitarian state censorship, external and internal, is part of the overall system of controlling the minds of its subjects. Therefore the attempt to liberate the "captive mind" by establishing publications free of censorship is a vital step on the road leading to the destruction of totalitarianism. Perhaps the most significant intellectual contributions from Poland to our understanding of its mechanisms are the documents about the functioning and scope of censorship and the studies concerned with the impact of official propaganda on language, a new and original subject for linguistic investigation. That Newspeak *produces* Doublethink (*and vice-versa*) *we already know. But Polish dissident scholars have noticed that demotic language develops its own "anti-bodies" helping to resist the creeping Orwellian inversions imposed from above. An understanding of this phenomenon of the day-to-day practice of totalitarianism can help to develop such resistance still further. This semantic awareness is an important factor in the struggle for the autonomy of society* vis-à-vis *the state which uses language to make it passive and powerless. The texts reproduced below are just samples of a vast documentation and literature on the subject. They deserve to be studied* in extenso *in the West.*

The Language of Propaganda

The first seminar of the Flying University was held on 5 October 1978 in Warsaw. Twenty-two people, writers and academics, attended it and the subject was the language of propaganda.

The present record was edited by S. Amsterdamski, A. J. Jawlowska and T. Kowalik and has been substantially abridged.

THE characteristics of the language of propaganda, or Newspeak, can be discussed under four headings:

1. A Newspeak statement has a single value imposed on it. Its univocal nature leads to clear polarization, eliminates doubt and results in value judgments free of ambiguity and impervious to questioning. Newspeak (NS) abounds in dichotomies between negative and positive value judgments, which tend to become more important than the meaning itself: in fact, meanings are allowed to be vague and imprecise but values imposed upon them have to be crystal clear. The resulting linguistic arrangement may be described as loosely organized semantics. Meaning is subordinated to judgment, sometimes to the point of losing all importance while the associated value such as good/bad, ours/theirs, progressive/reactionary becomes paramount. The intention, which in ordinary speech has to be deduced from the statement as a whole, is evident at the level of its components. I intend to discuss this at greater length later but it seems useful to point to

the existence of this phenomenon now. To a much greater degree than other " group styles," NS consists of pre-interpreted elements and it can be described as a single value language.

2. Newspeak forms a distinctive synthesis of pragmatic and ritualistic elements. Its aim is to exert a direct and decisive influence on events, its whole structure is designed for action. One would expect, therefore, a style capable of adjusting with ease both to the circumstances in which it has to operate and to the audiences it tries to reach. Flexibility might indeed be expected to be its essential characteristic but it is by no means always so. The reason is to be found in Newspeak's basic conservatism: its users cannot face the fact that some linguistic structures become exhausted and that in consequence their pragmatic usefulness is at an end. The ritualism of Newspeak (a form of self-fidelity, of loyalty to its own tradition), severely limits its pragmatic qualities. Boundaries of a ritualized speech are rigid and its users are not meant to cross them under any circumstances. A language like Newspeak has only one way of responding to a given situation. Indeed, pragmatic considerations are barred from some completely ritualized areas, such as the rhetoric of anniversaries. Nonetheless, the interaction of these contradictory elements, pragmatism and ritualism, is inherent in Newspeak and an ideal NS statement would carry a fully pragmatic quality in a form ritualized to the utmost.

3. Magic is another important element of Newspeak. Words do not so much refer to reality or describe it, as create it. That which is said becomes a fact. Most slogans have a magic character, e.g. " Youth and the Party together forever." Formally, these are statements of fact. Statements of intention do not perform magic functions and such slogans as " Let Poland grow in strength, let its people grow in affluence " do not belong to this category. In other words, magic consists in expressing conditions which are desired as if they were actual and real. The magic also has negative power: as soon as the description ceases to be used, the subject of description ceases to exist. This applies equally to common expressions and names.

4. Arbitrary decisions play a greater part in the development of Newspeak than in that of other " group styles." Even in NS their use has limitations: no decisions can be made which would involve questioning the essence of NS. Within these limitations, the area of arbitrariness is exceptionally wide. Words and expressions, previously sanctified, can, between one day and the next, be " taken off the party propaganda agenda " in the words of Zenon Kliszko in 1968. They may be reinstated later, again on the strength of a one-off decision. The definition of meaning is also subject to arbitrary changes and, regarded from this angle, NS presents itself as a manipulated speech. The censorship documents recently made available throw much light on this aspect of the problem. Instructions for the censors not only list matters which are unmentionable but also give guidance on the

terms in which admissible subjects should be discussed. The metalanguage of these documents greatly clarified the conditions of NS.

Of the four essential characteristics of NS the first is the most important. While the other three are not simply its epiphenomena, they nevertheless depend on it and take lower place in order of importance. To go further, the principles of pragmatism and ritualism, magicality and arbitrariness can be all regarded as expressions of the underlying single value nature of NS, the characteristic defining it most closely.

WE find NS to be univocal, pragmatic, ritualistic, magical and arbitrary. But what is NS? So far, we have used the following terms to describe it: language, speech and style. They are not convertible terms and linguistics gives us a definition for each. We should not disregard the differences between them although it would be difficult to exclude any one of them when trying to define NS. It would be legitimate, for instance, to discuss NS as a functional group style. NS has developed a number of characteristics which add up to one: a set of forms, a phraseology and well defined vocabulary preferences. However, the concept of a group style assumes the existence of specific areas of speech in which it operates and specific social situations in which it may occur. On the surface, NS fits these categories. But only on the surface: in fact NS has universal aspirations and as its area of operations extends, it attacks as yet unconquered regions of language in order to subordinate them. While born in political journalism, NS became a model of speech with universal application. It aspires to the role of language itself rather than to a style within it. It can perhaps be best defined as a quasi-language: it can be argued that it operates on all levels of language, from intonation to the rules governing the structure of statements, from phonetics to rhetoric. It is expressed most fully, however, in vocabulary and phraseology and I shall concern myself chiefly with those in my further remarks.

The underlying characteristic of NS, that of imposing single values which must not be debated or questioned, is best established in this sphere. Not only the statements but their component words and idioms must be used as if they were beyond contradiction. A model of apodictic statement is the slogan in which all values are given a single dimension and a complete directness to be accepted as a whole by the recipient. The presence of ambivalence, indirectness or uncertainty destroys the very nature of a slogan. In NS the component parts (words, phrases, and sometimes whole syntactic structures) take on permanently the values imposed on them in slogans: the slogan characteristics become their essence rather than their temporary function. NS statements (not only slogans) are built of those ready-made elements, their value predefined with the utmost precision. The whole of NS rhetoric rests on this principle.

The tendency to endow words and statements with exact values applies not only to expressions which have connotations of ideological attitudes and beliefs such as, let us say, "liberty." It applies also to words which in ordinary speech would be considered neutral. In NS there is no room for innocence or maldefinition, every word has to convey judgment. A reader of NS must be aware that he is expected to react negatively even to such an innocuous word as "circles" when it refers to a group of people and when it is used in the plural. "Circles" do not have to be qualified in any way or only by the addition of "certain." The same applies to "forces": if not defined further, it must be understood that they are forces of evil, such as anti-Polish, anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, etc. To complicate matters further however, "forces" can have a positive value but only if given precise qualifications such as "forces of socialism" or "forces of progress."

The phenomenon of "reserved words" works on similar principles. These are qualifying words which are allowed to appear in specific contexts only and in reference to specified subjects. The word "leading" is one: it can be used only to describe "the leading role of the party." The "reservation" of certain words demonstrates yet again the fundamental rule that there is only one admissible way of treating a given linguistic situation.

Before discussing this aspect further, I would like to pause and look at another problem: that of the relationship between NS and classical speech. One aspect in particular deserves attention: the NS treatment of the language of the enemy. I have said already that NS cannot ignore the existence of established connotations and generally accepted meanings. It takes cognizance of them, more often than not, in terms of conflict. Typical examples are "communist" and "Soviet" both used pejoratively before the war, or the word "Bolshevik" allowed nowadays in historical contexts only. In order to counteract potentially undesirable associations, "Soviet" has been re-translated to "*radziecki*" (literally: "of the Workers Councils").[1]

[1] *Voices from the floor:*

G.H. "In fact '*radziecki*' was used before the war by some . . ."

A.B. "Communists never used the word 'Soviet' not even then."

Speaker: "I didn't know this. . . ."

A.B.: "The communists used the word '*radziecki*' exclusively in such expressions as '*Związek Radziecki*' (Union of the Workers' Councils) instead of 'Soviet Union.'"

Speaker: "It means that they re-translated it even then to give it a different value."

A.B.: "'Union of the Workers Councils' sounded positive, 'Soviet Union' sounded negative."

Speaker: "Memoirs of the Occupation simply avoided the word 'communism' and its derivatives because it was difficult to find a non-pejorative equivalent for it. In fact the word is rarely used even today. Those examples illustrate typical NS attitudes to the language of the enemy. As NS is not able to isolate itself completely and it cannot pretend that the enemy language is not there, it has to create counter statements."

E.F.: "I don't know when the Communist Party started using the term '*radziecki*' but it is a fact that only communists and fellow travellers used it before the war. In current

Ideally, NS should be able to produce a counter-formula directly negating the enemy's statement. This is not always possible, for instance in the case of "socialism with a human face" or "human rights." These cannot be refuted with a counter-statement. Instead, we get an explanation, usually of some length. Sometimes, however, counter-statements are attempted, not in the form of refutation but of a paraphrase, enlarging or otherwise altering the original intention. A good recent example of this practice was "the human right to peace" invented to counteract President Carter's "human rights."

The action against the language of the enemy can be illustrated further if we take a look at the treatment quotations receive in NS. The rule is this: the language of the quotation must not in any way undermine the principles of NS. Therefore, if needs be, it must be isolated and commented on or else be reduced to NS characteristics. In either case, the quotation loses its integrity and autonomy. Even when the quoted text is the subject of a polemic, its integrity need not be respected. Some words and concepts are particularly prone to this treatment. For instance, when, in 1969, the daily *Zycie Warszawy* quoted the description "The Six Day War" from a Western newspaper, it was felt necessary to add: "This is the name given by the bourgeois press to the 1967 aggressive campaign by Israel." The purpose of this meta-language intervention was not to give information as the context made clear what the war in question was. Its purpose was to disarm and neutralize the language of the quotation, to reduce it to the norm. Such treatment is meted out to counteract the spread of unauthorized formulations which might threaten the rules of NS. When a commentary is added to a quotation, the latter usually retains its formally separate existence. In other cases, Newspeak elements are introduced into the quotation, either by interpolating "supposedly" or "so-called" or in a more complex fashion, as in the following: "President Johnson announced that he was to meet the puppet president of South Vietnam." The quotation as it stands is of course bogus and no American President could say anything of the sort. But in NS the president of South Vietnam had to be, always, a puppet president and that was that.

These examples of the treatment accorded to the language of the enemy and in particular to quotations from it make apparent certain general characteristics of NS, such as the tendency to eliminate statements expressed in other than its own terms and in consequence to abolish linguistic choice. Not only a choice between different words and phrases but also between different styles. The fully developed NS

editorial practice, in reminiscences and journals written during the war but published now, 'Soviet' is replaced by '*radziecki*.' This treatment has been given to, among many, Ringelblum's Diary. Ringelblum never used '*radziecki*' and the replacement amounts to much more than a change of emphasis. The terminology he used determined his political position: had he in fact written '*radziecki*' rather than 'Soviet' this would have implied an acceptance of the communists' language."

does not confine itself to its own territory but it attacks other modes of speech and group styles in an attempt to destroy them. It seeks to become the only linguistic reality, a fully fledged quasi-language. Its intended reach is very wide indeed and it goes beyond matters of speech to impose a model of behaviour.

I HAVE discussed only a few selected topics of vocabulary and phraseology. This is not the whole picture and the problems of rhetoric (in the widest sense) are equally significant. To shape its rhetoric, NS employs a vast store of devices. The links between the vocabulary, the phraseology and the rhetoric are very close: the rhetoric is the ultimate object but it is also the criterion of usefulness of a given NS formula. The formulae are purpose-made so as to fit into the rhetoric of NS. This is where the importance of the characteristic of NS previously referred to becomes apparent. The slogan quality acquired by words and formulae is essential for the proper functioning of NS rhetoric, as slogans are its most frequently employed tool.

NS, besides trying to replace the classical language, also lays it to waste. This either by taking over its elements and altering their quality or, more subtly, preserving the appearances of classical meaning while in fact substituting a new one. The wreckage is most extensive in sociology, politics and history. The degradations spread into specialized linguistic traditions such as the patriotic and the revolutionary. Everything is reduced to a formula or a platitude in which imposed value and ritualistic incantation override meaning. NS destroys effective communication, particularly public communication, as it alters and neutralizes formulations which stood for authentic meanings and real attitudes. NS disintegrates communication in an even deeper sense: it kills confidence in language in general.

TO end, a few words on the subject of reactions to NS. Any Polish speaking person is assailed by NS on all sides and it is very difficult not to surrender. But NS also creates, on all levels, reactions of self-defence. Perhaps the language of the young can be regarded as an example, the meta-language of the streets as another. The latter produced a whole range of derisive nicknames for NS and they are very telling. There is *mowa trawa* (gas and hot air), *dretwa mowa* (numb speech), *trucie* (poison), *nawijanie* (spinning), *naplatanie* (plaiting) and *nadawanie* (casting).

The most significant form of self-defence is the adoption of the grotesque by Polish writers. It has been, for several decades, the most vital and original phenomenon in our literature, and one of its successes has been the parodying of Newspeak. This I consider to be of major social consequence, although some may think the reach of literary parody limited. Parody teaches how to distance ourselves from

NS, it discloses its mechanisms, it demonstrates its abuses. Its presence is widely felt, not only in the high reaches of art but also in mass culture and everyday speech. Parody acts as antitoxin to NS and it is impossible to overestimate its importance: it spreads distrust and suspicion of NS. But even parody is not enough. We have to rebuild confidence in language over the head of Newspeak. In the present situation, the distrust of NS only too easily grows into general distrust of language as a means of communication. Rebuilding of confidence in language other than NS would imply making clear to all the dividing line between the two. Basically, one cannot say anything real in NS; in current Polish one can mock and ridicule. What we desperately need is to be able to use the Polish language to say serious things seriously.

I have some reservations about the press which succeeded in presenting 15 May* as little more than a day of rowdy student capers. I consider this to be improper. The truth should be spoken and the profound truth of every human being, especially the young, must be respected. A person cannot be moulded in conformity with some preconceived pattern, and this is something the Polish press ought to take into account. The manipulation of public opinion by the press in many countries of the world should not be imitated in Poland. Man is a thinking being in search of truth and Poles have been seeking the truth for more than a thousand years. This creates a singular maturity even among those seemingly immature or on the threshold of full development. If what they read in the newspapers the next day is contrary to what really happened, they are embittered by the knowledge that they live in a state promoting lies and the falsification of the truth about them. . . . The responsibility of the press is not confined to any one institution or authority, but extends to society as a whole, to the nation and to each individual. Together with all those anxious for the welfare of the country, we fervently appeal to the press to serve the rights of man and nation and to end the onesided presentation of certain information, opinions and points of view.

Extract from a sermon by Cardinal Wojtyla 9 June 1977

*The *Juvenalia* festivities.

Polish Censorship Exposed

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 18 November 1977

The Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR" received a parcel with the following explanatory note on 2 November, 1977:

Lund, 18 October 1977

The Social Self-Defence Committee,
Warsaw

I, Tomasz Strzyzewski of Masvagen 13a, Lund, place the enclosed documents of the Central Office in Warsaw for Control of Press, Publications and Performances (GUKPPiW) at the disposition of KOR.

This material forms part of the documentation surrounding the activities of Polish censorship with which I was familiar in my capacity as a censor employed by the Cracow Division of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances from 1 August 1975 to 10 March 1977.

Once aware of the enormity of possibilities for destruction and the range of devastating influence exerted by the censors on Poland's national culture and social consciousness, I decided to escape and reveal to the world as extensive and representative a portion of the GUKPPiW's secret documents as possible.

The opportunity presented itself on 10 March 1977, when I asked for political asylum in Sweden. I have been trying since then to find the most effective means of utilizing the documents in my possession. That search has taken quite a while. With the transformation of the Workers' Defence Committee into the Social Self-Defence Committee and consequent change of activities, however, I deem it most appropriate to offer the papers to that Committee's members.

I should like the members of KOR to know that I will do everything in my power in order that the material should be published in Polish and made available to the West.

At the same time, I ask the Committee to extend protection to the children I am trying to bring to Sweden—my 6-month-old daughter Beatka and 3-year-old son Tomasz. I fear they might fall victim to the retribution which the authorities are no longer able to exact from my person.

Tomasz Strzyzewski
Masvagen 13a, 426 rum
222–33 Lund, Sweden

After carefully studying the material received, approximately 700 pages, the Committee for the Self-Defence of Society makes the following statement:

The documents made available to us constitute a random but representative selection of confidential documents issued between February 1974 and February 1977 by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. A terrifying picture emerges from the collection as a whole. The material can be divided into three basic categories.

The *first category* contains guidelines and instructions for censors. These not only define with pedantic pettiness the type and scope of information and how it is not to be disseminated by the mass media, but also the kind of information which should be floated and promoted. Such bans and injunctions embrace matters of national significance at one end of the spectrum to the pettiest of problems at the other end. Restrictions placed on information with a religious, nationalist and socio-economic content are particularly worthy of note. In these spheres, access to the truth has been virtually blocked off. Guiding principles, however, also include bans and so-called "directives" pertaining to individual names, facts, figures and events. Several instructions selected at random from the Book of Directives and Recommendations of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances will suffice to illustrate the range of operations.

"All information about the direct threat of industry and the use of chemicals in agriculture to human life and health must be expunged."

"Absolutely no information is to be published concerning the 'Katowice' mine disasters in which four miners lost their lives."

"All publications presenting general statistics with regard to conditions of safety and hygiene at work or to occupational diseases must be withheld."

"Figures illustrating the state and growth of alcoholism on a national scale are not to appear in the mass media."

"School No. 80 in Gdansk was closed down when it was discovered that material used to insulate windows emitted harmful substances. No information on this subject is to be released."

"It is forbidden to publish any information whatsoever about the sale of Polish meat to the USSR."

"Information concerning Poland's purchase of licences from capitalist countries is to be eliminated from the mass media."

"All criticism of religious affairs in socialist countries should be expunged."

"All information relating to Episcopal instructions forbidding the clergy to cooperate with the Front of National Unity, social organizations and Pax, must be eliminated."

"Material concerning the Second Synod of Bishops and its third session to be held at the Vatican in 1974, must not contain any speculations regarding the content of Cardinal Wyszynski's speech or any assessments emphasizing the role of Polish participants and the high quality of their contributions."

"It is forbidden for press, radio or television to accept obituaries, announcements and other forms of information about gatherings held in cemeteries, at monuments, battle sites, etc. (to honour the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising or its various events) by former soldiers of Home Army groups, detachments, etc., and other right-wing organizations which fought during the Uprising."

"There is to be no release of material pertaining to the sources and methods of financing the activities of the Citizens' Militia Volunteer Reserve Force (ORMO)."

"It is forbidden to publish information about, or references to, the failure of [compulsory] purchase depots to take delivery of cattle and pigs from farmers and fattening centres."

"No information is to be released concerning the annual consumption of coffee in Poland. The purpose of this directive is to prevent disclosures of the amount of coffee re-exported."

"There should be no criticism of decisions made about wages or of social policies currently pursued."

"In order to accommodate the sensitivity of certain groups of Poles abroad to contacts with representatives of the Polish state, Comrade Wieslaw Adamski's title of Vice-Minister (Under-Secretary of State) must be eliminated from all publications. Whenever his name appears in print, it is only to be accompanied by mention of his non-governmental function as secretary-general of the Polonia Society. This directive is strictly confidential."

"It is forbidden to allow polemics of any sort with material published in *Trybuna Ludu* and *Nowe Drogi*."

"No information is to be released about the bribery affair in Sandomierz."

"No information is to be printed concerning the greetings received by B[oleslaw] Piasecki on his 60th birthday from executive members of the Party and Government."

"Material concerning the destruction of the historic mills of St. Clare in Wroclaw is not to be published."

"Until verified, no information should be released on Ugandan President General Amin's speech, in which the erection of a monument to Adolf Hitler in Uganda was announced."

Similar quotations could be mutiplied and complemented by current guidelines on the detailed matters dealt with in the separate "information notes for censors" or "information notes." (These are related to subjects as diverse as the problem of reuniting families, Katyn, Wajda's film "The Promised Land," market supplies, the cabaret known as "Under the Aegis" (*Pod Egida*), celebrating the American Bicentennial and even whether or not certain dates should appear in red on calendars.)

"Information notes about questioned material," prepared every two weeks by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Per-

formances, belong to the *second category* of texts. These notes are virtually a register of interference by the censors and contain extensive excerpts (and even reproductions of deleted satirical cartoons) from the questioned scripts. It is a striking fact that preventive censorship in the Polish People's Republic literally controls every vehicle for the transmission of information to the public—from the press, books, performances and films to invitations, small advertisements, diplomas and memorial plaques. Even the smallest editions of texts intended for internal circulation, such as the hymns mimeographed by the Pauline Fathers for pilgrims to Jasna Gora or the 350 copies reproduced from the Wroclaw Film Discussion Club's bulletin *Politechnika,* are not immune from censorship. Despite official assurances that periodicals such as *Polityka* or *Zycie Gospodarcze* are not subject to precautionary censorship, the ambiguity of their position is evident. Instruction note no. 2 of 6 February 1976, provides the following clarification: "During inspection of these publications, employees of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances are duty bound to confiscate without discussion all printed matter violating directives and instructions pertaining to the preservation of state secrets. All reservations they might have after evaluating doubtful or controversial articles, must be transmitted to the chief editorial office. The latter usually shares our opinions and the offending items are either corrected in accordance with our suggestions or removed."

Listed below are just a few among hundreds of examples of censorship recorded in detail between 1974 and 1976 in "Information about questioned material" and "Information concerning current interventions."

1. *Socio-political matters.* Material subjected to censorship included copious information about the growing plague of alcoholism and inadequate government efforts to deal with the problem; numerous alarming notes concerning industrial pollution of the environment; information about road accidents and injuries sustained at work; criticism of an act which would enable authorities to incarcerate opponents in psychiatric institutions; criticism of government-inspired "social deeds"; data concerning the carcinogenic properties of polyvinyl chloride; articles proposing the adoption of Western models for the division of labour; information about anti-semitic excesses; articles critical of the activities of state administrative organs or the administration of justice. Deletions affected texts as diverse as Stefan Kisielewski's comments on the Helsinki Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, articles by Marcin Krol and Jacek Maziarski on free will and workers' democracy, Wieslaw Gornicki's reminiscences about East European government activities in the United Nations, J. Ladosz's comments on the inappropriate methods used to combat anti-communist ideology (censoring the translated works of Western thinkers), etc.

2. *Socio-economic matters.* Material questioned included many references to the scandalous work of sea ports and resultant financial losses computed in millions of zlotys; comments about the low quality of artificial leather or "Polkorfam"; criticism of housing policy and the economics of market supply; all articles stipulating the necessity for changes in incomes policy or social facilities in certain occupations; comments concerning the shortage of places in kindergartens; critical references to the trade in furniture (a note, for example, about a set of imported furniture reduced from 112,000 to 11,000 zlotys); remarks about the mistakes made in the so-called "second-hand sale" of agricultural machinery; critical observations about errors in urban planning, about conditions of work for women and of life for working-class families, imported toys, meat consumption, restaurant prices and about the inadequacy of student grants.

3. *Religious matters.* The intervention of the censors in this field is particularly frequent and harsh. The censor not only encroaches upon journalistic articles but also on the statements of Pope Paul VI and the Polish Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. Parts of the Holy Scriptures, hymns etc. are not infrequently deleted. All anti-Marxist polemics, references in any shape or form to the historic role of the Church and all manifestations of criticism of state-imposed atheism in the writings of Catholic authors, encounter objections. In addition, the censors questioned articles on such topics as the Polish Mormons and Uniates; reflections on the religious beliefs of Romuald Traugutt; the text of a discussion on "science and faith"; an interview with Mieczystaw Jastrun on the durability of Christian inspiration in art; advertisements about religious retreats and pilgrimages or for catechism instructors; polemics with Zenon Kosidowski's biblical studies; descriptions of the situation of the Church in East Germany, etc. In the period under review, *Tygodnik Powszechny* suffered more than any other Polish periodical from interference by the censors.

4. *Scientific and educational matters.* The texts questioned included articles and discussions resolutely opposed to a projected programme which would give children 10 years of schooling and an abridged course in the Polish language; articles criticizing conditions of work and pay in schools, the organization of higher education (the appointment of "docents," the backwardness of education in Poland compared to the West), absurd changes in the dates of school vacations, errors in the system of admission to institutions of higher education and material critical of the educational atmosphere in schools. Also questioned were articles analysing the sociological background of organized hooliganism, references to the tradition of the Boy Scout movement, critical remarks about school textbooks, etc.

5. *Matters concerning history and culture.* The material questioned included articles and excerpts from memoirs concerning persons and recent phenomena of history still officially unrecognized (for

example, Jozef Pilsudski, Boleslaw Limanowski's concept of socialism, anarchism), particularly events during the Second World War (the Home Army's activities) and the immediate post-war years, etc. All references to inadequate preservation of historical monuments, such as the mysterious fire at the garrison church in Wroclaw, are singled out for sysematic elimination. Consistent deletions of the adjective "royal" when appended to the Castle in Warsaw, belong to the category of absurdities.

6. *Art and literature.* In this sphere and during this period, the censors utilized an expanded system of directives containing blacklisted names and works. This did not mean, however, that they refrained from intervening in other cases warranting attention. On the contrary, they questioned the political soundness of numerous poems, stories, literary sketches, films, theatre and cabaret performances, articles about music, statements critical of mass culture (particularly television) and even facetious verse and satirical cartoons. The above examples, chosen at random, by no means exhaust the register of interventions by the censor.

The *third category* of documents consists of instructions emanating from the so-called "Double-checking Department" of the censor's office. Its function is to examine publications already in circulation for the censors' "oversights" and "unnecessary interference" (both, of course, generally impossible to rectify). These "oversights" are analysed in minute detail and act as pointers for the future. The bulletin of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances serves the same purpose by periodically synthesizing the "main tendencies appearing in questioned material taken from the mass media throughout Poland."

LET us turn to conclusions. We can say, without hesitation, that we are dealing with one of the biggest unmasking operations of the whole post-war period. Only Jozef Swiatlo's revelations of the early 1950s were of comparable importance. While the latter, however, exposed the criminal actions directly aimed against the citizen's person and life by the secret police, the documents made available to us unmask other but parallel anti-national activities in the form of censorship imposed by party and state authorities in the Polish People's Republic. By methodically stifling freedom of speech and information, the nation's culture is being buried and the personality of both the individual and society is being crippled according to plan.

This is but one more confirmation of the thesis that lies and distorted information play a dominant role in Polish public life, and are enveloping ever wider spheres. The process of falsification is no longer confined to historical tradition, ideology and national culture. Elementary facts are also being deformed or suppressed, including those, the distortion or omission of which is synonymous with crimes committed against the country's citizens (as in the case of prohibiting the release

of information about the carcinogenic properties of PVC coatings or the direct threat posed to human health and life by chemicals used in agriculture). This is allegedly done in the name of social peace and order so that the anxiety gnawing at the nation will not be aggravated. There are concrete reasons, however, for this disquiet and silence or falsification of the truth will not facilitate their removal.

The documents of the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances expose yet another deception—that of the censor's office as the self-appointed guardian of state secrets. According to periodic reports on the performance of censors, an impressive percentage of interventions is listed under the heading " state secret." There is, however, no indication of exactly which information was censored on these grounds. We take full responsibility for declaring that, even if the strictest rules and vigilance were to be applied, only five or six pieces of information out of the approximately 700 pages of documents issued by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances could have any possible connexion with the realm of state secrets. The full texts of those few items which might involve national security have been replaced by a general outline in the documents we will publish. The documents as a whole, however, disprove the censors' own contention that their existence and activities are justified by the need to protect state secrets and, indeed, prove that the latter are created at the whim of the censor's office. It is intolerable that the label of " state secret " should be attached to thousands of items of information concerning, for example, the type of parasites attacking our cattle, the hazards confronting people employed in various branches of the chemical industry, the social and pastoral activities of the Church, the names and works of writers and scholars, books and films, historical events, or the many decorations, orders, etc., which cannot even be mentioned in obituaries.

We are able to appreciate the social and national function of state secrets in ensuring the defence and security of the country. It is obvious from the documentary testimony of the censor's office, however, that by applying the principle of state secrets to its own operations, these functions are directly subverted. Such activities only serve to immobilize society and render it incapable of self-defence.

It is essential that the destructive and ludicrous policy of impoverishing public life and national consciousness in Poland should become a matter of general debate as soon as possible. After duplication, all the material will be shown upon request to persons enjoying the public's confidence. The Polish Episcopate will be given the complete collection of documents and, depending on technical capacity, we shall make them available to society as a whole. Any continuation of the nation's acceptance of the practices described would be acquiescence in gradual self-annihilation. We therefore call upon all

people of good will to keep the Social Self-Defence Committee informed about any further activities on the part of the censors.

Excerpts from the Book of Directives and Recommendations issued in Warsaw by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances

Part III. Foreign Relations

P. 2, para. 2
All information concerning diplomatic initiatives or actions taken by the socialist countries (especially Poland and the USSR) can only be released after, or simultaneously with, the appearance of appropriate official communiqués in the Polish Press Agency (PAP) or TASS. Under no circumstances can information acquired from other sources either proceed or differ in content from official information. This does not apply to matters separately regulated by instructions issued on an *ad hoc* basis.

P. 3, para. 5
All material containing sharp criticism of the Albanian Labour Party's leadership and Albanian government must be approved by the Central Office prior to publication.

Pp. 4–6, para. 10
In view of the principles governing our foreign policy *vis-à-vis* countries of the so-called Third World, the following rules should be observed:

(a) Material favouring any side involved in possible border conflicts in Arab and African countries should not be published [voided 28 July 1976].
(b) It is forbidden to publish information indicating support for the aspirations to a leading role in the Arab world of any one ruling party in the Arab states; for example, Baath, the Arab Socialist League in Egypt, or the National Liberation Front in Algeria.
(c) Because of our relations with Iraq and the fluid nature of the problem, the Iraqi Baath Party should not be referred to as a rightist Baath movement and criticism of controversies between Baathist factions in Iraq and Syria should not be published. The only acceptable material is that which reports the controversies in a dry, factual manner.
(d) There must be no publication of information concerning possible limitations on the freedom of action of communist parties or their leaders in Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan, Iraq, Libya and Syria.
(g) It is forbidden to publish information relating to meetings and

rallies held by young people and students from Arab and African countries temporarily resident in Poland, if Arab and African regimes are attacked during the course of such demonstrations.

(h) No information is to be published about conflicts between non-Arab minorities and the governments of Arab countries if such information would tend to discredit anti-imperialist Arab governments.

(i) It is not allowed to publish information concerning visits to Poland of representatives from opposition organizations in Arab and African countries.

(j) No information should be published concerning possible trade with Rhodesia and South Africa, or contacts between Polish institutions and South Africa.

(m) States with which Poland maintains diplomatic relations should not be referred to as military dictatorships or called other names such as guerillas or military junta. This rule does not apply to Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic.

(n) All material (including the briefest references, photographs, etc.) on Iran, past and present, the Shah, his family and persons connected with him, or "predictions" on the future fate of monarchy in Iran, should be cleared with the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. In addition, matters connected with Mossadegh's politics should not be discussed. Emphasis should not be placed on Iran's role in the context of the policies pursued by imperialist forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

(o) Publication is not permitted of any expressions of sympathy with Eritrean liberation movements in Ethiopia [new version, 12 January 1976].

P. 6, paras. 11–12

It is forbidden to publish information suggesting the existence of any kind of contacts (commercial, cultural, scientific, tourist or in the field of sports) either between Poland and the regimes of South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Rhodesia not recognized by our government, or between Poland and firms and citizens of those territories. This directive should also be applied to any information which might suggest efforts on the part of the above mentioned regimes to establish links. The Central Office should be consulted about any questionable material. [The content of this note is for the exclusive information of the censors 7 September 1974].

All material (even the shortest references, photographs, etc.) concerning past and present Iran, the Shah, his family and persons connected with him, should be approved by the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances. Material prepared by the Polish Press Agency is not subject to this directive (22 April 1975) [voided 12 January 1976].

Official Bulletin "S" of the Central Customs Office
List of Publications Subject to Especially Strict Control

Warsaw, 28 February 1976

1. *Allgemeine unabhängige jüdische Wochenzeitung,* Düsseldorf
2. *Der Ausweg,* Austria
3. *The American Zionist,* USA
4. *The American Review of Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade,* bi-monthly, New York
5. *American Opinion,* monthly, Massachusetts
6. *ACEN News,* bi-monthly, New York
7. *The American Slavic and East European Review,* quarterly, New York.
8. *American Polonia,* New York
9. *Antemurale,* Rome
10. *Bayern Kurier,* weekly, West Germany
11. *Die Brücke,* Munich
12. *Bulletin der Europäischen Exil-Union,* West Germany
13. *Bellona,* London
14. *Belgisch Israelitisch Weekblad,* weekly, Antwerp
15. *The Bulletin of the International Peasant Union,* New York
16. *The Baltic Review,* three times yearly, New York
17. *The Broadsheet,* monthly, London
18. *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs,* London
19. *Borghese,* weekly, Milan
20. *Bulletin,* USA
21. *Centrale,* monthly, Brussels
22. *C.I.D.* (Centre d'Information et de Documentation), fortnightly, Brussels
23. *Canadian Slavonic Studies,* quarterly, Montreal
24. *Canadian Slavic Papers,* quarterly, Toronto
25. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* weekly, New York
26. *Civis,* West Germany
27. *The Communist,* monthly, London
28. *Christ und Welt,* Stuttgart
29. *Commentary,* USA
30. *Deutsche Studenten-Anzeiger,* West Germany
31. *Deutsche Wochenzeitung,* weekly, West Germany
32. *Deutscher Ostdienst,* West Germany
33. *Deutsch-Kroner und Schneidemühler Heimatbrief,* West Germany
34. *Duszpasterz Polski za Granica,* Rome
35. *Deutschland-Berichte D.B.,* monthly, Bonn
36. *Deutsche Nachrichten,* Hanover
37. *Deutsche Umschau,* Hanover
38. *Dissent,* bi-monthly, New York
39. *East Europe,* monthly, New York
40. *Ebrei d'Europa,* bi-monthly, Florence
41. *East West Digest,* monthly, Britain
42. *Encounter,* Britain
43. *Est (L')*, quarterly, Milan

44. *L'Esprit*, monthly, Paris
45. *Echo der Zeit*, Reeklingen, West Germany
46. *Europas Lietuvis*, London
47. *Forum*, weekly, Vienna
48. *Federalist*, monthly, New York
49. *General-Anzeiger für Bonn und Umgegend*, Bonn
50. *Gente*, weekly, Milan
51. *Die Gemeinde*, Vienna
52. *Grosstrehlitzer Kreisblatt*, West Germany
53. *Gleiwitzer-Beuthener Tarnowitzer Heimathbrief*, West Germany
54. *Grünberger Wochenblatt*, West Germany
55. *Grossener Heimatgrüsse*, West Germany
56. *Gazeta Polonii*, USA
57. *Glos Katolicki*, Paris
58. *Glos Kobiet*, London
59. *Glos Polski*, Bochum, West Germany
60. *Horyzonty*, Paris
61. *L'Homme et la société*, quarterly, Paris
62. *Israelisches Wochenblatt*, Switzerland
63. *Israël*, Switzerland
64. *Israël d'Aujourd'hui*, weekly, Brussels
65. *Izraelskie Nowiny i Kurier*, Israel
66. *Information Juive*, France
67. *Issnes*, USA
68. *The Irish Communist*, monthly, London
69. *Jutro Polski*, London
70. *Journal of International Affairs*, USA
71. *Journal of Politics*, USA
72. *Journal of Central European Affairs*, monthly, Colorado
73. *Jewish Currents*, USA
74. *Jedioth Chadashat*, Israel
75. *Jüdische Illustrierte*, West Germany
76. *Jüdische Sozialarbeit*, West Germany
77. *Jüdische Rundschau Maceabi*, Switzerland
78. *Jerusalem Past*, [sic] Israel
79. *Jewish Chronicle*, Britain
80. *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, London
81. *Jewish Observer and M.E.R.*, Britain
82. *Jewish Review*, Britain
83. *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Britain
84. *Kelewis*, Boston, USA
85. *Kolberger Zeitung*, Düsseldorf, West Germany
86. *Krapitzer Heimatbrief*, West Germany
87. *Kreuzburger Nachrichten*, West Germany
88. *Kurier Polski*, Buenos Aires, Argentina
89. *La Tribune Sioniste*, fortnightly, Brussels
90. *La Voix Internationale de la Résistance*, monthly, Brussels
91. *Münchner Merkur*, Munich
92. *Münchner Jüdisz Nachrichten*, Munich
93. *Midstream*, USA

94. *Mein Beskidenland*, West Germany
95. *The Monitory of one*, [sic] New York
96. *Der Monat*, USA
97. *Nation Europa*, monthly, West Germany
98. *Na Antenie*, London
99. *The National Jewish Monthly Review*, USA
100. *Notre Parole*, France
101. *Neue Welt*, Vienna
102. *Neisse Zeitung*, West Germany
103. *Der Neue Oberschlesische Wanderer*, West Germany
104. *Neuer Glogauer Anzeiger*, West Germany
105. *Neusalzer Nachrichten*, West Germany
106. *The New Review*, quarterly, New York
107. *Nasza Droga*, Australia
108. *Na Tropie*, London
109. *National Review*, weekly, New York
110. *News from Poland—Biuletyn Prasowy—Wiadomosci o zyciu w Polsce*, fortnightly, New York
111. *Nuova Umanita*, weekly, Rome
112. *Ostpreussenblatt*, Hamburg
113. *Oppelner Heimatblatt*, Wuppertal
114. *Oberschlesien*, Bonn
115. *Osteuropäische Rundschau*, Munich
116. *Orka*, USA
117. *Our Lady's Digest*, USA
118. *Oltrecortina*, Rome
119. *Pommersche Zeitung*, West Germany
120. *La Parole Ouvrière*, France
121. *Periodic Reports on the Jewish Position*, USA
122. *Posener Stimme*, West Germany
123. *Pressedienst der Heimatvertriebenen*, West Germany
124. *Problems of the Peoples of the USSR*, quarterly, USA
125. *Problems of Communism*, bi-monthly, Washington
126. *Polak*, West Germany
127. *Polak w Europie*, West Germany
128. *Polak w Rzymie*, Rome
129. *Polish American Journal*, USA
130. *Polish Review*, Brooklyn, USA
131. *Polska w Europie*, Paris
132. *Post Eagle*, New Jersey, USA
133. *Polemiki*, London
134. *Przemiany*, Rome
135. *Publik*, West Germany
136. *Przeglad Prasy*, monthly, West Germany
137. *Der Ratiborer*, West Germany
138. *Rheinischer Merkur*, Cologne, West Germany
139. *Regards*, monthly, Brussels
140. *The Russian Review*, quarterly, California
141. *Robotnik*, London
142. *Rocznik Polonii*, London
143. *Rocznik Towarzystwa Naukowego*, London

144. *Rola Boza*, Scranton, USA
145. *Rzeczpospolita*, London
146. *Stettiner Nachrichten*, West Germany
147. *Sagan — Sprottauer — Heimatbriefe*, West Germany
148. *Schlesische Bergwacht*, West Germany
149. *Secolo (II)*, Rome
150. *Sorauer Heimatbrief*, West Germany
151. *Specchio (Lo)*, weekly, Rome
152. *Sternberger Heimatpost*, West Germany
153. *Studies on the Left*, monthly, New York
154. *Soviet Studies*, quarterly, Glasgow
155. *Surray*, fortnightly, USA
156. *Soviet Studien*, West Germany
157. *Sovietica*, quarterly, Naples
158. *Studies on the Soviet Union*, quarterly, USA
159. *Survey*, monthly [sic], New York [sic]
160. *Sucasnist*, monthly, Munich
161. *Slavica Canadiana*, Winnipeg
162. *Sodalis Marianus*, London
163. *Der Tagesspiegel*, Berlin
164. *Telegraf*, Berlin
165. *Teviskes zibuzion*, Toronto
166. *Tribune juive*, France
167. *Three Monthly Review of Eastern Europe*, London
168. *Témoignages*, monthly, Monaco
169. *Teki Historyczne*, London
170. *Tygodnik Polski*, Melbourne, Australia
171. *Ukrainian Art Digest*, monthly, Philadelphia
172. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, quarterly, New York
173. *Wanderer*, Wiesbaden
174. *Wegweiser*, Frankfurt
175. *Waldenburger Heimatbote*, West Germany
176. *Wartheland Nachrichten*, Berlin
177. *Der Westpreusse*, Münster
178. *Weichsel — Warthe*, West Germany
179. *Weg und Ziel*, West Germany
180. *World Jewry*, USA

Springer Press Publications

181. *Die Welt*
182. *Bild-Zeitung*
183. *Berliner Morgenpost*
184. *Hamburger Abendblat*
185. *Bild am Sonntag*
186. *BZ am Abend*
187. *Die Zeit* [a Springer publication!], Hamburg
188. *Die Zukunft*, Austria

List of Publishers whose Publications are Subject to Especially Strict Control

1. USA

(1) The Hoover Institution, California
(2) The Central European Federalist, New York
(3) Komitet Wolnej Europy, New York

2. BRITAIN

(1) Gryf Publication Limited, London
(2) Oficyna Poetow i Malarzy, London
(3) Orbis Polonia, London
(4) Polonia Book Fund Ltd, London
(5) Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, London
(6) Institute of Jewish Affairs, London
(7) Towarzystwo Oswiaty Powszechnej, London
(8) The Polish Library, London
(9) The Polish Research Centre, London
(10) Taurus, London
(11) Veritas, London

3. FRANCE

(1) Christian Bourgeois Editeur
(2) Galerie Lambert, Paris
(3) Instytut Literacki, Paris
(4) Libella, Paris
(5) Librairie Polonaise, Paris
(6) Presses Universitaires, Paris
(7) Syndykat Dziennikarzy Polskich, Paris
(8) Zwiazek Polskich Federalistow, Paris

4. WEST GERMANY

(1) Piper Verlag

The Polish Ministry of Anti-Truth

The internal documents of the Polish censorship, revealed by Mr Leo Labedz in *The Times* yesterday and today, make truly fascinating reading. . . . There is no hint in these documents of any belief that what is officially printed or broadcast has anything to do with objective truth, or that what is cut out is cut out because it is false. The directives do not say "there is to be no repetition of the malicious rumour that rivers flowing from Czechoslovakia are increasingly polluted." They say "there should be no disclosure about the increasing pollution of rivers flowing from Czechoslovakia." Their authors know perfectly well, and assume that those they are addressing also know, what the truth is. They simply do not want it "disclosed." In other words they are peddling an ideology which has no hold over their own minds. They are salesmen who do not believe in their product.

As any capitalist could tell them, a salesman who does not believe in his product is unlikely to be a success. And so it proves. For anyone who knows Poland knows that Poles do not believe what they are told by their official media; and fortunately they do not have to, for they have other sources of information. Poles are able to travel abroad and maintain individual contacts with the West to a greater extent than any other East European nation. They are also, like other East European nations, great listeners to Radio Free Europe, in spite of the government's efforts to jam it. And more than most other European nations, East or West, they go to church—which is not of course a source of daily news but does provide an alternative and far more sincerely offered view of the world than the spurious Marxist consensus to be found in the official media.

Mr Labedz contrasts "the more ham-fisted Soviet censorship" with "its more fine-fingered Polish derivative." But the sad truth is that the Soviet version is considerably more effective, for there is almost certainly a much higher proportion of Soviet citizens who believe at least the broad message they are getting from their official media than there is in Poland or any other of the Soviet Union's East European colonies. This probably has little to do with the techniques of censorship, and much more to do with the simple fact of being colonies. It is much easier to question the credentials of a government and a social system which you know to have been imposed and kept in power by foreign troops than of one whose crimes are committed in the name of your own national pride—especially if you happen to be a citizen of a reasonably successful world power.

The Times, Editorial, 27 Sept. 1977

Katyn: Historical Background

Stanislaw Swianiewicz

THE Katyn affair, though it belongs to the past, means a lot today because, so long as the truth is not sufficiently elucidated, it is a factor which casts a particular shadow over relations between the Poles and the Soviet Union.

The Katyn story has already been under discussion for more than 35 years. I think it may be helpful if I present this story in stages.

The Prisoners who Disappeared

The first stage developed between September 1939 and July 1941, i.e. between the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939 and the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish treaty on 30 July 1941, shortly after the outbreak of the German–Soviet war. In September 1939, when the Soviet Union joined with Hitler's armies in their war against Poland and struck a terrible blow on the rear of the Polish army, the Soviet troops took, on Polish territory, according to the Soviet press, about 8,000 officers and about 200,000 other ranks, as prisoners-of-war. The other ranks were partly released and partly sent to work in the mines. The number of officers was subsequently greatly increased by the arrests made by the occupying authorities in the Eastern Polish provinces. By November 1939 the officers were concentrated in three camps: Kozielsk in the province of Tula, Starobielsk in the Ukraine and Ostaszkov in the north of Russia. There were in those camps altogether about 15,000 people: officers, non-commissioned officers and police constables. They were allowed to correspond with their families.

By May 1940, however, this correspondence was in most cases broken off. This produced great uneasiness among the prisoners' families. About 400 officers from all three camps, who were transferred to the camp of Griazovetz, in the province of Vologda, continued to write letters to their families.

The Polish Search and the German Discoveries

The second stage runs from autumn 1941 to April 1943. In 1941 the Polish wartime government in London, after signing the treaty with the Soviet Union started to bombard the Soviet authorities with various official and semi-official inquiries concerning the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers who were urgently needed for the formation of the Polish Army in Russia. At the end of 1941 General W. Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, visited the Soviet Union and had a conversation with Stalin on this matter. The Soviet standard answer was that all Poles had been released according to the treaty and that their where-

abouts were not known. Further, the Soviet authorities refused to convey any information about the destination to which the majority of the inmates of the three above-mentioned officers' camps had been evacuated in April 1940.

In April 1943 German radio announced the discovery of the graves of the Polish officers in the forest near the village of Katyn in the Smolensk region. The Polish government proposed the International Red Cross in Geneva for an independent investigation. The German authorities expressed their readiness to admit the International Red Cross commission to the territory under their occupation. The Soviet government, however, not only rejected this proposal but, on 26 April 1943 severed their diplomatic relations with the Polish wartime government in London.

Commissions of Investigation and the Nuremberg Tribunal

After the rejection by the Soviet Union of the Polish proposal to place the matter in the hands of the International Red Cross, the German authorities on their own initiative organized an international medical commission which consisted of experts from 12 countries, among them Dr François Naville, Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Geneva, well known for his outspoken hostility towards Nazi Germany. The commission produced its report at the beginning of May 1943. In the report the experts unanimously agreed that the bodies had been in the graves for about three years, i.e. since 1940 when that territory was still under Soviet rule. From the fact that the bodies were dressed in winter clothes and also from the fact that in the graves there were no insects, usually prevalent in summer time, the commission deduced that the killing took place in cold weather. This agreed with the information received from the local population that the periodic executions of Polish prisoners of war took place during April 1940, when the fields were still covered by snow.

During the same period the German authorities admitted to Katyn the technical commission of the Polish Red Cross from the Polish territories under their occupation. This commission stayed there between 28 April 1943 and 3 June 1943, and carried out a great part of the work connected with the exhumation of the bodies. At the end of the war one of the members of the commission, Dr Marian Wodzinski, managed to make his way to the West in order to submit his report to the Polish wartime government in London.

Dr Wodzinski's report confirms the conclusion of the international commission that the crime must have been perpetrated at the beginning of 1940, but emphatically denies the German propaganda statement concerning the number of bodies (14,000) in the Katyn graves. There were according to this report 4,145 exhumed bodies. In addition, in the grave no. 8 there were approximately 150–200 bodies which had not yet been exhumed at the time of Dr Wodzinski's departure from the

vicinity of Katyn. It follows that in Katyn there were approximately 4,300 bodies, i.e. one-third of the missing Polish officers.

In autumn 1943, the Soviet troops recaptured the Smolensk area and a special commission was appointed for " ascertaining and investigating the circumstances of the shooting of Polish officer prisoners by the German Fascist invaders in Katyn forest." The commission published its report on 24 January 1944. According to this report the Katyn crime was perpetrated by the Germans in the autumn of 1941, when warm weather prevailed.

There were two basic differences between the international commission organized by the Germans at the beginning of 1943, and the special Soviet commission established at the end of that year:

1. The Germans tried to give to their commission an international character. The Soviet commission consisted exclusively of Soviet citizens of Russian nationality. Not a single Polish communist was invited to be a member of that commission.
2. The terms of reference of the Russian commission were more narrowly defined than in the case of the international commission organized by the German authorities. The Soviet commission was told in advance *who* committed the Katyn crime. Their task was only to describe *how* the Katyn murder was committed by the Germans, i.e. to concoct a story.

The story was hastily produced, and on the basis of it the Soviet prosecutor at the Nuremberg tribunal in 1947 accused Germany of the crime. But this story fell to pieces because of the counter evidence submitted by the German lawyers defending Field Marshal Goering. Ultimately, in the verdict of Nuremberg, a number of German crimes were listed, but not the execution of the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest.

This verdict raises the obvious question: if the Germans did not perpetrate this crime then who did?

Post-Nuremberg Investigations

The ambiguous attitude of the Nuremberg tribunal in the Katyn affair deepened the mystery of this crime. Some institutions, as well as a number of private persons, have undertaken their own research.

The first noteworthy collection of facts and documents was published in Polish in 1948. This was based on documents which were in the possession of the High Command of the Polish troops in the West. The English translation of this collection was first published in 1965 by the Polish Cultural Foundation in London (*The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents*).

A very important contribution to the elucidation of various intricacies of the Katyn affair was made by the publication of the detailed minutes of the hearings before the Select Committee on the Katyn

Forest Massacre set up by the US House of Representatives in 1951. It comprises 2,362 pages and was published by the US Governmental Printing Office in 1952. The committee came to the unanimous conclusion that the Katyn murder was perpetrated in spring 1940 by the Soviet secret police.

There have been several private studies of the problem of Polish POWs missing in the Soviet Union, and a number of books, pamphlets and articles have been published on this subject in the West, mainly in English and Polish. The general conclusion of almost all of these publications is that the NKVD was responsible for the killing of one-third of the officers in Katyn and for the unknown fate of the remaining two-thirds.

The arguments may be briefly summarized in the following points:

1. Since the ambiguous verdict of the Nuremberg tribunal no evidence whatever has been found indicating German guilt in the Katyn murder, but much new evidence indicating Soviet guilt has been forthcoming.
2. According to the testimony of the survivors, the liquidation of the Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov camps in April 1940, was strictly regulated by orders from the central authorities of the NKVD in Moscow who decided the fate of each prisoner individually. This means that the Soviet authorities in Moscow had in their files information about each particular prisoner. Yet between August 1941 and April 1943 they refused to answer the persistent Polish inquiries into the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers. The mystery of Soviet behaviour was resolved by the discovery of the Katyn graves. Had these officers still been alive in 1941 in some camp overrun by German troops, it would have been quite easy to inform the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev, particularly as at that time there existed a military alliance between the Soviet Union and the Polish wartime government in London.
3. It had been established almost without doubt that the Katyn murders were perpetrated mainly in April, and partly in May 1940, i.e. during the time when those territories were under Soviet administration. This conclusion follows from examination of the clothes and footwear of the victims, the letters and newspapers found in their pockets, from the age of the spruces planted on the graves, and also from the dates of the last letters received by the families of those POWs whose bodies were found in the Katyn graves. An important indicator of the time of execution is provided also by the diaries found during the examination of some bodies. The last entry in the diary of Major A. Solski was made when he was already in the forest at 6.30 a.m. on 9 April 1940, immediately after his watch and his wedding ring had been taken from him, probably a few minutes before the execution. The well-known Polish-American writer Tadeusz Wittlin has taken from Major Solski's last diary

entry the title for his book on the Katyn murders, *Time Stopped at 6.30*. These dates are completely consistent with the evidence of the survivors of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszkov according to which the time of the liquidation of those camps was early spring 1940.

4. A Russian peasant, Ivan Krivozhertsov, an inhabitant of the Katyn forest area, the first person to report to the German occupying authorities about the Katyn graves, testified that several times early in spring 1940 he saw convoys of prisoners of war brought to a place called Kosogory inside the Katyn forest, where, according to the general opinion of his neighbours, they were executed. In September 1943 Krivozhertsov, together with his mother and sister, escaped to the West before the advancing Soviet troops and managed to reach some Polish units under British command. His testimony given in 1946 at the Headquarters of the 2nd Polish Corps in Ancona, Italy, is printed in the above-mentioned collection of facts and documents, *The Crime of Katyn* (pp. 229–240). After the war Krivozhertsov came to Great Britain together with the Polish troops as a displaced person and soon died in mysterious circumstances. The most comprehensive description of his experiences is given in Joseph Mackiewicz's book *The Katyn Wood Murders* (pp. 173–195).
5. In June 1950 B. Olshanski, a former associate professor at the University of Voronezh, and a Soviet army officer, who defected to the West, published in the Russian periodical based in New York, *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, his conversation with his friend Academician Burdenko who had presided over the Soviet special commission on the Katyn murders. This conversation took place in 1946, shortly before Burdenko's death. Burdenko, who was already gravely ill, confessed that he had signed the report of the special commission against his conviction. According to Burdenko's estimate, the bodies of the Polish officers must have been buried in the Katyn graves about four years before January 1944, when the report was issued. Burdenko had to sign it because Stalin was personally interested in this matter. Later on Olshanski repeated this revelation in his testimony before the Committee of the US House of Representatives.
6. In 1971, Abram Vidra, residing in Israel, a former inmate of Soviet forced labour camps, disclosed in the Jewish press that he had been imprisoned with a former NKVD officer who confessed that he had acted as an executioner in the massacre in the Katyn forest in 1940. Vidra repeated his revelation in 1972 on German television in Wiesbaden.
7. In January 1972 the British Foreign Office made public some confidential reports written by Sir Owen O'Maley, wartime Ambassador to Poland, concerning the Katyn murders, and also the written opinions of top Foreign Office officials concerning those reports. The reports were dated 23 May 1943 and 11 February 1944. The

general conclusion which may be drawn from the perusal of these documents is that towards the end of the war the consensus of opinion in the Foreign Office was that the available evidence indicated Soviet responsibility for this crime, but at the same time it was considered not desirable to make the Katyn problem a subject of public discussion.

8. At the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s the clandestine Russian publication *Chronicle of Current Events* several times published information about the witnesses of the Katyn forest massacre who are still kept secluded in Soviet prisons. Some details may be found in Louis Fitz-Gibbon's book, *The Katyn Cover-Up.*

The Mysteries of Katyn

Today—40 years after the execution of the Polish officers at Katyn—the responsibility of the Soviet security police for this crime seems to be clear. The volume of evidence against the NKVD is constantly increasing. But there are also a number of mysteries connected with this drama. First, there is no exact proof of the fate of the remaining two thirds, i.e. about 10,000 of the missing prisoners, though there are some indications as to the geographical location of the graves of the POWs from Starobielsk and Ostaszkov. These indications have been discussed at length in the book by Louis Fitz-Gibbon, *Unpitied and Unknown.*

Secondly, the motivation for the decision to kill the overwhelming majority of the Polish officers is not clear. The decision was taken probably some time in March 1940, after those officers had been kept in comparatively tolerable conditions for about half a year. About 450 men, roughly about 3 per cent of the total, were spared and sent to the Griazovetz camp in the province of Vologda. In June 1940 about 1,000 Polish officers and cadet officers were seized during the Soviet occupation of Lithuania and directed also to the Griazovetz camp. There is no evidence that any mass execution of Poles occurred in the second half of 1940, or the first half of 1941. Consequently in 1941, at the time of the German attack against the Soviet Union, there were about 1,500 Polish officers and cadet officers who made up the core of the Polish army organized in the Soviet Union in 1941–42. It seems that in the period March–June 1940, those Soviet authorities on whom the decision about the fate of prisoners depended were overwhelmed by a kind of killing fury, which suddenly subsided in the middle of 1940. The analysis and the elucidation of these vagaries of the Soviet policy of terror is a matter for future historians and social psychologists.

Thirdly, there is also some mystery in the unwillingness of the present Soviet rulers to close the Katyn affair by revealing the truth. The Soviet leaders seem to admit that Stalin and Beria committed many atrocities. Everybody knows about the famous secret speech by

Khrushchev at the Communist Party Congress in 1956. Beria was executed for his many crimes. Many victims of the Stalin and Beria terror, e.g. Marshal Tukhachevsky, have been rehabilitated posthumously. Many were released from the camps after Stalin's death. The present Soviet authorities refused, however, to consider the evidence collected in a number of serious publications in English, Polish and French, and refuse to tell the truth about the fate of the Polish officers who were in their hands in the time of Stalin and Beria.

The German Nazis exterminated certainly many more Jews than the Soviet authorities killed Poles. But present-day Germany has recognized the immorality of Hitler's policy in respect of the Jewish population, and we may say that confidence between contemporary Jews and contemporary Germans has been to a very great extent restored. There cannot be any real confidence between the Poles and the Soviet Union until the Katyn crime is fully elucidated by the Soviet authorities themselves.

The Katyn Massacre: Selected Bibliography

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Central Office for Control of Press,
Publications and Performances
Section for Instructions, Evaluation and Control

Warsaw, 14 January 1975

Information Note No. 2
Confidential

With reference to Note No. 21/IX concerning the death of Polish officers at Katyn, the following basic principles have been adopted in accordance with relevant statements in both the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* and the communiqué issued by a Special Commission appointed by Soviet authorities in 1943.

In September 1939, the Soviet Army placed a group of Polish officers in internment camps around Smolensk. This area was overrun by the Germans in August 1941. The officers were shot in the autumn of that year by the Nazis and buried in mass graves in the Katyn Forest.

A Special Soviet Commission began to investigate the affair imme-

diately after the Red Army had liberated the Smolensk area in September 1943. N. Burdenko (chairman), Alexei Tolstoy and W. Potiomkin, all members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Metropolitan Nicholas and others sat on the Commission. That body established that the Nazis had murdered approximately 11,000 Polish officers at Katyn in pursuit of plans to exterminate the Slav nations physically. The shooting was carried out by a special military detachment hiding under the name of the " staff of the 537th work battalion."

Germany's deteriorating military situation, the growing military power of the Soviet Union and the progressive consolidation of an anti-German coalition, resulted in the decision of the Nazis to resort to provocation. In short, their own crimes were blamed on Soviet authorities. The object of the exercise was not only to obliterate Nazi crimes but also to sow discord within the anti-German coalition and, in particular, between the Russians and Poles. These aims were partially realized. By appealing to the International Red Cross in the matter of the Katyn massacre, the Polish émigré government exacerbated already tense relations with the USSR to such a degree that the Soviet government severed diplomatic relations with Sikorski's government on 25 April 1943.

The perpetrators of the Katyn massacre were finally exposed in a communiqué of 24 January 1944, issued by a Special Commission authorized by a Special Soviet State Commission to determine and investigate crimes committed by the German fascist invaders.

The Censor's Office has, hitherto, insisted upon the elimination of all information naming Katyn as the place where Polish officers died during the Second World War. The guidelines now in force establish both the limits of information and the type of publications in which it can appear.

At the same time it is necessary to stress the undesirability of an exhaustive treatment of the Katyn affair in either historical or, more particularly, in journalistic works. For this reason and pending a final decision by the censor, all material exceeding the limits stipulated for this subject, should be referred to the Central Office for Control of Press, Publications and Performances.

Signed by
Tadeusz Ratajski
Deputy Director

Committee for National Self-Determination
Appeal to Polish Olympic Competitors

Warsaw, 13 February 1980

Today begin the Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid. The Summer Games are to take place in July 1980 in Moscow, the capital city of the country where 40 years ago there occurred the genocidal crime

of the murder of 15,000 Polish officers who were taken prisoner by the Soviet army invading Poland in September 1939, after the earlier German attacks. The Committee for National Self-Determination proclaimed 1980 as the year of national remembrance of this crime and it demands that the USSR should reveal its circumstances and those responsible for it. It also demands that all the graves of the victims should be made known.

In our Declaration of 31 January 1980 we protested against the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. In this situation the participation of Polish competitors in the Moscow Games would be an affront to the national dignity of a country whose citizens have been struggling for two centuries for its independence, shedding blood "for your freedom and ours."

We are convinced that the Olympic Games must remain a symbol of real peace and of the noble brotherhood of all nations.

For the Committee for National Self-Determination
Marian Pilka
Wojciech Ziembinski
Edward Wladyslaw Staniewski (on behalf of the Human Rights Committee)

Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR"

Warsaw, 11 April 1980

It is 40 years since the massacre of thousands of Polish officers by the NKVD in the Katyn forest. The date itself is symbolic, for the crime was not committed on one day, but victims were taken gradually from the Kozielsk camp to the place where afterwards mass graves were found. April 1940 is the time when the last letters were sent by the murdered prisoners of war from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszkowo. April 1940 is the date of the latest notes found with the remains in the Katyn graves. In April 1940 one of the prisoners of the Kozielsk camp, Professor Swianiewicz, was taken to the NKVD prison in Moscow for questioning. He was taken from a train carrying prisoners to the place of the Katyn crime. To this day the number of people shot in the Katyn forest is unknown and to this day it is not known where the graves of the prisoners of Starobielsk and Ostaszkowo are. It has been known for a long time now who was guilty of the crime and few would believe the gross lies of Soviet propaganda which has tried to blame the Nazis for it. The direct and indirect perpetrators of the crime were never punished and never interrogated in the USSR. The crimes of genocide have never been brought to trial, as the government of the USSR and other governments dependent on it still insist on the case of Nazi crimes. Together with the whole Polish nation and all the people in the

world for whom a crime remains a crime, no matter who commits it, we demand the disclosure and punishment of the guilty. We demand this not in the name of revenge, which we reject, but in the name of justice and truth. At the same time we demand punishment for the crimes committed by the Soviet authorities on Polish citizens after 17 September 1939, when the Red Army in cooperation with the Werhmacht and the government of Nazi Germany occupied part of the territory of the Second Polish Republic.

The authorities of the Polish People's Republic not only do not attempt to disclose the truth about the Katyn crime and other crimes of genocide committed by the USSR, but instead they persecute those who demand such a disclosure and who wish to pay tribute to the memory of the victims of those crimes. Such repressions have the opposite effect to the one the authorities intend, for they unmask the Polish authorities in the eyes of public opinion and at the same time confirm the truth. We believe that the disclosure and punishment of the Stalinist crimes against Polish citizens would be an important step towards brotherhood and friendship with the Russian nation and other nations incorporated today in the Soviet empire. We are strengthened in this belief by the recent impressive action of a large circle of campaigners for democracy and human rights, for the most part Russian and some of them members of other nations of the USSR. These campaigners, whom we regard as our brothers, also demand that the truth about Katyn be disclosed. We are grateful to them and we believe that this is an event of historical importance, which allows us to trust that brotherhood in truth and love between our nations has a future and some day will prevail. We call on our own people here and in exile to celebrate with dignity the sad anniversary of Katyn, not in the spirit of revenge but in the spirit of truth and brotherhood of all people of good will all over the world. At the same time we are warning the authorities of the Polish People's Republic that the repression of the firm and natural will of the nation to perpetuate the memory of the Katyn crime would only meet with the contempt of our people.

Russians and Ukrainians on the 40th Anniversary of Katyn

April 1980

In these memorable and painful days for Poland, we, the Soviet defenders of human rights, would like to assure our Polish friends, and through them the whole Polish nation, that none of us have ever forgotten nor will ever forget the responsibility carried by our country for the crime committed in Katyn by its official representatives.

We are convinced that the day is not far away when our nation will give their due to all those involved in this tragedy: to the executioners

as well as to the victims; to the former in accordance with their crimes, to the latter—with their martyrdom.

Ludmila Alexeyeva, Andrei Amalrik, Vladimir Bukovsky, Boris Weil, Thomas Wenclowa, Alexander Ginszburg, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, Zinaida and Pyotr Grigorenko, Boris Efimov, Tatyana Zhitnikova (Plyushch), Arina Zholkovskaya (Ginzburg), Julia Zachs, Edward Kuznetsov, Pavel Litvinov, Kronid Lyubarsky, Vladimir Maximov, Vladimir and Galina Malinkovich, Raisa Moroz, Victor Nekrasov, Vladlen and Svetlana Pavlenkov, Leonid Plyushch, Galina Salowa (Lyubarskaya), Nadya Svetlichnaya, Pavel Stokatelny, Valentin Turchin, Boris Shragin, Yuri and Veronica Stein, Tatyana Khodorovich.

Guidelines for Censors and Propagandists

Censor's Review* of the Book *Encounters with Icons* by Vladimir Soloukhin, published in 1975 by Wydawnictwo Literackie in Cracow and awarded PAX's prize for the best foreign work of literature translated into Polish.

Born on 14 June 1924, Vladimir Soloukhin is a graduate of the Maxim Gorky Literary Institute. He made his debut as a poet with a small volume called *Rain in the Steppe*. Athough he has cultivated different literary forms, his preference lies with the reporting of current events and essays. Among his publications are *Postcards from Vietnam*, *Slav Notebooks* and *From a Lyrical Poet's Point of View*.

Encounters with Icons offers reflections on the meaning of culture and particularly art in the life of both individual and society. According to the author, technological development creates ever new possibilities for, but simultaneously (and, of this, we are not always aware) exerts control over mankind. Despite increasingly efficient communication and transportation, for example, the time at our disposal is constantly diminishing. Mankind is increasingly more powerful, yet the individual is increasingly weaker: " as an entity possessing modern technology we are, of course, more powerful. We hear and see from a distance of thousands of miles, our hands are monstrously extended. We can even hit somebody on another continent. We have already stretched a hand with a camera as far as the moon. But all that is—'we.' If ' you ' were to be left with nobody but yourself, without radioactive and chemical reactions, without atomic-powered submarines or even a protective jacket—quite simply, alone, could you say of yourself, with the premature appearance of sclerosis and stones in the left kidney (I do not even mention the soul), that you are stronger than all your predecessors on the planet Earth? " (p. 10).

Technology also creates enormous threats to humanity as a whole: " . . . After all, even moral evil, cowardice, can pull the right lever or push the appropriate button—indeed, a coward would probably be the very first to pull it " (p. 10).

In the author's opinion, therefore, man should meditate more often than hitherto upon the realities surrounding him. Soloukhin declares that this can also be done by maintaining contact with tradition as well as by frequent association with genuine art.

Changes in the society and customs of the Soviet Union are presented against this background. Accepting the relationship of the whole nation to tradition and cultural achievements as essential,

* From *Censor's Information*, No. 5, Warsaw, 23 January 1976.

Soloukhin depicts these changes as undesirable in nature. This opinion is often formulated in sharp, unequivocal terms and its thrust has been only lightly tempered in the author's epilogue in which a more optimistic note is struck. In "Letters from the Russian Museum," Moscow architecture is compared with that of Leningrad. Soloukhin also reflects on the paintings exhibited in the Leningrad Museum and his thoughts often stray far beyond the original subject. . . .

There are, nevertheless, according to Soloukhin, people who perceive the beauty and value of historic remains and works of art. Without help from a state indifferent to such things, these people save icons, veritable masterpieces of old painting, from destruction. Their resources, however, are slim.

The title of the book's second part, "Black Boards," refers to the dark shade assumed by icons with the passage of time. Proper techniques can restore the hidden beauty of the original.

Combining the approaches of a journalist and essayist, Soloukhin records the search for, and the finding and purchasing of old icons. Carried away by passion, he opposes even more vehemently and violently than before the destruction of, and contempt for, certain values springing from the nation's tradition and cultural past. It is against this background that the author also touches upon other matters, such as the absence of mature respect for spiritual values among a large section of Soviet society, and the lack of tolerance for both believers and their feeling of insecurity. He also points to the detrimental effects of the Revolution upon remnants of the past.

Numerous instances are cited of the often ruthless destruction of Orthodox churches and icons both in the immediate post-Revolution period and later. Soloukhin offers as proof such examples as icons being chopped to construct boxes for potatoes, splintered by axes or, at best, used for boarding up windows. Orthodox churches were treated in equally unceremonious manner: "A tractor arrived from the state farm, . . . rammed into the bottom and it collapsed into pieces; the beams were later taken for firewood," or: "My mission was confined to saving a church building condemned to demolition. The reason was extremely good—bricks were needed for a cowshed." According to the author, such incidents often took place against the will of the villagers: "Several women stood humbly and silently on the church steps watching Jacob carry out, and then throw into a heap, a baptismal font, candlestick holder, copper dress wrenched from a large icon and some small chains. They asked to be allowed into the church to look round but the person in charge admitted nobody"; "When they closed down the church, a certain woman rescued an icon and hid it in her house. She later moved from our area into the town, asked me to go to her house at night and handed over the icon, saying 'I entrust you with the safety of Praskov' . . ."; "Hope still persists among the local believers—that perhaps they will not destroy"; "Your carpenters were not paying much attention—I told the chairman—and

besides, there were four more icons. Shouldn't there have been twelve the same?—four are missing. The old women carried them off home. Were they so carelessly hacked because they were not chopped by carpenters?"; and "A teacher chopped that icon for firewood when the church was shut down but my sister crept into his backyard at night, found the face from the icon famous for its miraculous powers and still has it to this very day." Soloukhin also gives examples of more active resistance, such as the case in which the local people placed their own padlock side by side with that put on the door of an Orthodox church by the authorities. Strangers could not enter the church, therefore, without these people knowing. The women with whom the author talked were often ready to defend the church: "It would be better to die than let the key out of our hands." While writing about people trying to save icons, the author refers to certain events which took place during the period of collectivization in the Soviet Union: "Auntie Masha was our neighbour. The campaign against kulaks began. A horse-drawn sledge arrived at night. Winter, blizzard. Everybody, including children, were packed onto the sledge and taken away." Soloukhin maintains that some of the villagers (especially the older ones) are still intimidated: "Perhaps you worship? Please don't be afraid, we won't tell anybody" (referring to icons).

In "Black Boards," Soloukhin presents the following picture of Soviet society: the people, particularly in country areas, are deprived of close contact with culture, their attitudes are largely pragmatic and, as a result, they are unable to appreciate the real values inherent in art.

The Revolution was accompanied by a turning away from tradition and facilitated the destruction of many historical remains. It isolated the people from certain positive values which had survived from the past. At the same time, the author writes that religious toleration does not exist in the Soviet Union and despite being met with passive resistance in certain cases, the state fails to take the feelings of believers into account. This is why the latter feel threatened and give the impression of being bullied.

The granting of approval for publication of this book was a serious oversight on the part of the censors and cannot be justified by the fact that the work was published (Moscow, 1972) in the Soviet Union. Its reception by Soviet citizens differs from that by the Polish readers. Every state conducting its own internal policy solves its own problems in different ways. In giving permission to discuss sensitive subjects, the authorities of every country are first and foremost concerned with their own citizens. At the same time, and on the basis of reciprocity, it is accepted practice in relations between countries belonging to the socialist bloc not to disseminate information relating to the internal difficulties of any one of these states.

A Tranquillizer for the Use of Party Members

Some Comments by Stanislaw Baranczak on Notatnik Lektora (*"Notes for the Lecturer,"* No. 11/71, 3 March 1978), Party manual for internal circulation only

On occasion, even the Polish United Workers Party experiences difficulties with its members. In such cases, in order to make some current absurdity more palatable to the ranks, an army of lecturers is brought in. Their job is to explain dialectically, to invigorate, to comfort and to give strength and assurance to the bemused, if passive, perpetrators of the Party's latest questionable deed.

In order to instruct the instructors how to approach their unenviable task, various interparty publications, such as the "Notes for the Lecturer" are made available. They proffer the ready-made line of lies deemed suitable for the occasion.

I am the lucky possessor of one such opuscule, the current issue of the "Notes," a collector's item, even though produced in considerable numbers. It is devoted to an attempt to counteract Tomasz Strzyzewski's revelations on censorship. These were made available in Poland in print by KSS-KOR and the ranks of party members were able to hear most of them on Radio Free Europe. Clearly, the material smuggled out by the Cracow censor must have seriously shaken any but the totally thoughtless.

What then are the ingredients of the party tranquillizer?

Ingredient No. 1: there is censorship in every country. The authors quote, among others . . . Sweden, using much discretion in skimming over the difference between the Swedish and the PPR interpretation of such concepts as "freedom of speech" and "state secret." The booklet goes on to paint a truly horrifying picture of gloomy Sweden where censors maltreat and harry courageous artists and journalists on the quiet, without anyone being able to find out about it. Clever "Notes," a little masterstroke of propaganda!

However, if an ill disciplined but well informed reader were still to protest that he knew of countries without any form of censorship, there is a ready answer to that: "In some countries censorship operates openly, in others it is one of the secret services, either a department of the police or of a camouflaged organization." Just like the notorious underground organization which made sure of a perfect cover by never getting started at all. The "Notes" conclude: "The so-called freedom of speech in the West is a complete fiction."

Ingredient No. 2: in the PPR, censorship is getting less and less restrictive all the time. We learn with some amazement that about 40 per cent of non-periodical publications and 800 periodicals are now exempt from preventive censorship. "Why on earth then do they all say exactly the same thing? Why is there no genuine discussion, no

real problems?" a grudging participant of many party meetings might ask. And the answer comes pat: "With the growth of political experience and sense of responsibility among authors themselves, and among editors and publishers, the role of external censorship by the Office for Control of Publications will shrink even further." Quite simple, really: just censor yourselves and there will be no need for us to control your wares.

Ingredient No. 3: censorship in the PPR is, in fact, very liberal. "In 1977 . . . not a single non-periodical publication was rejected *in toto*, 96 per cent passed the censor without any alterations being demanded and as for the rest, the changes enforced related mostly to the regulations protecting state and military secrets. Some excisions were made of improper words and of detailed descriptions of sexual activities." Why is it then that, as revealed at the last Writers' Congress, 36 books were refused publication? Perhaps it was indeed the case not of official censorship but of the "growth of political experience and sense of responsibility" on the part of publishers?

Need one add anything to this catalogue of lies, fatuity and misrepresentation assembled with such care and devotion? Perhaps just this: the whole thing is clear testimony of official impotence. As the case is spurious from beginning to end, black being called white, lie truth, evil good and slavery freedom, the mass of misrepresentation defeats itself: lies, lies and more lies add up to pitiable inanity.

The Polish Pope and the Polish Catholic Church

Anna Kaminska

EX ORIENTE LUX! Such was the tenor of world opinion upon the elevation of a Polish cardinal to St. Peter's throne. On 16 October 1978 the continuous succession of Italian popes, which had lasted for 455 years, came to an end. But the political significance of the outcome of the last conclave resides in the fact that the new head of the Roman Catholic Church comes from a country ruled by communists. The origin and personality of the new Pope may constitute a weighty factor in confrontation or coexistence of East and West. Therefore an estimate of the person and acts of John Paul II and of his immediate background, Polish political realities and the Catholic Church in Poland which raised and formed him, is of primary importance.

The victories of the Red Army in the Second World War extended Soviet rule over Eastern Europe to the River Elbe. Poland, or rather the Polish people, had to submit to Stalin's will. In 1945 in Poland, as in all other East European countries overrun by the Red Army, a so-called coalition government was formed. But already in 1947 the coalition partners disappeared, and the Communist Party established its dictatorship. Matyas Rakosi, the author of the communist victory in Hungary, boasted that it was their "salami tactics" which enabled the communists to consolidate their power at all levels. The non-communist members of the coalition were "sliced off" like pieces of salami.

After a few years only mutilated and pliable rumps of former non-communist parties were left. In Poland it was the Peasant Party and the Democratic Party which suffered this fate, whereas the Socialist Party was united with, or rather absorbed by, the Workers' (Communist) Party.

After all opposition parties were overpowered, there still remained one adversary: the Catholic Church with its Holy See in Rome outside the sphere of communist control. Why did not the communist leaders employ "salami tactics" towards the Church as a means of doing away with that opponent? In fact that is exactly what they have been doing, and with some results. But, as there is a substantial difference between a political party and the Church, the process of "slicing off" has had to take a much longer time. The Catholic Church in Poland has been the strongest church in Eastern Europe. After its victory during the Counter-Reformation in the seventeenth century, it ruled unchallenged over the souls of the Polish people. The Church enjoyed

exceptional influence and wealth, accommodating itself to changing political currents and circumstances. It was in the Russian part of partitioned Poland that the Jesuits defied the Pope's decision dissolving their order, and survived, until their restitution, under the protection of the tsars, who in this way could emphasize their disregard of Rome.

Historically, the Catholic Church and the communist regime in Warsaw have harboured deep animosity towards each other. The Church represented great power, uniting close to 90 per cent of the population within its organization and behind its ideology. The peasants, who originally had benefited from the agrarian reform carried out by the communist government, were quickly made aware of the real agricultural policy of the new regime. They became the target of persecution as they opposed the Soviet model of collectivization. They have remained the strongest and most faithful ally of the Church. The workers, in whose name the communists claimed to have seized and wielded power, were soon disillusioned because of the ineffective economic policies of the new government. The overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia, which to a great extent consisted of the members of the former landed gentry, and which after the war absorbed the remnants of that class, was naturally opposed to the motley, mostly uneducated group of people who formed the government, and whose only claim to power rested on Stalin's will. Even for those who were by no means religious, the Church offered the only opportunity of openly expressing their disapproval of the government by attending Sunday mass.

As for the communists, their Marxist-Leninist doctrine demanded clear repudiation of any sort of religious ideology; the law of history and not the grace of God laid the foundation for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The communist leaders had every reason to announce war on the Church. But there also were good reasons for declaring only cold war. The Church had a coherent, uniform organization, not inferior to that of the Communist Party, and in addition it had a large social basis which the communists lacked. The communists had for the time being to tolerate the independence of their implacable opponent, but by no means did they intend to maintain this situation for ever. The "salami tactics" proved to be useful, but had to be applied with great care.

In the struggle between the Church and the state in Poland one can discern three major phases: first, 1947–56; second, 1956–70; third, 1970–78. In the first period the Party employed two different tactics: restrictions and subversion. Old Church privileges were cancelled. The denominational schools (which in Poland meant the Catholic schools) were abolished. Religious instruction in state schools was abolished, the social activities of the Church were curtailed, and Church property was heavily taxed. The theological departments at the universities were closed. The Church was pushed out of public life. Many priests were

imprisoned on various charges, and Cardinal Wyszynski, the Primate, was exiled to a convent.

At that time the young Karol Wojtyla was just beginning his rapid rise in the Catholic Church. He was born on 18 May 1920 in Wadowice, a small town not far from Cracow, as the younger son of a non-commissioned officer. The outbreak of the Second World War interrupted his studies at the University of Cracow; in 1940 and 1941 he was earning his livelihood as a worker. In 1942 he decided to become a Catholic priest. Subsequently he found asylum in the palace of the Archbishop of Cracow, Stefan Sapieha, where, studying theology, he survived the German occupation. Ordained as a priest in 1946, he went to Rome to continue his studies.

THE formation of *Pax*, a subversive organization within the Catholic community, can be regarded as the first application of "salami tactics" to the Church. It was not the Polish communists who created *Pax*, but Moscow, and *Pax's* allegiance to the Kremlin had to be recognized by Warsaw. *Pax* constituted the first crack in the monolithic structure of the Catholic Church in Poland. It offered an alternative for those who regarded themselves as Catholics, and were not willing to join the Communist Party, but at the same time were ready to support the communist government. *Pax* formed the core of the "progressive Catholic movement," which also attracted some clergymen, the so-called "priest patriots." The government regarded *Pax* as the only official representation of lay Catholic intellectuals. In 1953 *Tygodnik Powszechny* ("General Weekly"), a leading Catholic organ, established in Cracow in 1945, was suppressed and subsequently re-emerged under the direction of *Pax*.

In 1956, both the clergy and the lay Catholics felt that in view of the international situation they had no alternative but to come to terms with the communist system. During the Polish October of 1956 they did not seek a change of the political order, but wanted rather to achieve a kind of *modus vivendi* with the socialist state. Gomulka needed support, and he accepted help from everyone, including the Catholics, who offered it. From the point of view of the Party this was very significant. The Church had softened to the extent of being ready to negotiate and even collaborate with the communists.

This leads us to the second phase of Church–state relations. Gomulka regarded the support of the Catholics favourably, and made some transitory concessions. He allowed religious instruction in schools, only to do away with it two years later. For a while Church property was less harassed by taxation. Cardinal Wyszynski was allowed to return to the Primate's palace in Warsaw. But the most important event was the formation of the Catholic parliamentary faction—*Znak* ("Sign"), to which the Party gave at the 1957 elections 11, and from 1961 onwards five, seats in the Seym.

In this way *Pax* was discounted. It lost its position as the only official lay representation of the Catholics. It had to give back *Tygodnik Powszechny* to its former owners, a group of Cracow intellectuals connected with the Episcopal Curia and *Znak*. *Pax* was never recognized by the Church hierarchy as representative of Polish Catholics. Now a competitive organization recognized both by the Church and the state had appeared. *Znak* wanted to discredit *Pax*, and to remove it. It could not achieve this, allegedly because Moscow stood behind *Pax*. The main difference between *Pax* and *Znak* was that *Pax* was never regarded as an opposition. *Znak* was. This fact cannot be overstressed. There was in Poland no official parliamentary opposition other than the Catholic group *Znak*.

The original members of *Znak* represented various Catholic intellectual centres such as the five Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs, the Catholic University at Lublin, the weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the monthlies *Wiez* ("Bond") and *Znak*, which lent its name to the parliamentary group. Two of its founders, J. Zablocki and T. Mazowiecki, were former members of *Pax*, who left it only in 1955 after the Vatican placed *Pax* under a ban. From the very inception of *Znak* there was little agreement among its members as to the programme the group should adopt. There were almost as many political ideas as there were people involved. This greatly facilitated the Party's tactic of playing one person off against another, and finally reduced the whole political activity of *Znak* to a point where it became an instrument of subversion in the Catholic camp. In fact, it was only during its first tenure in the Seym that *Znak* reflected the opinion of the Catholic intellectuals who gave it their mandate. Soon, after much quarrelling, S. Stomma of Cracow, a member of the editorial board of the *Tygodnik Powszechny*, took the lead, and a so-called neo-positivism was adopted as the political credo. It involved taking no risks and collaborating with the government, which led finally to the political bankruptcy of the group.

The fruits of the Polish "Spring in October" in 1956 were allowed to survive for no longer than two years. Had *Znak* decided to remain faithful to the democratic ideas which it had adopted as its original political principle, it would have tendered its resignation from the Seym soon after 1958.

SUCH were the political conditions under which Karol Wojtyla developed his activities. In 1948 he returned from abroad and settled in Cracow, where in 1951 he took his doctoral degree in theology and in 1953, at the last moment before the Department of Theology at the University of Cracow was liquidated, he completed his second thesis, for the so-called *habilitacja*. He did not leave Cracow even when he became a professor in the Catholic University at Lublin in 1954. His superiors had obviously destined him for an administra-

tive career, and already in 1958 he was made a titular bishop and appointed auxiliary at Cracow. In December 1963 he became Archbishop of Cracow.

The members of the editorial boards of *Znak* and of *Tygodnik Powszechny* were his close collaborators. Wojtyla and the Catholic intellectuals surrounding him created in Cracow a centre which was intended to be a counter-poise to Warsaw and in particular to the Primate. When, after a short political thaw, Gomulka toughened the ideological line, Wyszynski resumed his old stance. He had the courage to oppose in public the rule of the Party, and to defend Polish national traditions against Sovietization. Wojtyla and his close circle advocated dialogue with the communists.

As a result, instead of fighting in the Seym, *Znak* (mainly Stomma and the Cracow group connected with *Tygodnik Powszechny*) concentrated on opposing the Primate. The controversy between that group and the Primate concerned primarily the attitude towards the regime. The intransigent stand adopted by Wyszynski was thwarting the more opportunistic line pursued by *Znak*. This basic conflict evolved into a multifold argument concerning even religious dogma. The Primate was accused of conservatism, social and religious, of impeding the introduction in Poland of the decisions of Vatican II. In 1963, during the second session of the Vatican Council, Stomma "lost" at Rome a secret, personal memorandum containing sharp criticism of Wyszynski. Its contents became known almost immediately thereafter. The memorandum suggested that a direct contact (disregarding the Primate) should be established between the Vatican and the Polish government. Later Stomma disclosed that he had acted in concert with Kliszko, Gomulka's right hand man.

The discrepancy between the Primate and the Cracow centre had deep historical roots. It reflected the difference in political attitudes towards foreign rule of the Russian and Austrian parts of partitioned Poland. While in the so-called Congress Kingdom, with Warsaw as its capital, the spirit of resistance remained alive, manifesting itself in successive uprisings, in Galicia compliance and collaboration were adopted as a political principle. It is difficult not to see that the political line pursued by the Cracow Catholic group continued that tradition.

In the face of the Primate's intransigence, the flexible attitude of the Cracow Catholics was appreciated by the regime. In order to widen the rift between Wyszynski and Wojtyla the government used to direct foreign journalists, interested in religious life in Poland, not to the Primate but to the Archbishop of Cracow. Wojtyla with diplomatic skill maintained a balance, avoiding political traps, while the Party made efforts to push him further apart from Wyszynski. But it was mainly thanks to the great political wisdom of the Primate that the

Communist Party was not as successful in Poland as it was in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia.

During the rule of Gomulka three major trends can be discerned: (1) *Znak,* which enjoyed the support of the Episcopate, adopted a subservient attitude towards the regime. (2) There appeared a growing rift between some bishops and the Primate. (3) With such people as Stomma, the regime tried to set the Polish Episcopate, above all the Primate, and the Vatican at variance. The communists applied the principle *divide et impera.*

AFTER the Second World War, the Vatican adopted a rigidly hostile attitude towards all communist regimes. The papal bull of 1949 made it clear that there could be no dialogue between the Church and those states ruled by professional atheists. At that moment this also suited the communists. At the time of consolidation of power by the communists in Eastern Europe they were very much concerned with their ideological purity. The Church was regarded as the seat of superstition, obscurantism, the stronghold of feudalism and capitalism, and there was no place in Marxism-Leninism for talks with such an adversary.

In 1955–56, when de-Stalinization began, Pius XII expressed (on 23 December 1956) a warning against the "illusion of a false co-existence." There was, however, at the same time a strong current of opinion at the Holy See which advocated the exploration of the possibility of establishing a *modus vivendi* with the communists.

With the accession of John XXIII, the Vatican policy towards Eastern Europe, and especially Russia, changed dramatically. In February 1963 the Soviet Union released from detention Archbishop Slipyi of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, which had been forcibly incorporated with the Greek Orthodox Church of Russia in 1946. In March 1963, Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei, accompanied by his wife, visited the Pope. The encyclical *Pacem in Terris* of April 1963 by Pope John XXIII laid the foundations for dialogue and cooperation between Catholics and communists. This trend was further strengthened by Pope Paul VI's encyclical *Ecclesiam Suam* of August 1964.

The agreement of 29 June 1966 between the Vatican and Belgrade was the first far-reaching understanding between two hitherto implacable opponents. But when the Pope desired to employ his Yugoslav gambit in Poland, he encountered strong opposition from the Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski. Wyszynski believed that the Polish Church was strong despite or because of its opposition to the government, and that any new agreement could only lead to a deterioration in the status quo. In spite of the stand of the Polish Primate, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli departed for Poland in February 1967. His diplomacy was followed by the Pope's conciliatory decision of May 1967 by

which he invested four administrators of Polish western territories, Bishops Kominek, Jop, Drzazga and Pluta, with the authority of bishops residentiary, with the reservation, however, that they might be recalled by the Pope. According to canon law only an administrator appointed permanently can be given the powers of a bishop residentiary. The Pope made an exception here, thus opening the door to further negotiations.

Following Casaroli's first visit to Poland Archbishop Wojtyla was awarded a cardinal's biretta on 26 July 1967. There was a widespread assumption that he had been chosen by both the Vatican and the Polish government as a counter-balance to Wyszynski. In the following years he was clearly chief executor of Pope Paul VI's policy of *rapprochement* with the Polish government. It was also after Casaroli's visit that Wojtyla became a member of four significant congregations in the Vatican, those for the Eastern Churches, the Clergy, Catholic Education and the Liturgy. He also became a consultant in the Council for the Laity and a member of the secretariat general of the Synod of Bishops. In 1969 Cardinal Wojtyla was selected as a vice-chairman of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate. While Cardinal Wyszynski was allowed by the Government to visit only Rome, Wojtyla travelled extensively, to the USA and Canada in September, October and November of 1969, and again in August 1976. In February 1973 he visited Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand. In June 1977 he was in West Germany. It was during his activities at the Vatican and his travels that he demonstrated his ability to handle both divine and mundane matters with the sure ease of a master.

No political organizations ideologically opposed to Marxism apart from the Catholic one were allowed by the government to exist. But the political activity of such a prominent Catholic group as *Znak* was not too inspiring. Stomma's loyalty to Gomulka led him to comply with all requests made by the Party as to the composition of the *Znak* parliamentary faction. The most outspoken and unmanageable members, such as Kisielewski, Mazowiecki and Makarczyk, were dropped. Their places were taken by Party favourites such as Myslik and Auleytner. After J. Zawiejski's resignation from *Znak*, followed by his death in 1969, *Znak* began to dissolve.

After the governmental crisis of December 1970, the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs demanded the resignation of Stomma; the removal of Gomulka had left his people vulnerable to attack. Stomma, however, managed to convince the new Party leadership that he could be useful if retained in his post. As a result it was he who prepared with the collaboration of the Party a new list of the *Znak* candidates to the Seym in 1972.

BUT at the same time *Znak's* position as the representative of Polish lay Catholics was challenged by a competitive group

known as The Centre for Documentation and Social Studies (ODISS). This group was organized by J. Zablocki, a former member of *Pax*, and at that time a member of *Znak*. While Stomma, in spite of the evident inefficiency of the ruling clique, was faithfully standing by Gomulka, Zablocki based his hopes on the " star of darkness," the Minister of Interior, Mieczyslaw Moczar. ODISS also managed to overcome *Znak's* monopoly of contacts with West European " progressive " Catholics, who nourished great expectations (or illusions) in connexion with the Catholic-Marxist " dialogue," and the possibility of collaboration with the communists.

The split between ODISS and *Znak* was already evident in 1974–75. An open break occurred in 1975–76 on the occasion of the " national " discussion of the new Constitution proposed by the Party. On 17 January 1976 a number of Catholic intellectuals signed an open letter to the Chairman of the State Council, H. Jablonski.[1] The letter was formulated in a very cautious way in comparison with such protests as the " letter of 59 " or the " letter of 101 " written by the liberal intellectuals. For instance, as regards the most controversial proposal concerning the introduction to the Constitution of the principle that the Communist Party is the only leading force of the nation and the state, the Catholic intellectuals only expressed their reservations, but did not reject the proposal. In spite of this cautious formulation, members of ODISS, the Catholic Intelligentsia Club at Poznan, and two *Znak* deputies, Stomma and Lubienski, were afraid to sign the letter. Moreover, ODISS composed its own resolution by which it cut itself off from all protests against the new Constitution. It stated that " while we do have confidence in the Polish Episcopate, who in times of national emergency have always been guided by a deep and authentic sense of responsibility for the good of the nation, we cannot say this about some other people, whose inspiration or aims are not always clear." [2] Those " other people," from whom ODISS cut itself off so decisively, were, of course, those liberal intellectuals who courageously opposed the attempt by the Party to sanction by the Constitution its dictatorship and the subordination of the State to the Soviet Union.

Thus at that time there were already three Catholic political groups, *Pax*, *Znak*, and ODISS, all canvassing for the favour of the Party. The bankruptcy of *Znak* became apparent at the session of the Seym in February 1976, when its member Lubienski spoke for the new Constitution, and all other members, with the exception of Stomma, who mustered his courage and abstained, voted for it.

As a result of Stomma's " insubordination " it was Zablocki who gained the upper hand at the elections to the Seym in 1976. Three members of *Znak*, Zablocki, Lubienski, and Auleytner were re-elected

[1] See the text published in *Kultura* (Paris), Apr. 1976, pp. 107–109.
[2] Ibid. p. 109.

They were reinforced by Ozdowski, the president of the Catholic Club at Poznan, and Bender, a professor in the Catholic University at Lublin. They replaced Stomma and Myslik of Cracow. Since the majority (three out of five) of the former *Znak* members retained their mandates, they decided to continue under the old name. This led to an explosion of recriminations within the Catholic camp. On 12 March 1976, Mazowiecki, the editor of the monthly *Wiez*, Swiecicki, the president of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club at Warsaw, Turowicz, the editor of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and Stomma sent a letter to Auleytner in which they protested against the use of the name *Znak* by the new parliamentary faction,[3] which they argued had nothing in common with the original *Znak*. When the original *Znak* was formed in 1956, it enjoyed great support and the trust not only of the Church hierarchy, but also of the majority of the non-Marxist intelligentsia. It was regarded as an element of democratic pluralism, of national independence, of the Polish historical heritage. The invaluable trust enjoyed by the old *Znak* had been wasted by its parliamentary representation.

THE Party could now claim a new success. When the old Catholic representation in the Seym had been compromised, the regime replaced it by an even more subservient tool: the new *Znak*, based on ODISS with Zablocki as chief. During the events of June 1976, when the workers of several big factories at Warsaw, Plock, and Radom rose against the governmental economic policy, the new *Znak* proved that it was worthy of Gierek's confidence. When the groups of intellectuals, which formed spontaneously, criticized the policy of the Party, and demanded that reprisals against the workers be stopped, the new *Znak* remained deaf and mute.

The time had now come to curtail those Catholic intellectual groups which expressed their disapproval of the new *Znak*. Among them there was, as we recall, the Catholic Intelligentsia Club at Warsaw and the periodical *Wiez*. Their activities were financed by the Catholic business enterprise "Libella." The authorities revealed financial irregularities in the operation of "Libella," and they closed it down. In this way the Warsaw Catholic Intelligentsia Club and *Wiez* lost their economic basis. In the meantime Zablocki, who certainly was well informed about what was going on, organized at Poznan a new Catholic Club, called the Polish Catholic Club, thus splitting the Catholic organizations in that area too. He obtained the licence to establish a new Catholic business enterprise, "Social Industrial Workshop." He applied to the authorities to allow him to take over "Libella." In this he was supported by the Episcopate. Surprisingly enough (because of the Episcopate), and naively enough (because of the Party), the adversaries of Zablocki, centred around the four

[3] Ibid. p. 110.

Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (Warsaw, Cracow, Wroclaw, and Torun), the editorial boards of *Wiez, Tygodnik Powszechny,* and *Znak,* also applied for a "slice" of "Libella." They were, of course, refused. Zablocki took everything.

From the point of view of its political role, the new *Znak* should be placed somewhere in between *Pax* and the old *Znak.* It was not, as *Pax* was, a creation of Moscow. It had a national character, the support of the Episcopate, and as a political pseudo-party it could be compared with those remnants of the Democratic Party and the Peasant Party which were allowed to serve the Communist regime. By taking over "Libella" Zablocki made *Wiez* and the Catholic Intelligentsia Club at Warsaw economically dependent on ODISS. And so the opposition lost two important centres.

THE "salami tactics" were effective where the lay arm of the Church was concerned. They also worked to some extent in negotiations with the Vatican, the Episcopate, and the Primate. The desire to reach an understanding with the Warsaw regime was shared both by the Vatican and by influential members of the Polish Episcopate. The question was at whose expense they were willing to achieve this. The third party, the Primate, opposed negotiations which might be successful at his expense. The fourth party, the faithful, did not count for much. The interplay between the Vatican, the Episcopate, and the Primate, was effectively exploited by the regime in Warsaw. The aim of the Party was clear: to break the Primate, to force him, and with him the whole Church, to adopt a subservient attitude towards the regime. If we disregard far-reaching Soviet international aims, the Vatican did not count for very much, before the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope, from the point of view of Polish internal developments. Nor did the Bishops present any danger. The Primate was the only power the Party had to reckon with. If he had "softened" and accepted collaboration, the Party could have congratulated itself upon another advance in its efforts to subordinate the Catholic Church in Poland (and not only a group of Catholic intellectuals of the new *Znak*).

The means which the Party employed to achieve this end are of some interest. The Vatican *Ostpolitik* plays a crucial role here. Why did Pope Paul VI make such great concessions to obtain the so-called normalization of relations with the communist regimes? Much has been written on this subject, but perhaps some observations are in order here.

The Vatican might have harboured the legitimate fear that if the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe were left to itself in its daily accommodations with the communists, its ties with the Holy See could be weakened. In time this might lead to a gradual detachment from Rome. If compromise with the communists in Eastern Europe was

inevitable, the Vatican wanted to play its part and for its continuing presence in Eastern Europe the Holy See was ready to pay a high price.

The Vatican may hope that if the Pope bestows his blessing upon the communist regimes and acknowledges them as legitimate rulers, their ideological intransigence will soften. Indeed John Paul II in his speech to the diplomatic corps on 20 October 1978 referring to the communist regimes said that the Vatican was " willing to enter into dialogue with those who are legitimately charged with providing for the common good of society." As time passes the communist regimes in Russia and in Eastern Europe are becoming more and more conservative, but they never cease to make efforts to subordinate all sections of society, and hence also the Church, to the state.[4] The Church in communist countries could be tolerated only as a pliable tool used either to keep the masses down, or as an agent helping to extend communist rule over the rest of the world. If that role suits the Church the door to dialogue is open.

The first fruit of the Vatican *Ostpolitik* in Poland was the investiture of the four apostolic administrators in the Oder-Neisse area in 1967 with the authority of bishops residentiary. This direct contact between the Vatican and Warsaw was, however, not welcomed by the Polish Primate. He was afraid that he would become only a passive observer. This forced him to seek his own *modus vivendi* with the regime.

The change of leadership in Poland in December 1970 gave Wyszynski an opportunity to take the initiative to become a party in the Warsaw-Rome negotiations. With Gierek's accession to power a new pattern of state-Church relations evolved. It was rumoured that Paul VI himself would visit Poland. Wyszynski could not afford to be left out. But when he extended his hand with an offer of a better understanding with the communist regime, he wanted to obtain an honourable compromise, a firm and honoured place for the Church and himself in the communist state. But this was not exactly Gierek's idea.

Gierek started his rule by making assurances, as every new Party secretary does, that he wanted to unite the whole nation, to create a political reality in which there would be place for all people, atheists and believers. International circumstances worked for him. In the aftermath of the Warsaw-Bonn agreement of 1970, the Vatican too made its contribution to *détente*. By his decision of 26 June 1972, Paul VI normalized the Church administration in the Oder-Neisse area. The temporary appointments of the bishops in this territory were made permanent. However, if the Pope and the Polish Catholic hierarchy expected in turn concessions on the part of the communist leaders, they were mistaken. Warsaw even made a last minute attempt to block the Pope's decision by which he created two new dioceses of

[4] An interview with L. Kolakowski by *Il Giornale*, 18 Oct. 1978.

Kamien-Szczecin and Kolobrzeg-Koszalin—thus enlarging the Church administration in this area. The Pope's concession of 26 June was not followed by further negotiations. Gierek gave him to understand that any further talks must be preceded by the liquidation of the embassy of the Polish government-in-exile at the Vatican. Indeed, on 19 October 1972 the embassy of the "Republic of Poland" was closed, and the last ambassador received another job at the Vatican.

In the meantime the Primate also managed to become a party to the negotiations between Warsaw and the Vatican, and he even persuaded the Bishops to support his stance. After his and the Bishops' visit to Rome in November 1972, which lasted over seven weeks (it was the so-called gratitude visit for the Pope's decision to normalize the Church administration in the Oder-Neisse area), they expressed their joy that their views, favouring a tough line in the negotiations with the regime, had found full understanding in the Curia.

In response the Warsaw regime also toughened its line. New harassments of the Church were initiated. In April 1973 the Seym passed a bill on the socialist education of young children. The school curriculum was to be so organized that the children would be detained at school in the afternoon. This meant that they would not be able to attend classes in religious instruction offered in the churches.

Many old churches destroyed in the Second World War were rebuilt from governmental funds. They were treated as architectural and national monuments. But practically no new churches were erected. Thirty years passed. New towns and settlements were founded. The Catholic hierarchy made continuous efforts to obtain permission to build new churches. In this respect the Party did no more than make promises. When people took the initiative and tried to arrange even temporary chapels, the militia was sent to destroy them. Students at Catholic seminaries were beginning to be conscripted into the army.

This harassment angered the Primate, and he redoubled his efforts to oppose any new agreement between the Vatican and Warsaw. The stand of the Vatican in the state-Church conflict in Poland was of crucial importance. When the Vatican admitted the Primate to its negotiations with Warsaw, it certainly expected him to be more sympathetic to the Pope's *Ostpolitik*. It seems, however, that he did not understand hints. The Pope had to resort to warnings. In spite of Wyszynski's opposition, Archbishop Casaroli visited Warsaw again, and was warmly welcomed by the regime. But Wyszynski did not remain idle. On the evening of 7 February 1974 he took action. From the pulpit of St. John's Cathedral in Warsaw, in the presence of Casaroli, he delivered a sermon in which he was more critical than ever of the Warsaw regime. When Casaroli was given the translation of Wyszynski's sermon, he was dumbfounded. He had hoped to bring the negotiations with Warsaw to a successful conclusion, but Wyszynski had virtually torpedoed any possibility of an agreement. The time had

come to give the embattled Cardinal a more serious warning. The Pope sent into retirement another stubborn Archbishop, the Hungarian Primate, old Cardinal Mindszenty, living in exile in Austria. Wyszynski had to consider seriously the Pope's decision regarding Cardinal Mindszenty. A few months later, in October 1974, Pope Paul VI wished to see Wyszynski. As the Italian press (*Il Giornale*) reported, the Pope summoned Wyszynski in order to force him to be more co-operative. The " Iron Cardinal " constituted the last obstacle to an agreement with Warsaw. In order to avoid any surprises on the part of Wyszynski in Poland, it was decided that the talks between the Vatican and Warsaw should be conducted in Rome. A councillor at the Polish Embassy at Rome, at the Quirinal of course, was appointed as deputy minister with an assignment to conduct the negotiations with the Holy See.

THE Holy Father's *Ostpolitik* was not the only nightmare that haunted Wyszynski. At home the Church did not present such a homogeneous structure as the Cardinal would have wished. Not only in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, but also in Poland there was dissension among the clergy, and the Primate did not have his fold entirely under control. The so-called " progressive priests " or the " priest patriots " were taking more and more of the governmental bait. They collaborated with *Pax*, and accepted governmental decorations, in spite of the Primate's warnings. By 1975 the government had conferred decorations on some 3,000 priests, many of whom had accepted this high honour together with less visible but more tangible benefits. It was not only the low-ranking priests, but also some higher members of the Church hierarchy who were well regarded and supported by the regime.

The Party tried to isolate Wyszynski, to set the princes of the Church at variance. *The Holy Cross Sermons* by Cardinal Wyszynski were published as a book at Rome in 1974.[5] But it so happened that two different versions of the book were in circulation, one authentic, and one false. The fake was composed in the spirit of " progressive Catholic social doctrine." It was wholly contrary to what Wyszynski had really written. The office of the Primate reacted immediately, and the Polish Press Agency published a communiqué containing a warning about the circulated fake. By publishing the warning so promptly the government wanted to clear itself of being suspected of the forgery. Was it to be understood as a hint that it was the Episcopate who were guilty? Anyway, the Bishops walked straight into the trap

[5] These were the sermons delivered by Wyszynski in the church of the Holy Cross at Warsaw. The original Polish title *Kazania Swietokrzyskie* was borrowed from the title of the oldest monument of the Polish language, from the thirteenth century, which consists of the fragments of sermons discovered in the monastery in the Holy Cross Mountains (Gory Swietokrzyskie) in central Poland. These sermons have been known in Polish literature as *Kazania Swietokrzyskie* (The Holy Cross Sermons).

by arguing that they could not have been responsible for they had no material means of committing a forgery of such a high typographical quality.

However, the Warsaw regime started to woo Wyszynski as well. In an interview with *Newsweek* (10 February 1975), K. Kakol, the Minister for Denominational Affairs, acknowledged that differences of opinion between Wyszynski and the communist leaders were "natural." Moreover, when he was asked whether Wyszynski had been provoking conflict between the Church and the state, Kakol answered that he would not use such strong language to describe the conduct of a man of such high moral standards. A special gesture was made over a year later, on 3 August 1976, when Wyszynski reached the critical age of 75. According to canon law the Cardinal had to submit his resignation to the Pope. One might have expected the Warsaw regime to put strong pressure on the Vatican to retire the "Iron Cardinal." On the contrary, on his 75th birthday Wyszinski received a bouquet of 75 roses from Gierek. After the June 1976 riots it was necessary to placate the Church to stabilize the situation. When the Vatican reconfirmed the old Cardinal in office, Bishop Dabrowski, while congratulating Wyszinski in the name of the Episcopate, emphasized that the Holy Father had been asked not only by the Polish Church, but also by the government to retain the Primate in his position. A few days later, in another interview (for an Italian weekly *Famiglia Cristiana*, 29 August 1976) Minister Kakol flattered Wyszynski again by describing him as a good patriot, and stressing that the Church teaches honesty.

What was the Primate's stand? When one looks carefully at Wyszynski's activities, one notices that he had undergone some change during 1975–76. The "national" discussion of the new Constitution provided an opportunity for the Church hierarchy too to take a stand for or against the regime. The opinion of the Episcopate on this matter sent by Cardinal Wyszynski (9 January 1976) to H. Jablonski, the Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission on Amendments to the Constitution, was studied and well balanced[6]: it emphasized the Bishops' desire to preserve the existing international order. The Episcopate expressed its concern as to the future of the Catholic Church in Poland in connexion with the provision which designated the Communist Party as the only leading force in the country. But there was in their letter no explicit criticism of the Party's past and present policies towards the Church. Compared with a letter of a group of young instructors and students of the Catholic University at Lublin, addressed to Stomma, the Chairman of the parliamentary faction *Znak*,[7] the Bishop's letter sounded bleak. In spite of all critical voices the new Constitution was adopted, though in a somewhat moderated

[6] See the text published in *Kultura* (Paris), May 1976, pp. 70–75.
[7] Ibid. Mar. 1976, pp. 31–33.

form, by the Seym on 10 February 1976. On 20 February, the Episcopate expressed its satisfaction about the modifications to the proposed changes in the "improved" Constitution. Their memorandum stated among other things: "Although the Constitution does not include all the amendments submitted by the people, it has to be acknowledged that the Extraordinary Commission of the Seym was aware of the anxiety expressed by Catholic opinion, and has met it halfway." [8]

AT that moment, however, the Constitution did not present the most important problem that the Primate had to cope with. On 8 February 1976 a special papal legate, Archbishop L. Poggi, appeared in Warsaw. He was received by Olszowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He talked with Vice-Minister Czyrk and Minister Kakol. He did not meet Wyszynski, and the Bishops who met him only "by chance" allegedly expressed their indignation at the Vatican's conduct of affairs.[9]

During the workers' riots against the rise in price of basic food products in June 1976, despite savage reprisals against the workers, the line adopted by the Church hierarchy was at first one of prudent silence. It was only after the killing of a dissident student by the militia in May 1977 at Cracow that Cardinal Wojtyla openly expressed his criticism of the Polish regime. The Pope's chief Polish executor of his *Ostpolitik* was not in the habit of opposing, at least in public, the Party's rule, and in this respect he preferred to live in the shadow of the Primate. But he could not remain deaf and mute in the face of the act of political terror that occurred in the very place of his residence. Two points of the sermon he delivered on that occasion are worth noticing. First, he condemned all regimes which kill their political enemies. Second, he made a remarkable statement regarding economic systems: "We are still very far from the liberation of the workers for which they themselves have fought for one and a half centuries. Having liberated themselves from the capitalist pagan economy, they have fallen prey to the materialist (read communist) pagan economy, and the people, just as they were slaves before, remain slaves today." [10] This equation of the effect of the capitalist and socialist economic systems on the position and well-being of the workers seems rather surprising. Wojtyla has clearly placed the position of West European and American workers with their trade unions and high wages on a par with that of East European and Russian workers. The word "pagan" may afford a clue to an understanding of his peculiar piece of economic wisdom. It is Western prosperity and freedom of choice that is to be blamed for distracting the people's attention from the Church, and for making them "slaves" of material goods. This one

[8] Ibid. Apr. 1976, p. 49
[9] Ibid. Apr. 1976, p. 52.
[10] *Il Giornale*, 17 Oct. 1978.

statement speaks volumes about the then Cardinal Wojtyla's political and social ideas.

IN 1977 the Vatican speeded up its *Ostpolitik*. It almost seemed that for the Holy See the price for the "normalization" of relations with communist regimes did not matter much. On 9 June 1977 Paul VI received Kadar, and subsequently an agreement between the Vatican and Hungary was signed. On 27 September 1977 the Vatican "normalized" its relations with Czechoslovakia. And finally Gierek paid a visit to the Vatican on 1 December 1977. Wyszynski was coping with the new situation masterfully. He took Gierek's assurance that the Party wished to preserve religious freedom at its face value. Moreover, on 29 October 1977 Gierek received Wyszynski. No details were released about their discussion, which was said to have concerned "very important national and Church matters which have a weighty significance for the unity of Poland." [11] The Party magnanimously gave up its plan for educational reforms, and so children could, if they wished, go to church in the afternoons to have their weekly religious instruction. After a long struggle, the government gave permission for some new churches to be built. These acts of courtesy provided a setting for Gierek's visit to the Vatican.

Concessions were made on both sides. Wyszynski, on his part, stopped attacking the ruling Party as he used to. His letter of August 1977 to his fold on the occasion of Charity Week (2–8 October 1977) can serve as an example of the Primate's new political line. Hinting at the rulers of communist Poland, he called them "spirits animated by good will to do justice." [12] Did Wyszynski finally capitulate under manifold pressure, or was it a tactical manoeuvre only conceived in the hope of outlasting the Vatican's *Ostpolitik*? If he was toying with the idea of achieving an understanding with the communist leaders, he soon became disillusioned, and resumed his old stance. Or was he forced to retreat under another pressure, the pressure of public opinion? His own pronouncement might be held to justify the latter assumption. Already in November 1977, during his visit to Rome, Wyszynski publicly stated: "We are being watched by the people, who look about apprehensively, asking themselves whether the Episcopate is not sometimes going too far in its contacts with the Government. The people take a clear stand on that matter, and we have to reckon with this." [13]

This change in Wyszynski's attitude, soon after his meeting with Gierek, and before the Pope himself had a chance to talk with the First Secretary, may have also been connected with some misgivings about the *Ostpolitik* in the Roman Curia. On 17 November 1977, in

[11] *Facts on File*, 19 Oct. 1977.
[12] See the text published in *Kultura* (Paris), Nov. 1977, pp. 139–144.
[13] *Kultura* (Paris), Jan.–Feb. 1978, p. 142.

a speech delivered in Vienna at a conference organized by the *Österreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen,* Casaroli admitted that the contraditions between Marxist and Christian principles could not be overcome. As a major obstacle he singled out the atheistic indoctrination of the young which was alien to Catholic teaching. He also informed his listeners, in a veiled way, that any positive results of the *Ostpolitik* were insignificant, and that he was sceptical about future developments.[14] Did the criticism of the Pope's *Ostpolitik* manage to penetrate the thick walls of the Vatican?

At home the Primate formulated concrete desiderata, which he presented to the government. Among other things, he demanded that the Church be given free access to the press, radio and television. In a letter of 6 February 1978, addressed to university students, Wyszynski demanded from the government freedom of association for Catholic youth. He contrasted the national Catholic heritage with foreign (Soviet?) fashion, and required that the government provide equal career opportunities for Catholics in public life and the professions.[15] From the communist point of view these were political and not religious demands, and hence totally unacceptable. The Primate spoke in an even sharper tone from the pulpit on 8 May:

> The Polish people are being told a lie. But they understand the importance of knowing the truth in spite of all the distortions and falsifications fabricated by the propaganda to which they are exposed. It is the Church that has the right to tell the individuals who wield power the truth, the bitter truth. The Church does not fight against them, but against their errors and sins, against the injustice and damage being done by them.[16]

The Episcopate, which had been supporting Polish dissident opposition in a discreet way, came out openly against the system of censorship. The letter of the Polish bishops on the subject put the case boldly, an unprecedented act in communist history.

Wyszynski seems to have realized how dangerous and risky was his attempt (or even a pretence of an attempt) at achieving an understanding or a compromise between the Church and the communist state. In Gierek's scheme "understanding" meant the submission of the Church to the demands of the Communist Party, and "compromise" meant collaboration in controlling the people. Wyszynski refused to surrender, but the Party refused to abandon the idea of the allegedly established partnership. It adopted a policy of manifesting its adherence to the Primate's talks with Gierek, in which Wyszynski expressed his readiness to cooperate "for the weal and unity of the nation." The governmental weekly *Polityka* published on 23 March 1978 a

[14] *L'Osservatore Romano,* 6/7 Feb. 1978.
[15] *Tygodnik Powszechny,* 12 Feb. 1978.
[16] *Kultura* (Paris), June 1978, p. 88.

lengthy article by its editor Rakowski in which the Primate's views on university students were presented, or rather misrepresented, as being in full agreement with state policy. The slogan of the Party urged cooperation between the state and the Church in order to achieve a "positive goal." Rakowski praised "the superior wisdom" of Pope Paul VI, who "recognized the new socialist reality."

Yet in the last months of his life Paul VI seems not to have pressed the Polish Church to come to terms with the communist regime. Had he understood the danger inherent in his *Ostpolitik*? Or was he not able to exercise his power because of old age and bad health?

THE death of Paul VI, the election and death of John Paul I closed an epoch in the history of the Church. With the election of Cardinal Wojtyla a new chapter has been opened. What kind of chapter it is going to be depends much on the personality and not only on the theological but also on the political and social ideas of the new Pope.

To the Soviet leadership the outcome of the last conclave must have been of great concern. Lenin's far-sighted decision to restore the patriarchate of Moscow initiated the religious policy of the Soviet Union. New steps to use the Church, or religion, in the service of the Soviet empire were taken by Khrushchev. Brezhnev has further developed that policy. Aiming at extending Soviet influence, he seeks alliance with, for example, the Muslims in Iran, and in Latin America communists try to work together wih the Catholic priests against right-wing military regimes. The *Ostpolitik* of Paul VI was most enthusiastically welcomed by the Kremlin.

The adoption of the name John Paul by Cardinal Wojtyla indicates, as he himself has stressed, that he intends to continue, undoubtedly in the political realm as well, the line initiated by John XXIII and Paul VI. Immediately after Moscow and Warsaw had overcome their first surprise, they expressed their expectations that the Vatican would continue this policy. A comment by the Soviet Press Agency *Novosti* offered an insight into the designs of the Kremlin. One of the basic propagandistic slogans of the Soviet Union is "the fight for peace." Considering the international activity of Paul VI from that point of view, the Soviet Press Agency acknowledged his political performance. It put special emphasis upon the fact that the Pope condemned "US aggression in Vietnam," and that he initiated close collaboration with the Russian Orthodox hierarchy (some of whom, as is known, are atheists). The Polish press followed suit. *Polityka* (21 October 1978) pointed out that

> John Paul II has been educated and formed in Poland where all people, Marxists and Catholics together, build their socialist country. Its economic structure, its ideals and models differ from the structure and values of the capitalist world, but they do not

> differ from the humanistic ideals of many Catholics in the whole world. Here between the Rivers Bug and Oder the foundations are being laid for collaboration between socialist government and the Church.

From this point of view, *Polityka* emphasized, the election of Cardinal Wojtyla may be of crucial importance to Italy and the Catholic countries of the Third World, where " the ideas of socialism and the desire for social changes, and the demand for economic and social justice are so pressing today."

The elevation of a Polish cardinal to St. Peter's throne undoubtedly improves the position of the Church in Poland vis-à-vis the regime. At least for the time being, the Communist Party may have had to slow down the application of its " salami tactics " toward the Church. The question arises of how the Church is going to use its increased authority; how will it formulate its demands on the regime?

It seems that as long as Wyszynski is able to control Church affairs in Poland, it is rather the state that will have to make a few concessions. But after Wyszinski's demise, the regime will undoubtedly try not only to regain its losses, but to resume the process of " slicing off " with greater speed, since there seems to be no one of Wyszynski's stature and authority to oppose the Party. And the Pope? He is the leader of hundreds of millions of Catholics, and it is not only they for whom he sets moral standards; the Pope's support, acknowledgment or condemnation bear great moral weight in the political sphere as well, and it is for that reason that the Kremlin makes efforts to ensure his acquiescence.

Throughout its history the Vatican has acted like a chameleon, changing colour, but not substance. Past experience may not however be sufficient to face the present historical situation which is in many respects unprecedented even for the two-thousand-year-old Catholic Church.

Believers' Complaints

Letter from Cardinal Wyszynski to the Director of the Department of Religious Affairs.

10 July 1978

His Excellency Minister Kazimierz Kakol,
Director of the Department of Religious Affairs,
Warsaw.

Dear Sir,

Your letter of 29 April 1978 could well have been left unanswered, considering the manner in which the objections were raised and their *meritum*. However, I do not want to maintain such a method of correspondence between us.

This " protest and decided reservation about the persistent practice of the misuse of sacred objects " is a typical simplification and unsubstantiated generalization, and necessitates the raising of a number of questions and explanations regarding:

1) the scope of the church's mission,
2) the definition of political activity,
3) hostility towards the socialist state.

A proper definition of this terminology would give an answer as to whether the objections raised by the Academic Chaplaincy are justified. From a few individual cases you have created a problem and deduced incommensurable consequences. I am forced to reply to the objections which have been made an issue for the Church.

The political life of the community has been assigned a broad scope; it embraces every part of life, so that the citizen has no area for his individual interests. The citizen has become almost completely displaced from his own rights. And, as his rights have been reduced, so there have been imposed on him obligations which the State considers it essential for him to fulfil. The range of these obligations, especially in the economic and professional sectors, is so great that the citizen has almost no time and place for his own personal life.

This situation has led to an excessive growth of the concept of " political activity." Hence everything is suspect that is unconnected with the obligations imposed on the citizen by the state. With a system of police infiltration into the private life of the citizen, this is becoming difficult to endure.

It is not surprising that resistance is growing among citizens who are restricted in their personal and social rights. Man has " the right to defend his rights " (*Pacem in terris*).

Here and there, individual attempts are being made at " defending the minimum of these rights."

But the defence of one's rights is not an activity that is, *par excellence,* political; it is simply the duty of the citizen. It cannot therefore be called "hostility towards the socialist state."

If, therefore, certain initiatives in this field spring up here and there, the question arises as to whether the state authorities are not going too far into man's requirements as a citizen.

Evidence that this is so is provided by how the education of the citizen is programmed, especially for schools.

If these programmes so often include a distorted image of Poland's history and national culture which verges upon ignorance, is it at all surprising that people are striving in their own sphere to correct this crooked view of the nation's past, and by means of appropriate lectures and factual information drawn from learned sources to supplement their ignorance of the last two centuries of Polish history, and especially of the period following the rebirth of Poland?

The harm done when the method of dialectical materialism is imposed upon history and culture is so obvious that even young students can recognize it. They see the gaps in this interpretation and want to fill them. For, of course, it is not really possible to interpret political, economic and socio-moral facts which took place centuries ago by the method of dialectical materialism, through the glass of the present. The results will be patently erroneous.

The activities of the "Flying University" are simply modest attempts to fill the gaps in state education, to uncover facts from the past that have been veiled by silence, to put straight obvious facts which are often wrongly presented in school or university teaching. One cannot raise the objection that this shows a hostile attitude to the state when it is something which every intelligent person has the right to do.

Are these lectures of a political or a humanistic nature? Do they have the nature of an illegal activity? Are they "hostile towards the socialist state"? I could not perceive this from the summaries which the lecturers made available to me. Why, then, extend blame, and increase the count of enemies, of which the state has so many at home and abroad, in consequence of certain errors having been constantly perpetrated? Expending so much political energy against lecturers and audiences is but to compound these errors further. It is like the campaign of Goliath against David.

I shall move on to a different question, one which is of vital importance to the present situation in Poland, which must preserve domestic peace if she is to overcome the growing socio-economic crises. In addition to these, we have today the threat to the peace of Poland on the international plane, as is obvious to all. If the system of government goes on digging a gulf between the Party and the people, this could lead to a dangerous division of society into "them and us."

This, sir, is a tragic situation. And any category of citizens who

today bear responsibility for the state must see it. They must make their voices heard, although it costs them dear. Today there is no one in Poland exempt from the obligation of speaking the truth. He who keeps silent is a potential wrecker of the state and polity.

It is there, among those who cravenly keep silence, that one should seek the "enemies of the socialist state," and not among those who wish to learn the truth about Poland, distorted by the official teaching.

I cannot, sir, see in the work of the "Flying University" the delinquency which you have protested to me. It is a forlorn defence of the right to truth and the right to defence. In the history of nations, we have a great number of examples of this.

The wrecker waging war against a democratic policy is the system of proliferation of police intervention, the UB, ORMO and every type of secret police which poses a universal threat, a system which advances not so much the interests of the governing class as its own position.

I feel it my obligation, sir, to inform you that I am convinced that you act as the key point in the meeting of socio-moral and religious values on the one hand, and the system of government on the other. It is your duty, sir, *ex officio*, to understand this, irrespective of the promptings of the police apparatus and what is said by the powers-that-be in the state—for the sake of social peace in our country and the proper balance of the citizen's rights and duties.

What I said in the first part of my letter may serve as a basis for considering the question of *Caritas*. You know, sir, that the confiscation of several thousands of socio-educational and residential care institutions belonging to the Church was a highly unpopular move for the state authorities to make. We still remember it today, since it is a burden on the clear title of the new government and it remains a constant grievance of the Catholic community against this government. Especially as regards the harm done to the numerous religious orders who had deserved well of Poland, and who, in consequence of their service to society were deprived of their property and means of caring for their own superannuated members.

It is impossible, therefore, to consider this problem *al pari* with a political action "in direct accord with the complex of relations between Church and State." Quite on the contrary, the question of priests belonging to an "Association" must be one of the initial elements in the normalization of Church-State relations. Among these initial elements for normalization I count the righting of wrongs done to the Church during the period of Stalinist deviations, such as, for example, the restoration to the Episcopate of the Church organization "*Caritas*," the restoration of printing presses and Catholic publishing houses, the return to the religious orders of their residential care institutions and the premises of these Institutions, the restoration of junior seminaries and Catholic schools,

the restoration of various buildings which are the property of the Church and which have been taken over by the authorities without legal justification and often as a result of the false or tendentious interpretation of such prescriptions.

I shall confine myself to these examples.

Striving to get these wrongs righted is not a political struggle against the polity. And, naturally, justice granted to the Catholic community can be a useful element in strengthening social peace in Poland, and a "necessary condition for improved relations between State and Church."

I trust, sir, that you will read in this clear presentation of the question a sign of my confidence of the line you are taking in dealing with the complex of questions which fall within the competence of your department. An exchange of correspondence at an objective level and free from harmful suggestions I consider to be positive and advisable.

Yours sincerely,
STEFAN, CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI

Resolution

Przemysl, 4 August 1979

Last autumn the Przemysl curia reported to the voivodship authorities the need to build a church in Kmiecie, a new housing estate in Przemysl. So far there are around 7,000 people in the area. Since the voivodship authorities have not given their permission to this very day, the inhabitants decided to buy a site with an old barn and adapt it for a temporary chapel. On Palm Sunday the chapel was consecrated. Only after a few days it became obvious that the chapel was too small and work on extending it began. Our initiative met with reprisals and harassment of the priests and laymen involved in this work. A parish delegation went to the Ministry for Religious Affairs where they heard from the Department Director A. Wolowicz that new churches will be built only where there exists a real need and this decision lies with the authorities. In this situation our parishioners—on the basis of article 82 of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic and article 18 of the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee religious freedom—decided to demand respect for our fundamental rights. Therefore we set up a Self-Defence Committee of Believers. Since there already exists one such Committee in Podlasie, we adopt the name: the Przemysl Self-Defence Committee of Believers.

The Committee resolves to defend our own chapel and to defend other Christian communities fighting for their rights. The Committee demands: (1) an immediate restitution of the car confiscated from Fr Michalski; (2) that reprisals against both laymen and priests of our parish be stopped. Moreover, we suggest that in every diocese, or even in every parish, Committees of Believers be formed.

To: The Przemysl curia, Secretariat of the Episcopate, Secretariat of the Primate of Poland, Social Self-Defence Committee "KOR," the Podlasie Self-Defence Committee of Believers, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights.

To the Polish Seym—a letter initiated by the Przemysl diocese

August 1979

We, the undersigned citizens of the Polish People's Republic, appeal to the Polish Seym, as the highest authority in Poland, demanding that Polish radio and television broadcast the Holy Mass with the sermon on all Sundays and Church holidays, as well as a regular religious programme for the disabled. This wish, for years expressed by the Polish Episcopate, was put forward by the plenary conferences of the Polish Episcopate on, for example, 26 June 1975, 12 June 1976, 16 June 1977, 17 September 1978. The authorities have so far replied only with silence. We, however, "cannot remain silent when the Church is refused the right to own or the freedom to use the mass media, necessary today for the carrying out of its God-given mission" (from the letter of 153rd Plenary Conference of the Episcopate).

The vast majority of Polish society regard themselves as believers. They have a right to radio and television broadcasts of the Holy Mass as well as a religious programme. Over four million Poles have reached the age of retirement. There are large numbers of disabled people, the sick and invalids. For many of those who cannot go to church, a radio or television transmission is the only chance of listening to the Holy Mass. Even in the German Democratic Republic, where Catholics form a much smaller section of the population than in Poland, the state-owned mass media broadcast the Holy Mass. Why then in Poland are believers openly persecuted by this stubborn refusal to broadcast the Holy Mass and a religious programme for the sick?

We demand that the Seym effect a change in this situation. We are convinced that the majority of Polish people will support these demands of the Polish Episcopate.

Signatures under this text have been collected since the beginning of August. By 17 October, 5,695 signatures were collected and forwarded to the Polish Seym.

Podlasie Self-Defence Committee of Believers
Communiqué no. 4

Opole Stare, July 1979

After the declarations of the authorities in the days of the Pope's visit to Poland one could think that at least one of the many problems facing believers would be solved: the problem of building new chapels and churches in Poland. Looking at Warsaw one could be led to believe it: a few churches are being raised, permission is given to build more, the exterior of the Saviour's Church is being renovated. Un-

fortunately all this is merely window dressing. In the rest of the country everything is as it used to be. To mention a few examples:

1. The town of Olecko, Suwalki voivodship, Olsztyn diocese. A parish of 12,000 with a small church for 600 people. In recent months the parish tried to buy an empty chapel from the evangelical church. The authorities obstructed the purchase and bought the chapel themselves in order to pull it down within a few days. It was an old chapel with beautiful frescoes. The Olecko parish has for years now unsuccessfully tried to obtain permission to build a church.

2. A workers' settlement in Kowale, Suwalki voivodship, Olsztyn diocese. A parish of 4,000; only one chapel for 250 people. Attempts to acquire a church since previous spring. The only result: reprisals against parish members delegated to discuss this with the authorities.

3. The town Golda, Suwalki voivodship, Olsztyn diocese. A parish of 12,000, with one small church which accommodates 500 people. The town has a ruined fifteenth century church that could easily be restored but despite many years' effort no permission has been given. All letters in the past two years on this subject from the curia and the parish priest have been left unanswered.

4. In the same parish the village Galwiecie, inhabited by about 80 families. Last year the mass was celebrated in a cemetery tomb. The villagers collected 8,600 zlotys to turn the tomb into a cemetery chapel. In June 1978 a police captain of Suwalki searched the village and confiscated the collected money. Then the village was fined by the Petty Offences Tribunal for illegal gatherings and illegal collection of money. After six meetings the Tribunal gave the money to the Centre of Child Health. At the same time the voivoda ordered the cemetery chapel to be pulled down.

5. The town Przemysl. New housing estate of Kmiecie. The Przemysl curia applied to the voivodship authorities for permission to build a church. There was no reply so the people bought an old barn and started to raise a temporary chapel on the site. In the beginning of July, in front of the voivodship prosecutor's office in Przemysl, the police surrounded Father Adam Michalski's car and the bailiff lawlessly—without any court or tribunal verdict—confiscated the car, which was then taken as far as Lubaczow, because the authorities feared the reaction of the people. A parish delegation went to Warsaw to the Ministry of Religious Affairs with a petition signed by 700 people who demanded immediate return of the car and official permission to build a church on the Kmiecie housing estate. The Department Director in the Ministry, A. Wolowicz, told the delegation that new churches will be built wherever there is a real need for them, and the needs are known to and defined by the central and voivodship authorities.

It seems that the authorities are not concerned with the regular delegations carrying hundreds and thousands of signatures of people

who demand new churches and chapels. It seems that the authorities know the needs of the people better than the people themselves.

In July, in our chapel in Opole Stare, over one hundred young people gathered in a retreat (the so called " oasis "). Over 4,000 people participated daily in the Holy Mass. Since even after the departure of the retreat participants around 2,000 local people attend the services and the Mass, there is a real need to extend our small chapel which holds only 200 people. Under the circumstances, the Committee resolved to extend the chapel and convert it into a church. The Committee has applied to the commune and voivodship authorities for an allocation of building materials.

Pope John Paul II in Poland

Extracts from Sermons by Pope John Paul II on Human Rights
Sermon on Corpus Christi, Cracow 1978 (*as Cardinal Wojtyla*)

Dearly beloved brothers and sisters. At this the third altar of our Corpus Christi Procession let us join with the Holy Father in His prayers for justice and peace—*justitia et pax.* One might say these are two leading themes of His pontificate. In all their major utterances the issue of justice has been a constant source of concern to the Popes, especially in recent times. Paul VI contributed the encyclical *Populorum progressio* in connexion with the encyclical *Pacem in terris* which John XXIII bestowed on us.

Each year too, and especially on 1 January, at the start of each New Year, he addresses the whole world with a message about peace. This issue is central to his pontificate, since it is fundamental for the Church and for the contemporary world. . . .

. . . one cannot build peace, one cannot mete out justice other than by looking deeply into the human condition, into man's dignity. In taking up the cause of mankind, the dignity of man, we see it through the truth of Corpus Christi. . . . Our prayer with the Holy Father for justice and peace in the modern world, for justice and peace in our own country Poland, is a prayer for man: for every man. It is a prayer for the rights of man—for the inalienable rights of man. For the rights which must not be curtailed to fit systems, to fit doctrines, but which must be seen in the context of the whole truth about man's greatness. About man's freedom. Man may not be deprived of these rights. Especially if they have been promulgated, especially if they have been guaranteed.

. . . And if we are alarmed at the vast sums spent on armaments in the contemporary world, all at the expense of the poor—at the expense of the poor! —then we may say to those for whom these issues are most important: look at those who go hungry. Could not these terrifying budgets be used to feed the whole of the Third World, the whole hungry world?

We see the cause for peace through the cause for mankind and take the view that if the world does not mature in its understanding of man's dignity, in its understanding that man may not be deprived of his rights, of his congenital and inalienable rights, that he may not be restrained, that he may not be trampled on, that he may not be imprisoned for his beliefs, that he may not be the target for these acts of terrorism at which the whole world shudders, if the world's understanding of this does not mature through and through, then the cause for peace is in peril.

Sermon at Oswiecim-Brzezinka (Auschwitz-Birkenau), 7 June 1979
(during the Pope's visit to Poland)

How can anyone on this earth be surprised that a Pope who was born and brought up here on this land, a Pope who came to Peter's See from Cracow—the archdiocese on the territory of which the Oswiecim camp is located—that this Pope began the first encyclical of his pontificate with the words *redemptor hominis,* that he devoted this encyclical in its entirety to the matter of man, the dignity of man, the threats facing man, and . . . human rights, the inalienable rights of dignity and the threats to those rights, the inalienable rights of man which can be trampled on so easily and annihilated by man? To do so it is enough to dress him in another uniform, to equip the apparatus of violence with the means of destruction; it is enough to foist on him an ideology in which human rights are subordinated to the requirements of the system, subordinated in an arbitrary fashion, so that, in fact, they do not exist. . . .

We are concerned not only with the matter of rights, but also and above all with love, with love for one's neighbour in which love for God is expressed—this love which Christ proclaimed in his commandment, which every human has inscribed in his heart, in the commandment which God the creator himself carved out in that heart. This commandment also finds concrete expression in respect for other people, in respect for their individuality, their conscience. It finds concrete expression in dialogue with others, in the ability to look for and acknowledge what might be good and positive even in someone who is erring in good faith. . . .

We are standing at this spot in order to think about every nation and every human being as a brother. If in what I have said there has also been bitterness, my dear brethren and sisters, I did not say it in order to accuse anybody. I said it in order to remember, because I am speaking not only on behalf of those who perished, the 4,000,000 victims in this huge field. I am speaking on behalf of all whose rights are infringed and violated anywhere in the world. I am speaking because I am committed—we all are committed—to the truth. I speak because I am committed—because we all are committed —to care for man. That is why I am asking all who have listened to the speech to concentrate, to concentrate all your strength on care for man. Those among my listeners who believe in Jesus Christ! I ask you to concentrate in prayer for peace and reconciliation.

Farmers Self-Defence Committee—Lublin Region
On the Arrival of John Paul II in our Country

The hearts of the Polish people are overjoyed and will follow every step of the Pope during his visit to Poland. Having listened to his

words on human rights in his encyclical *Redemptor hominis* and in his sermons, we understand that he also has us, the peasants, in his mind. In him we have found a leader of all humanity and we are happy that our nation has given him to the world. Now, at the time of his visit, we remember all the more those of his thoughts that concerned us, the Polish nation. He said about the peasants that they "should be able to decide about the fate of the nation which they have defended and fed, and which they still are defending and feeding." It is a defence of a different kind than in the days of Raclawice or in 1920: today they defend the nation by standing firm by their land and resisting all attempts to take their land away from them, for they know that this would lead to conditions similar to those obtaining elsewhere for the past 50 years. By defending their land the peasants are defending the authentic Polish way of life, its national culture and outlook. And they feed the nation, though they could and would be able to do it better if fewer obstacles were put in their way. John Paul II went further on the peasant question: he demanded that "the people be not only the object but the subject of justice, order and peace in their own country." This pronouncement contains a programme of national independence. The Pope, as archbishop of Cracow, had often spoken, together with all the Polish bishops, in defence of peasants, e.g. in the memorandum to the government about child benefits for peasants equal to those of other families. Together with other bishops, he spoke of "the peasants as the great moral and patriotic force in the nation," and of the "necessity to create conditions for peasants that would make them secure and enable them to serve the nation with the fruits of their toil." Polish peasants can hear in these and similar pronouncements a call to stop legal and other discrimination against peasant families. When Polish peasants listen to the words of Pope John Paul II about human rights and about Poland, they raise their heads in hope and, honouring him in their prayers, support all he does for mankind.

Thoughts on the Visit Expressed in a Special Issue of *Glos*.

May 1979

Bohdan Cywinski: Will the Pope's visit to Poland be a time of moral awakening for us all? It will certainly be the peak of the collective emotions of the Poles. Emotions, however, rise easily and go easily, too. The important thing here is whether those sentiments will bring about the firm attitude of moral responsibility the Pope speaks of in his encyclical. I do not believe the moral attitudes of society will suddenly change, but I believe that such a change will be initiated. The papal visit will be a time of sowing, the moral harvest will come later.

I expect a time of sowing of neighbourly love, courage and the sense of responsibility in one's service. We have read the encyclical *Redemptor hominis*. Vital social matter has been put in this message addressed to the whole Church. We have to become masters of our own national fate. Responsibility for the conduct of everyday life points to the realization of the rights of man and citizen. We should consequently draw conclusions from this as to our attitudes, reflections and activities. We have to choose between the status of liege subject and that of citizen, between the fight for democracy and freedom and the acceptance of the nation's total reification.

Stanislawa Grabska: It would be ideal if the Pope's visit brought about a great religious and moral awakening of the nation. The weak points of Christianity in Poland are, in my opinion, the absence of ethical consequences of our faith in private and social life. This is manifested in our yielding to the temptations of affluence, conformism, egoism and a certain baseness, the habit of compromising with evil and approving of hypocrisy.

The discrepancy between faith and ethics in everyday life is also to be observed in the general atmosphere of hopelessness that life will not bring anything great or beautiful. People feel content with the illusions vodka gives them. Against this hopelessness and indifference the Pope speaks to us: " The Gospel is good news about God's love of Man and the love reveals to us the greatness and dignity of each individual. Have faith in the enormous and real adventure of life in God here and now and in the future full of life in Him. Believe in your own vocation."

If there is anything I am afraid of, it is certainly the fact that the whole of society will expect the Pope to perform an economic or political miracle. And then, after the days of great enthusiasm, a new wave of discontent that nothing has changed will come. The Papal message is to declare that the Kingdom of God is in us and that it calls for the inner transformation of Man.

Adam Stanowski: At this moment the most important issue is not what to expect, but reflection on what action we feel called upon to take. Such actions should be those which after the Pope's visit we would aim to fix, deepen and enliven.

It seems to me that of all the tasks which we could and should assign ourselves and our society in the context of this visit, the most important is the slogan " do not lie ": a call to life led in truth, do not lie by word, gesture or silence.

Father Ludwik M. Wisniewski: Perhaps the coming of the Pope is an event which should initiate a truly thoughtful examination of our religiousness and of our Christianity in the personal as well as the social dimension. The Pope has declared " Do not fear Christ " and this has been accepted by the whole world. Somewhat in connexion with these words one might address to the clergy as well as to others

the following words: "Do not fear to be with people." This is our basic responsibility: to be with those who suffer and with those who do battle.

Jacek Wozniakowski: I think that regardless of how the Pope expresses his thoughts, inevitably after his departure we in Poland will feel a stronger common bond and greater responsibility—each in his own particular area—for the common welfare which includes also, perhaps first of all, civil rights and basic human freedoms.

It seems clear already unfortunately what the policy of our authorities will be. We can see how industriously they try to diminish the historical dimension and meaning of this visit, we see how their greatest wish is that above all nothing should change after the Pope's visit. Non-change as a political ideal; triviality as a method. It seems to me that there can only be one result of such a lack of imagination, lack of broad perspectives and lack of bold initiative: the gap between the scale of events and the scale of bureaucratic manoeuvres, between that which concerns the nation and what concerns those "at the top." One more chance—a unique, incomparably greater chance than any other—will be lost: the chance to dissolve various calcifications in the veins of this country. Sadly, perhaps those more and more numerous voices which claim that this arteriosclerosis is incurable are right.

Draft of Proposed Instructions on Press Coverage of the Papal Visit Prepared by the PUWP Central Committee's Department of the Press, Radio and Television in May 1979

It is anticipated that the centralized system for approving all press and news material connected both directly or indirectly with the visit will be strictly observed throughout its duration. These duties will be performed by teams of employees of the PUWP CC Department of Press, Radio, and Television. In connexion with the above, it is suggested that two five-person duty groups will be appointed from among department employees, and these will fulfil the above-mentioned duties from 0800 until 0200 hours on the following day, throughout the Pope's visit.

It is further suggested that a group of several outstanding journalists who are experts in religious affairs be appointed as consultants and commentators on events connected with the visit. This group would constitute a working team at the disposal of various editorial offices as the need might arise. Suggestions as to the persons to be selected from the PUWP CC Department of Press, Radio, and Television for supervisory tasks and those in the advisory team of experts and commentators, as well as to the manner in which they will operate, will be presented in a separate document.

The rule is thereby established—apart from the exceptions specified

below—that PAP [Polish Press Agency] has the exclusive rights to provide information about the Pope's visit. (The above does not include the Catholic press, which will be supervised according to the censorship regulations in force.)

The following schedule for the coverage of the visit to be applied:

The Daily Press

a. On the first day of the visit—June 2—the popular [morning] and afternoon papers will publish a photograph of the Pope, information on the start of the visit, a biography and a commentary from PAP (*Zycie Warszawy* will have its own commentary), while the party press will not print any picture, but solely information, a biography, and a commentary from PAP (*Trybuna Ludu* will have its own commentary).

b. PAP will prepare three versions of information material on the papal visit and ceremonies connected with it on a daily basis:

Version A—the popular press (most extensive version);

Version B—the party press (much shorter, a different approach);

Version C—the afternoon press (a shortened form of Version A).

There is a possibility that local newspapers in places along the papal route could be allowed to include their own material (snapshots, a commentary—after an earlier approval). It is anticipated that *Trybuna Ludu* and *Zycie Warszawy* will be publishing their own commentaries during the visit.

PAP, depending on the turn of events and the political atmosphere of the visit, will prepare three different versions of commentaries, to be published at specific times and by specific publications during the course of the visit.

Furthermore, PAP will prepare a commentary which may possibly be published during the visit in local and factory papers.

Weeklies

It is taken for granted that all the weeklies, whose appearance on the news-stands will coincide with the beginning of the visit, *will publish no material pertaining to it.*

National sociopolitical weeklies and certain local weeklies, in the course of the visit and after having consulted the department in each instance, may eventually publish a commentary of their own. No pictures are anticipated. A list of possible titles and subjects to be taken up by various weeklies will be submitted separately. It may only be suggested that these materials ought to concern the present life of John Paul II and forthright aspects of state-Church relations; subjects touching on the political past of Cardinal Wojtyla should be avoided.

Illustrated weeklies will publish no commentaries of their own on the papal visit. Should such need arise, separate decisions will be made, in each case, by the PUWP CC Department of Press, Radio, and Television.

It is suggested, on the other hand, that all illustrated weeklies include during the papal visit in their section on current events one to three photographs connected with the visit of the Pope in Poland (chiefly of the meeting in the Belvedere Palace and possibly from the ceremonies at Gniezno).

It is suggested that photoreporting appear only in *Perspektywy*—on the meeting in the Belvedere and in Przekroj and on the ceremonies in Oswiecim [Auschwitz].

After the visit—depending on its course, it is expected that *Trybuna Ludu* and *Zycie Warszawy* will publish their own commentaries, summing up the event.

The remaining daily press will use PAP [material].

It is suggested that *Polityka* publish a report on the Pope's visit to Oswiecim.

The remaining sociopolitical weeklies, according to instructions from the department, will cover selected subjects in summing up the visit of John Paul II to Poland.

A similar approach is expected by monthlies and other periodical publications.

Illustrated weeklies using colour photographs will include a number (two to four) of photographs in any article covering a specific aspect of the visit after its conclusion. It is suggested that *Perspektywy* also publish an additional photoreport.

It is expected, on the other hand, that, towards the end of, and immediately following the papal visit to Poland, particular emphasis (to be described in a separate document) will be put by the press on international events, especially the imminent approach of the signing of the SALT II agreement.

Lay Catholic Organizations in Poland

Antoni Pospieszalski

IT all began almost immediately after the new rulers of Poland became established in power in 1945. Surprisingly enough, the architects of the first significant movement of lay Catholics were not the Catholic bishops nor the Polish laity. They tried hard enough, but their efforts were soon stifled. No, the architects of this first movement were the Russians. Curiouser still, the man to whom they entrusted this task was, up to that time, their arch-enemy, the still young leader of the pre-war fascist movement, known as Falanga, Boleslav Piasecki. Virulently nationalistic, anti-German, anti-Soviet, and anti-semitic, he had never been a significant force in pre-war Polish politics. But he had his dreams of power. The Second World War, far from shattering these dreams, seemed to him to have opened new and virtually unbounded vistas. He formed his own partisan force and fought bravely first against the Germans, then against the Russians, and in the end, almost inevitably, found himself a prisoner of the latter. There is little doubt that as a well-known fascist he faced death. But then the unexpected happened. After a few weeks in prison Piasecki reappeared in Warsaw, not only a free man, but definitely *persona grata* with the new regime. There is also little doubt that Piasecki, while in prison, offered his services to the Soviet conquerors, and that his offer was accepted. It is in fact known that the deal was made and sealed by no less a person than the famous General Serov, at the time chief architect of Soviet political power in Poland and later, under Khrushchev, head of the KGB. Politically, the Soviets as well as the Polish communists felt most uncertain in the conquered country, and any sort of ally was apparently acceptable.

In a country 80 per cent Catholic, Piasecki was given the task of rallying Catholic opinion behind the new regime. A *sui generis* militant Catholicism of a Francoist type had always been part of his political platform, so in this respect the metamorphosis was not quite so astounding. Piasecki soon started a Catholic periodical *Dzis i jutro* ("Today and Tomorrow"—in 1955 condemned by the Holy Office), and this was the beginning of the so-called *Pax* movement which exists to this day. Piasecki himself died on New Year's Day of 1979. His successor is one of his closest collaborators in the post-war period, Ryszard Reiff.

Pax is a unique phenomenon in the communist world. Apparent similarities with such organizations as the "peace priests" in other Soviet-dominated countries are superficial. Piasecki, for all his ideological pliability and political servility, was no mere stooge. He was

a man hungry for power, and apparently to the very end he lived under the delusion that one day he could become a more or less equal partner of the ruling communist party. To this end he developed the idea that socialism (Soviet socialism, of course—he was shrewd enough to adopt the ruling ideology as his main political weapon) need not necessarily be atheistic and anti-religious, but could just as well be implemented by people of a different *Weltanschauung,* namely believing Christians. His slogan was *"multi-Weltanschauung."* He thus envisaged a Marxist-Christian condominium, ideologically dual, but apart from that strictly totalitarian, without much democratic nonsense. There were some political facts which seemed to him to justify this delusion. On the one hand, the strength of the faith of the overwhelmingly Catholic nation which he sought to harness and use as his political power base; on the other hand, the communists' obvious need to come to terms with this Catholic reality and get it under control. Nevertheless, it was a delusion. The Catholic community, above all the hierarchy, had no desire to serve as a power base for Piasecki or anybody else, nor were the communists at any time ready to share power with people of a different *Weltanschauung.* Piasecki's preaching must have seemed to them a huge joke. They allowed it as a convenient way of dividing Polish Catholics against themselves, and in this they were at least partly successful.

THROUGHOUT the first decade of post-war Poland *Pax* was the only organization of lay Catholics on the scene. In the first years there existed, among other "democratic and anti-fascist" political parties, the pre-war Christian Democratic Labour Party, but it was soon banned while the others were either merged with the Communist Party (the Socialists) or reduced to the subordinated status of an "allied" party (above all the Peasants' Party). In Cracow there survived for eight years a group of lay intellectuals and journalists grouped around the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* ("The General Weekly") founded in 1945 by the late Archbishop of Cracow, Cardinal Sapieha. But the Cracow group took an apolitical stand, trying only to safeguard basic Christian values against the mounting wave of atheistic propaganda and eventually Stalinist anti-religious terror. Piasecki, hovering uneasily between the Episcopate and his political masters tried unsuccessfully to act as mediator. The bishops never trusted him and the Party preferred to deal directly with the real wielders of spiritual power headed by Cardinal Wyszynski. The famous Church-State "Agreement" of April 1950 (which, incidentally, earned Cardinal Wyszynski the displeasure of the Vatican of Pius XII) soon proved to be for the communists merely a stepping stone on the road to total repression. By 1953 religious instruction had been banned from schools, some bishops and priests found

themelves in prison, and later in the same year Cardinal Wyszynski himself was arrested. There is no doubt that *Pax* viewed these developments with alarm, but it could do nothing to prevent them. It had even, ignominiously, taken over the highly respected *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Piasecki came to be seen as the willing tool of the oppressors. But the nadir of his chequered career was still to come.

And yet on balance the score in this risky game is not all on the debit side. While for Piasecki and his inner circle it was mainly a power game, the margin of ideological freedom, which he had to be given to endow him with at least some credibility, attracted a great many genuine Catholic intellectuals and politicians who saw in *Pax* a much-needed opportunity to safeguard at least some of the values to which they had devoted their lives. Among them was (and still is) the prominent Catholic novelist Jan Dobraczynski; among them were (but are no longer) Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Andrzej Micewski, two brilliant journalists, and scores of others. In the nearly 35 years of its existence *Pax* has published some 20 million copies of novels, poetry, translations from Western literature, religious essays and monographs, almost all of an impeccably Christian nature. It can safely be said that most of it would never have seen the light of day if non-party authors, Catholic or non-Catholic, had had to depend only on the meagre outlets that were open to them outside *Pax*. It must also be said that Piasecki saved many people from physical extinction by taking them under his wing. His manipulators had obviously to pay a price for their manipulations; paying a price is a normal fact of political life, of communist politics as well as others, though this fact is often overlooked in the West.

The heaviest price they had to pay for their experiment with *Pax* was that it amounted to an admission that they were not all-powerful. They had to seek for a way round the formidable obstacle of the Polish Catholic Church. Piasecki was devoured by his lust for power, and that was his weakness. But this weakness did lead him to expose the rulers' sensitive flank far more effectively than any frontal opposition could have done. A precedent had been created. In the very different circumstances, after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech, which were to lead to the Polish October of 1956, a far more genuine Catholic force emerged and claimed a status similar to that of *Pax*. Piasecki viewed the proceeding democratization with even greater alarm than the preceding repression. Increasingly he was forced to show his hand and he resolutely came out against it. There is evidence that he appealed over the heads of the Polish party directly to his Soviet masters urging them to restore order, and he persisted in this attitude right to the Eighth Plenum of the party which installed Gomulka in power and at least outwardly sanctioned the liberalization of the regime. Even before that Piasecki had to face growing dissent within the ranks

of *Pax* and the departure of many of its more honest, or politically more astute, members. This is important mainly because as a result yet another lay Catholic organization came into being which tried to steer a middle course between *Pax* and the emergent movement which was to be known as *Znak* (The Sign). This was the so-called Christian-Social Association led by an ex-*Pax*-member, Jan Frankowski. Curiously enough this shadowy body also survives to this day, though its founder is also no longer among the living. *Pax* survived its October 1956 débâcle, although at one moment Piasecki was in danger of losing his seemingly indisputable leadership of the organization. *Pax* survived because presumably the Russians and quite certainly Gomulka wanted it to survive. The manipulators did not give up, but the manipulation became far more complicated.

THROUGHOUT the remaining years of the 1950s, the 1960s, and even the 1970s the main political representation of Polish Catholics was the *Znak* movement. Ideologically it was a continuation of the independent stand represented by the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* until 1953 when it was handed over to *Pax*, and again after 1955 when it was restored to its rightful owners. In the following years the movement acquired a wider social base in the form of the Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia which sprang up spontaneously in all main Polish centres, though eventually their number was arbitrarily limited by the state authorities to five. In the new atmosphere created by " the Polish October of 1956 " it seemed that it was now possible for Polish Catholics to play an independent political role, circumscribed only by the geo-political realities of Poland which required that the Communist Party remain in power. Since the disbandment soon after the war of the pre-war Christian Labour Party, the Bishops have always been against the revival of a specifically Catholic political party, not wishing to identify the Church with any one part of the potential electorate or any set of political solutions. But they did not object to a number of people standing for the Seym as independents and describing themselves informally as a Catholic group. Anyway, the election of January 1957 was only a slight modification of the general pattern of so-called elections in communist countries and the electorate remained impotent. The composition of the Seym and the numerical strength of various groupings within the Seym were largely determined in advance in the course of a pretty rough horse-trading process, the overwhelming majority of seats remaining in the hands of the Communist Party and its two licensed minor satellites. At one time it seemed that the *Znak* group could secure as many as 48 seats, but in the end they had to be content with five (out of 458). Even so, in the first post-October Seym it was still possible for a number of other independents to associate themselves with the *Znak* group, so that at one time the group counted

effectively 11 members. In subsequent parliaments their number was again limited to five which remains a standard to the present day. *Pax* and the Christian Social Association were granted a roughly equal and lesser representation, respectively. At various times both Piasecki and a prominent member of the *Znak* group, first the respected Catholic writer Jerzy Zawieyski, later a minor figure Konstanty Lubienski, were members of the collective presidency, the Council of State.

Of course, it was (and still is) no more than a symbolic representation; any effective opposition remained out of the question. However, the novelty of the situation lay in the fact that it was a genuine representation, not merely, like *Pax*, a licensed façade designed to fulfil a prescribed task in the overall long-term strategy of the ruling party. Manipulation, as it were, was answered, if only in a minor way, by counter-manipulation. An element of genuine plurality was introduced into the highest (though only formally the highest) legislative body of the country. This has not happened, in any comparable way, in any of the other countries of the Soviet bloc. As a matter of fact, the Catholic deputies were not bent on outright opposition to the communist regime. They were too well aware of the geo-political realities, and they aimed at most at a certain humanization of the autocratic communist rule. This was later to be termed "neo-positivism," recalling the policies of political thinkers of the late nineteenth century who had turned their backs on the tradition of fruitless armed risings against tsarist Russia and called for "organic work" to preserve the biological and cultural substance of the nation. Behind them was the parallel "organic" attitude of the Polish Episcopate who had long proclaimed that the Church can, and must, carry out its Christian mission under any political regime. The *Znak* group, therefore, saw as its first task an attempt to improve relations between Church and State. But they were also determined to voice Catholic opinion over the whole spectrum of political issues, not excluding foreign policy. The licensed Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia provided them with a suitable sounding board, as did the three Catholic periodicals: the revived *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and the newly founded monthly magazines, *Znak* ("The Sign") and *Wiez* ("The Link"). These three, in spite of artificially limited circulation and increasing harassment by the state censorship, have played an enormous part in maintaining the self-confidence of the nation. They even affected, by sheer force of their intellectual respectability, the more subservient editorial lines of the *Pax* periodicals, especially the weekly *Kierunki* (which replaced the earlier *Dzis i jutro*) and the daily *Slowo Powszechne*. (*Pax*, unlike *Znak*, has a licensed daily.)

With the steady recession of party "liberalism" throughout the 1960s from the lofty promises of the "Polish October" the position of the whole *Znak* movement became more and more difficult. Rela-

tions between the Church and the party steadily worsened to culminate in the great clash of 1966, at the time of the Polish Millennium (i.e. of the 1,000th year of Polish Christianity), when the hierarchy was accused of having usurped the functions of Polish foreign policy by addressing to the German Bishops a letter suggesting mutual forgiveness for the crimes that had embittered relations between the two nations. For the parliamentary group of *Znak* the moment of truth came at the time of the events of March 1968 when the group protested in the Seym against the savage measures of police repression against the demonstrating students and the incipient anti-semitic campaign. In this the Catholic deputies were truly representing popular opinion in the country and, above all, that of the Polish Bishops who on that occasion went for the first time beyond defending only the liberties of the Church and of the faithful and boldly stood up in defence of human rights in general, also of unbelievers and especially Jews. Their main spokesman in the Seym was Jerzy Zawieyski, at the time still a member of the Council of State. The party responded with a furious campaign against the *Znak* group, virtually accusing them of high treason. Zawieyski was forced to resign from the Council of State. The whole incident undoubtedly contributed to his premature death soon afterwards.

The stresses of the 1960s inevitably led to growing dissension within the ranks of the *Znak* movement itself. A minority headed by deputy Janusz Zablocki began to urge a more conciliatory line in order to preserve the status of the parliamentary group within the establishment. The majority thought the price too high. They felt that political integrity was the movement's greatest political asset. However, the problem failed to come to a head in the remaining years of the Gomulka regime. In December 1970 the workers' strikes in the coastal cities on the Baltic toppled Gomulka and brought Edward Gierek to power. A new wave of relative liberalization and Gierek's conciliatory gestures towards the Church postponed the problem for a further few years. The next crisis came in February 1976 over the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic which severely curtailed the internal and external sovereignty of Poland by writing into it the provisions that the Communist Party played "a leading role in the State" and that Poland was bound by "unshakeable fraternal bonds with the Soviet Union." It is true that the amendments were finally passed in slightly attenuated forms which, however, failed to quench the wave of protests which went far beyond the *Znak* movement alone. The two Cardinals, Wyszynski and (the future Pope) Wojtyla, spoke out strongly against the amendments, and several open letters signed by numbers of prominent people were addressed to the authorities. Just as in March 1968 it fell to the *Znak* group to register the protest of the nation in the highest legislative body of the country. By this time, however, Janusz

Zablocki (who as early as 1969 had constructed his own power base within the movement called ODISS—Centre for Documentation and Social Studies—and began to publish his own periodical *Christian in the World*) had managed to shape the parliamentary group in his own image. In the division on the proposed amendments to the Constitution only the stalwart one-time leader of the *Znak* group, Stanislaw Stomma, abstained; the remaining four voted for the amendments. As a result Stomma in turn disappeared from the parliamentary group and in the following elections of 1976 was duly replaced by a member of Zablocki's choice. This, in effect, was the end of *Znak* as an independent parliamentary group. The new group is currently being referred to as neo-*Znak*. In fact, a curious situation has developed, for *Znak* as a broad movement has neither ceased to exist, nor has it revised its traditional stand. The *Znak* periodicals continue to appear, though they have to contend with increased pressures from the state censors, and often come out after considerable delays. Of the five existing Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia only one (Poznan) seems to support the Zablocki group. At the present time however, the rift appears to be unbridgeable. On the other hand, the Warsaw Club for instance has issued a protest against official reprisals which it condemned as both illegal and immoral. It was in effect an expression of solidarity with the democratic opposition in Poland. The statement took the form of a resolution passed unanimously at a meeting attended by over 300 members.

STILL on the scene, of course, there is *Pax* under the nondescript leadership of Reiff and the *Pax* periodicals; its laudable publishing activities also continue. There is, moreover, the Christian Social Association under the even more nondescript leadership of Kazimierz Morawski, with its own weekly publication *Za i przeciw* ("For and Against"). However, about all these Catholic, or pseudo-Catholic, movements, including neo-*Znak*, there seems to be an aura of a certain unreality; they all seem to be equally far removed from the real issues facing the country. The resulting vacuum was soon to be filled by other forces—and the fact that it has been filled is characteristic of the unique atmosphere of ferment reigning in Poland today. In the same year 1976 which saw the establishment of neo-*Znak* in parliament, there came into being the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) formed specifically to secure the release of workers arrested during the food riots in June of that year and to seek redress for other victims of the repression that followed. The initial successes of the Committee and wide publicity (though strictly *samizdat* publicity—hardly anything on its activities appeared in the official press) proved to be contagious. In March of the following year another, partly rival, body appeared on the stage: the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO). When in July 1977 all the workers arrested after the June riots were eventually

released KOR, having achieved its initial purpose, did not disband, but re-constituted itself as a permanent Social Self-Defence Committee, at the same time retaining its, by now historical, original initials (KSS-KOR). Neither of these new movements is specifically Christian or Catholic, though the more rightist ROPCiO is more likely to invoke Polish Catholic traditions than the more leftish KSS-KOR. Both seek the cooperation and protection of the powerful Roman Catholic Church which is only too willing to support both of them in the defence of human rights without associating itself with the political aims of either. In fact, partly in response to Gierek's conciliatory gestures, partly as a result of the virtual demise of *Znak*, the Church was forced to enter into more direct contact with the state authorities than would perhaps otherwise have been the case, even though, where the rights and interests of the Church itself are concerned, the Bishops were never inclined to leave these matters to lay spokesmen. But it is significant of the non-political and truly *Catholic* (in the non-denominational sense) stand of the Polish Church that its relations with the leftish, secular-minded KSS-KOR are, if anything, closer than with the more rightist and more traditionalist ROPCiO. In this sense, however, both organizations can be considered to be modern extensions of the earlier lay Catholic movements, especially *Znak*.

There are other extensions of a similar kind. The activities of the unofficial Society for Academic Courses, the "Flying University," have a distinctly Catholic component, as is witnessed by the fact that some of its lectures have taken place in churches. It is more than natural that many Catholic students are active in the Committees for Student Solidarity (SKS) formed at several universities to counteract the pressures of the official, party-dominated Socialist Society of Polish Students (SZSP). Young Catholics, mainly students, have undertaken the ambitious task of publishing their own magazine called *Spotkania* ("Encounters"). It is an unofficial publication, as is the other newspaper *Bratniak*, produced in Gdansk. They are of course uncensored, like so many other unofficial periodicals which have sprung up spontaneously all over the country since the end of 1976, following the lead given by KOR's "Information Bulletin." There are, moreover, a number of local lay organizations of parishioners, often called into being in defence of their parish priest who may be in trouble with the authorities for trying to obviate a ban on the erection of a much-needed chapel or church. It is this kind of local lay movement which has eventually forced the authorities to grant permission for the building of the church in Nowa Huta, the industrial township near Cracow which the party had planned to become a model "socialist" city without a church. (Incidentally, the church in Nowa Huta, completed a few years ago, is an outstanding example of modern church architecture.) An example of more recent (and more modest) local Catholic pressure groups is for instance the Believers' Self-Defence Committee

in the parish of Cisow near Tarnobrzeg, or a similar diocesan committee in Przemysl. One can also add that for a number of years the Church has sponsored the so-called "Life-Light Movement" of young people (more popularly known as "The Oasis," since groups meet on trips to and retreats in the countryside). It is interesting to note that shortly before the general election in March 1980, 460 delegates from this movement meeting in Czestochowa issued a general statement on human rights, in which members were advised that only those who in all conscience were able to support the existing regime should vote for the official single list candidates; all others should bear witness to the truth by withholding their vote.

In contrast to *Pax*, *Znak*, and the minor licensed organizations or enterprises of earlier years, a common feature of the new movements and associations is that they are all "unofficial," i.e. unrecognized by the state, unregistered, and passed over in silence in the official press. In this sense, real as they are, they suffer from another kind of "unreality." The state authorities take cognizance of them only in the form of occasional raids on private apartments where "illegal" gatherings are taking place, confiscation of papers or typing equipment, random arrests (usually for no more than 48 hours), intimidation by anonymous thugs, sometimes a minor trial which ends in no more than a substantial fine. But such "liberal" practices are now being replaced by sterner punishments. After the Eighth Party Congress the trial of the Free Trade Unions activist, Edmund Zadrozynski, was held. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on trumped-up criminal charges. Similar charges were preferred against the manager of the unofficial publishing house "NOWA," Miroslav Chojecki, and his assistant, Bogdan Grzesiak [see Part I, p. 162]. The prospect of increased repression does not, however, diminish the gap between the *pays légal* and the *pays réel*.

A divorce between appearances and facts, between the established façade and underlying reality is, of course, a permanent feature of all communist states. In Poland, however, it is all the more striking, precisely because the underlying reality is so real and takes such clearly defined forms. When in 1945 General Serov enlisted the services of Piasecki this amounted to recognition that the reality was there and had to be dealt with. The attempt, from the communist point of view, went awry, and the movement founded by Piasecki became the forerunnner of something that was not planned at all. The question now is how the Polish party, no doubt in consultation with Moscow, will react to the new reality that has since developed. Will it find a way of absorbing it into the framework of its own establishment, as it did in 1956 with *Znak*? The problem is now one of much bigger proportions and can hardly be tackled without major implications for the communist regime. What is happening is a growing alienation from political reality which even increased repression can hardly camouflage and keep in check.

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The editor would like to express his thanks to ANDREW STYPULKOWKSI for his help in the preparation of these two special issues of *Survey* on Poland.

Studies in Soviet Thought

A Quarterly Review Published by the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), the Center for East Europe, Russia and Asia at Boston College, and the Seminar for Political Theory and Philosophy at the University of Munich.

Editors: THOMAS J. BLAKELEY, GUIDO KÜNG, and NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ

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Subscription Information

1980, volume 21 (four issues). Private rate: Dfl. 45,– / US $ 22.50 per volume. Institutional rate: Dfl. 129,– / US $ 68.00 per volume. Prices include postage and handling. *Private subscriptions should be sent direct to the publishers.*

D. Reidel Publishing Company

P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland
160 Old Derby Street,
Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

SURVEY: Index Volume 24
Nos. 1–4 (106–109), 1978–79

Author	*Title*	*No.*	*Page*
ADELMAN, Jonathan R.	The Soviet and Chinese Armies: their Post-Civil War Roles	1	57
ADOMEIT, Hannes & AGURSKY, Mikhail	The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex	2	106
ANIN, David S.	Lenin, Trotsky and Parvus	1	204
BENNIGSEN, Alexandre	Several Nations or One People?	3	51
BESANCON, Alain	Solzhenitsyn at Harvard	1	133
BREGEL, Yuri	The Works of V. V. Barthold and the Soviet Censorship	3	91
BURG, Steven L.	Soviet Policy and the Central Asian Problem	3	65
BUSHNELL, John	The New Soviet Man Turns Pessimist	2	1
CIOLKOSZ, Lidia	The Uncensored Press	4	56
D'AGOSTINO, Anthony	Ambiguities of Trotsky's Leninism	1	178
DELI, Peter	Jean-Paul Sartre and Hungary 1956	1	32
DRAWICZ, Andrzej	Experience of Democratic Opposition	4	33
DUNLOP, John B.	The Many Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism	3	18
GARSON, Robert	Churchill's Spheres of Influence: Rumania and Bulgaria	3	143
GIDWITZ, Betsy	Soviet International Civil Aviation Policy	2	19
GLAD, John	Art out of Hell: Shalamov of Kolyma	2	45
HAUNER, Milan	100 Years of Czech History	3	214
HELLER, Michael	Lenin and the Cheka	2	175
	The First Warning	3	159